BOOK II. ON ETHICS, OR MORALS PROPERLY SO CALLED. PART I. On Speculative Morality, or the Theory of Moral Sentiment. E CHAPTER I.-INTRODUCTION. THICS, or Morals properly so called, is the science which treats of human duty. In the general introduction to Moral Science prefixed to the present Inquiry, we pointed out the relation which Ethics bears to other departments of human knowledge, and mentioned the first and leading division of this science, into speculative morality, or the theory of moral sentiment, and practical morality, or the rule of action. All those sciences which we called the mixed mental, or moral, are partly speculative, partly practical, and the one division so naturally runs into the other, that they are seldom kept quite separate; for in treating of the thoughts, emotions, and actions of men as they are, we are constantly led to consider how they ought to be. Still it appears to me certain, that the confusion which has hitherto been so much remarked in systems of Ethics, and the diversity of opinions on the subject, may be traced, in a great degree, to an imperfect apprehension of this grand and primary difference. Verbal disputes have also been very frequent, but if we avoid these, and state the question properly at the outset, we have reason to hope that the subject may be elucidated, seeing that it is one which not only lies within the compass of the human understanding, but is open to the reflection and experience of every man. Every one has not time or opportunity for watching and calculating the motions of the heavenly bodies, or analyzing the various substances that compose the earth; but all may know something of what passes within them when they approve or disapprove of actions or characters, and may judge when praise or blame ought to be awarded. It has been said that a question well put is half solved, and if this be true generally, it applies with double force to the present subject, which has certainly been obscured from want of a proper statement at the opening of the investigation. If we succeed in this respect, we shall probably find that disputes as to the existence or non-existence of a moral sense, the prevalence of reason or of sentiment in morals, of sympathy or of utility, and other similar questions will be easily set at rest. In treating of speculative morality, we shall first consider the nature of the moral sentiments; and secondly, the causes from which they spring: and in discussing practical morals, we shall in the first place determine the purpose which these sentiments seem to serve in the economy of human life, or the effects which they are meant to produce; and afterwards the occasions on which they ought to arise in order to fulfil that purpose. 395 CHAPTER II. ON THE NATURE OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS. HOWEVER ber OWEVER great may be the scepticism of some subjects, or on that of morals in particular, it is impossible to deny the existence of certain sentiments of approbation and disapprobation, considered merely as mental phenomena, and without any reference to their causes or their consequences. Disputes may arise on the real nature of these sentiments, on their origin, and on their effects; but these very disputes suppose that there is something real at the bottom of the controversy. Some may assert that the sentiments are simple, unsusceptible of analysis, others that they are compound; those may maintain that they are original instincts, common to the human race and uniform in all men, like the feelings of hunger and thirst; these that they are gradually acquired by experience of the consequences of actions, or caught from others, and may be modified or totally changed by custom and education. Most men suppose that the sentiments in question are of the utmost importance to human life and happiness, while a few have endeavoured to prove that they are irrational and useless, a mere artifice of crafty politicians. But amidst all this diversity of opinions, the reality of such sentiments has not been called in question. Here then we can take our stand |