Prudence is a duty; though, since it looks entirely to self, a failure in Prudence is not esteemed so great a vice as a failure in veracity or honesty, which regard others. However, a very imprudent man is always thought morally culpable.

Paley's definition of virtue corresponds to his account of moral obligation, and the one is as faulty as the other. "Virtue is," says he, "the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness. According to which definition," he continues, "the good of mankind is the subject; the will of God the rule; and everlasting happiness the motive, of human virtue."

Now it may be remarked in the first place, that what he calls the "subject" and the "rule," are not two things, but one; for he himself observes a little further on, that the only way by which we can know what is the will of God, is by considering what is good for man. Again, it would seem that the phrase "in obedience to the will of God," meant that a wish to obey God was the proper motive of virtue, were it not that the last clause assigns everlasting happiness as that motive. Assuredly the expectation of future reward or punishment is a great additional sanction to morality, but to affirm that it is absolutely essential to virtue, and the only moral motive, to the exclusion even of Benevolence, is at variance with common sense. According to this view, no ancient pagan could have been virtuous, not only unless he believed in a future state of rewards and punishments, but also unless those actions which we are wont to approve and admire, proceeded from a hope in futurity.

Cato has ever been esteemed a model of virtue ; but, according to Paley, improperly, if he did not firmly believe in a future state; and if moreover the desire of everlasting happiness were not his ruling motive. Though Paley in general gives proofs, if not of metaphysical acuteness, at least of sound judgment, yet in the present instance he has made a statement as opposed to the notions of mankind as the finest system that ever was spun by crazy theorist. It may be safely affirmed that even the belief of Berkeley in the non-existence of matter, is not more at variance with common sense than the above definition of virtue; and common sense is a far surer guide in morality than in metaphysics. Virtue is not confined to one motive, but admits of many; though were we to pronounce one in particular more moral than another, it would certainly be Benevolence, rather than any form of self-love. But according to the definition of Paley, if Benevolence be the motive, there is no virtue.

The belief in a future state, and in rewards and punishments, has certainly a great and beneficial influence on the conduct of men in the present life; but it is quite a different thing to maintain that the essence of virtue lies in the desire of happiness hereafter. This desire encourages good deeds, both directly and indirectly; first, as it actually looks to the reward, secondly, as it promotes the disposition of mind necessary to receive that reward. The Scriptures do certainly hold out the prospect of future happiness, but in order to obtain it we must love God and our neighbour; and therefore we are prompted

to cultivate Piety and Benevolence. Nor let any one say that these are natural gifts, which can neither be lost nor improved, for the contrary is notorious. The rewards and punishments of futurity are, therefore, doubly valuable, for they not only act as immediate dissuasives to vice, but they induce us to cultivate a virtuous disposition, which is its own reward, and a blessing to all within its influence.

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CHAPTER IV.

ON THE PROPER OBJECT OF MORAL APPROBATION.

AVING fixed, in the preceding chapter, the

HAV

essential characters of virtue, we shall not be at a loss to determine the proper object of moral approbation. In considering any human action, two things demand our attention, the outward effects produced, and the causes whence they spring. The former, because they are outward, may be traced with comparative ease, at least the immediate effects; but the latter, being inward, can be known with certainty only to the individual himself. Still, those effects are valuable as signs from which we may infer the cause with more or less probability. Since, then, a human action consists of two parts, one seated in the mind of the agent, the other without that mind, the first question is, which of these two is the proper object of moral approbation?

What is an outward action without reference to its cause? It is a series of changes which may be pronounced advantageous, harmless, or hurtful to man, like the actions of the lower animals, or the movements in inanimate matter, but which cannot be either approved or disapproved, because in themselves they are not endued with reason and feeling. None but beings like ourselves, rational and sensitive, can rouse approbation or disapprobation, as we know by experience, and as we might infer with

out direct experience, supposing ourselves first to be acquainted with the final cause of moral sentiment. If the purpose of such sentiment be to encourage beneficial and discourage hurtful actions, then it can fulfil its purpose only when applied to creatures sensitive and rational; for none other can feel pleasure or pain on account of praise or blame, and can direct their conduct so as to secure the one and avoid the other. Hence it is evident that the outward part of an action cannot be the proper object of moral approbation.

In order to determine this object, we must therefore have recourse to the inward part of an action or the state of mind in which it originates. Now there are various circumstances connected with this mental state, which are sometimes made the objects of praise and blame, properly or improperly, and which therefore demand our attention. These are the Motive, the Intention, the Disposition. Which then of the three is the proper object of moral sentiment?

With regard to motives, it follows from the whole of the preceding inquiry, that no motive or class of motives can be called universally bad. We have every reason to believe that no desire, and therefore no motive has been given in vain, but that all are subservient to some useful purpose. That man would indeed be foolish and presumptuous, who should wish to annihilate any of the self-regarding desires, because they sometimes, nay, frequently lead to ill. If any desire might be considered as an exception, it would certainly be that which looks directly not to the good of self but to the evil of others. But we have seen that ill-will is not only necessary at times