Walter N. Tobriner, President of the D.C. Board of Commissioners and Chairman of the National Capital Housing Authority, accepted the building from Whiting-Turner, Inc. of Baltimore, contractors. "In his recent State of the Union Message, President Johnson asked that we 'call upon the genius of private industry' to solve the problems of the cities," Secretary Weaver said. "The partnership of government and industry, through this Turnkey method, is one of the most dramatic answers to that call. And this magnificent new building is proof that this partnership works." The Turnkey approach permits a builder or developer to come to a local housing authority with a proposal to build on a given site. If the local authority likes his idea, it contracts to buy the finished product at a fixed price. This reverses the old system whereby the authority would purchase a site, develop plans and specification, and select a contractor to do the construction. HUD Officials estimate a savings of 15 to 20 percent in construction time and cost under "Turnkey". "This new technique results in greater involvement by both private construction and financing interests in the development of low-rent public housing," Secretary Weaver said, adding that reaction from the building industry is overwhelmingly favorable. Since the Secretary first announced "Turnkey" on an experimental basis January 20, 1966, HUD has received applications from 58 localities in 22 states, proposing some 14,000 units of Turnkey housing. "Almost 1,000 units are under construction, and another 1,500 are under firm contract," he said. "That's a pretty good record for a new idea." Total development cost of Claridge Towers is $5,334,142. NCHA estimates the project would have taken three to four years to build under old procedures. Under "Turnkey", the building was completed in 10 months. RIBICOFF PRAISES ARCHITECTS, PLANNERS, ENGINEERS Senator RIBICOFF. Your discussion has been provocative and interesting and important. I am very grateful to the three of you and your organizations for having sent you. It is good to know that there are people around like yourselves. It would be my hope that the cities and private resources would make a fuller and more complete use of your services, and I would hope that your organizations as a group or as individuals would take to the soapbox, because America needs your viewpoints. Mr. ROGERS. I would like to point out, Senator, that our organization, AIA, took to the soapbox last year or year before last when our president resigned from the Bureau of Public Roads Advisory Board in indignation, and I think we sort of took to the soapbox on the extension of the Capitol question. Senator RIBICOFF. I think that is good. There is no substitute for public opinion. These men that sit around here, the television and newspaper people, they can't wait for you to say something provocative so they can put it in the press. The only way you can move politicians, whether they are at the city or State or Federal level, is by making sense and calling attention to the problems that exist. And that is all to the good. I am very, very grateful for your being here. My apologies for keeping you so long. I do apologize because I think it is an imposition. I do not know what else we could have done, but I am sorry that you had to wait so long. Your testimony was very valuable. Mr. WISE. Thank you very much for the opportunity. We appreciate being invited. Mr. HAM. Thank you, sir. Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. The subcommittee is adjourned. (Whereupon, at 1:20 p.m. the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene on Thursday, April 20, 1967 at 10a.m.) (The following articles concerning the future of our cities were subsequently placed in the record by Senator Ribicoff:) EXHIBIT 223 UNHAPPY THOUGHTS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF OUR CITIES By Victor H. Palmieri, Deputy Executive Director, National Advisory Council, President of Janss Investment Corp., Los Angeles, Calif. (A talk delivered at the Conference on the State of the Future, Los Angeles, October 1, 1966) Much nonsense has been written and spoken of late about our cities, and a great deal more about the future. Therefore, to talk about both of these subjects, as I have been asked to do here, creates a splendid opportunity to compound the confusion. To defeat this prospect, I am going to state four propositions about our cities and their future that I think are grounded in objective fact. These propositions concern first, the racial ghetto and its relationship to the deterioration of the core city; second, the politics of the metropolitan city; third, the problem of urban planning with respect to the social, as well as the physical, environment; and, fourth, the source and dimension of the financial resources required for urban needs. Even a quick glance at reality in terms of these four issues should point up the irrelevance of much of what is being said and done, or not done, about our cities. Time enough, then, to suggest considerations that might be relevant. First, as to the ghetto and the core city. Within the next two decades-probably by 1980-the core area of almost every major metropolitan city of the United States will be racial-predominantly black-islands. This is not speculation. It is already very largely a fact in Washington, D.C., Chicago and New York City. It is rapidly becoming a fact in Detroit, Philadelphia and Los Angeles. Three established factors-the rate of population growth among minority groups (almost three times that of the white population in the City of Los Angeles); the increasing income level and mobility of middleclass white families; and the resulting domino effect on racially impacted school districts-will maintain the velocity of the trend and virtually guarantee its ultimate outcome. Second, as to the politics of the metropolitan city: The fragmented, crazy-quilt pattern of government within the metropolitan region is a familiar fact of urban life. The essential point here is that it is not likely to change. Any significant redistribution of political power on a regional basis-the "metro-government" objective-remains outside the bounds of probability-not to mention feasibility. The Metropolitan Water District-the nearest approach to regional government in the history of Southern California-was formed three decades ago by the independent cities solely and simply to avoid the domination and limit the growth of the City of Los Angeles. The 70-odd cities that now exist within the County of Los Angeles testify to their achievement. Recent experience with SCAG (the Southern California Association of Governments), a truly modest attempt at regional association on a purely voluntary basis, which the City of Los Angeles has so far refused to join, even at the risk of forfeiting millions in Federal aid confirms the point that Balkanism remains an imbedded characteristic and effective regional government is simply not in the cards. Indeed Mayor Yorty's testimony in his recent uphappy appearance before the Senate Subcommittee leaves room for doubt as to the effectiveness of any part of our local governmental structure. Third, as to the urban planning: The fact is that the metropolitan planning efforts that are being carried on at all levels of government-from H.U.D. in Washington to the State Planning Office in Sacramento, to the Los Angeles Regional Planning Commission-will have no real effect whatever on the shape and quality of the metropolitan environment. With one obvious and often painful exception—the State Division of Highways-the agencies of government responsible for planning have no role in the process of public policy making and administrative decisions that determine the character and direction of both public and private investment. In short, the work of the planning agencies is largely uncoupled. It is carried on as an abstract exercise, much like drawing pictures in the sand, and with precisely the same effect. Fourth, as to financial resources, often referred to in the city as "money": The fact is that the major metropolitan cities are bankrupt. New York's annual deficit is almost a half a billion, Boston is even worse off relative to its size, and Los Angeles' turn has arrived, as the Council's recent desperate decisions with respect to new excise taxes clearly demonstrate. With property tax rates uniformly at or above the $10 per 100 level—a point which students of taxation have traditionally regarded as one of diminishing return because of the effect on business growth-it is clear that the primary revenue base of local government has been exhausted. This at a time when the pace of urban growth and the crisis of social change are creating a totally new dimension in the need for public services and facilities. This, then, is the city of the future-the very near future. A black island spreading like a giant ink blot over the heart of a metropolis which is bankrupt financially and paralyzed politically. Meanwhile, in Los Angeles, the public debate centers on fluoridation and there is a comfortable concensus that everything is going to be all right if we can just find a way to build a mass rapid transit system. Everything is not going to be all right. The conclusions I have stated are based on facts observable, demonstrable facts. These facts make up a hard reality that will not yield to rapid transit systems, or urban renewal projects, or community action programs, or property tax reform, or open housing laws, or police review boards, or compensatory educational programs. In short, it will not yield to what is largely a "safety valve" system of ad hoc, ameliorative measures designed to take effect over the span of a generation. The issue if it is still openwill be resolved long before then. That issue, I might add, is not simply the fate of the central city, or even the quality of urban life. It is, rather, the ability of our society to respond to the great challenge of our time-a challenge significantly different in its terms than any we have known before. In the conquest of the frontier, the preservation of the union, the building of our industrial productivity-in all the great tests with which destiny has confronted past generations of Americans—the stakes were confined to the fate of one people. Whether today this nation can come to grips with the crisis of its great cities is a momentous question for all men who place their faith in the democratic society. The basic requirements for effective action are clear: First, there must be a commitment to the effect in terms of national policy sufficient in strength to establish priority over all other domestic goals. Second, there must be institutions built capable of deploying human and material resources effectively within the core city. Third, there must be concert of action among all agencies of government aimed at shattering the racial hegemony of the ghetto. The priority commitment at the national level must be definitive enough to compete for resources with military security objectives and to penetrate all the layers of the federal-state-local decision-making apparatus. Unless the President, the leaders of Congress and the heads of Federal executive agencies reflect this total commitment in word and deed, there will be no chance to create the political base for the necessary share of the national budget. Without a substantial allocation of national resources over the long term, even the main needs of the city cannot and will not be met. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that only the incentive of large-scale federal grants can overcome the political paralysis of state and local governments in the area of urban problems. In Los Angeles, by the way, there is reason to doubt that even this will work. The institution-building process is essential at both the national and local level, but in a rather different sense in each case. In the Federal government the problem of overlapping responsibilities among multiple agencies makes concerted action toward major objectives almost impossible to achieve. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare controls the crucial sphere of education and health programs. The Department of Housing and Urban Development is responsible for urban renewal, public housing and a host of other projects affecting the physical environment of the city. The Office of Economic Opportunity which administers the Poverty Program is promoting citizen participation through community action programs. The Small Business Administration and the Department of Labor have important roles in the urban economy. Now the President has proposed a new cabinet level agency for transportation, presumably to help these other agencies keep in touch with each other. Some way to rationalize this Byzantine agglomeration has to be found as a predicate for effective action at the national level. However, the problem of institution-building is even more critical within the city itself. Here the prime need is competence competence in men and competence in organizations. The fact is that we have no institutions in our major urban areas that have the competence-the personnel, local knowledge, techniques of action and political contacts that is necessary to make it possible to spend large amounts of money effectively in the tricky environment of the core city. The kind of institution that is needed must have capabilities for managing social research, for exploiting information technology, for establishing contact and maintaining communication with the wide spectrum of groups and their volatile leadership elements. For organizing its efforts in such a way that community action and participation become the major energy source of all programs over the long term. It must be, in short, a systems manager in the field of social engineering. The kind of institution that I have in mind can perhaps best be described as a combination of Hull House and the Rand Corporation. Its function, however, would be as a prime contractor and systems manager for deploying federal funds in specified programs within the city. There is, in fact, a useful analogy with our military procurement program system. Over the past ten years, by selective subsidy, the Department of Defense has created from the aerospace and electronics industries and from the scientific community a massive and uniquely efficient complex dedicated totally to the develop ment and production of weaponry. This system of prime contractors and research institutions has given the DOD the capability of administering with unprece dented efficiency a national security budget of over fifty billions annually. Incidentally, this is said to make it the fifth largest socialist state in the world. There is no analogous system of institutional resources available in the urban field. As a result, it would be difficult to spend even small sums with reasonable efficiency in the work of redeeming our cities. Witness the current agonies of the Poverty Program. Yet the scope of the task facing the nation and its great cities over the next decade can probably best be measured in hundreds of billions. Without institutions of high competence operating as prime contracting agencies at the local level, the task cannot be accomplished. Indeed, it should not be attempted. The racial monolity of the ghetto must be shattered. The theory that dispersal of ethnic minorities will occur gradually through impact of anti-discrimination measures is palpable nonsense. It fails to take account of the economic and cultural moat that also seals off the black island. More importantly, it ignores the fact that gradualism is simply impractical, given the velocity of this urban crises. A radically different strategy is needed. One that marshals all of the available forces of public investment, one that couples all the planning apparatus of government, to a single objective, to establish within the ghetto new centers of human activity-government office buildings, major educational installations, medical and para-medical complexes, cultural facilities (for example, the Music Center), major work centers which perforce will bring an ethnic mix to the streets of the ghetto. Private industry cannot be expected to do this. But local government services and employment are the fastest growing sector of the economy, and it is a sure bet that they will continue to be a major source of employment growth in urban areas. Once the principle of priority for public investment within the ghetto is established, once it begins to be implemented, two things will follow. First, there will be a change in the residential pattern in terms of race. This is true because it will be a relatively easy matter to establish new communities in conjunction with these major public employment centers. Convenience and cost are always the strongest counterforces to racial discrimination and prejudice. Second, the texture of the primary schools will change, not simply because of the leavening agent of racial diversity, but more because white office workers will demand better schools. When the schools change, when there is work and productive human activity there, when the pulse of the ghetto begins to beat again, there will be hope for the city. This will mean also new hope for the Negroes and the Mexican-Americans, for the poor and the aged, for all Americans who have missed the last train to suburbia. [From the Scientific American, September 1965] EXHIBIT 224 THE MODERN METROPOLIS THE URBAN REVOLUTION THAT BEGAN IN THE LATTER HALF OF THE 19TH CENTURY HAS CULMINATED IN A QUALITATIVELY NEW KIND OF HUMAN SETTLEMENT: AN EXTENDED URBAN AREA WITH A DENSE CENTRAL CITY By Hans Blumenfeld The preceding article is entitled "The Origin and Evolution of Cities"; in this article we speak of the product of that evolution not as "the modern city" but as "the modern metropolis." The change of name reflects the fact that from its long, slow evolution the city has emerged into a revolutionary stage. It has undergone qualitative change, so that it is no longer merely a larger version of the traditional city but a new and different form of human settlement. There is some argument about the term. Lewis Mumford objects to "metropolis" (from the Greek words for "mother" and "city"), which historically had a very different meaning; he prefers the term "conurbation," coined by Patrick Geddes, the Scottish biologist who was a pioneer in city planning. This word, however, implies formation by the fusion of several preexisting cities; most metropolises did not originate in that way. The term "megalopolis," coined by the French geographer Jean Gottmann, is generally applied to an urbanized region that contains several metropolitan areas, such as the region extending from Boston to Washington. On the whole it seems best to retain the term "metropolis," now commonly adopted in many languages as the name for a major city center and its environs. "Metropolitan area" can be defined in various ways; the U.S. Bureau of the Census, for instance, defines it as any area containing a nuclear city of at least 50,000 population. The new phenomenon we are considering, however, is a much bigger entity with a certain minimum critical size. In agreement with the German scholar Gerhard Isenberg, I shall define a metropolis as a concentration of at least 500,000 people living within an area in which the traveling time from the outskirts to the center is no more than about 40 minutes. Isenberg and I have both derived this definition from observations of the transformation of cities into metropolises during the first half of the 20th century. At the present time at least in North America-the critical mass that distinguishes a metropolis from the traditional city can be considerably larger-perhaps nearing one million population. The emergence of a basically new form of human settlement is an extremely rare event in the history of mankind. For at least 5,000 years all civilizations have been characterized predominantly by just two well-marked types of settlement: the farm village and the city. Until recently the vast majority of the population lived in villages. They produced not only their own raw materials-food, fuel and fiber-but also the manufactured goods and services they required. The cities were inhabited by only a small minority of the total population, generally less than 20 percent. These people were the ruling elite the religious, political, military and commercial leaders and the retinue of laborers, craftsmen and professionals who served them. The elite drew their subsistence and power from the work of the villagers by collecting tithes, taxes or rent. This system prevailed until the end of the 18th century, and its philosophy was well expressed by physiocrats of that time on both sides of the Atlantic, including Thomas Jefferson. The industrial revolution dramatically reversed the distribution of population between village and city. A German contemporary of Jefferson's, Justus Moeser, foresaw at the very beginning of the revolution what was to come; he observed that "specialized division of labor forces workers to live in big cities." With 83-453 0-67-pt. 16- -13 |