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pleted before the property becomes subject to the new jurisdic tion. This will not be the case if the property, at the time of the transfer, is situated in the latter jurisdiction. Here third persons, resident in the State where the chattels are situated (and in some cases though not residing there), may justly claim that as to them the title has not completely passed out of the original owner until the law of the actual situs of the chattels has also been complied with.

Another prominent example of this principle may be seen in the rules for the determination of the law governing a person's status. Once permanently fixed by the proper law, it is not in general altered by any subsequent change of situs on the part of the individual. Thus, if one be born a bastard, and is subsequently legitimated under the proper law by the intermarriage of his parents, his status as a legitimated child becomes permanent, and will not be altered by the assumption of a new situs, though by the law of the latter a subsequent intermarriage of the parents does not legitimate.

So also, if a marriage is valid by the proper law, it will not in general be rendered invalid by a subsequent removal to a State by whose laws such marriages are invalid. Thus in State v. Ross,' a white woman, domiciled in North Carolina, went into South Carolina to marry a negro resident there. They were married there and lived there for several years, when they removed to North Carolina. Upon a prosecution in North Carolina for lewdness, under a statute of that State absolutely prohibiting the marriage of a white person and a negro, it was

These are the exceptional cases already alluded to, in which the lex fori will prevail over the proper law. The cases illustrating this principle are very numerous, and are collected hereafter. See post, §§ 129, 134, 135. Ref. erence is here made to a few only. Green v. Van Buskirk, 5 Wall. 307; Guillander v. Howell, 35 N. Y. 657; Faulkner v. Hyman, 142 Mass. 53; Catlin v. Plate Co., 123 Ind. 477, 8 L. R. A. 62; Sheldon v. Wheeler, 32 Fed. 773; Sturtevant v. Armsby Co., 66 N. H. 557, 23 Atl. 368.

7 What is the proper law to govern the status will be seen, post, §§ 68

et seq.

Post, §§ 99 et seq.; Miller v. Miller, 91 N. Y. 315; Ross v. Ross, 129 Mass. 243, 247, 256, 37 Am. Rep. 321.

76 N. C. 242, 22 Am. Rep. 678.

held that since both the parties were domiciled, at the time of the marriage, in South Carolina, where such marriages were not illegal, the subsequent removal of the parties to North Carolina, the former home of one of them, should not affect it. The prosecution therefore failed.

So it is also with divorced persons. If validly divorced in the State of their domicil, their status as single persons will thereafter be recognized, whithersoever they may remove. 10

This principle explains in some measure the reluctance shown by the courts to substitute the lex fori for the proper law in cases where they are called upon to enforce executory contracts made abroad. The violation of the policy of the forum entailed by an enforcement of the proper law must be very pronounced to induce them to decline its enforcement. Thus executory contracts relating to lotteries," for the purchase price of slaves, 12 for the sale of intoxicating liquor, 18 contracts forbidden by the usury laws of the forum," and many other contracts of a similar kind, have been enforced in States whose policies strictly prohibit such dealings, because valid by the proper law. Though not expressly stated by the authorities, it is believed that this reluctance to substitute the lex fori for the proper law in these cases is due to the principle that the rights of the parties, once perfected and definitely fixed by the proper law controlling their voluntary agreement, will not be set aside without the gravest consideration and weighty reasons, even though the

10 See post, §§ 89 et seq. Other examples of the same principle, as appli cable to status, may be seen by reference to the following cases: Taylor v. Sharp, 108 N. C. 377, 13 S. E. 168; Cummington v. Belchertown, 149 Mass. 223, 227, 21 N. E. 435; Schluter v. Bank, 117 N. Y. 125, 130, 22 N. E. 572. This principle does not fully apply to status more or less of an unpermanent character, such as the status of guardians, administrators, etc. See post, §§ 102 et seq., 114 et seq.

11 Kentucky v. Bassford, 6 Hill (N. Y.), 526; McIntyre v. Parks, 3 Met. (Mass.) 207; post, § 178.

12 Greenwood v. Curtis, 6 Mass. 358, 4 Am. Dec. 145; Roundtree v. Baker, 52 Ill. 241,14 Am. Rep. 597; Osborn v. Nicholson, 13 Wall. 654.

18 Tegler Snipman, 33 Ia. 194, 11 Am. Rep. 118; Hill v. Spear, 50 N. H. 253, 9 Am. Rep., 205; post, §§ 177, 178.

14 Post, § 179

general policy of the forum be violated by its enforcement. Even in the case of executory contracts, however, there are some instances in which the lex fori may be substituted.16

§ 16. Value of Precedents in Private International Law. — The exceptions and the related principles discussed in the preceding sections exert a very marked influence upon the weight ordinarily to be attached to precedents and decided cases. This effect should be constantly borne in mind in the investigation. of the authorities upon a point involving the conflict of laws. If unnoticed, it may result that decisions will be cited to sustain propositions which in reality they do not sustain.

In the exceptional cases, the court, as has been observed, generally substitutes the law of its own State (lex fori) for the proper law. If the court says as much in plain terms, naming the exception to which it belongs, and giving its reasons for believing it to be one of the exceptional cases, no confusion of the lex fori with the proper law is apt to arise. But frequently the courts fail to make the distinction, merely holding that the case is governed by the law of their own State, without even specifically designating it the lex fori; sometimes treating it as the enforcement of the proper law, instead of a law substituted for the proper law; sometimes confusing terms, as in cases of foreign transactions relating to personalty situated in the forum, where they designate the substituted law as the lex situs rather than the lex fori, in which aspect it should be considered, as we have seen.1 The consequence of all this confusion is of course that false impressions are created as to the law really looked to by the court as ruling the particular case, and still more with respect to the proper law which should rule similar instances where the circumstances creating the exceptional cases are not present. This has been a most fruitful source of confusion and error. Some hints therefore, drawn from experience, touching the points to be looked to in attaching the proper weight to authorities in these investigations will not be amiss.

1. In distinguishing the various conflicting cases, care must 15 Ante, § 9. See Oscanyon v. Arms Co., 103 U. S. 261. See also post, § 152.

1 Ante, § 14.

be taken in the first place to observe in what State the suit is brought, for the determination of the governing law in a given case will often depend upon which State is the forum.*

2. This point must be observed as well with respect to federal courts sitting in a State to enforce its laws, as with regard to the State courts."

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3. After ascertaining and carefully noting which State is the forum, observation should next be directed to the facts of 2. the case. If such as to constitute one of the exceptions, the decision will in general be of little direct authority with respect to the "proper law" governing such transactions. It is only a direct authority for the application of the lex fori in the case of the particular exception disclosed by the facts of that particular case. The rest is dictum, more or less valuable.

4. If the facts in the case under investigation do not disclose an instance of the operation of any of these exceptions, the decision is a direct authority, more or less valuable, touching the "proper law."

5. If there be disclosed ground for the operation of one of the exceptions, but the court enforces a foreign law (not the lex fori), the decision is direct authority of a very strong kind to show that the foreign law thus enforced is the "proper law."

6. The weight to be attached to a particular decision will depend, as in other cases, upon the character of the court, the care bestowed upon the opinion, whether it is decision or merely dictum, its date, the particular facts or statutes in the case, etc.

7. In examining the facts of the case, care must always be taken to note the nature of the transaction in detail, to observe what are the various foreign elements that enter into the case, which of these are given weight in the decision and which are

2 See Armstrong v. Best, 112 N. C. 59, 17 S. E. 14; Robinson v. Queen, 87 Tenn. 445, 3 L. R. A. 214. This principle should also be borne in mind in deciding in what State a suit of this nature should be instituted.

Hence federal decisions are as much authorities on questions of the conflict of laws as are the State courts. For example, see Swann v. Swann, 21 Fed. 299; Atherton Co. v. Ives, 20 Fed. 894; Barnett v. Kinney, 147 U. S. 476; Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 129; Bowles v. Field, 78 Fed. 742, 743; Smith v. Union Bank, 5 Pet. 518; Green v. Van Buskirk, 5 Wall. 307,

discarded. Many different combinations of these elements may arise, and each combination may cause a change in the result. It is of the utmost importance therefore to note what combination of foreign elements exists in a particular case, and whether the court had before it the whole combination, in making its decision, or only one or more of the foreign elements. The value of the decision will in large measure depend upon this. Abundant illustrations of these principles will be seen hereafter.

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