there may be some supposed right of dominion over the neighbouring state; or, lastly, there may be a wish not only to conquer, but also to civilize surrounding tribes, and improve their form of government. To propagate their ideas and institutions by war, was a favourite object, or at least, a pretext with the French republicans. Now what may be the predominating motive in the breast of the conqueror, no one can tell for certain, and, therefore, it is always possible that he may be moved by some of those views which are not altogether unjustifiable. For this reason, conquest, however destructive, does not prove so bad a disposition in the conqueror as many other acts, of which the immediate evil consequences are comparatively very limited.

But, the reasonableness of the common sentiment which condemns the ordinary criminal much more than the rebel or the conqueror will fully appear, if we trace the consequences, ultimate as well as immediate. In the first place, the evils of insurrection and of war are not always without compensation; for the former is sometimes necessary to overthrow a tyrannical government, and introduce a new and better order of things, as a storm is required to agitate and purify the atmosphere. Though the thunderbolt blasts where it strikes, the rest of nature is invigorated and refreshed. Even foreign war, destructive as it is in itself, may ultimately lead to good. Thus the Romans did not merely subdue, but they did also civilize and finally pacify many countries, which previously were sunk in barbarism or torn by inward convulsions; and by maintaining universal peace they favoured

universal prosperity. Though England cannot be
justified for first attacking India, yet it must be
allowed that the British sway is on the whole a
blessing to that country, for it tends to civilize the
people, puts a stop to many horrid practices, and
prevents wars between the native princes.15

Secondly, however destructive rebellion and foreign
war may be, they are, from the nature of things, par-
tial and occasional evils, as compared with ordinary
crimes, were these not prevented by morals and
legislation. It is seldom that rebellion offers suffi-
cient chances of success to induce any one to run
the great risk that attends it, and when there are
fair chances of success, the probability is that there
is some good reason for resistance. In like manner,
the spirit of conquest is checked by fear of effectual
opposition on the part not only of the country menaced,
but also of its neighbours, who, thinking themselves
endangered, may make common cause with the in-
vaded, and drive the invaders back upon their own
territory. Thus Napoleon, after having over-run
Europe, was doomed to see France conquered in its
turn, and the standards of the Allies planted in the
streets of Paris. The risk then as well as the diffi-
culty attending conquest and rebellion are too great
to allow of either becoming a frequent occurrence.
But if ordinary crimes against person and property
were not prevented by moral sentiment and by law,
they would be committed in all places and at all

15 The abominable society of the Thugs, for instance, was sup-
pressed by the British Government.

times, for the temptation to them is perpetual and the perpetration easy. The only check to them is morality and law, whereas political offences are prevented by utter impossibility or the fear of effectual opposition.

Since, then, from the nature of the case, political offences and political aggression cannot be of very frequent occurrence, it is reasonable that moral sentiment should be most strongly directed against other crimes, which but for that sentiment would become frequent every where, and by this frequency would produce an amount of ill incomparably greater than the partial and passing evils of rebellion and war, terrible though they be. In short, the disposition evinced by the ordinary criminal is far more dangerous to society, and to private happiness, than that of the political agitator or the ambitious warrior; for were the first to become common, it would reduce mankind to solitude and barbarism, and if not branded with ignominy, it would become common. Therefore, here, the general sentiments of mankind are in perfect agreement with the most far-sighted views of utility. Wars and revolutions may be compared to earthquakes or eruptions, which overthrow in a day a flourishing city or bury it under heaps of cinders, but are rare and partial visitors; while vulgar crimes are like the common fevers of every country, which work more slowly, but incessantly spread their

ravages.

539

CHAPTER V.

ON THE MOTIVES TO THE PRACTICE OF VIRTUE.

TH

HE only question that now remains to be discussed, in order to complete our system of Ethics, is, what are the motives to practice, which may be drawn from the foregoing theory of moral sentiment, and from the nature of virtue as here described.

If the above principles be correct, no doubt can be entertained whether it be for our interest to practise the self-regarding virtues; for unless they conduced to our real interest, they neither would, nor ought to, have been called virtues. A tendency to the ultimate good of the individual is one of their essential characters, and without it they would never have been approved, nor ought to have been approved by mankind. All virtue, as we have seen, supposes a sacrifice, but sacrifice without a compensation is contrary to reason; and, therefore, if the sacrifice be required by the moral sentiment of men in general, we may infer that it is followed by a due compensation, unless we maintain that men, in all countries, and in all ages, have on this point been irrational. So far as the self-regarding virtues are concerned, this general consideration might suffice; but at the same time, it may be more satisfactory to show how they affect our happiness.

Having already dwelt upon the particular good effects of prudence or discretion, temperance, fortitude, and courage, we shall not here dilate upon these, but shall observe only that they are sufficiently striking to warrant the encouraging maxim, that "conduct is fate." What we shall now consider, is rather the joint influence of all these qualities, as tending to produce that greatest of human blessings, a healthy state of mind, free from eating cares and anxieties, from groundless fears, from despondency and imaginary ailments, and, lastly, from satiety. What are all the gifts of fortune, all the advantages of station, all bodily perfections, or even intellectual endowments, to one whose mind is not prepared for enjoyment? and without the above virtues, how can it be so prepared? Though the exercise of those virtues were itself unaccompanied with pleasure, they would still be necessary to ward off pain, to nurse our natural sensibility to innumerable delights, and prevent it being blunted prematurely. Of the two great causes which tend to destroy our sensibility to enjoyment, anxiety and satiety, the one arises from want of prudence or want of courage, the other from want of temperance. The man who lives beyond his income, or he who addicts himself to gambling or other hazardous speculations, is kept in a state of anxiety from want of prudence; another, as the miser, is anxious in the midst of riches from want of courage; while a third, from over-indulgence, becomes insensible to pleasure. To persons such as these, even the happy valley of Abyssinia could have no charms, for their minds are too absorbed with