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OF MISDEMEANORS BEFORE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATES

with in subdivision (a), as this procedure is set out in the Federal Magistrate Act of 1979).

Subdivision (b) sets out those matters which are deemed essential in receiving a plea of guilty or plea of nolo contendere to a petty offense for which no sentence of imprisonment will be imposed. Quite clearly the magistrate should be satisfied that the defendent understands the nature of the charge and the maximum penalty which could be imposed. Because this abbreviated procedure may be used only upon a prior determination that no imprisonment will be imposed, the defendant need not be advised of any sentence of imprisonment provided for in the applicable statute. Underlying subdivision (b) is the conclusion that the much more elaborate procedures provided for in Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 need not be routinely applied in petty offense cases for which no sentence of imprisonment will be imposed. Pursuant to rule 1(b) of these rules, however, a magistrate is free, as he deems appropriate, to selectively follow certain of the Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 procedures beyond those incorporated in this subdivision (b). By virtue of rule 1(b) of these rules, all of the Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 procedures are to be followed by magistrates as to offenses above the petty offense category, or for which a sentence of imprisonment will be imposed.

Subdivision (c), although based upon rule 6(b) and (c) of the 1971 Magistrates Rules, is different in certain significant respects. Under the 1971 rules, if the defendant waived trial in the district where the charge was pending, his statement to that effect was to be transmitted to the magistrate before whom the proceeding was pending, and that magistrate was then to transmit the papers or certified copies thereof to the clerk of the district court in which the defendant was arrested, held or present. That elaborate procedure, though generally following the provisions of Fed.R.Crim.P. 20, has proved troublesome in practice. The transmission of defendant's statement from one district to another, followed by transmission of the papers the other direction, has often resulted in serious delay, sometimes lasting several weeks. This delay may severely inconvenience the defendant who, especially in a petty offense case, may wish to plead guilty and complete the proceeding against him at the earliest possible time. To meet that concern, subdivision (c) provides for a waiver of venue in such cases. This will allow the filing of a new formal charge in the district where the defendant was arrested, is held or is present, to which the defendant may promptly plead without waiting for the transmission of papers from the district where that charge was first brought. Before imposing sentence, the magistrate will often find it useful to communicate with the magistrate in the district where the offense arose concerning the details of the offense. Because of the minor nature of the offense involved, the consent of the United States attorney in the district of the original charge is not required. This means, provided the case involves a petty offense for which no sentence of imprisonment will be imposed, that this waiver of venue for plea and sentence is a right of the defendant.

The last sentence of subdivision (c) applies only to a statement made in connection with waiver of venue. It does not apply to his later plea following the waiver. Subdivision (d), concerned with sentencing in petty offense cases in which no sentence of imprisonment will be imposed, rests upon the conclusion that the more elaborate procedures of Fed.R.Crim.P. 32 need not be routinely followed in such cases. The first sentence, stating that the magistrate is obliged to permit the defendant to be heard before a sentencing, recognizes "the need for the defendant, personally, to have the opportunity to present to the court his plea in mitigation." Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301 (1961). The last sentence recognizes that while often the circumstances in such a case will be such that the magistrate can properly immediately proceed to the matter of sentencing, this is not inevitably so. There

will be occasions when the magistrate will want additional facts from the probation service or the parties. For example, when a case is before the magistrate for sentencing by virtue of subdivision (c) of this rule, it will occasionally be necessary for the magistrate to acquire additional facts from the district where the charge originated.

Subdivision (e) is new. The language follows that in Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(a)(2).

Rule 4. Securing Defendant's Appearance; Payment in Lieu of Appearance

(a) FORFEITURE OF COLLATERAL. When authorized by local rules of the district court, payment of a fixed sum may be accepted in suitable types of misdemeanor cases in lieu of appearance and as authorizing the termination of the proceedings. Such local rules may make provision for increases in such fixed sums not to exceed the maximum fine which could be imposed upon conviction.

(b) NOTICE TO APPEAR. If a defendant fails to pay a fixed sum, request a hearing, or appear in response to a citation or violation notice, the clerk of the district court or a magistrate may issue a notice for the defendant to appear before a magistrate on a date certain. The notice may also afford the defendant an additional opportunity to pay a fixed sum in lieu of appearance, and shall be served upon the defendant by mailing a copy to his last known address.

(c) SUMMONS OR WARRANT. Upon an indictment or a showing by one of the other documents specified in Rule 2(a) of probable cause to believe that a misdemeanor has been committed and that the defendant has committed it, a magistrate may issue an arrest warrant or, if no warrant is requested by the attorney for the government, a summons. The showing shall be made in writing upon oath or under penalty of perjury, but the affiant need not appear before the magistrate. If the defendant fails to appear before the magistrate in response to a summons, the magistrate may summarily issue a warrant for his immediate arrest and appearance before the magistrate.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES

The first sentence of subdivision (a) is derived from rule 9 of the 1971 Magistrates Rules. It recognizes that forfeiture of collateral without appearance is an accepted way of terminating proceedings as to minor traffic offenses and similiar infractions. See ABA Standards for Traffic Justice § 3.4 (1975). While the earlier provision permitted such disposition only "in cases of petty offenses," it is now provided that this procedure may be authorized by local rules "in suitable types of misdemeanor cases." This change is necessitated by the peculiarities to be found in some state codes, whereby violations which should logically be classified as petty offenses are in fact above the petty offense category because of the high penalties which are authorized by law (but seldom if ever imposed). Local rules can identify those situations with greater specificity than is feasible in this rule, such as that certain specified misdemeanors may be dealt with in this way only for first offenders. It must be emphasized, however, that the aforementioned change in the rule is limited in nature; it is intended to apply only to misdemeanors of the malum prohibitum variety. The last sentence of subdivision (a) expressly recognizes, as

OF MISDEMEANORS BEFORE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATES

some local rules now provide, that the amount of collateral to be forfeited may increase as the case reaches later stages (e.g., after the defendant fails to respond to a violation notice or a notice to appear).

Rule 4 of the 1971 Magistrate Rules provides that if a defendant fails to appear in response to a citation or violation notice, a summons or arrest warrant may issue. That rule expressly states that a warrant may issue only upon probable cause, but no comparable declaration is made with respect to issuance of a summons. However, subdivision (b) of that rule declares that a warrant "may summarily issue" if a defendant fails to comply with a summons. In practice, these provisions have received a variety of interpretations. Some magistrates have construed these provisions literally and thus have reached the conclusion that without any probable cause showing to the magistrate at any time (that is, either before the summons issues or before the warrant issues after noncompliance with the summons), a warrant of arrest may be issued and executed. Others, perhaps drawing upon the interpretation which has been placed upon the summons provisions in Fed.R.Crim.P. 4 and 9, see United States v. Millican, 600 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Greenberg, 320 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1963), have read the provision that a warrant may summarily issue upon noncompliance with a summons as meaning that the summons must have itself been issued upon a showing of probable cause. There has also been some variation in practice as to the service of summonses under the 1971 rules; in some localities, a summons for a petty offense is served in a less formal manner than a Fed.R.Crim.P. 4 summons.

Present rule 4 differs from its predecessor in that it gives express recognition to two different follow-up procedures short of arrest: a notice to appear, and a summons. These two procedures, because they are different in several significant respects, avoid constitutional issues which might otherwise arise and provide greater flexibility in the follow-up process. (This flexibility should aid in addressing a problem of considerable dimensions. During the statistical year 1978 there were 437,000 violation notices filed by law enforcement agencies with the district courts; some 50,000 of those were referred directly to magistrates for a mandatory hearing, while another 80,000 were referred to magistrates for "follow-up" because of the failure of the defendant to respond to the instructions on the violation notice or subsequent warnings sent by the Central Violations Bureau.)

A notice to appear, on the one hand, is in the nature of a reminder or warning letter. Either the clerk of the court or a magistrate may issue a notice to appear. It may be issued without the kind of probable cause showing needed for a warrant or a summons; it will suffice that the defendant has failed to pay a fixed sum under subdivision (a), to request a hearing, or to appear in response to a citation or violation notice. The notice to appear calls upon the defendant to appear before a magistrate on a certain date, but may also afford the defendant a further opportunity to utilize the convenient alternative of forfeiting colateral in lieu of making an appearance. Moreover, the notice may be served simply by sending a copy to defendant's last known address. The defendant's non-compliance with the notice to appear carriers no immediate adverse consequences; an arrest warrant may not issue merely because of nonappearance following this notice, as the notice itself issued without a probable cause determination.

A summons, on the other hand, may be issued only by a magistrate, and only upon a showing of probable cause supported by oath. It is to be served in the same manner as a Fed.R.Crim.P. 4 summons. Because probable cause must be established before the summons issues, the magistrate may summarily issue a warrant for the defendant's arrest if the defendant fails to appear when summoned.

New rule 4, by expressly recognizing both a notice to appear and a summons as permissible follow-up proce

dures, provides needed flexibility. In some localities or on some occasions, the notice-to-appear device may prove to be the best alternative, as such a notice may issue without a case-by-case probable cause determination and may be served without difficulty. Elsewhere or on other occasions, the circumstances may make the summons alternative more appropriate. It is permissible to use them in tandem; that is, a defendant who failed to respond to a notice to appear might then be served with a summons rather than an arrest warrant, as he might take more seriously the latter, more formal directive to appear. It must be emphasized, however, that rule 4 does not grant any right to a defendant to be dealt with in this sequence. Provided the requirements of subdivision (c) are met, a summons may issue without prior resort to the notice-to-appear alternative, and a warrant may issue without first trying the summons alternative. Pursuant to the first sentence of subdivision (c), the magistrate may ordinarily decide on his own whether a warrant or summons is most appropriate; it is only in the exceptional case in which the U.S. Attorney requests a warrant that the magistrate may not resort to the summons alternative. This departure from the policy of Fed.R..Crim.P. 4(a), whereunder a warrant is to issue unless a summons is requested, is justified by the fact that the U.S. Attorney will often not be involved in these minor cases.

By expressly recognizing both a notice to appear and a summons as follow-up alternatives and further providing that only the latter (i) requires a probable cause showing and (ii) permits summary issuance of a warrant upon defendant's nonappearance, new Rule 4 ensures that the follow-up procedures are not vulnerable to attack on Fourth Amendment grounds.

If a summons could be issued on an information not supported by oath, and a warrant then issued for failure to appear in response to the summons, the end result would be that defendant could be arrested on warrant though there had never been a showing under oath of probable cause. This is not permissible.

1 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 151 at 342 (1969). See also United States v. Millican, supra (probable cause required for summons under Fed.R.Crim.P. 9); United States v. Greenberg, supra (probable cause required for summons under Fed.R.Crim.P. 4). While it is said in United States v. Evans, 574 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1978), that a bench warrant issued solely on the basis of the defendant's failure to appear on a traffic citation "is clearly valid and based on probable cause," it is significant that this comment was made with respect to practice in a state where such nonappearance is itself a criminal offense. That is not true in the federal system. 18 U.S.C. § 3150.

As previously noted, issuance of either a summons or an arrest warrant requires a showing of probable cause under oath. If that showing could be made only by the police officer who earlier issued the citation or violation notice now appearing in person before the magistrate, the result would be a most inefficient use of scarce law enforcement resources. However, the Fourth Amendment does not require such an appearance, nor does new rule 4(c), which expressly recognizes that "the affiant need not appear before the magistrate." This means that a magistrate may issue an arrest warrant or a summons under subdivision (c) merely by reviewing a document which the officer completed on an earlier occasion (most likely at the time the officer gave the citation to the defendant). Such a procedure is constitutionally permissible provided that this document is prepared in such a way that it conforms to two important Fourth Amendment requirements: (i) that the warrant be upon probable cause "supported by Oath or affirmation"; and (ii) that the magistrate himself decide the probable cause

OF MISDEMEANORS BEFORE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATES

issue based upon facts, and not merely conclusions, supplied to him.

It is clear that the Fourth Amendment oath requirement does not require a personal appearance of the affiant before the magistrate issuing the warrant; “it is the oath itself and not the face-to-face confrontation which is mandated by and which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment requirement." State v. Cymerman, 135 N.J.Super. 591, 343 A.2d 825 (1975). This means, for example, that a warrant may constitutionally issue upon sworn oral testimony communicated by telephone or similar means, as is authorized by Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(c)(2). See United States v. Turner, 558 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1977); People v. Peck, 38 Cal.App.3d 993, 113 Cal.Rptr. 806 (1974); State v. Cymerman, supra; Advisory Committee Note to 1977 amendment to Fed.R.Crim.P. 41.

Indeed, the Fourth Amendment does not require that an oath be administered by the magistrate issuing the warrant or, for that matter, by some other person such as a notary public. Rather, the "true test" as to whether the Fourth Amendment oath requirement has been met is whether the procedures followed were such "that perjury could be charged therein if any material allegation contained therein is false." Simons v. State, 515 P.2d 1161 (Okla.Crim.1973). See also United States v. Turner, supra (variation from usual oath-taking procedures constitutionally permissible provided "the legal significance of the undertaking remains the same"); United States ex rel. Pugh v. Pate, 401 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1968) (false-name affidavit unconstitutional because "someone must take the responsibility for the facts alleged"; court appears to assume false name would bar perjury prosecution); State ex rel. Purcell v. Superior Court, 109 Ariz. 460, 511 P.2d 642 (1973) (unsworn uniform traffic ticket and complaint sufficient as charge under state law, but if it is to be used to obtain an arrest warrant then it is necessary that "the officer's certification of the complaint is done under the penalty of perjury"); State v. Cymerman, supra (what constitution requires is procedure whereby officer could not "avoid the sanction for perjury or false swearing by supplying false information"); State v. Douglas, 71 Wash.2d 303, 428 P.2d 535 (1967) (all the formalities of swearing not necessary if enough was done so that the officer "could be held responsible if the statements in the affidavit he signed had been false").

This means, therefore, that if a magistrate receives a document which by its form and manner of preparation could be the basis of a criminal prosecution of the maker if the material facts alleged therein were known by him to be false, the magistrate may constitutionally issue a warrant based upon that document without having the maker appear before him or otherwise communicate with him further. Illustrative is In re Walters, 15 Cal.3d 738, 126 Cal.Rptr. 239, 543 P.2d 607 (1975) holding that a magistrate's finding of probable cause required by the Fourth Amendment was properly based upon "arrest and follow-up reports [which] were written and signed by the arresting officer under penalty of perjury." In the federal system, this "penalty of perjury" requirement can be met by complying with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, which reads:

Wherever, under any law of the United States or under any rule, regulation, order, or requirement made pursuant to law, any matter is required or permitted to be supported, evidenced, established, or proved by the sworn declaration, verification, certificate, statement, oath, or affidavit, in writing of the person making the same (other than a deposition, or an oath of office, or an oath required to be taken before a specified official other than a notary public), such matter may, with like force and effect, be supported, evidenced, established, or proved by

the unsworn declaration, certificate, verification, or statement, in writing of such person which is subscribed by him, as true under penalty of perjury, and dated, in substantially the following form:

(2) If executed within the United States, its territories, possessions or commonwealths: "I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on (date)."

Assuming now that the document submitted to the magistrate meets the oath requirement of the Fourth Amendment in the manner just described, it will still not meet constitutional requirements unless the form of the document is such that it communicates facts and not just conclusions. The Fourth Amendment requirement of probable cause for issuance of an arrest warrant means that before such a warrant may constitutionally issue it is necessary "that the judicial officer issuing such a warrant be supplied with sufficient information to support an independent judgment that probable cause exists for the warrant." Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971). This is not the case when the document supplied to the magistrate merely sets out the officer's conclusion that a specified person has committed a specified offense. Whiteley v. Warden, supra; Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958).

The Uniform Traffic Ticket and Complaint is commonly utilized in state traffic law enforcement. Some have urged that it be adopted for use in federal traffic enforcement as well, while others have noted that certain citation and violation notice forms currently utilized in the federal system for charging minor offenses are in many respects similar to it. This being the case, it must be emphasized that issuance of either an arrest warrant or a summons under rule 4(c) in the manner heretofore described requires a somewhat different type of document. For one thing, the Uniform Traffic Ticket and Complaint or any comparable document which merely identifies the offense charged cannot be used alone to establish probable cause, as it "amounts to nothing more than a mere conclusionary assertion by the complaining officer that defendant committed the offense charged." State v. Miernik, 284 Minn. 316, 170 N.W.2d 231 (1969). For another, in order to comply with the Fourth Amendment oath requirement without the necessity of the officer appearing before the magistrate or some other official, the language specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1746 should be utilized.

Thus, in order to take advantage of the simplified procedure in rule 4(c), any complaint, citation or violation notice forms which are to be used as a basis for warrant or summons issuance should be revised (or "amended" by a hand stamp, as is now being done in some localities) to include essentially the following: On 19, while exercising my duties as enforcement officer at or

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OF MISDEMEANORS BEFORE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATES

I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this

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Proceedings under these rules shall be taken down by a reporter or recorded by suitable sound recording equipment. In the discretion of the magistrate or, in the case of a misdemeanor other than a petty offense, on timely request of either party as provided by local rule, the proceedings shall be taken down by a reporter. With the written consent of the defendant, the keeping of a verbatim record may be waived in petty offense cases.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES

The first sentence of rule 5 is broader than rules 2(d)(3) and 3(c)(2) of the 1971 Magistrates Rules, both of which apply to trial proceedings only. The change reflects the fact that it is often desirable to make a record of other proceedings, such as an evidentiary hearing on a motion. Making a record encourages greater formality and dignity in the conduct of the proceedings, and provides the basis for meaningful appeal.

The second sentence recognizes that the magistrate in his discretion may require that the proceedings be taken down by a reporter. A magistrate might well conclude that use of sound recording equipment would be insufficient when, for example, the case is to be tried before a jury or is likely to be appealed in the event of a conviction. The second sentence also recognizes that, in cases involving more than a petty offense, the parties should be entitled upon timely request to a record made by a reporter.

In recognizing that a defendant in a petty offense case may waive the keeping of a verbatim record, the third sentence of rule 5 conforms to rule 3(c)(2) of the 1971 Magistrates Rules. However, the rule does not contemplate the routine obtaining of waivers in petty offense cases. While it is desirable to permit the defendant in a petty offense case to avoid delay by waiving the making of a verbatim record when, e.g., recording equipment is temporarily not functioning, absent such exigent circumstances there should be no need to seek a waiver of the recording requirement.

Rule 6. New Trial

The magistrate, on motion of a defendant, may grant a new trial if required in the interest of justice. The magistrate may vacate the judgment if entered, take additional testimony, and direct the entry of a new judgment. A motion for a new trial based on the ground of newly discovered evidence may be made only before or within two years after final judgment, but if an appeal is pending the magistrate may grant the

motion only on remand of the case. A motion for a new trial based on any other grounds shall be made within 7 days after a finding of guilty or within such further time as the magistrate may fix during the 7-day period.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES

Rule 6 is identical to rule 7 in the 1971 Magistrates Rules, except that the time within which a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence may be made has been changed to two years so as to conform to Fed.R.Crim.P. 33. This subject matter has been retained in the magistrates rules to emphasize this change. By comparison, a motion to withdraw a plea is not dealt with in these rules. By virtue of rule 1(b), Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(d) will apply except for petty of fenses for which no sentence of imprisonment will be imposed, and as to those offenses rule 1(b) permits resort to Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(d).

Rule 7. Appeal

(a) INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL. A decision or order by a magistrate which, if made by a judge of the district court, could be appealed by the govenrnent or defendant under any provision of law, shall be subject to an appeal to a judge of the district court provided such appeal is taken within 10 days of the entry of the decision or order. An appeal shall be taken by filing with the clerk of the district court a statement specifying the decision or order from which an appeal is taken, and by serving a copy of the statement upon the adverse party, personally or by mail, and by filing a copy with the magistrate.

(b) APPEAL FROM CONVICTION. An appeal from a judgment of conviction by a magistrate to a judge of the district court shall be taken within 10 days after entry of the judgment. An appeal shall be taken by filing with the clerk of the district court a statement specifying the judgment from which an appeal is taken, and by serving a copy of the statement upon the United States Attorney, personally or by mail, and by filing a copy with the magistrate.

(c) RECORD. The record shall consist of the original papers and exhibits in the case together with any transcript, tape, or other recording of the proceedings and a certified copy of the docket entries which shall be transmitted promptly by the magistrate to the clerk of the district court. For purposes of the appeal, a copy of the record of such proceedings shall be made available at the expense of the United States to a person who establishes by affidavit that he is unable to pay or give security therefor, and the expense of such copy shall be paid by the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.

(d) STAY OF EXECUTION; RELEASE PENDING APPEAL. The provisions of Rule 38(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure relating to stay of execution shall be applicable to a judgment of conviction entered by a magistrate. The defendant may be released pending appeal by the magistrate or a district judge in accordance with the provisions of law relating to release pending appeal from a judgment of conviction of a district court.

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(e) SCOPE OF APPEAL. The defendant shall not be entitled to a trial de novo by a judge of the district court. The scope of appeal shall be the same as on an appeal from a judgment of a district court to a court of appeals.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES Subdividion (a) of new rule 7 deals with those decisions or orders of a magistrate (e.g., the granting of a pretrial motion to suppress evidence) which, if made by a judge of the district court, could be appealed by the government (e.g., the granting of a pretrial motion to suppress evidence) or the defendant (e.g., denial of a motion to dismiss the charge on double jeopardy grounds, Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977). Rule 5 of the 1971 Magistrates Rules, dealing only with appeal by the government, provided that such a decision or order "shall be subject to rehearing de novo by a judge of the district court upon motion for such rehearing filed with the magistrate by the attorney for the government within 10 days after entry of the order." That provision, because it provided for a de nove rehearing by a district judge rather than appeal to a judge, was inconsistent with the adjudicatory authority of magistrates in cases lying within their own trial jurisdiction. Consequently, it has been modified so as to provide for interlocutory appeal and has been relocated with the other appeal provisions. Subdivisions (b) through (e) are virtually unchanged from their counterparts in the 1971 rules, subdivisions (a) through (d) of rule 8. Subdivision (b), as does subdivision (a), now provides that appeal is to be taken by filing the notice of appeal with the clerk of court rather than the magistrate, as this will facilitate prompt action by the clerk to get the case into the assignment system.

Although the first sentence of subdivision (c) continues the requirement that the magistrate transmit the record to the clerk, it must be noted that the magistrate is a part of the district court and that the clerk may be keeping the record for the magistrate, in which case there may be no reason to "transmit” anything. If there are several trials on a single tape, it is permissible to transmit a certified copy of the portion of the tape relating to the case appealed. The last sentence of new subdivision (c) replaces a sentence which merely stated: "Any expense in connection therewith shall be borne by the government." This change makes the rules consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 3401(e),

which requires a showing of indigency in order for the Director to pay transcript costs. The language should not be read as depriving the magistrate of the authority to determine if the affidavit is bona fide and sufficient.

Rule 8. Local Rules

Rules adopted by a district court for the conduct of trials before magistrates shall not be inconsistent with these rules. Copies of all rules made by a district court shall, upon their promulgation, be filed with the clerk of the district court and furnished to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES

Rule 8 is identical to subdivision (a) of rule 11 in the 1971 Magistrates Rules.

Subdivision (b) of the 1971 Rules (reading: "If no procedure is especially prescribed by rule, the magistrate may proceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules or with an applicable statute") has not been retained. That language has been the cause of some confusion among magistrates, especially as to the applicability of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to proceedings before magistrates. That issue is now dealt with more directly in new rule 1.

Rule 9. Definition

As used in these rules, "petty offense" has the meaning set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 19. (Added Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, title II, § 216(a), 98 Stat. 2017, and amended Nov. 18, 1988, Pub. L. 100-690, title VII, § 7089(b), 102 Stat. 4409.)

1988 AMENDMENT

Pub. L. 100-690 amended Rule generally, substituting "has the meaning set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 19" for "means a Class B or C misdemeanor or an infraction".

EFFECTIVE DATE

Rule effective Nov. 1, 1987, and applicable only to offenses committed after the taking effect of this rule, see section 235(a)(1) of Pub. L. 98-473, set out as a note under section 3551 of this title.

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