The leading case of Pennoyer v. Neff 2 furnishes an excellent illustration of these principles. In that case, an attachment was issued in Oregon upon an order of publication against property there belonging to a non-resident defendant. An Oregon statute permitted the court in such cases to subject the property, and if that proved insufficient to satisfy the debt, to make a personal decree for the balance against the absent debtor. The court pursued this course, and the case was carried on appeal to the United States Supreme Court. That court held that, so far as the attachment of the property was concerned, the proceeding was in rem, and that the presence of the property there gave the court jurisdiction, though the owner was a

non-resident, had not appeared, and had been notified of thouroug

pendency of the cause no otherwise than by advertisement in a newspaper. But it was also held that the personal decree for the balance of the money due by the non-resident defendant was beyond the court's jurisdiction, and that the statute authorizing such a course contravened the federal constitution.

§ 86. Exterritorial Effect of Foreign Judgments and Decrees. The federal constitution, in its requirement that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, is no stricter than are the principles of private international law, when those principles begin to operate upon judicial proceedings. While the above mentioned clause of the federal constitution is a part of the municipal law of each State of the Union and operates intra-territorially upon domestic proceedings, the rules of private international law come into play only when the inquiry extends to the effect to be given, in one State or country, to the judicial proceedings of another. But the federal constitution and the rules of private international law both unite in declaring that, in order to a valid exercise of jurisdiction by a tribunal, there must be given to the defendant a reasonable notice and opportunity to defend himself; there must be "due process of law." What constitutes such due process in respect to proceedings in personam as well as in rem has already been shown.

2 95 U. S. 714. See also Alley v. Caspari, 80 Me. 234, 6 Am. St. Rep. 185, note.

Hence in order that effect may be given abroad to a judgment in rem or in personam, the court rendering the judgment in question must have jurisdiction of the cause, and such jurisdiction of the defendant or of the property threatened as "due process of law" demands. If the judgment or decree be in rem, it is only necessary that the res be within the court's jurisdiction and that a general publication of notice of the suit be given. If in personam, it is essential that the court should have obtained jurisdiction of the defendant's person, either by his voluntary appearance and submission to the court's jurisdiction, or by a personal service of process upon him within the territorial limits of the court's authority.

If these conditions are complied with, the foreign judgment will in general be given effect everywhere; if not complied with, the judgment or decree, even though valid where rendered, will in general be regarded as void and of no effect outside the jurisdiction where it is rendered.

But, supposing the conditions complied with, it does not necessarily follow that the foreign judgment or decree will be given conclusive effect in other States. In case the judgment or decree be in rem, it is true, the effect given to it is generally conclusive everywhere, if the res is within the court's jurisdiction, for the sovereignty of a State over everything within its limits is supreme, and will usually be respected in other States.1

But with respect to judgments and decrees in personam, such as judgments for money, private international law goes no further than to declare them a prima facie evidence of indebtedness, permitting the merits of the cause of action to be again inquired into, at least where such is the effect that would be

1 This is universally conceded in the case of decrees in admiralty. See The Rio Grande, 23 Wall. 458; Williams v. Armroyd, 7 Cr. 423; Gelston v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 246; China Mut. Ins. Co. v. Force, 142 N. Y. 90; Street v. Ins. Co., 12 Rich. (S. C.) 13. And generally also in attachment and other proceedings in rem. Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U. S. 185; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714; Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall. 139; Noble v. Oil Co., 79 Penn. St. 354; Arndt v. Arndt, 15 Ohio, 33. But see Hornthall v. Burwell, 109 N. C. 10, 13 S. E. 721; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Fleming, 39 Neb. 679, 42 Am. St. Rep. 613.

given to foreign judgments in the State where the judgment in question was rendered.2

As between the States of this Union, the comity enjoined by private international law touching the effect to be given to foreign judgments is reinforced and supplemented by the clause in the federal constitution providing that full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the judicial proceedings of every other State, and by the act of Congress, made in pursuance thereof, declaring that the judgments of the courts of each State shall have the same faith and credit in other States as they have in the States where they are rendered.*

Under these provisions, the judgments and decrees of the courts of one State, if valid and conclusive there, are for the most part valid and conclusive in every other State of the Union. Without them the judgments of each State would be regarded as strictly foreign judgments in every other State."

But it is to be observed that it is not the design of these provisions to confer any new power upon the States, but simply to establish a just rule of comity by which may be regulated the effect of their admitted jurisdiction over the persons and things within their borders. They do not propose to make the judg

2 Hilton . Guyot, 159 U. S. 113. It is probably otherwise if foreign judgments are given conclusive effect in the State where the particular judgment in question is rendered. Ritchie v. McMullen, 159 U. S. 235; Wunstan v. Higgins, 138 N. Y. 70; Rankin v. Goddard, 55 Me. 389. But this rule is subject to qualification where the foreign judgment is based on matters of mere local policy. See Hohner v. Gratz, 50 Fed. 369; De Brimont v. Penniman, 10 Blatchf. 436. Upon the effect of foreign judgments, see a learned and full discussion in Story, Confl. L. §§ 598 et seq., and notes.

8 U. S. Const. Art. 4, § 1.

4 U. S. Rev. Stats. 905.

5 Slack v. Perrine, 164 U. S. 452; McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312; Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U. S. 87; Guthrie v. Lowry, 84 Penn. St. 533; Elsasser v. Haines, 52 N. J. L. 10, 18 Atl. 1095; Edwards v. Jones, 113 N. C. 453, 18 S. E. 500; Dorsey v. Maury, 10 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 298. These provisions apply not only to judgments of State courts, but also to the judgments of the federal courts, when litigated in the State courts. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714; Southern Ins. Co. v. Hardware Co. (Tex.) 19 S. W. 615; Barney v. Patterson, 6 Har. & J. (Md.) 182; Niblett v. Scott, 4 La. Ann.

ments of other States domestic judgments to all intents and purposes, but merely give a general validity, faith, and credit to them as evidence. No execution is to issue upon such foreign judgment without a new suit in the tribunals of the State where it is sought to be enforced. Nor does it enjoy any priority, privilege, or lien which may be accorded it in the State where it is rendered, but only such as the lex fori gives it in its character of a foreign judgment."

Under these provisions, the judgment is to be given the same effect in other States as in the State where it is rendered, and since it is in general conclusive there upon the rights litigated, until reversed, it will also be held to be conclusive in other States, as to the original merits of the controversy.

It is immaterial what the nature of the controversy is. The judgment is equally conclusive, whether it be in rem or in personam; whether it fastens a personal liability upon the defendant, or whether it only affects his property or his status. Thus, the valid judgment of a competent court determining the domicil of a testator and probating his will of chattels is conclusive in every State in the Union. So also the judgment of the courts of the domicil declaring a child to have been lawfully adopted is in general conclusive. And so it is with almost every kind of judgment; such as judgments for money, or in divorce or attachment proceedings, etc., provided only the court pronouncing the judgment has jurisdiction of the cause, of the person, and of the res. To this general principle there seems to be only one exception. It does not apply with full force to foreign judgments for the enforcement of a penalty.10 It follows from what has been already said that when an

6 Story, Confl. L. § 609; McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312; D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 11 How. 165.

7 Wood v. Watkinson, 17 Conn. 500; McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312; Story, Confl. L. § 609.

• Thomas v. Morissett, 76 Ga. 384; In re Gaines, 45 La. Ann. 1237, 14 So. 233.

9 Van Matre v. Sankey, 148 Ill. 356, 36 N. E. 628. See Foster v. Waterman, 124 Mass. 592.

10 Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 672. See ante, § 10.

action is brought in one of the States of this Union to enforce a judgment rendered in another, only such defenses can be made thereto in general as could be made in the State where it was pronounced, in an action there on such judgment.

11

Thus in an action in one State of the Union upon a judgment rendered in another, the defendant may show that the court pronouncing the judgment had not jurisdiction of the cause, of the subject-matter, or of the parties; " or that the judgment is not responsive to the pleadings at least, if the defendant does not appear at the trial.12 So the defendant may show matters ex post facto that go in release or discharge of the judgment, according to the law of the place where the judgment is given.18

But an exception to this principle arises where the defendant pleads the statute of limitations to the action upon the judgment. The scope and effect of this defense is in general determined by the law of the State where the action upon the judgment is brought (lex fori).1

§ 87. Divorce Causes, Proceedings Quasi in Rem. In divorce causes, the actual subject-matter of the litigation is the marriage status itself. The design is to affect or dissolve the marital relation, not to impose a general personal liability upon either party, or to give personal relief. Hence they partake of the nature of proceedings in rem rather than of proceedings in personam, the res being the status. And this is true whether the suit be for divorce a mensa

1 or divorce

Wall. 108;

11 Harris v. Hardeman, 14 How. 334; Cheever v. Wilson, Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457; Grover & B. M. Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U. S. 287.

12 Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U. S. 254.

18 McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312; D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 11 How. 165. 14 Jacquette v. Huguiron, 2 McLean, 129; Bauserman v. Charlott, 46 Kan. 480, 26 Pac. 1051; Packer v. Thompson, 25 Neb. 688, 41 N. W. 650. See post, § 210. But if the statute of the State where the judgment is rendered declares that the judgment shall not be good after a certain period of years, that law, not the lex fori, must govern. Bowersox v. Gitt, 12 Penn. Co. Ct. 81.

1 See De Meli v. De Meli, 120 N. Y. 485; Butler v. Washington, 45 La. Ann. 279, 12 So. 356, 19 L. R. A. 814.