reflecting mind to love a mere abstraction, for such is justice, charity, temperance, or still more virtue in general, as distinct from an individual agent, and an individual action. Strictly speaking, nothing but a living being, capable of thought and feeling, can be the object of love, and it is only by an extension of the term that we can apply it to inanimate nature, or to generalities created by the mind itself.

To love virtue for its own sake, may well be considered excellent practical advice; for since general rules are necessary, not only to enlighten our own conscience and guide our sentiments in regard to others, but also to govern our conduct and strengthen us against temptation, it is desirable that those rules should be invested with becoming sanctity. All I would ask is, that our veneration for them should not be so great, our faith in their excellence so implicit, as to make us forget that they are the work of fallible mortals, and therefore, may sometimes err; that after all, they are but proximate rules, and consequently may require to be compared from time to time with some fundamental rule, to see if they be duly grounded. To instil into the minds of citizens. a due respect for the government and laws of their ancestors, of which time has proved the utility, may be highly salutary; but would we wish this respect to degenerate into a superstitious awe that dare not even improve? Surely it is as absurd to deny that we ought ever to mount up to the first principles of government, as to assert that on every occasion we are bound to bring them forward. As, in the lapse of time, and amid the changes which inevitably at

tend it, a political constitution may have become corrupt, or require some reform to suit it to the altered circumstances, so among the corruptions of the world, moral rules may sometimes deviate from their original purity, and in order to restore their beauty, must be washed in the fountain-head. The virtue of this fountain is equal to that of the stream which cleansed the Syrian leper.

It appears then that the use of general rules and general terms may lead to fallacy in theory as well as to error in practice, by hiding from our view the real foundations of morality, and preventing us from recurring to these as the ultimate rule of action. Thus one general term is explained by a second, virtuous by what is right, right by what is virtuous, or either by that which is our duty, which we ought to do, or which lays us under a moral obligation; all meaning the same thing, and the one being as well or as little understood as the other. And it will be easy to show that general rules do sometimes pervert our moral sentiments, and lead to errors in practice.

We have seen that the influence of general rules upon our moral sentiments may be traced to two causes, reason and association, but principally to the latter. So far as reason operates, that influence is beneficial, but so far as it depends upon association, though generally, it is not always, salutary. For, while there are certain qualities of mind bearing upon actions, which are almost invariably useful, such as justice, temperance, and fortitude, there are others of a mixed character, which generally, but not invariably lead to good. Such are active courage

and perseverance. qualities are commonly beneficial either to the individual possessed of them, or to others with whom he is connected, and that the very words are expressive of commendation. Hence, whenever we meet with these qualities, we are already prepared to applaud, from the force of association, arising from numberless cases where courage or perseverance, and praise have gone together. But, it is certain, that quite as much courage and perseverance may be shown in a bad cause as in a good, in destroying as in benefiting mankind, in conquering as in civilizing the world; and therefore, if here we follow our general rule, we may applaud where we ought to condemn. And that we sometimes do so is certain, partly from this cause, partly from that formerly mentioned, our wonder, and hence our admiration, at the rare and great, even at the great and bad. I have heard assassins lauded, at least political assassins; such as Alibeau, and others, who fired at the king of the French, because they showed great courage, and a rare indifference to life; and many of my readers may recollect that even the murderer Thurtell was raised into a sort of hero, on account of the determined and daring nature of his villany. In such instances, the general rule which tells us to approve, weakens, or overcomes the moral detestation which would otherwise arise from a

It will be allowed that these

view of the particular case, where courage and perseverance are made the instruments of crime.

Having now gone through the five secondary causes which influence moral sentiment, we may sum up the result in a very few words. The first cause, which

is education, or early custom, propagates moral sentiment, first among the rising generation, and hence among men of all ages; rouses it immediately on the proper occasions, directs it well generally, but perverts occasionally. Passion or strong emotion generally distorts, and sometimes quite perverts our sentiments, whether the emotion be peculiar to one or common to many: complexity of actions bewilders the judgment, and hence causes a variety in sentiment local and temporary utility modifies the same in a greater or less degree, and sometimes may change it entirely; and general rules give it accuracy, uniformity, strength and promptitude in most cases, but pervert it in a few.

PART II.

ON PRACTICAL MORALITY, OR THE RULE OF ACTION.

CHAPTER I.—ARGUMENT OF THIS PART.

N the preceding Part of this Book, having discussed

IN

the nature and causes of moral sentiment, in the present we have to consider what are the reasons which justify us in encouraging such sentiment, and what is the rule which we can rationally follow in awarding approbation or disapprobation. We have also to treat of the proper object of these sentiments, the circumstances which ought to modify praise and blame, and the motives to the practice of virtue.

In order to enlist the reason and feelings of mankind on the side of practical morality, it is not enough to discover the nature and causes of moral sentiment; for this nature and these causes being allowed, it may still be asked, why am I bound to favour such sentiment in myself and others? Can I find a guide to tell me when to approve and when to disapprove? or do I require no direction? What is meant by saying that I ought to act so and so, that it is my duty so to do, or that I am morally obliged? Lastly, are there any motives which reason can deem sufficient. to lead me to the practice of virtue? To answer these questions is the object of the following Part.

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