three years; and such person may be tried either before or Receiving after the conviction of the principal offender. This section is founded on U. S. Rev. Sts. § 5357. The word "embezzled" is twice inserted, and the last sentence "and such person," etc., is added. See note to § 272. Harless v. United States, 1 Ind. Ter. 447. It is not necessary to allege that the owner of the goods did not consent. Bise v. United States, 144 F. R. 374. An indictment for receiving stolen cattle which fails to allege that the defendant knew they were stolen but which alleges that they were stolen and that the defendant received them with intent to deprive the owner of the use and benefit thereof is sufficient. Bise v. United States, 5 Ind. Ter. 602. stolen goods, etc. acts, etc. SECTION 289. Whoever, within the territorial limits of Laws of any State, organized Territory, or District, but within or upon States any of the places now existing or hereafter reserved or ac- adopted for quired, described in section two hundred and seventy-two of punishing this Act, shall do or omit the doing of any act or thing which wrongful is not made penal by any law of Congress, but which if committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of the State, Territory, or District in which such place is situated, by the laws thereof now in force would be penal, shall be deemed guilty of a like offense and be subject to a like punishment; and every such State, Territorial, or District law shall, for the purposes of this section, continue in force, notwithstanding any subsequent repeal or amendment thereof by any such State, Territory, or District. This section is founded on U. S. Rev. Sts. § 5391, and the Act of July 7, 1898, c. 576, § 2 (30 St. 717), but is rewritten in order to make the intention clear. See note to § 272. United States v. Pridgeon, 153 U. S. 48, 54, 38 L. ed. 631; Drury v. Lewis, 200 Id. 1, 8, 50 L. ed. 343; United States v. Clark, 46 F. R. 633, 636; United States v. World's Columbian Exposition, 56 Id. 630, 633; Exum v. State, 90 Tenn. 501, 510. This is limited to the places described in § 272. In re Kelly, 71 F. R. 545; United States v. Barney, 5 Blatch. 294; but see United States v. Laws of States adopted for punishing wrongful acts, etc. Davis, 5 Mason, 356, 26 Fed. Cas. 781. This is not limited to crimes expressly made such by the United States statutes: United States v. Franklin, 174 F. R. 163; but has the same effect as though Congress had defined the offenses in the words of the State laws. United States v. Coppersmith, 4 F. R. 198, 10 Rep. 517. It is not limited to statutory crimes. United States v. Wright, 15 Int. Rev. Rec. 9, 28 Fed. Cas. 791. The punishment is that provided by the State laws. Sharon v. Hill, 24 F. R. 726. The State statutes of limitations, however, are not adopted. United States v. Andem, 158 F. R. 996. As to the meaning of the words "now in force," see United States v. Paul, 6 Pet. 141, 8 L. ed. 348; United States v. Barnaby 51 F. R. 20, 23; United States v. Tucker. 122 Id. 518. The criminal jurisdiction of the State courts is excluded from these places: State v. Mack, 23 Nev. 359; and apparently their jurisdiction to enforce a penalty: Western Union Tel. Co. v. Chiles, 214 U. S. 274, 53 L. ed. 994; see, however, Madden v. Arnold, 22 N. Y. App. Div. 240. This section does not apply to offenses by Indians. United States v. King, 81 F. R. 625. CHAPTER TWELVE PIRACY AND OTHER OFFENSES UPON THE SEAS SECTION 290. Piracy under the law of nations 291. Maltreatment of crew by officers of vessel 292. Inciting revolt or mutiny on shipboard 293. Revolt and mutiny on shipboard 294. Seaman laying violent hands on his commander 295. Abandonment of mariners in foreign ports 296. Conspiracy to cast away vessel 297. Plundering vessel in distress, etc. 298. Attacking vessel with intent to plunder 299. Breaking and entering vessel, etc. 300. Owner destroying vessel at sea 301. Other person destroying or SECTION attempting to destroy ves- 302. Robbery on shore by crew of 303. Arming vessel to cruise 304. Piracy under color of a for- 305. Piracy by subjects or citizens 306. Running away with or yield- 308. Sale of arms and intoxi- 309. Offenses under preceding sec- 310. "Vessels of the United SECTION 290. Whoever, on the high seas, commits the Piracy crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life. This section is taken from U. S. Rev. Sts. § 5368. By the Act of Jan. 15, 1897, c. 29, § 2 (29 St. 487), the death penalty is changed to imprisonment for life. The Three Friends, 166 U. S. 1, 52, 41 L. ed. 897; United States v. Howard, 3 Wash. C. C. 340; United States v. Kessler, 1 Baldw. 15; United States v. Terrel, Hempst. 416, note, 1 West. L. J. 246; United States v. Chapels, 2 Wheeler, Cr. Cas. 205; 9 A. G. Op. 455. This section. is constitutional, and Congress has power to define and Piracy Maltreatment of crew by officers of vessel provide punishment for the crime of piracy. United States v. Smith, 5 Wheat. 153, 5 L. ed. 57; United States v. The Pirates, Id. 184, 5 L. ed. 64. For cases defining the phrase "high seas," see note to § 272. As to the effect of a commission from some unrecognized belligerent State, see United States v. Klintock, 5 Wheat. 144, 5 L. ed. 55. Prosecutions for piracy committed on the high seas, or in any place out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, should take place in the district where the offender is apprehended, or into which he may be first brought. 1 A. G. Op. 185. SECTION 291. Whoever, being the master or officer of a vessel of the United States, on the high seas, or on any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, beats, wounds, or without justifiable cause, imprisons any of the crew of such vessel, or withholds from them suitable food and nourishment, or inflicts upon them any cruel and unusual punishment, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to repeal or modify section forty-six hundred and eleven of the Revised Statutes. This section is taken from U. S. Rev. Sts. § 5347, and the Act of March 3, 1897, c. 389, § 18 (29 St. 691). The words "of the United States" are added after "vessel," and the words "without justifiable cause" are transposed so as to appear before "imprisons." Butler v. McLellan, 1 Ware (U. S.), 219, 4 Fed. Cas. 905; Roberts v. Skolfield, 3 Ware (U. S.), 184, 20 Fed. Cas. 932; Fuller v. Colby, 3 Wood. & M. 1, 9 Fed. Cas. 980; In re Smith, 13 F. R. 25; Riley v. Allen, 23 Id. 46. Officer. Any person who has authority to control the actions of the crew, or any part of it, by directing their work, is an officer, such as one of the "roustabouts" who is set over his fellows as a "captain of the watch." He may be held to answer a charge of beating and wounding any one so placed under his command. United States v. Trice, 30 F. R. 490. Crew. Crew includes officers as well as seamen, and a Maltreatmaster is liable for imprisoning the first mate. United States ment of crew by v. Winn, 1 Law Rep. 63, 28 Fed. Cas. 732; Id. 3 Sumner, officers of 209, 28 Fed. Cas. 733. It does not include a stowaway, al- vessel though he is forced to work for his food. United States v. Small, 2 Curtis C. C. 241, 27 Fed. Cas. 1128. The master when on board has generally sole authority to inflict punishment. If he is present when it is inflicted by a subordinate, and can prevent it, but does not, he is responsible. No other officer can punish seamen for misconduct to him personally when the master is on board, except by authority of the latter, express or implied, unless the ship's service requires instantaneous punishment to induce a seaman to do his duty. United States v. Taylor, 2 Sumner, 584, 28 Fed. Cas. 31. Under the former wording of this section "malice" meant a wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse. The word covered all intentional wrongs not included in the words hatred or revenge. To authorize a conviction, malice, hatred, or revenge must have concurred with a want of justifiable cause to inflict the injury. Id.; United States v. Harriman, 1 Hughes, 525; United States v. Freeman, 4 Mason, 505. When this statute was enacted, flogging was not a cruel or unusual punishment within its meaning. If flogging was inflicted from malice, the master should have been indicted for beating and wounding, and not for inflicting cruel and unusual punishment. United States v. Collins, 2 Curtis, 194, 25 Fed. Cas. 545. But since the Act of 1850 (Rev. Sts. § 4611), such punishment would be held cruel and unusual. A whaling vessel is within this section. United States v. Cutler, 1 Curtis, 501, 25 Fed. Cas. 740. See charge of Judge Curtis, 1 Curtis, 509. Whether the punishment was from malice, hatred, or revenge, is a question for the jury. United States v. Alden, 1 Sprague, 95, 24 Fed. Cas. 768. A prisoner having been extradited upon a charge of murder under Rev. Sts. |