of its rolling stock, its value would be greatly impaired. Suits, therefore, which seek to deprive the receiver of the possession of the property, and all process the execution of which would have that effect, are subject to the control of the court appointing the receiver, so far as may be necessary to the ends of justice. The marshaling of the assets, and the orderly distribution of the fund or property according to the rights and equities of the several parties in interest, is not to be interfered with by the judgment or process of the state court. The judgment of the state court is conclusive as to the amount of the debt, but the time and mode of its payment must be controlled by the court appointing the receiver. The receiver should have the right to appeal from the judgments of the state courts. Appeals should not be taken for Appeals by receiver. delay, but that justice may be done. When the receiver, in good faith, takes an appeal, he should not be required by this court to execute a supersedeas bond. The receiver is an officer of the court. His possession of the property is the possession of the court. The property of the railroad stands as security for all the obligations of the court incurred in its operation. The receiver, no more than the judge of the court, should be required to become personally bound as a condition of his appealing, in good faith, from the judgment of a state court rendered against him in his official capacity. The court will not part with the possession of the property until the obligations incurred by the receiver are paid, or proper provision is made to secure their payment. Dow v. Memphis & L. R. R. Co., 20 Fed. Rep. 267, 269, 17 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 324. The objection of plaintiff's counsel to the clause of the order, as originally drawn, which required the receiver to execute supersedeas bonds in cases which he appealed, is sustained, and that clause will be stricken out. Receivers Sale of Railroad on Foreclosure-Delay of Purchaser to Complete Sale. If a mortgage upon a railroad is foreclosed and sale had under order of court, the jurisdiction of the court over the corporate property is not at an end, if the purchasers delay to complete the contract, and it is in the power of the court even after such sale to authorize the receiver to continue the operation of the road and to purchase rolling stock therefor, and to direct that the price thereof should form a first lien upon the mortgaged property. Vilas 7. Page, 106 N. Y. 439. Same Purchase of Rolling Stock-Lien of Price. The court authorized the receiver of an insolvent railroad company to purchase rolling stock, and directed that the price should be a first lien "on the said mortgaged premises and all proceeds thereof which may come into this court, or are, or shall become subject to its jurisdiction or authority." Held that, by such order, the price of the rolling stock became a first lien, not only upon the proceeds derived from the sale but also upon the mortgaged property itself. Vilas v. Page, 106 N. Y. 439. Same-Order Authorizing Purchase of Rolling Stock-Failure of Clerk to Enter. An order by the court constituting the price of certain property purchased by a receiver, a lien upon the property in his hands was duly made at a special term, and the judge directed that it should be entered by the clerk in the records of the court. The clerk failed to enter it although it was duly filed in his office on the day of its date, and the date of filing indorsed upon it. Held, that the order became effectual as an authority to the receiver upon being filed with the clerk, and that the mistake of the clerk would not prejudice parties dealing with the receiver in reliance upon the order or furnish to other parties a defense which they would not have had if the order had been promptly recorded. Vilas v. Page, 106 N. Y. 439. Same Purchase of Rolling Stock-Contract with Seller-Lien.-The receiver of an insolvent corporation was authorized to purchase rolling stock, the price of which was to constitute a first lien upon the mortgaged premises and all proceeds thereof which should come into court. Previously to that time, the rolling stock of the corporation had been sold upon execution and purchased by V., one of the directors of the company. After receiving authority to purchase under the order, the receiver entered into a contract with V., by which it was agreed that if it should be determined by certain proceedings then pending, that the stock belonged absolutely and beneficially to V., he should release it to the receiver receiving therefor the sum of $18,000, and it was declared that such sum should be a first lien upon the premises of the railroad company, which when deeded by the receiver under a sale in foreclosure proceedings, should be conveyed expressly subject to the lien. Held, that, by the terms of the agreement, the contract provided for a lien upon the mortgaged property, and in effect for a reservation by the purchasers on foreclosure out of the purchase money, of a sum sufficient to pay the amount to V., and therefore operated to constitute the amount payable to V., a first lien, not only upon the mortgaged premises, but also upon the proceeds, and was therefore within the scope of the authority conferred upon the receiver by the order of the court Page, 106 N. Y. 439. Vilas v. Same Purchase of Rolling Stock by Director at Execution Sale-TitleAgreement with Receiver.--The receiver of an insolvent corporation ap into an agreement with a director who had purchased part of the rolling stock of the corporation previous to the receiver's appointment, at a sale under an execution. The agreement provided that "if it shall be finally determined by this or any other action or proceeding, that said property belongs absolutely and beneficially" to the said director, he should be paid a specified sum. The agreement was entitled in the foreclosure proceedings under which the receiver had been appointed. In these proceedings, the court held that the title of the director was absolute and beneficial in the sense that it was paramount to the mortgage. Held, that such finding was conclusive upon the question whether the title of the director was of the agreement having reference to the foreclosure proceedings and to absolute and beneficial under the terms of the agreement, the language to any possible right of redemption, which the mortgagors or persons claimthe situation of the parties at the time it was made, but having no reference ing under them might have. Vilas v. Page, 106 N. Y. 439. an Same Purchasers of Railroad-Contract to Indemnify Receiver-Personal Judgment. The purchasers of a railroad at foreclosure sale, entered into conduct of a branch of a suit which involved the determination of the title of a purchaser at execution sale to certain of the rolling stock. The puragreement with the receiver, by which they agreed to undertake the chasers agreed if there should be any recovery in favor of the purchasers 42 A. & E. R. Cas.-3 of the rolling stock to indemnify the plaintiffs in the foreclosure suit and the receiver against the same. Held, that in the event of a judgment being rendered in favor of the purchaser of the rolling stock, such agreement formed no warrant for a personal judgment against the purchasers of the railroad. Vilas 7. Page, 106 N. Y. 439. Same-Authority to Borrow and Issue Certificates When Granted.-A receiver petitioned for authority to borrow $347,577.18, and to issue his certificates therefor. This sum included (1) $111,904 for the expense of purchasing and laying steel rails, and changing a narrow-guage track to the standard guage and strengthening trestles; (2) $35,000 for rails and ties, and for laying the track between two towns; (3) $47,242.18 for the payment of unpaid vouchers for claims against the company, none of which were liens upon the railroad; (4) $20,000 to reimburse bondholders who advanced that sum to meet arrears of wages to employes to avert a threatened strike; (5) $100,000 for the purchase of locomotives and cars used by the receiver in operating the road, constituting its entire rolling stock, the annual rental of the equipment being $28,800, and the lessors being willing to cancel claims for unpaid rentals amounting to about $7,000; (6) $4,000 for the cost of relaying a line of track on a connecting road, the result of which would be to cancel a debt of $8,000 and secure enough additional business to pay the cost in three months; and (7) $29,430 for the price of land purchased by the company and on which its track had been laid, and which was especially valuable on account of a deposit of gravel therein. The issuance of the certificates was consented to by the holders of $943,000 of first mortgage bonds, and $293,000 of second mortgage bonds. The holders of the remaining $257.000 first mortgage bonds, and $219,000 second mortgage bonds did not consent, and some of them with other lienholders objected. Held, that, as it was doubtful whether the improvements would add to the value of the road and to its selling price, the petition must be denied as to the items of $35,000, $20,000, and $47,243.18, except upon consent of all the lienholders; but that certificates should be issued for the remaining items, if desired by the consenting bondholders with leave thereafter to petition to have the same made a charge on the nonconsenting bondholders. Investment Co. of Philadelphia v. Ohio & N. W. R. Co., 36 Fed. Rep. 48. MISSOURI PACIFIC R. Co. ข. TEXAS PACIFIC R. Co. (SULLIVAN Intervenor.) (U. S. Circuit Court, E. D. Louisiana, February 4, 1890.) * * * Receivers Judgment against, in State Court-Conclusiveness-"Judiciary Act." The provision of the Act of Congress of March 3, 1887, known as the "Judiciary Act," authorizing suits in state courts against receivers appointed by courts of the Uuited States without the previous leave of the court appointing him, that the act "shall not affect the jurisdiction over or disposition of any suit commenced in any court of the United States before the passage thereof“ renders it necessary that leave should be obtained from the court appointing the receiver, when the suit in which the receiver was appointed was commenced before the date of the act, and a judgment rendered in an action against a receiver appointed in a suit commenced prior to the passage of the "Judiciary Act," which has been commenced without the consent of the court, is not conclusive as against the receiver, but is subject to the equity jurisdiction of the court appointing him. Same-Introduction of Testimony-Waiver. Where an action for damages for personal injuries has been commenced in a state court against a receiver without the leave of the court, and a claim has been made by intervention in the suit in which the receiver has been appointed, if the intervenor offers evidence in addition to that contained in the record of the state court, tending to show the fact of injury and the extent of damages, he thereby waives any right he may have to the claim that his judgment is, by virtue of the "Judiciary Act," conclusive upon the question of negligence and damages. Same Judgment for Damages-Excessive Verdict. It appeared that the wife of the intervenor was employed in keeping a boarding car for the receiver, in connection with a construction train, in which she did a large part of the work; that by an accident her leg was broken, her arm dislocated, and her back, shoulder and side injured. She was not able to walk for four months after the injury. At the end of two years she had not recovered from the injuries, and was able to do little work. Held, that a verdict for $10,000 was excessive, and that it should be reduced to $5,000. ON Exceptions to the Master's Report upon the intervention of Owen Sullivan. Rice & Armstrong, for intervenor. Howe & Prentiss and T. H. Prendegast, for defendant. Facts. PARDEE, J.-In this case, on October 26, 1888, the court made an order discharging the receiver, and directing the delivery to the defendant company of all property, funds, and assets in his hands as receiver. It is further provided in said order that the said company should take the said property subject to any and all judgments which have heretofore been rendered in favor of intervenors in the case, which have not been paid, as well as subject to such judgments as might be thereafter rendered by the court in favor of intervenors on interventions then pending and undetermined, or which might be filed prior to February, 1889. I further provides that all claims against the receiver, as such, up to the 31st day of October, 1888, be presented and prosecuted by intervention prior to February 1, 1889, and, if not so be a charge on the property of said company. Under this said order, the intervenor presented to this court his petition of intervention on the 3d day of January, 1889; and in his petition he alleges that on the 25th day of February, 1888, he recovered a judgment against John C. Brown, receiver of the Texas & Pacific Railway Company, in a suit entitled "Owen Sullivan against J. C. Brown, Receiver," on the docket of the district court of Harrison county, Tex., a court of comto the wife of intervenor by a railroad engine operated by, petent jurisdiction, in the sum of $10,000, for injuries done presented by that date, the same be barred, and not to and under the control of, said receiver, his agents and employes, all of which will more fully appear by the transcript and abstract of judgment attached. Further, that this judg ment was appealed from by the said John C. Brown, receiver, to the supreme court of the state of Texas, in which court the said judgment was affirmed. He avers, also, that said. judgment has never been paid, in whole or in part, and the said judgment was obtained when all the property of the defendant railway company was in the hands of, and under the control of, said John C. Brown, receiver. Intervenor prayed that his said petition of intervention be filed, and referred to one of the masters of the court for examination and report as to the binding effect of the same upon the said J. C. Brown, receiver, and that the said J. C. Brown, receiver, be ordered to pay intervenor the sum of $10,000, with interest, according to the terms of said judgment, and for equitable relief. Service of said petition being accepted by the attorneys of said Texas & Pacific Railway Company, an order was made referring the same to a special master for report. The special master has reported in favor of intervenor, on the ground that the suit in Harrison county was rightfully instituted, under authority of the act of congress, approved March 3, 1887, and the judgment therein rendered is conclusive against the receiver. The special master recommends that the receiver be ordered to pay the intervenor the amount of the judgment, interest, and costs, and the costs of this intervention. To this report the Texas and Pacific Railway Company have filed exceptions as follows: "First. The master erred report. in holding that, under the judiciary act of conExceptions to gress of 1887, the intervenor had a right to sue the receiver in the state court without permission of this court. Second. The master erred in holding that the judgment of the state court was conclusive in the respect, and to the extent, stated by him in his said report. Third. The master erred in holding that there was any neglect in the premises on the part of the receiver. Fourth. The findings and report of the master are contrary to law and the evidence, and the evidence does not furnish any legal basis for the recovery and the report. Fifth. The judgment and claim of intervenor, and amount reported, are, in any event, excessive and inequitable; and, under said act of congress, this court has the right and power to, and should, reject the same, or reduce the amount of the report and recovery." Subsequently supplemental exceptions were filed, as follows: "(1) That the master erred in receiving or considering the judgment rendered in the state court, because the same was not admissible, and could not have any effect, for the following reasons: (a) |