who abandons that State and goes to another to reside permanently, thereby ipso facto loses citizenship in the former State and acquires it in the latter, regardless of his own intention or wishes.3

§ 22. The Legal Situs or Domicil of the Person. - In law, persons are either natural persons, individuals; or artificial persons, corporations. Private international law regards for the most part the domicil of natural persons. The very nature of what is usually termed the "domicil" of corporations differs essentially from that of individuals, and is subject to very different rules. It is manifestly impossible for a mere corporation to possess a permanent home or residence in the same sense as an individual, nor is there usually the same occasion to fix a domicil for it. Many of the transactions, which in the case of an individual must be regulated by the law of his domicil, do not arise at all in the case of corporations, such as most questions of status, the making of wills, the intestate succession to estates, marriage, divorce, etc. But there are some transactions to which a corporation may be a party, just as an individual may be, such as taxation, the conveyance of property, or the making of contracts. In these cases, it sometimes becomes necessary to invoke the aid of some foreign law, corresponding to what would be the law of the domicil, if the party were an individual instead of a corporation. For such purposes (comparatively infrequent), a corporation must be assigned a situs, which is sometimes spoken of as a domicil.1

Dougherty v. Snyder, 15 S. & R. (Penn.) 84, 16 Am. Dec. 520; Firth v. Firth, 50 N. J. Eq. 137, 24 Atl. 916, 917. Owing to this principle, the American courts are more prone than others to use the terms "residence" and "citizenship," as synonymous with domicil. But even in the United States, this only applies to citizens of the United States, not to citizens or subjects of foreign countries. In general, private international law does not concern itself with mere residence or with citizenship. See post, § 66.

1 A section will hereafter be devoted to the situs of corporations. Post, § 67. With respect to associations of persons, not incorporated, such as partnerships, it may be observed that, since their existence as a legal entity is not recognized by the law, neither will the law assign them a distinct situs of their own. See Faulkner v. Hyman, 142 Mass. 53, 55. Such associations are sometimes spoken of as "domiciled or "resident" in a particular place, but what is meant is merely that all the partners or members reside there and

The domicil of natural persons may be divided for the purposes of the subsequent discussion into the following heads: (1) Definition of domicil; (2) Certain general principles touching domicil; and (3) The several kinds of domicil, and the principles governing each. These will be taken up in order. § 23. Definition of Domicil of Natural Persons. - The domicil of a natural person, as used in private international law, may be defined as the State or country where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home.1

The conduct of a man's business, the presence of his family, his voting, the payment of his taxes, etc., are not essential elements of a domicil, but are merely evidences, more or less weighty, of an intention to make the place where these things exist or are done his permanent home. Such circumstances therefore should find no place in the definition.

The definition of domicil above given is very broad, as it must be to cover all the points that may arise. Indeed, owing to the number of points to be covered, there are few terms more difficult to define. As was said in Abington v. N. Bridgewater, "The fact of domicil is often one of the highest importance to a person; it determines his civil and political rights; it fixes his allegiance; it determines his belligerent or neutral character in time of war; it regulates his personal and social relations whilst

that there the firm transacts its business. It is the domicil of the members that is looked to, when that is important, not that of the firm. For instances of the loose employment of these terms, as applied to unincorporated associa tions, see Williams v. Dry Goods Co., 4 Okl. 145, 43 Pac. 1148; Halsted v. Straus, 32 Fed. 279, 280; Long v. Girdwood, 150 Penn. St. 413, 24 Atl. 711, 23 L. R. A. 33.

1 Dicey, Confl. L. 79; Story, Confl. L. § 41; Jopp v. Wood, 4 DeG., J. & S. 616, 622; Mitchell v. United States, 21 Wall. 350; Desmare v. United States, 93 U. S. 605; Guier v. O'Daniel, 1 Binn. (Penn.) 349, note; Price v. Price, 156 Penn. St. 617, 27 Atl. 291; Gilman v. Gilman, 52 Me. 173, 83 Am. Dec. 502; Hairston v. Hairston, 27 Miss. 704, 61 Am. Dec. 530, 532; White v. Tennant, 31 W. Va. 790, 8 S. E. 596; Hart v. Lindsey, 17 N. H. 235, 43 Am. Dec. 597, 601; Steer's Succession, 47 La. Ann. 1551, 18 So. 503.

2 Pearce v. State, 1 Sneed (Tenn.), 63, 60 Am. Dec. 135; Guier v. O'Daniel, 1 Binn. (Penn.) 349, note; Steer's Succession, 47 La. Ann. 1551, 18 So. 503, 506; Shelton v. Tiffin, 6 How. 163.

823 Pick. (Mass.) 170, 176.

he lives, and furnishes the rule for the disposal of his property when he dies. Yet as a question of fact, it is often one of great difficulty, depending sometimes on minute shades of distinction which can hardly be defined."

To every definition proposed some objection may be offered. Thus Story defines domicil to be "the place where a person has his true, fixed, and permanent home and principal establishment, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning." Among the objections to this definition perhaps the most serious one is that it has no application to the constructive domicil of an infant, married woman, or other person incapable in law of exercising a choice with respect to his or her place of abode. The same fault is to be found with most of the definitions that have been proposed.

§ 24. Area of Domicil. Since the domicil, for the purposes of private international law, is the State or country where a party has his permanent home, it is manifest that the term need not be confined to the particular tract of land, town, county, or district, `immediately occupied by him,1 but it also extends to the whole country or State in which he resides, that is, the whole territory over which the sovereignty of the State extends, and controlled therefore by the same system of laws. But it is worthy of notice that the term includes the town, county, or district of residence, as well as the State itself, and that one domiciled in such town, county, or district must also be domiciled in the State of which it forms a part, for the greater includes the less.

2

Eminent authorities have declared it not essential that one domiciled in a particular State or country should also have a fixed residence in any particular spot in that country. Thus, let us suppose a Frenchman comes to England, intending to remain permanently, spending his life traveling from one point to another in England, but residing permanently at no particular spot. According to these authorities, England becomes

♦ Story, Confil. L. § 41.

1 This corresponds to the municipal domicil, but the national or quasinational domicil is more comprehensive.

• Dicey, Confl. L. 91–93; Jac. Dom. § 77.

his permanent home and national domicil, but he is domiciled in no particular town or county in England, he has no municipal domicil there.

Under this view, the Frenchman's municipal domicil, if he has any at all, remains in France. But having ceased altogether to reside in France, and becoming domiciled in England, he cannot be said to reside in any town or county or province of France. We are then driven to the conclusion that he must be held to have no municipal domicil anywhere. This conclusion is in direct contravention of the great weight of authority in the United States and elsewhere, to the effect that a resident of a State must always be held to possess a municipal domicil somewhere in that State.

4

In this country the question is still an open one. In an Illinois case, a woman domiciled in Missouri abandoned that State, with her husband, intending to remove to Illinois and to reside either at Bloomington or Salem. She went to Illinois with her husband, but before they had decided in which town they should settle she died intestate. The laws of Missouri governing the succession to personalty differed from those of Illinois, and the question thereupon arose whether she was domiciled at her death in Illinois or Missouri, the lex domicilii determining the order of succession. The court held her domicil to be Missouri, but based its decision upon the ground that, not having definitely fixed upon either town as a place of residence, there was no sufficient evidence of the parties' intention to reside permanently in Illinois at all. The main point was left undecided.

§ 25. Domicil, the Actual Permanent Home. - Domicil usually conveys the idea of "home" in case of persons sui juris

8 Abington v. N. Bridgewater, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 170; Whitney v. Sherborn, 12 Allen (Mass.), 111; Otis v. Boston, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 44; Crawford v. Wilson, 4 Barb. (N. Y.) 505; Ayer v. Weeks, 65 N. H. 248, 18 Atl. 1108; Shepherd v. Cassiday, 20 Tex. 24, 70 Am. Dec. 372; School Directors v. James, 2 W. & S. (Penn.) 568, 570, 87 Am. Dec. 525; Mills v. Hopkinsville (Ky.), 11 S. W. 776.

4 Cooper v. Beers, 143 Ill. 25, 33 N. E. 61. See Lowry v. Bradley, 1 Speer's Eq. (S. C.) 1, 39 Am. Dec. 142, 145, where the court seems to lean the other

way.

and capable of possessing an actual home of their own, but a home need not necessarily be a domicil.1 "Home" means an actual abode, coupled with the intention of remaining there, but it is not needful that there should be a purpose to remain permanently or for an unlimited time. But when is added to home the notion of permanency and stability, when it becomes a permanent home, there being no present fixed expectation of changing it at any future time, near or remote, the home then becomes a domicil.

Indeed it is too well settled for dispute that a person sui juris, who actually resides and has his home in a given State, is domiciled there, provided he has legally formed an intention to remain there permanently, or for an unlimited or indefinite period; or, to put it somewhat differently, provided he has no present fixed intention of removing therefrom in the future.*

§ 26. Domicil, the Constructive Permanent Home. - There are some cases in which the law will assume that a person has his home in a particular country, though the fact may be far otherwise, and even though the party may never have set foot upon its shores. In these instances a permanent home is implied by construction of law.

These cases arise for the most part (though not always) where the person whose domicil is to be determined is non sui juris, and is therefore deemed legally incapable of forming an intention of permanent residence, or else where from the circumstances of the case the law must presume a purpose to reside in a given country. One may thus be assigned a domicil in a State where he does not actually live.

1 Otis v. Boston, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 44; Steer's Succession, 47 La. Ann. 1551, 18 So. 503.

2 Dicey, Confi. L. 80 et seq.

3 Guier v. O'Daniel, 1 Binn. (Penn.) 349, note; Dupuy v. Wurtz, 53 N. Y. 556; Hairston v. Hairston, 27 Miss. 704, 61 Am. Dec. 530; Gilman v. Gilman, 52 Me. 173, 83 Am. Dec. 502; Allgood v. Williams, 92 Ala. 551, 8 So. 722; White v. Tennant, 31 W. Va. 790, 8 S. E. 596.

4 Putnam v. Johnson, 10 Mass. 488; Hallett v. Bassett, 100 Mass. 167; Price v. Price, 156 Penn. St. 617, 27 Atl. 291; Whitney v. Sherborn, 12 Allen (Mass.), 111; Gilman v. Gilman, 52 Me. 165, 83 Am. Dec. 502. The first mode of expression is the more accurate.