Once the broad budget totals are agreed upon in the form of that one-page budget, then and only then can Congress get about the business of spending. Thereafter, if any Member of Congress proposes spending outside the scope of the budget law which Congress has passed in the form of a law intended to bind itself, it would take a two-thirds vote.

Congress can pass the budget by majority vote. Congress can set those budget levels wherever it wants, but once it makes a decision, we want it to be a serious decision that we agree then will provide the plan for all of our smaller decisions that we take for the rest of the year, and we will make it difficult for people to avoid the force of law that they have given to that budget by requiring a two-thirds vote, the same as would be necessary for a veto override to go outside the budget.

If any Member of Congress is thereafter deprived of pork barrel spending in his district, we will have the same political dynamic that presently exists with the Base Closure Commission; we can all go back to our districts and say that darn process, it is outrageous, it is political, it is wrong, but the overall system will be responsible.

Individual Members won't have to self-immolate. How many times have you heard, "The process isn't the problem, we need to make tough decisions." And yet in order to make those tough decisions we have got to come up with a process that binds us as a group. If the only defense against runaway deficit spending is that every single Member can stand up and self-immolate it won't happen, so we have to design a system that tolerates what we know to be the priorities and the incentives that operate on all of us.

The new procedure will also bring entitlement programs within budget control by adopting a proposal recently endorsed by President Clinton's Bipartisan Entitlement Commission on which the chairman and I both served. For every Federal program, except Social Security and interest on the debt, Congress will actually decide how much to spend in the coming year. Congress can raise the level of spending for any of these programs. These are not caps, but Congress will decide instead of writing a blank check.

At the same time, following the example of the Lugar amendment to the food stamp program some years ago, the agency head, the Secretary of Agriculture in the case of food stamps, is given regulatory authority to adjust benefit levels and eligibility requirements, so at the end of the fiscal year that program costs no more than Congress appropriates for it.

These days food stamps continue to run out of control because everyone knows that there will be a supplemental. If there is any shortfall, Congress will provide it in a supplemental, but under the Budget Process Reform Act, spending outside the budget, as I have already described, will require a two-thirds vote, so we will have budget control over our spending.

The process is nonpartisan, nonideological in the sense that it doesn't tell us either whether we should prefer guns or butter or whether we should spend more or less next year. Congress can triple the budget, triple Federal spending next year under this process, but once Congress decides what the budget is, there will be enforcement, and there won't be blank check spending.

Finally, the bill strips away the incentives for gridlock and yearend embarrassments, like shutting down the Government toward which we are headed again this year, by providing an automatic continuing resolution. If Congress and the President fail to do anything in time for the next fiscal year, last year's spending levels are automatically reauthorized.

You know that in a clinch we have from time to time enacted continuing resolutions that freeze everything in place. That is a result that neither the Congress nor the President wishes for the long haul because each of us has priorities that we want to impose on that process that are different from the year before. It provides a strong incentive for people to do their work on time so that they are not rendered impotent. But unlike Gramm-Rudman, which was planned irrationality, this is planned rationality, relatively speaking. We found that by having the sword of Damocles of GrammRudman, planned irrationality, everyone was tempted to play chicken because they knew in the end that America would never have irrationality, so we have got to remove the incentive for playing chicken with the Federal Government and that is the final feature of the Budget Process Reform Act in that sense.

Last, the President is given a tool that is separate from and apart from, although complementary to or, indeed, substitute for if people aren't willing to have the line-item veto, and it is called lineitem reduction.

Instead of impoundment authority or instead of even the lineitem veto in the context of the budget, the President would be given the power to pare back overbudget spending to a level set by Congress in the budget law that it had passed. So the President couldn't impose his own priorities on the Congress; he could act as the chief executive to enforce the law that he signed or that was passed over his veto. And any overbudget spending, remember that must be passed by two-thirds by the Congress in the first place, could then be singled out by the President, he could pare it back to the level in the budget, and if Congress wanted to override it, they would need yet another two-thirds vote.

The multiple redundant supermajority requirement means that overbudget spending is going to be subjected to a special glare and public view with a hopefully view to making sure that we keep it under control and better checked that way. Overall, that is the Budget Process Reform Act.

The genius of the framers of our Constitution was that they did not rely on the self-abnegation of American politicians. As Madison famously said, “If men were angels, no government would be necessary; if angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary." But neither Members of Congress nor our constituents are angels. We do need government controls over spending, and this kind of reform of the 1974 Act is in order based on the empirical evidence of the last 20 years, and I hope that as a result of the hearings that you are holding we can swiftly enact these needed changes.

Thank you.

Mr. Goss. Thank you, Mr. Cox. That is appealing and wellthought-out, and written testimony will be accepted for the record from all witnesses, without objection.

[Mr. Cox's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER COX, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Earlier this month, the House and Senate approved the first balanced budget since 1969. That was an historic achievement. To get this far, the chairman of the House and Senate Budget Committees, John Kasich and Pete Domenici, had to battle an amada of special interests. They also had to overcome the biggest handicap of all: the 1974 Budget Act itself.

The 1974 Budget Act institutionalized deficit spending. Since 1974, 90 percent of our $5 trillion national debt has been added. That's why it took the biggest landslide congressional election in nearly half a century to break the pattern. But this year's effort alone won't suffice. To institutionalize fiscal responsibility year in and year out, we've got to change the deeply flawed budget process.

During the past several years, from my days as a Counsel in President Reagan's White House through my efforts as cochairman of the Task Force on Budget Process Reform, I have developed a comprehensive proposal for the tough reform we so urgently need. I drew upon the experience and ideas of Republican and Democrat administration_officials, congressional leaders, and academic experts. The proposal is the Budget Process Reform Act. In the last Congress, more than 200 Members of the House and Senate had signed on as cosponsors.

The hallmarks of our reform legislation are clarity, evenhandedness regarding the role of the President and Congress, and strict discipline. It is based on the premise that an effective budget process must do each of the following:

Be as simple as possible in concept and means of implementation, so that the process is clear and understandable to Congress and the public.

Encourage early consultation and cooperation between Congress and the President.

Produce decisions on overall budget levels early in the budgeting year.

Be evenhanded with respect to the President and the Congress, not giving either an advantage in dealing with the other or in establishing spending priorities.

Tie each individual spending decision to an overall, binding budget total. Require explicit decisions on spending levels for all Federal programs, not just those arbitrarily deemed controllable.

Prevent threatened shutdowns of the Government.

Not raise difficult questions of constitutionality.

Contain a bias in favor of a spending restraint that could be overcome only if both the President and the Congress wish to do so.

We must adopt a new budget system worthy of the people's trust. It must be strong enough to withstand the test efforts of those who don't want to accept restraints on spending. It must be strong enough to survive the inevitable attempts to replace it with some less restrictive expedient.

Here are the key features of the Budget Process Reform Act:

BUDGET FIRST, SPENDING SECOND

This proposal would require that Congress enact a legally binding budget-in the form of a joint, rather than a concurrent resolution-by April 15 of each year. Until the budget is signed into law, no authorization or appropriations bill could come to the House or the Senate floor, or before any committee. The budget would set ceilings on all Federal spending except Social Security and the interest on the debt— for the coming fiscal year.

ONE-PAGE BUDGET

Under the current budget system, the budget is as thick and detailed as New York City's phone book. The Budget Process Reform Act calls for a budget that will fit in a single page-setting specified ceilings on government spending within the 19 summary categories currently used. It is reasonable to ask Congress and the President early in the legislative session to agree at this high level of abstraction on how much the Federal Government should spend in the ensuing fiscal year.

To ensure that neither Congress nor the President will be able to escape the discipline of a reform budget process, I have written into the Budget Process Reform Act a series of enforcement mechanisms which, in effect, lock the door on all the exits and deny Congress and the President the tools to pick the locks.

THE SUPERMAJORITY REQUIREMENT

First, Congress would be permitted to enact spending legislation in excess of the budget ceilings only by a supermajority vote-two-thirds of both Houses. The only way to adopt spending proposals by simple majority would be to authorize and appropriate within the ceilings of a duly enacted budget law.

NO MORE BLANK CHECKS

The Budget Process Reform Act will require Congress to determine the desired level of spending for each Federal program except Social Security and interest on the debt. Open-ended blank-check appropriations such as those for entitlement programs, which authorize the spending of such sums as may be necessary-would no longer be allowed.

LINE-ITEM REDUCTION

The Budget Process Reform Act will also give the President enhanced rescission authority-that is, the authority to rescind spending in excess of the budget ceilings. This line-item reduction authority is applicable only to the over-budget portion of the proposed spending. The President would also get the same authority to cut back any spending in excess of the previous year's levels in the event that Congress failed to adopt any budget at all.

To maintain the integrity of congressional control over the legislative process, the Congressional Budget Office, not the Office of Management and Budget, would be the scorekeeper for determining whether particular authorization and appropriations measures are consistent with the budget ceilings.

NO MORE BUDGET ACT WAIVERS

Mr. Chairman, as you and the other members of this committee are well aware, one of the most notorious ways that past Congresses had cheated the budget process was by waiving the requirements of the 1974 Budget Act. In fact, during the 103d Congress, two out of every three rules adopted by the House actually waived the Budget Act. My bill will end this practice.

AVOIDING GOVERNMENT SHUTDOWNS

Finally, the Budget Process Reform Act provides a safeguard against the contingency that Congress should fail by October 1, the beginning of the fiscal year, to complete action on appropriations for any program or activity. In that case, the previous year's funding level would automatically be reappropriated for the upcoming fiscal year. This automatic continuing resolution would apply to all spending, except for Social Security and interest. An added virtue of this sustaining mechanism is its bias in favor of spending restraint. If no action is taken, spending does not increase from year to year.

Through the Budget Process Reform Act, we will enforce the law. We will require cooperation between the President and Congress. We will bring entitlement programs under budget control. Above all, we will make the system clear and understandable to the people whose money we are spending.

Mr. Chairman, James Madison once famously said: "If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary." It was the genius of the framers of our Constitution that they did not rely on the self-abnegation of American politicians.

Because Members of Congress-like their constituents-are no angels, we must design a system that reflects the framers' realism about human nature and political organization. The Budget Process Reform Act is just that. It will help ensure that even if individual legislators aren't all fiscally responsible, the Congress overall will be.

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for giving me the opportunity to testify here today. I look forward to continuing to work with the committee on the urgent task of reforming the institution of the U.S. Congress.

Mr. Goss. I think that there may be some questions. You and I have had the opportunity to discuss a lot of this previously, and, indeed, your comments on the Kerrey Commission and the vast array of entitlements that we seem to discover in that process is worthy of note, and I think you have got some very compelling ideas.

Mr. Beilenson, do you have questions for the witness?

Mr. BEILENSON. I don't know. I don't want to argue with you because it takes time. Don't be offended if I say, Chris, that I found the second half of your testimony better than the first half. Some of your proposals I think make a lot of sense. I don't necessarily agree with them, but you are starting to hone in on some of the real problems.

I think you totally misjudged the situation when you were first talking. I think it is preposterous on the face of it to tie in, as I think you were, the huge deficits of the past 20 years to the factI think you said it was not a coincidence that those are the years in which we had a Budget Act. I don't know of anybody else who disagrees that our deficits would be far worse over the past 15, 20 years or so if we did not have a Budget Act.

You spoke about Miss O'Neill. I read carefully her testimony from last week, and her conclusions. They were quite different from the ones I think you were seeming to attribute to her, although you didn't do it all that directly.

The great problem with the Budget Act, the big problem with it, is of course, that it didn't control the entitlement spending, the mandatory spending. But especially since the 1990 summit-an agreement which I know some of you folks did not like at all—we have controlled discretionary spending, that fraction of our budget that comprises discretionary spending.

I disagree with you that the existing budget resolution does not give broad policy guidance. I think it does. I don't think that it excites or incites or attracts specific pork-barrel-types of considerations from Members. I mean, it isn't done in that kind of detail.

I don't think it is true that it is not binding. I think it is binding in a very real way on the allocations to the committees and is directly responsible for the fact that with respect to discretionary spending, we have been far more careful and far more constrained than we would have without it.

Finally, of course, pork barrel spending, despite the fact that the public has been led to believe that, is not the cause of the problem, as you well know, but you kept talking about pork barrel spending in each of our districts. We are getting away from that to a huge extent, thanks to a lot of folks on your side, among others, over the past few years.

If you add up all the pork barrel spending, it will amount toI am not saying it is not money, it is a few billion dollars, but compared to the huge, continually growing mandatory programs, it barely counts. That is not what has driven the deficit.

So I am just being argumentative, and unnecessarily, and I don't mean to be. I don't mean to be unpleasant about it. I think some of your statements at the beginning were off base entirely, I don't agree with them at all, but some of your specific proposals, which of course is more important, make some sense.

Mr. Cox. I take that as constructive criticism because how we talk about these things is as important as the substance of the proposals that we are offering if we are seeking to convince one another of the merits of the argument, and so I stand corrected with respect to my views and the views of June O'Neill.