payment of the special tax, cannot be joined in one indictment, the penalty for each being different. United States v. Gaston, 28 F. R. 848. An affidavit which is the basis of an information should conform substantially to the language of the statute alleged to have been violated. One which states that a party sold tobacco will not support an information charging him with carrying on the business of a retail dealer in tobacco without payment of the special tax. United States v. Strickland, 25 F. R. 469. Distilled spirits cannot lawfully be sold in any quantity or for any purpose by any person who has not paid the special tax. Doctors and druggists who sell distilled spirits as medicine are within the prohibition. United States v. Stafford, 20 F. R. 720. As to who is a retail liquor dealer, see United States v. Rennecke, 28 F. R. 847; United States v. Angell, 11 Id. 34. The janitor of a club which owned liquors and kept them for the use of its members, who used them on paying him the price thereof, is a retail dealer. United States v. Woods, 3 Cin. L. Bul. 59. One is not who sells an occasional drink of spirits out of a bottle not in a bar-room. United States v. Jackson, 1 Hughes, 531. Nor is one who sells a lot of spirits taken for debt. United States v. Feigelstock, 14 Blatch. 321. A grocer, who purchases a barrel of whiskey to oblige a customer, and who enters on his books a charge against the customer of exactly the same amount as he paid for the whiskey, is not a wholesale dealer under obligation to pay the special tax. United States v. Howell, 20 F. R. 718. As to what acts will constitute a retail liquor dealer a wholesale dealer, see United States v. Kallstrom, 30 F. R. 184. As to wholesale dealers in malt liquors, see United States v. Schneider, 35 F. R. 107. The special tax must be paid in advance. United States v. Clare, 2 F. R. 55, 14 Phila. 543. An assessment of the tax, and a demand and refusal to pay by the person carrying on business as described in this section, are not a condition precedent to the imposition of a penalty. United Sates v. Rectifying Establishment, 11 Int. Rev. Rec. 46, overruling United States v. 35 Barrels, 9 Id. 67. That provision is constitutional which declares real property forfeited which is employed in the violation of a revenue law. United States v. A Distillery, 2 Abb. U. S. 192. Such

real estate as pasture, orchard, wood lots, or homestead of the family, etc., which have no connection with the unlawful business, were not used in it, and contributed in no degree to facilitate its prosecution, are not liable to forfeiture. United States v. Spreckens, 1 Sawyer, 84. If a person having a wash and also a still on his premises, the latter not being an authorized distillery, distils fermented liquors, the personal property found on the premises shall be forfeited though the product of the establishment be not spirits but vinegar. United States v. Steen, 6 Ben. 172. This section is construed and the distinction between the distiller's property and the property of others as regards forfeiture pointed out in United States v. A Distillery at Spring Valley, 11 Blatch. 255. The limitation for the prosecution of the offenses of carrying on the business of distilling without having paid the special tax, given a bond, or provided a bonded warehouse, was, by Act of March 26, 1804, extended to five years. United States v. Wright, 3 Am. L. T. U. S. Ct. 17, 3 Pittsb. 192. See § 838. Other cases on this section are: Gregory v. United States, 17 Blatch. 325; United States v. Logan, 12 Int. Rev. Rec. 146, 11 Id. 181; Re 2000 Bottles, 5 Ben. 265. As to retail dealers, see further, United States v. Dunham, 33 F. R. 834; United States v. Cline, 26 Id. 515; United States v. Giller, 54 Id. 656; United States v. Wittig, 2 Lowell, 466; United States v. Woods, 28 Fed. Cas. 762; United States v. Alexis Club, 98 F. R. 725; Commonwealth v. Smith, 102 Mass. 144; United States v. Bonham, 31 F. R. 808. As to branch houses, see United States v. Chevallier, 107 F. R. 434, affirming 102 Id. 125; De Bary v. Louer, 101 Id. 425. As to commission merchants, see Quinn v. Dimond, 72 F. R. 993. As to an officer of the army in charge of a post exchange, see Dugan v. United States, 34 Ct. Cl. 458. As to a good defense in case of a single sale, see Ledbetter v. United States, 170 U. S. 606, 610, 42 L. ed. 1162; United States v. Shriver, 23 F. R. 134. As to medicinal preparations, see United States v. Stubblefield, 40 F. R. 454. See also United States v. Cota, 17 Id. 734. As to intent to defraud, see United States v. White, 42 F. R. 138. See further, Low v. United States, 169 F. R. 86; In re Mills, 135 U. S. 263, 34 L. ed. 107; United States v. Mallard, 40 F. R. 151;

Ex parte Friday, 43 Id. 916, 919. It is the dealing in liquors that constitutes the taxable business, and not their ownership. United States v. Allen, 38 F. R. 736. A druggist who bona fide uses spirituous liquor exclusively in preparing medicines, which he sells as such in good faith, and not as a beverage, is not required to pay the special tax. United States v. Calhoun, 39 F. R. 604; United States v. Starnes, 37 Id. 665. See United States v. White, 42 Id. 138. But a physician must pay such tax if he keeps such liquor on hand and sells it to his patients, even by way of prescription. United States v. Smith, 45 F. R. 115.

One who sells liquor knowing it to be such may be convicted for the non-payment of a tax, although the article is put up in bottles and labelled as an appetizer. United States v. Bray, 113 F. R. 1008. See United States v. Starnes, 37 Id. 665. See § 1014. This statute (§ 3281) is not unconstitutional by reason of providing for a forfeiture of real estate. Congress has power to determine what measures are requisite to enforce the collection of a tax (United States v. A Distillery, 2 Abb. U. S. 192; United States v. McKinley, 4 Brewst. (Penn.) 246; or to require a bond of one who engages in the business of distilling (Mason v. Rollins, 2 Biss. 99). It is not necessary in an indictment under this section to allege the particular means by which the United States are defrauded of the tax. United States v. Simmons, 96 U. S. 360, 24 L. ed. 819. As to what is sufficient, see United States v. Simmons, supra; Coffey v. United States, 116 U. S. 427, 434, 29 L. ed. 681; United States v. Staton, 25 Int. Rev. Rec. 10, 2 Flipp. 319. A proceeding against a distillery for forfeiture under the revenue laws is not a criminal proceeding within the meaning of the Constitution, but a proceeding strictly in rem. United States v. Three Tons of Coal, 6 Biss. 379. Upon an information to obtain the forfeiture of a distillery and the things connected therewith, it is not sufficient to say "all the boilers, stills, and other vessels used in the distillation of spirits, and all the distilled spirits, being about twelve barrels now in the distillery, owned by, and until seized in the possession of," etc. United States v. Distillery, 4 Biss. 26. Only such spirits as are owned by the illicit distiller, and

not such as are in the possession of bona fide purchasers on which the tax has been paid, and in relation to which all requirements of law have been fulfilled, are liable to forfeiture hereunder. United States v. 100 Barrels, 23 Int. Rev. Rec. 10. The words "owned by such person wherever found" should be construed to mean" wherever found of which he is the owner." "Owner" is here used in a popular and not a technical sense. The intention of Congress was to condemn the property of the delinquent to the extent to which it, in fact, existed in him at the time of seizure without reference to the technical legal title. United States v. 372 Pipes, 5 Sawyer, 421. This section (3281) is construed in United States v. One Copper Still, 8 Biss. 270, where it was held that personal property situated upon distillery premises and used in the business of illicit distilling is subject to forfeiture by the government irrespective of its ownership. Under this section (3281) it seems that only the right and interest of the owner of inculpated distillery premises can be condemned and forfeited. Heidritter v. Elizabeth Oil Cloth Co., 6 F. R. 138, 11 Repr. 595. As to what land is not subject to forfeiture, see United States v. Spreckens, 1 Sawyer, 84. In providing for the forfeiture of the interest in the land on which a distillery is situated of every person who knowingly has suffered or permitted the business of a distiller to be there carried on, or who has connived at the same, it is not requisite that he should have knowingly suffered or permitted it to be fraudulently carried on, or that he should have connived at such fraud. United States v. The Distillery at Spring Valley, 11 Blatch. 255. In order to forfeit the personal property of a person who has permitted or suffered his premises to be used for purposes of ingress or egress to or from an illicit distillery, it is necessary to show that such person knew that the ingress or egress over his premises was to or from an illicit distillery. Gregory v. United States, 17 Blatch. 325. The forfeiture operates at the time of the seizure and not at the time when the statute is violated. United States v. Feigelstock, 14 Blatch. 321. Prior to St. Feb. 8, 1875, this section was held not to apply to a wholesale liquor dealer who had not paid the special tax. 2000 Bottles of Liquors, 5 Ben. 265. Under this section any

number of acts, no matter how numerous, which go to show that the government has been defrauded of a tax are admissible. United States v. Staton, supra. But a single transaction does not constitute a person a dealer. Rahter v. Bank of Lancaster, 92 Penn. St. 393. And a sale of whiskey cannot be avoided by the vendee, because it is made in violation of law. The United States does not prohibit the sale of whiskey, but only imposes a penalty for the violation of the laws relating thereto. Id. As to limitation of proceedings hereunder, see United States v. Wright, 3 Am. L. T. (U. S. Cts.) 17, 3 Pitts. 192, and United States v. Mathoit, 1 Sawyer, 142. See also United States v. 100 Barrels of Spirits, 1 Dillon, 64; United States v. Harbison, 13 Int. Rev. Rec. 118.

Forfeiture takes effect immediately upon the commission of the acts denounced by the statute. United States v. Stowell, 133 U. S. 1, 33 L. ed. 555; United States v. One Distillery, 43 F. R. 846, 852, 174 U. S. 149, 43 L. ed. 929. A sale of the premises on which the distillery is situated, under a decree of a United States circuit court, in a proceeding in rem to enforce the forfeiture, does not pass a mortgagee's title under a mortgage previously made, if such mortgagee has not permitted or connived at the illicit distillery; if the mortgagor is the only party to the proceedings, only his equity of redemption passes. United States v. Stowell, 133 U. S. 1, 33 L. ed. 555; Mansfield v. Excelsior Ref. Co., 135 U. S. 326, 34 L. ed. 162; Glenn v. Winstead, 116 N. C. 451, 456. As to a former conviction under § 3296 not being a bar, see United States v. Three Copper Stills, 47 F. R. 495; Dobbin's Distillery v. United States, 96 U. S. 395, 24 L. ed. 637; United States v. 2462 Pounds Tobacco, 103 F. R. 791; Cuzner v. California Club, 155 Cal. 303, 315.

Manufacturing oleomargarine without
payment of special tax

2 Aug., 1886, s. 4; 24 Stat. 209.

Commonwealth v. Mills, 157 Mass. 405, 406; Commonwealth v. McDonnell, Id. 407. "It is manifest that this section (3243) was incorporated into the Act of Aug. 2, 1886, to make it clear that Congress had no purpose to restrict the power of the States over