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basic programming service of a particular na- primary transmission made by a superstation or tional network.
a network station may be made without obtain(4) PRIMARY TRANSMISSION.—The term “pri- ing the consent of the copyright owner. mary transmission" has the meaning given that term in section 111(f) of this title.
(Added Pub. L. 100-667, title II, § 202(2), Nov. (5) PRIVATE HOME VIEWING.–The term “pri
16, 1988, 102 Stat. 3949.) vate home viewing" means the viewing, for
TERMINATION OF SECTION private use in a household by means of satellite reception equipment which is operated by
For termination of section by section 207 an individual in that household and which
of Pub. L. 100-667, see Effective and Termiserves only such household, of a secondary
nation Dates note below. transmission delivered by a satellite carrier of
REFERENCES IN TEXT a primary transmission of a television station
For effective date of the Satellite Home Viewer Act licensed by the Federal Communications Commission.
of 1988, referred to in subsec. (a)(2)C), see section 206
of Pub. L. 100-667 set out as an Effective and Termi(6) SATELLITE CARRIER.—The term "satellite
nation Dates note below. carrier" means an entity that uses the facili
The date of the enactment of the Satellite Home ties of a satellite or satellite service licensed
Viewer Act of 1988, referred to in subsec. (a)(5XC), is by the Federal Communications Commission, the date of enactment of Pub. L. 100-667, which was to establish and operate a channel of commu- approved Nov. 16, 1988. nications for point-to-multipoint distribution The Communications Act of 1934, referred to in of television station signals, and that owns or
subsec. (d)(6), is act June 19, 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. leases a capacity or service on a satellite in
1064, as amended, which is classified principa'y to
chapter 5 ($ 151 et seq.) of Title 47, Telegraphs, Teleorder to provide such point-to-multipoint dis
phones, and Radiotelegraphs. For complete classificatribution, except to the extent that such
tion of this Act to the Code, see section 609 of Title 47 entity provides such distribution pursuant to
and Tables. tariff under the Communications Act of 1934, other than for private home viewing.
EFFECTIVE AND TERMINATION DATES (7) SECONDARY TRANSMISSION.—The term
Section 206 of title II of Pub. L. 100-667 provided “secondary transmission” has the meaning that: “This title and the amendments made by this given that term in section 111(f) of this title. title (enacting section 119 of this title and sections 612
(8) SUBSCRIBER.—The term "subscriber" and 613 of Title 47, Telegraphs, Telephones, and Rameans an individual who receives a secondary diotelegraphs, amending sections 111, 501, 801, and 804 transmission service for private home viewing of this title and section 605 of Title 47, and enacting by means of a secondary transmission from a
provisions set out as notes under sections 101 and 119 satellite carrier and pays a fee for the service,
of this title) take effect on January 1, 1989, except directly or indirectly, to the satellite carrier
that the authority of the Register of Copyrights to
issue regulations pursuant to section 119(b)(1) of title or to a distributor.
17, United States Code, as added by section 202 of this (9) SUPERSTATION.—The term "superstation"
Act, takes effect on the date of the enactment of this means a television broadcast station, other Act (Nov. 16, 1988)." than a network station, licensed by the Feder- Section 207 of title II of Pub. L. 100-667 provided al Communications Commission that is sec- that: “This title and the amendments made by this ondarily transmitted by a satellite carrier. title (other than the amendments made by section 205 (10) UNSERVED HOUSEHOLD.-The term "un
(amending section 605 of Title 471) cease to be effecserved household", with respect to a particu
tive on December 31, 1994.” lar television network, means a household
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS that(A) cannot receive, through the use of a
This section is referred to in sections 111, 501, 801, conventional outdoor rooftop receiving an
804 of this title; title 47 section 613. tenna, an over-the-air signal of grade B in
CHAPTER 2-COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP AND tensity (as defined by the Federal Commu
TRANSFER nications Commission) of a primary network station affiliated with that network, and
201. Ownership of copyright. (B) has not, within 90 days before the 202. Ownership of copyright as distinct from date on which that household subscribes,
ownership of material object. either initially or on renewal, to receive sec
203. Termination of transfers and licenses grant
ed by the author. ondary transmissions by a satellite carrier
204. Execution of transfers of copyright owner. of a network station affiliated with that
ship. network, subscribed to a cable system that
205. Recordation of transfers and other docuprovides the signal of a primary network
ments. station affiliated with that network.
CHAPTER REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS (e) EXCLUSIVITY OF THIS SECTION WITH RESPECT TO SECONDARY TRANSMISSIONS OF BROAD
This chapter is referred to in section 912 of this title. CAST STATIONS BY SATELLITE TO MEMBERS OF THE
8 201. Ownership of copyright PUBLIC.-No provision of section 111 of this title or any other law (other than this section) shall (a) INITIAL OWNERSHIP.—Copyright in a work be construed to contain any authorization, ex- protected under this title vests initially in the emption, or license through which secondary author or authors of the work. The authors of transmissions by satellite carrier for private a joint work are coowners of copyright in the home viewing of programming contained in a work.
(b) WORKS MADE FOR HIRE.—In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.
(c) CONTRIBUTIONS TO COLLECTIVE WORKS.Copyright in each separate contribution to a collective work is distinct from copyright in the collective work as a whole, and vests initially in the author of the contribution. In the absence of an express transfer of the copyright or of any rights under it, the owner of copyright in the collective work is presumed to have acquired only the privilege of reproducing and distributing the contribution as part of that particular collective work, any revision of that collective work, and any later collective work in the same series. (d) TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP.
(1) The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may be bequeathed by will or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate succession.
(2) Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including any subdivision of any of the rights specified by section 106, may be transferred as provided by clause (1) and owned separately. The owner of any particular exclusive right is entitled, to the extent of that right, to all of the protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner by this title.
(e) INVOLUNTARY TRANSFER.-When an individual author's ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, has not previously been transferred voluntarily by that individual author, no action by any governmental body or other official or organization purporting to seize, expropriate, transfer, or exercise rights of ownership with respect to the copyright, or any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, shall be given effect under this title, except as provided under title 11. (Pub. L. 94-553, title I, § 101, Oct. 19, 1976, 90 Stat. 2568; Pub. L. 95-598, title III, § 313, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2676.)
music of a song). The definition of "joint work" is to be contrasted with the definition of "collective work," also in section 101, in which the elements of merger and unity are lacking: there the key elements are assemblage or gathering of "separate and independent works ... into a collective whole."
The definition of "joint works" has prompted some concern lest it be construed as converting the authors of previously written works, such as plays, novels, and music, into coauthors of a motion picture in which their work is incorporated. It is true that a motion picture would normally be a joint rather than a collective work with respect to those authors who actually work on the film, although their usual status as employees for hire would keep the question of coownership from coming up. On the other hand, although a novelist, playwright, or songwriter may write a work with the hope or expectation that it will be used in a motion picture, this is clearly a case of separate or independent authorship rather than one where the basic intention behind the writing of the work was for motion picture use. In this case, the motion picture is a derivative work within the definition of that term, and section 103 makes plain that copyright in a derivative work is independent of, and does not enlarge the scope of rights in, any preexisting material incorporated in it. There is thus no need to spell this conclusion out in the definition of “joint work."
There is also no need for a specific statutory provision concerning the rights and duties of the coowners of a work; court-made law on this point is left undisturbed. Under the bill, as under the present law, coowners of a copyright would be treated generally as tenants in common, with each coowner having an independent right to use or license the use of a work, subject to a duty of accounting to the other coowners for any profits.
Works Made for Hire. Section 201(b) of the bill adopts one of the basic principles of the present law: that in the case of works made for hire the employer is considered the author of the work, and is regarded as the initial owner of copyright unless there has been an agreement otherwise. The subsection also requires that any agreement under which the employee is to own rights be in writing and signed by the parties.
The work-made-for-hire provisions of this bill represent a carefully balanced compromise, and as such they do not incorporate the amendments proposed by screenwriters and composers for motion pictures. Their proposal was for the recognition of something similar to the "shop right" doctrine of patent law: with some exceptions, the employer would acquire the right to use the employee's work to the extent needed for purposes of his regular business, but the employee would retain all other rights as long as he or she refrained from the authorizing of competing uses. However, while this change might theoretically improve the bargaining position of screenwriters and others as a group, the practical benefits that individual authors would receive are highly conjectural. The presumption that initial ownership rights vest in the employer for hire is well established in American copyright law, and to exchange that for the uncertainties of the shop right doctrine would not only be of dubious value to employers and employees alike, but might also reopen a number of other issues.
The status of works prepared on special order or commission was a major issue in the development of the definition of “works made for hire" in section 101, which has undergone extensive revision during the legislative process. The basic problem is how to draw a statutory line between those works written on special order or commission that should be considered as "works made for hire," and those that should not. The definition now provided by the bill represents a compromise which, in effect, spells out those specific categories of commissioned works that can be considered "works made for hire" under certain circumstances.
HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES
HOUSE REPORT NO. 94-1476 Initial Ownership. Two basic and well-established principles of copyright law are restated in section 201(a): that the source of copyright ownership is the author of the work, and that, in the case of a “joint work,” the coauthors of the work are likewise coowners of the copyright. Under the definition of section 101, a work is “joint” if the authors collaborated with each other, or if each of the authors prepared his or her contribution with the knowledge and intention that it would be merged with the contributions of other authors as "inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole." The touchstone here is the intention, at the time the writing is done, that the parts be absorbed or combined into an integrated unit, although the parts themselves may be either “inseparable" (as the case of a novel or painting) or "interdependent" (as in the case of a motion picture, opera, or the words and
of these, one of the most important categories is that of "instructional texts." This term is given its own definition in the bill: “a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publication with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities." The concept is intended to include what might be loosely called "textbook material," whether or not in book form or prepared in the form of text matter. The basic characteristic of "instructional texts" is the purpose of their preparation for “use in systematic instructional activities,” and they are to be distinguished from works prepared for use by a general readership.
Contributions to Collective Works. Subsection (c) of section 201 deals with the troublesome problem of ownership of copyright in contributions to collective works, and the relationship between copyright ownership in a contribution and in the collective work in which it appears. The first sentence establishes the basic principle that copyright in the individual contribution and copyright in the collective work as a whole are separate and distinct, and that the author of the contribution is, as in every other case, the first owner of copyright in it. Under the definitions in section 101, a "col. lective work" is a species of "compilation” and, by its nature, must involve the selection, assembly, and arrangement of "a number of contributions." Examples of "collective works" would ordinarily include periodi. cal issues, anthologies, symposia, and collections of the discrete writings of the same authors, but not cases, such as a composition consisting of words and music, & work published with illustrations or front matter, or three one-act plays, where relatively few separate elements have been brought together. Unlike the contents of other types of “compilations," each of the contributions incorporated in a “collective work" must itself constitute a "separate and independent” work, therefore ruling out compilations of information or other uncopyrightable material and works published with editorial revisions or annotations. Moreover, as noted above, there is a basic distinction between a "joint work," where the separate elements merge into a unified whole, and a “collective work," where they remain unintegrated and disparate.
The bill does nothing to change the rights of the owner of copyright in a collective work under the present law. These exclusive rights extend to the elements of compilation and editing that went into the collective work as a whole, as well as the contributions that were written for hire by employees of the owner of the collective work, and those copyrighted contributions that have been transferred in writing to the owner by their authors. However, one of the most significant aims of the bill is to clarify and improve the present confused and frequently unfair legal situation with respect to rights in contributions.
The second sentence of section 201(c), in conjunction with the provisions of section 404 dealing with copyright notice, will preserve the author's copyright in a contribution even if the contribution, does not bear a separate notice in the author's name, and without requiring any unqualified transfer of rights to the owner of the collective work. This is coupled with a presumption that, unless there has been an express transfer of more, the owner of the collective work acquires, "only the privilege of reproducing and distributing the contribution as part of that particular collective work, any revision of that collective work, and any later collective work in the same series.”
The basic presumption of section 201(c) is fully consistent with present law and practice, and represents a fair balancing of equities. At the same time, the last clause of the subsection, under which the privilege of republishing the contribution under certain limited circumstances would be presumed, is an essential counterpart of the basic presumption. Under the language of this clause a publishing company could reprint a contribution from one issue in a later issue of its magazine, and could reprint an article from a 1980 edition of an encyclopedia in a 1990 revision of it; the publisher could not revise the contribution itself or in
clude it in a new anthology or an entirely different magazine or other collective work.
Transfer of Ownership. The principle of unlimited alienability of copyright is stated in clause (1) of section 201(d). Under that provision the ownership of a copyright, or of any part of it, may be transferred by any means of conveyance or by operation of law, and is to be treated as personal property upon the death of the owner. The term "transfer of copyright ownership" is defined in section 101 to cover any "conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation," including assignments, mortgages, and exclusive licenses, but not including nonexclusive licenses. Representatives of motion picture producers have argued that foreclosures of copyright mortgages should not be left to varying State laws, and that the statute should establish a Federal foreclosure system. However, the benefits of such a system would be of very limited application, and would not justify the complicated statutory and procedural requirements that would have to be established.
Clause (2) of subsection (d) contains the first explicit statutory recognition of the principle of divisibility of copyright in our law. This provision, which has long been sought by authors and their representatives, and which has attracted wide support from other groups, means that any of the exclusive rights that go to make up a copyright, including those enumerated in section 106 and any subdivision of them, can be transferred and owned separately. The definition of "transfer of copyright ownership" in section 101 makes clear that the principle of divisibility applies whether or not the transfer is “limited in time or place of effect," and another definition in the same section provides that the term “copyright owner," with respect to any one exclusive right, refers to the owner of that particular right. The last sentence of section 201(d)(2) adds that the owner, with respect to the particular exclusive right he or she owns, is entitled “to all of the protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner by this title.” is thus clear, for example, that a local broadcasting station holding an exclusive license to transmit a particular work within a particular geographic area and for a particular period of time, could sue, in its own name as copyright owner, someone who infringed that particular exclusive right.
Subsection (e) provides that when an individual author's ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, have not previously been voluntarily transferred, no action by any governmental body or other official or organization purporting to seize, expropriate, transfer, or exercise rights of ownership with respect to the copyright, or any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, shall be given effect under this title.
The purpose of this subsection is to reaffirm the basic principle that the United States copyright of an individual author shall be secured to that author, and cannot be taken away by any involuntary transfer. It is the intent of the subsection that the author be entitled, despite any purported expropriation or involuntary transfer, to continue exercising all rights under the United States statute, and that the governmental body or organization may not enforce or exercise any rights under this title in that situation.
It may sometimes be difficult to ascertain whether a transfer of copyright is voluntary or is coerced by covert pressure. But subsection (e) would protect foreign authors against laws and decrees purporting to divest them of their rights under the United States copyright statute, and would protect authors within the foreign country who choose to resist such covert pressures.
Traditional legal actions that may involve transfer of ownership, such as bankruptcy proceedings and mortgage foreclosures, are not within the scope of this subsection; the authors in such cases have voluntarily consented to these legal processes by their overt ac
tions-for example, by filing in bankruptcy or by hypothecating a copyright.
AMENDMENTS 1978–Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 95-598 inserted “, except as provided under title 11".
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1978 AMENDMENT Amendment effective Oct. 1, 1979, see section 402(a) of Pub. L. 95-598 set out as an Effective Date note preceding section 101 of Title 11, Bankruptcy.
CROSS REFERENCES Copyright not capital asset, see section 1221 of Title 26, Internal Revenue Code.
Ownership by Government, see section 105 of this title.
8 202. Ownership of copyright as distinct from owner.
ship of material object Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied. Transfer of ownership of any material object, including the copy or phonorecord in which the work is first fixed, does not of itself convey any rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the object; nor, in the absence of an agreement, does transfer of ownership of a copyright or of any exclusive rights under a copyright convey property rights in any material object. (Pub. L. 94-553, title I, $ 101, Oct. 19, 1976, 90 Stat. 2568.)
HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES
(1) In the case of a grant executed by one author, termination of the grant may be effected by that author or, if the author is dead, by the person or persons who, under clause (2) of this subsection, own and are entitled to exercise a total of more than one-half of that author's termination interest. In the case of a grant executed by two or more authors of a joint work, termination of the grant may be effected by a majority of the authors who executed it; if any of such authors is dead, the termination interest of any such author may be exercised as a unit by the person or persons who, under clause (2) of this subsection, own and are entitled to exercise a total of more than one-half of that author's interest.
(2) Where an author is dead, his or her termination interest is owned, and may be exercised, by his widow or her widower and his or her children or grandchildren as follows:
(A) the widow or widower owns the author's entire termination interest unless there are any surviving children or grandchildren of the author, in which case the widow or widower owns one-half of the author's interest;
(B) the author's surviving children, and the surviving children of any dead child of the author, own the author's entire termination interest unless there is a widow or widower, in which case the ownership of one-half of the author's interest is divided among them;
(C) the rights of the author's children and grandchildren are in all cases divided among them and exercised on a per stirpes basis according to the number of such author's children represented; the share of the children of a dead child in a termination interest can be exercised only by the action of a majority of them.
(3) Termination of the grant may be effected at any time during a period of five years beginning at the end of thirty-five years from the date of execution of the grant; or, if the grant covers the right of publication of the work, the period begins at the end of thirtyfive years from the date of publication of the work under the grant or at the end of forty years from the date of execution of the grant, whichever term ends earlier.
(4) The termination shall be effected by serving an advance notice in writing, signed by the number and proportion of owners of termination interests required under clauses (1) and (2) of this subsection, or by their duly authorized agents, upon the grantee or the grantee's successor in title.
(A) The notice shall state the effective date of the termination, which shall fall within the five-year period specified by clause (3) of this subsection, and the notice shall be served not less than two or more than ten years before that date. A copy of the notice shall be recorded in the Copyright Office before the effective date of termination, as a condition to its taking effect.
(B) The notice shall comply, in form, content, and manner of service, with require
HOUSE REPORT NO. 94-1476
The principle restated in section 202 is a fundamental and important one: that copyright ownership and ownership of a material object in which the copyrighted work is embodied are entirely separate things. Thus, transfer of a material object does not of itself carry any rights under the copyright, and this includes transfer of the copy or phonorecord-the original manuscript, the photographic negative, the unique painting or statue, the master tape recording, etc.-in which the work was first fixed. Conversely, transfer of a copyright does not necessarily require the convey. ance of any material object.
As a result of the interaction of this section and the provisions of section 204(a) and 301, the bill would change a common law doctrine exemplified by the decision in Pushman v. New York Graphic Society, Inc., 287 N.Y. 302, 39 N.E.2d 249 (1942). Under that doctrine, authors or artists are generally presumed to transfer common law literary property rights when they sell their manuscript or work of art, unless those rights are specifically reserved. This presumption would be reversed under the bill, since a specific written conveyance of rights would be required in order for a sale of any material object to carry with it a transfer of copyright.
8 203. Termination of transfers and licenses granted
by the author (a) CONDITIONS FOR TERMINATION.-In the case of any work other than a work made for hire, the exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of copyright or of any right under a copyright, executed by the author on or after January 1, 1978, otherwise than by will, is subject to termination under the following conditions:
(Pub. L. 94-553, title I, § 101, Oct. 19, 1976, 90 Stat. 2569.)
HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES
HOUSE REPORT NO. 94-1476
ments that the Register of Copyrights shall prescribe by regulation.
(5) Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, including an agreement to make a will or to make any future grant.
(b) EFFECT OF TERMINATION.-Upon the effective date of termination, all rights under this title that were covered by the terminated grants revert to the author, authors, and other persons owning termination interests under clauses (1) and (2) of subsection (a), including those owners who did not join in signing the notice of termination under clause (4) of subsection (a), but with the following limitations:
(1) A derivative work prepared under authority of the grant before its termination may continue to be utilized under the terms of the grant after its termination, but this privilege does not extend to the preparation after the termination of other derivative works based upon the copyrighted work covered by the terminated grant.
(2) The future rights that will revert upon termination of the grant become vested on the date the notice of termination has been served as provided by clause (4) of subsection (a). The rights vest in the author, authors, and other persons named in, and in the proportionate shares provided by, clauses (1) and (2) of subsection (a).
(3) Subject to the provisions of clause (4) of this subsection, a further grant, or agreement to make a further grant, of any right covered by a terminated grant is valid only if it is signed by the same number and proportion of the owners, in whom the right has vested under clause (2) of this subsection, as are required to terminate the grant under clauses (1) and (2) of subsection (a). Such further grant or agreement is effective with respect to all of the persons in whom the right it covers has vested under clause (2) of this subsection, including those who did not join in signing it. If any person dies after rights under a terminated grant have vested in him or her, that person's legal representatives, legatees, or heirs at law represent him or her for purposes of this clause.
(4) A further grant, or agreement to make a further grant, of any right covered by a terminated grant is valid only if it is made after the effective date of the termination. As an exception, however, an agreement for such a further grant may be made between the persons provided by clause (3) of this subsection and the original grantee or such grantee's successor in title, after the notice of termination has been served as provided by clause (4) of subsection (a).
(5) Termination of a grant under this section affects only those rights covered by the grants that arise under this title, and in no way affects rights arising under any other Federal, State, or foreign laws.
(6) Unless and until termination is effected under this section, the grant, if it does not provide otherwise, continues in effect for the term of copyright provided by this title.
The Problem in General. The provisions of section 203 are based on the premise that the reversionary provisions of the present section on copyright renewal (17 U.S.C. sec. 24 (section 24 of former title 17]) should be eliminated, and that the proposed law should substitute for them a provision safeguarding authors against unremunerative transfers. A provision of this sort is needed because of the unequal bargaining position of authors, resulting in part from the impossibility of determining a work's value until it has been exploited. Section 203 reflects a practical compromise that will further the objectives of the copyright law while recognizing the problems and legitimate needs of all interests involved.
Scope of the Provision. Instead of being automatic, as is theoretically the case under the present renewal provision, the termination of a transfer or license under section 203 would require the serving of an advance notice within specified time limits and under specified conditions. However, although affirmative action is needed to effect a termination, the right to take this action cannot be waived in advance or contracted away. Under section 203(a) the right of termination would apply only to transfers and licenses executed after the effective date of the new statute [Jan. 1, 1978), and would have no retroactive effect.
The right of termination would be confined to inter vivos transfers or licenses executed by the author, and would not apply to transfers by the author's successors in interest or to the author's own bequests. The scope of the right would extend not only to any “transfer of copyright ownership,” as defined in section 101, but also to nonexclusive licenses. The right of termination would not apply to “works made for hire," which is one of the principal reasons the definition of that term assumed importance in the development of the bill.
Who Can Terminate a Grant. Two issues emerged from the disputes over section 203 as to the persons empowered to terminate a grant: (1) the specific classes of beneficiaries in the case of joint works; and (2) whether anything less than unanimous consent of all those entitled to terminate should be required to make a termination effective. The bill to some extent reflects a compromise on these points, including a recognition of the dangers of one or more beneficiaries being induced to "hold out” and of unknown children or grandchildren being discovered later. The provision can be summarized as follows:
1. In the case of a work of joint authorship, where the grant was signed by two or more of the authors, majority action by those who signed the grant, or by their interests, would be required to terminate it.
2. There are three different situations in which the shares of joint authors, or of dead author's widow or widower, children, and grandchildren, must be divided under the statute: (1) The right to effect a termination; (2) the ownership of the terminated rights; and (3) the right to make further grants of reverted rights. The respective shares of the authors, and of a dead author's widow or widower, children, and grandchildren, would be divided in exactly the same way in each of these situations. The terms "widow," "widower," and "children” are defined in section 101 in an effort to avoid problems and uncertainties that have arisen under the present renewal section.
3. The principle of per stirpes representation would also be applied in exactly the same way in all three situations. Take for example, a case where a dead author left a widow, two living children, and three grandchildren by a third child who is dead. The widow will own half of the reverted interests,