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each other, a forming-plate also provided with side-forming fingers adapted to be moved toward or from each other, means for operating said fingers at definite times during the formative action upon the bag-tube, operating means for the forming-plate adapted to cause the said plate to oscillate about its rear edge upon the surface of the cylinder during the rotary movement of said cylinder, the whole operating for the purpose of opening and forming the bottom of the bag-tube, and means to move the bag-tube with the cylinder," Held not merely for the function of the machine, but for mechanical means to bring into working relation the folding-plate and cylinder. ** Id. 3. STATE OF THE ART.-A limited construction will not be put upon the terms of a claim where it appears that the art is comparatively new and the terms used have not acquired a fixed and definite meaning therein. *Lindmark v. Hodgkinson, 540.

CONSTRUCTION OF RULES. See Abandonment of Applications, 5, 6; Amendments, 3; Examination of Applications, 5, 6; Interference, 7, 8, 10, 14, 16, 19, 20, 37; Motion to Amend Applications, 1, 2; Motion to Dissolve Interference, 1, 7, 10, 14; Preliminary Statement, 3; Testimony, 1, 5.

CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES. See Abandonment of Applications, 1; Construction of Trade- Mark Statutes; Copyright; Decisions of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia; Examination of Applications, 6; Interference, 18; Payment of Final Fees; Renewal of Forfeited Applications, 1; Trade- Marks, 81, 132.

1. COPYRIGHT.-In construing a statute the court is not always confined to a literal reading thereof, and may consider its object and purpose, the things with which it is dealing, and the conditions of affairs which led to its enactment so as to effectuate rather than destroy the spirit and force of the law which the legislature intended to enact. * American Tobacco Company v. Werckmeister,

571.

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2. SECTION 4952 AS AMENDED MARCH 3, 1891, CONSTRUED MEANING OF "ASSIGNS."-The word "assigns" in section 4952, Revised Statutes, as amended March 3, 1891, (26 Stat. L., 1106, c. 565; U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p. 3406,) is not used as descriptive of the character of the estate which the "author, inventor, designer or proprietor" may acquire. The statute was intended to give to the assigns of the original owner of the right to copyright an article the right to take out the copyright secured by the statute independently of the ownership of the article itself. ** Id.

3. SECTION 4904, REVISED STATUTES-COMMISSIONER MAY DELEGATE AUTHORITY.-Although section 4904, Revised Statutes, provides that whenever “in the opinion of the Commissioner" an interference exists notice shall be given to the parties, etc., the Commissioner is not obliged personally to determine in the first instance whether an interference in fact exists, but may delegate this duty to the Primary Examiner. The demands of the statute are fully met when it is provided that at some stage in the proceedings the personal opinion of the Commissioner may be invoked by either party. *United States of America, ex rel. The Newcomb Motor Company, v. Moore, Commissioner of Patents, 332.

4. RIGHT TO HAVE CLAIMS TWICE REJECTED-INTER PARTES CASE.-The provisions of the statutes giving an applicant the right to have his claim twice rejected (secs. 4903 and 4909, R. S.) does not apply in inter partes cases. *Id. 5. SECTION 4887, REVISED STATUTES.-The second clause of section 4887, Revised Statutes, as amended March 3, 1903, construed and Held not to be retroactive and not to apply to applications pending at the time of its passage. *De Ferranti v. Lindmark, 353.

6. FOREIGN APPLICATION.-Under the provisions of this section an applicant who filed an application in this country after the passage of the act is entitled to the benefit of a foreign application for the same invention filed less than twelve months prior to the domestic application, although such foreign application was filed prior to the passage of the act. *Id.

7. ACT OF MARCH 3, 1903.-The act of March, 1903, by which the limitation within which an application must be filed in this country after the filing of a foreign application for the same invention was extended from seven months to twelve months construed and Held not to apply to applications pending at the date of its passage. *Gueniffet, Benoit, and Nicault v. Wictorsohn, 367.

8. NOTARIES-MAY NOT TAKE ACKNOWLEDGMENTS, ETC., OF CLIENTS IN CASES BEFORE THE DEPARTMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT-SECTION 558, CODE OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CONSTRUED.-Held that the provisions of section 558 of the Code of the District of Columbia, which provides that no notary public shall be authorized to take acknowledgments, administer oaths, certify papers, or perform any official acts in connection with matters in which he is employed as counsel, attorney, or agent, or in which he may be in any way interested, for any of the Departments of the United States Government in the District of Columbia or elsewhere, applies to all notaries, whether within or without the District of Columbia. *The Hall's Safe Company v. Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Company, 473.

9. RENEWAL OF APPLICATION-ABANDONMENT SECTION 4897, REVISED STATUTES.-Under section 4897, Revised Statutes, relating to the renewal of forfeited applications, providing that “upon the hearing of renewed applications preferred under this section, abandonment shall be considered as a question of fact," the question of abandonment is one to be determined upon proof of the facts and circumstances and will not be presumed from laches in filing the renewal application, although it may be within the power of the Commissioner, whenever he entertains a doubt as to whether there has been abandonment, to require an explanation of the delay. *Cutler v. Leonard,

483.

10. REVIVAL-CASE FORMALLY ABANDONED.-Section 4894, Revised Statutes, does not authorize the Commissioner to set aside a formal abandonment of the application filed by the applicant with the concurrence of his assignee. Ex parte Hirth, 240. CONSTRUCTION OF TRADE-MARK RULES. See Trade- Marks, 73, 121, 131. CONSTRUCTION OF TRADE-MARK STATUTES. See Trade- Marks, 3, 4, 6, 7, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 23, 31, 32, 33, 36, 38, 40, 43, 59, 66, 76, 80, 85, 100, 102, 103, 104, 106, 114, 121, 122, 126, 128, 135.

1. ASSIGNMENTS OF TERRITORIAL RIGHTS-NOT RECORDABLE.-Section 2 and section 10 of the Trade-Mark Act construed and Held not to provide for the recording of a paper purporting to grant a mere territorial right to the use of a trade-mark. In re National Chemical Company, 138.

2. REGISTRABILITY-DISCRETION OF COMMISSIONER.-The purpose of the act of 1905 is to prevent and not to promote confusion, to protect and not to deceive the public. The language used empowers the Commissioner to exercise his discretion as to whether a proposed mark should be registered. If in his opinion its registration will "be likely to cause confusion or mistake in the mind of the public" or "deceive purchasers," he is bound to reject it. *In re S. C. Herbst Importing Company, 383.

CONTINUOUS APPLICATION.

1. SUBJECT-MATTER DISCLOSED IN PRIOR PATENT.-An application filed within one year after the grant of a patent disclosing the subject-matter of such

application is not a continuation of the application on which such patent was granted and is not entitled to the benefit of the date of such prior application. Although the claims of the second application were made in the prior application, on which the patent was granted, and could have been divided out therefrom, and the date of the prior application could have been thus secured, when the patent was granted the application was merged in the patent, the proceeding was closed, and there was nothing to be continued. *In re Spitteler and Krische, 374.

2. DOCTRINE OF NOT TO BE EXTENDED.-The rule which permits a divisional application to relate back to the filing date of the original, which also discloses its subject-matter, as long as it remains open in the Patent Office is a very liberal one, that sometimes works hardship upon intermediate inventors, and it ought not to be extended to cases not clearly within it. *Id. CONTRACTS. See Patent Rights.

COPIES OF PENDING APPLICATIONS. See Trade- Marks, 58.
COPYRIGHT. See Construction of Statutes, 1, 2; Process of Law.

1. PUBLICATION ABROAD WITHOUT NOTICE OF COPYRIGHT EFFECT ON RIGHTS IN THIS COUNTRY.-The requirement of the act of June 18, 1874, chapter 301, section 1, 18 Statutes, 78 (Rev. Stat., sec. 4962,) that "no person shall maintain an action for the infringement of his copyright" unless the required notice shall be inserted in the several copies of every edition published does not extend to publications abroad, and the owner of a work copyrighted in this country may restrain the publication thereof by another who has imported for purposes of reproduction copies published by such owner abroad without such notice. ** United Dictionary Company v. G. & C. Merriam Company, 559.

2. INFRINGEMENT MUSICAL COMPOSITION.-The copyright of a musical composition which is published in the form of sheet-music is not infringed by a perforated roll of paper designed to be used in connection with an automatic piano-player in reproducing the music recorded in the copyrighted sheets, since such perforated roll is not a "copy" within the meaning of the copyright statutes. **White-Smith Music Publishing Company v. Apollo Company,

562.

3. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN, CREATURE OF FEDERAL STATUTE.-Property in copyright is the creature of the Federal statute passed in the exercise of the power vested in Congress by the Federal Constitution in Article I, section 8, "to promote the progress of science and useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries." (See Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet., 591, 656; Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U. S., 82; Banks v. Manchester, 128 U. S., 244, 252; Thompson v. Hubbard, 131 U. S., 123, 151.) **American Tobacco Company v. Werckmeister, 571.

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4. SECTION 4962 of the REVISED STATUTES CONSTRUED-Where Notice Should BE INSCRIBED.-Section 4962 of the Revised Statutes as amended by act of June 18, 1874, chapter 301, (18 Stat. L., 78; U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p. 3411,) providing "that no person shall maintain an action for the infringement of his copyright unless he shall give notice thereof by inserting in the several copies of every edition published by inscribing upon some visible portion thereof, or of the substance on which the same shall be mounted, "the notice of copyright, has not for its object to require the inscription upon the original painting, map, etc., but only upon those published copies concerning which it is designed to convey information to the public which shall limit its use and circumscribe the rights of the purchaser. **Id.

5. ASSIGNMENT.-An instrument providing that "I hereby transfer the copyright in my picture 'Chorus' to the Photographische Gesellschaft, Berlin (The Berlin Photographic Company) for the sum of £200, London, April 2, 1894," signed by the author of the painting, Held to constitute a complete transfer of the property right of copyright existing in the picture, there being no evidence of any intention on the part of the author to retain any further interest in the copyright. **Id.

6. SAME.—An author may, before publication, assign the right or privilege of taking a copyright independent of the transfer of the copyrightable thing itself. **Id.

7. PAINTING-LOSS OF RIGHTS BY PUBLIC EXHIBITION.-The exhibition of a painting at a public gallery by the author prior to copyrighting the same does not deprive him or his assigns from subsequently securing a valid copyright where the same was expressly entered at the gallery with copyright reserved. **Id.

8. ACTION-SECTION 4965, REVISED STATUTES-SUIT TO RECOVER PENALTY AFTER JUDGMENT OF FORFEITURE.-After judgment of forfeiture of infringing copies of a copyrighted painting under section 4965 of the Revised Statutes (U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p. 3414) a separate action cannot be maintained to recover the penalty prescribed in said section for every infringing copy of the copyrighted painting found in the infringer's possession or sold by him, since such section contemplates but a single action in the nature of replevin, in which may be had both a forfeiture and a recovery of penalties. **Werckmeister v. American Tobacco Company, 582.

CORPORATIONS. See Access to Pending Applications, 1; Process of Law; TradeMarks, 56, 57.

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. See Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia Over Practice in the Patent Office.

1. REVIEW BY COURT OF CONCURRENT DECISIONS OF PATENT OFFICE TRIBUNALS.-To justify the court of appeals in reversing the concurrent decisions of the Patent Office tribunals on a conclusion of facts, plain error must be shown. Ries v. Kirkegaard and Jebsen, 312.

2. SAME. To justify the Court of Appeals in reversing the unanimous decisions of the Patent Office tribunals error therein must be made to clearly appear. *Onderdonk v. Parkes, 438.

3. CONSIDERATION OF QUESTION NOT RAISED BELOW.-Assignments of error by the Commissioner of Patents raising the question of the sufficiency of disclosure in appellee's applications will be given but passing notice by the court of appeals where such question was not raised before the tribunals of the Patent Office. It was incumbent upon appellant to "raise this question before the Primary Examiner, whose skill in the particular art peculiarly qualified him to consider it." *Cutler v. Leonard, 483. CROSS-EXAMINATION. See Interference, 5; Testimony, 5.

DATE OF FILING APPLICATION. See Continuous Application; Divisional Application.

AUTHORITY OF COMMISSIONER.-Where by reason of a foreign patent it was necessary that the applicant file his application in the United States Patent Office not later than March 15, 1908, and application papers were deposited in the mail at Paterson, N. J., on Friday, March 13, 1908, at five o'clock, but did not reach the Patent Office until Monday, March 16, Held that the Commissioner is without authority to give the application the date of March 14, 1908, as requested. Ex parte Meier, 207. DECEPTION.

See Trade- Marks, 105.

DECISIONS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. See Jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Patents. INTERFERENCE CASES-NOT FINAL-NO APPEAL TO SUPREME Court of the UNITED STATES.-A decision of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia on an appeal from the Commissioner of Patents is not "final" within the meaning of sections 8 of the act of February 9, 1893; (27 Stat., 434, 436, c. 74) and therefore is not appealable to the Supreme Court of the United States. **Frasch v. Moore, 609.

DECISIONS OF THE EXAMINERS. See Mandamus.

DECISIONS OF THE LOWER COURTS AFFIRMED. See Infringement, 1. DECISIONS OF THE PATENT OFFICE TRIBUNALS. See Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia; Priority of Invention, 10; Reopening of Decided Cases.

DELAY. See Delay in Claiming Invention; Delay in Filing Application; Interference, 44, 45; Reduction to Practice, 7.

DELAY IN BRINGING MOTIONS. See Interference, 50; Motion to Amend Appli cations, 2; Motion to Amend Preliminary Statement, 1, 6; Motion to Dissolve Interference, 4, 5, 6, 16.

DELAY IN CLAIMING INVENTION.

Interference-DIVISIONAL APPLICATIONS.-Applicant does not lose his right to claim an invention disclosed in his application by the fact that he makes no specific claim thereto until after another party files his application for the same invention. *Lotz. v. Kenny, 467.

DELAY IN FILING AMENDMENTS. See Amendments, 3.

DELAY IN FILING APPLICATION. See Construction of Statutes, 9; Interference, 40, 41, 43, 45.

1. INTERFERENCE-PRIORITY-REDUCTION TO PRACTICE.-After reduction to practice of an invention a mere delay of the inventor in applying for a patent, in the absence of concealment, abandonment, or suppression, will not prevent the inventor from getting a patent based upon priority of invention. *Rose v. Clifford and Newell et al., 457.

2. SAME-SAME-DILIGENCE.-The inventor is entitled to a reasonable time to perfect his invention before applying for a patent, and what is a reasonable time is dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case. * Mead v. Davis and Varney, 532.

DELAY IN FILING PETITION FOR REHEARING. See Rehearing. DELAY IN FILING PRELIMINARY STATEMENT. See Preliminary Statement, 1, 4.

DELAY IN FILING TESTIMONY. See Interference, 47.

DELAY IN PROSECUTING APPLICATION. See Abandoned Applications, 2; Abandonment of Applications, 7.

DEMURRER. See Trade- Marks, 31, 60, 63.

DESCRIPTION. See Construction of Claims, 1; Specifications, 1.

DESCRIPTIVE TERMS. See Trade- Marks, 1, 2, 6, 13, 14, 22, 23, 24, 35, 37, 38, 39,

44, 45, 52, 54, 61, 72, 84, 87, 93, 99, 107, 126, 129.

DEPOSITION. See Testimony, 1.

DILIGENCE. See Delay in Filing Application; Interference, 11, 12, 40, 41, 43, 44, 46; Preliminary Statement, 1; Priority of Invention, 3, 4; Reduction to Practice, 6, 7, 8.

DISCLOSURE OF INVENTION. See Amendments, 2; Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, 3; Interference, 31, 33, 38, 49, 52; Preliminary Statement, 5, 6, 9, 10; Reduction to Practice, 6, 7, 8; Reissue Applications, 3. DISCRETION OF THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS. See Construction of Trade- Mark Statutes, 2; Interference, 32; Trade- Marks, 60.

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