It is urged that the words "Label registered" are not objectionable for the reason that under the law the label is really copyrighted, not registered, and a strict compliance with the law requires notice to be placed upon the label so copyrighted, that as the applicant has complied with the requirement of the law by presenting its application for registration it not only has the right to, but should, put such notice on its copies filed with the Patent Office. The Copyright Act of June 30, 1874, prescribes distinctly that the notice of copyright should be made in the following terms: "Entered according to act of Congress in the year by in the office of the Librarian of Congress at Washington" or, alternatively: "Copyrighted 19 by,' naming the applicant for copyright. It was held by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Higgins v. Keuffel (C. D., 1891, 403; 55 O. G., 1139; 140 U. S., 428) that in order to maintain an action for infringement of the ownership of a label registered under the provisions of this act it was necessary that public notice of the registration should be given in the precise terms prescribed by the statute. It is further stated in that decision that— The copyright is secured when the registration is completed and a certificate of registration is given by the Commissioner. The use of the term "Label registered" therefore upon a label which has not been registered is not only unauthorized in the sense contended for by the appellant, but its appearance upon the label is insufficient to give the satutory notice required after the registration of the label, and it is believed that the sole function which can be ascribed to this statement is such as it might have in leading the public to believe that the registration of the label rendered the guaranty by the Government effective. Holding the above views I directed the Examiner of Trade-Marks to refuse registration of all labels in which the guaranty clause was not so qualified as to identify the guarantor in the manner stated. The decision of the Examiner of Trade-Marks is affirmed. EX PARTE UNITED STATES SANITARY MANUFACTURING COMPANY. APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TRADE-MARK. 137 O. G., 227. TRADE-MARKS-REGISTRABILITY-THE LETTERS "U. S." ON A CONVENTIONAL SHIELD. A mark consisting of the letters "U. S." on a conventional representation of a shield Held not registrable on the ground that the letters "U. S.," by reason of their common usage by the government on army accouter ments and upon other articles of merchandise, particularly when placed upon a simulation of the United States shield, should be regarded as public insignia, which can never become the exclusive property of the applicant, and on the further ground that the use of such a mark would tend to induce the public to believe that the goods bearing the same were made by or had the official approval of the United States Government.. ON APPEAL. METAL MANUFACTURES NOT OTHERWISE CLASSIFIED. Messrs. Christy & Christy and Mr. Darwin S. Wolcott for the applicants. MOORE, Commissioner: This is an appeal from the refusal of the Examiner of TradeMarks to register a trade-mark comprising the conventional representation of a shield bearing the letters "U. S." Registration was refused on the ground that the mark is a simulation of public insignia, the letters "U. S." being the common abbreviation of the words "United States" and that the placing of these letters upon a shield similar in form to the shield of the United States coat-of-arms would further tend to cause the public to believe that the goods upon which such mark was used were made by or had received the approval of the United States Government. It is contended in behalf of appellant that the title "United States" is not applicable merely to the United States of America, since there are other Governments known as United States-as, for example, the United States of Colombia. It is also urged that the initials "U.S." mean a large variety of articles or titles and that the use of the letters "U. S." as a guarantee by the Government "could be conveyed only by the use of a mark which had been adopted by statutory enactment." It is further urged that the shield used by the appellant does not correspond to the shield, coat-of-arms, etc., which have been adopted by the United States Government, since no bars or stars appear thereon. The contentions of the applicant are not believed to be well founded. Section 5 of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905 provides in part that No mark by which the goods of the owner of the mark may be distinguished from goods of the same class shall be refused registration of the trademark on account of the nature of such mark unless such mark * (b) consists of or comprises the flags or coat-of-arms or other insignia of the United States or any simulation thereof or of any State, or municipality, or of any foreign nation or of any design or picture that has or may hereafter be adopted by any fraternal society as its emblem. The phrase "or other insignia, of the United States" is believed to embrace symbols and other devices by which goods which are the property of the United States may be known. The Century Dictionary defines the word "insignia" as follows: (1) Badges or other distinguishing-marks of office or honor; (2) marks, signs, or visible tokens by which anything is known or distinguished. Webster's Unabridged Dictionary defines "insignia" as (1) Badges or other distinguishing-marks of office or honor; (2) marks, signs, or visible impressions by which anything is known or distinguished. The fact that the United States Government uses the letters "U.S." upon the accouterments of its army and upon various other merchandise is a matter of common knowledge of which judicial notice can be taken. By reason of this usage such marks are believed to have become "insignia" within the terms of the definitions above quoted. It is therefore clear that the Government of the United States has the right to use the letters "U. S." upon articles of any character whatsoever. Under these circumstances the appellant could never acquire an exculsive property right in the letters "U. S.” against the Government of the United States for similar reasons to those stated by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in re Cahn, Belt & Co. (C. D., 1906, 627; 122 O. G., 354; 27 App. D. C., 173) in reference to the use of the coat-of-arms of the State of Maryland, in which the Court said: The coat-of-arms of Maryland was never in the exclusive use of the applicants during any period, nor could the applicants ever acquire an exclusive use as a trade-mark of the State coat-of-arms. Nor can property be acquired in a mark which simulates a public emblem.. The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in the case in re American Glue Company (C. D., 1906, 695; 123 O. G., 999; 27 App. D. C., 391) and in re William Connors Paint Mfg. Co. (C. D., 1906, 696; 123 O. G., 999; 27 App. D. C., 389) construed the section of the statute above quoted to prohibit registration of trade-marks which simulate the great seal of the United States and the seal of the Department of Justice of the United States. For equally cogent reasons it is believed that any mark which is identical with or which comprises " any simulation" of any insignia used by the United States Government in a well recognized manner to designate articles belonging to the Government should be refused registration. In the present case the mark not only comprises the letters "U. S.," but these letters are imposed upon a shield of substantially the same contour as the shield forming a part of the United States coat-of-arms, and this fact, it is believed, would further tend to induce the public to believe that the goods upon which such mark is used was made by or had received the official approval of the United States Government. In my opinion the action of the Examiner of Trade-Marks in refusing to register the trade-mark claimed is right, and his decision is accordingly affirmed. RYDER V. BROWN v. TRIPP AND MCMEANS v. WHITE. Decided October 22, 1908. 137 O. G., 228. INTERFERENCE-MOTION FOR DISSOLUTION IN AFTER NOTICE UNDER RULE 114— TRANSMISSION. Where in answer to an order issued under Rule 114 against a junior party to an interference to show cause why judgment should not be rendered against him, such party presents a motion for dissolution alleging nonpatentability of the issue, it is incumbent upon him to comply strictly with the provisions of Rule 122, and such a motion filed after the expiration of the thirty days allowed by the rule should not be transmitted in the absence of a very satisfactory showing of reasons why it was not earlier presented. APPEAL ON MOTION. CAN-MAKING MACHINE. Mr. Arthur P. Greeley for Ryder. Mr. Victor J. Evans for Brown. Messrs. Bradford & Hood for Tripp and McMeans. MOORE, Commissioner: This is an appeal from the decision of the Examiner of Interferences refusing to transmit a motion to dissolve brought by Tripp and McMeans two days after the expiration of the thirty days allowed by Rule 114 in which to bring such motions. The record shows that on July 31 an order was issued against Tripp and McMeans to show cause on or before August 31, 1908, why judgment should not be rendered against them for the reason that the date of conception alleged in their preliminary statement was subsequent to the filing date of the senior party. On August 31, 1908, counsel for Tripp and McMeans telegraphed to the Office stating that we are forwarding to-day action responsive to action of July 31. On September 2, 1908, a motion for dissolution was filed accompanied by a motion to transmit the motion for dissolution to the Primary Examiner. The only ground alleged in the motion for dissolution is that the issue is not patentable in view of certain cited references. Trans mission of this motion was objected to by the senior party, White, upon the grounds that the motion was filed too late and that the statement of the grounds of the motion was not sufficiently definite. The Examiner of Interferences held that the grounds of the motion were sufficiently definite, but refused to transmit the motion for dissolution upon the ground that no sufficient excuse was alleged for the delay in filing the said motion in a case of this character. Where a party to an interference asserts his right to the claims forming the issue of such interference and upon the filing of preliminary statements finds that he is barred from obtaining a patent by reason of the fact that his date of conception was later than the filing date of a contesting party a motion upon his part denying the patentability of the issue is in the nature of an obstructive action based upon facts concerning which he has no greater interest than any other member of the general public. He being still a nominal party to the interference is, however, permitted by the Rules of Practice of the Office to present such a motion, but in order that he should be heard it is incumbent upon him to comply strictly with the rules provided for such purpose. In the present case the excuse offered by counsel for the appellant is merely that because of the failure of counsel for one of the interferants to furnish him with copies of that party's application in accordance with an agreement he was delayed in filing the motion. So far as the substance of the present motion is concerned, a motion to dissolve upon the ground of non-patentability might have been brought without reference to any of the opposing parties' applications, and in any event copies of the applications of the opposing parties might readily have been obtained from the Patent Office upon application therefor. Under the circumstances the Examiner of Interferences was clearly justified in holding that the delay in filing the motion was not excused by the affidavit of record. The decision of the Examiner of Interferences is affirmed. DE FERRANTI V. LINDMARK. Decided October 3, 1908. 137 O. G., 731. INTERFERENCE-REOPENING TO TAKE TESTIMONY AFTER APPEAL TO COURT. Where a party to an interference, in which times for taking testimony had been set, files a motion for judgment on the record, together with a stipulation signed by the parties setting forth that the parties involved in the interference are the same parties who filed certain applications for foreign patents specified in the oaths attached to their respective applications and in their preliminary statements, and judgment is rendered on the |