and support our efforts abroad. We must show it in the dedication of our own lives as many of you who are graduating today will have a unique opportunity to do, by serving without pay in the Peace Corps abroad or in the proposed National Service Corps here at home. But wherever we are, we must all, in our daily lives, live up to the age-old faith that peace and freedom walk together. In too many of our cities today the peace is not secure because freedom is incomplete. It is the responsibility of the executive branch at all levels of governmentlocal, State, and National-to provide and protect that freedom for all of our citizens by all means within their authority. It is the responsibility of the legislative branch at all levels, wherever that authority is not now adequate, to make it adequate. And it is the responsibility of all citizens in all sections of this country to respect the rights of all others and to respect the law of the land. All this is not unrelated to world peace. "When a man's ways please the Lord," the Scriptures tell us, "he maketh even his enemies to be at peace with him." And is not peace, in the last analysis, basically a matter of human rights the right to live out our lives without fear of devastation, the right to breathe air as nature provided it, the right of future generations to a healthy existence? While we proceed to safeguard our national interests, let us also safeguard human interests. And the elimination of war and arms is clearly in the interest of both. No treaty, however much it may be to the advantage of all, however tightly it may be worded, can provide absolute security against the risks of deception and evasion. But it can, if it is sufficiently effective in its enforcement and if it is sufficiently in the interests of its signers, offer far more security and far fewer risks than an unabated, uncontrolled, unpredictable arms race. The United States, as the world knows, will never start a war. We do not want a war. We do not now expect a war. This generation of Americans has already had enough-more than enough-of war and hate and oppression. We shall be prepared if others wish it. We shall be alert to try to stop it. But we shall also do our part to build a world of peace where the weak are safe and the strong just. We are not helpless before that task or hopeless of its success. Confident and unafraid, we labor on-not toward a strategy of annihilation but toward a strategy of peace. CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, Dr. GERALD A. JOHNSON, Assistant to the Secretary (Atomic Energy), Washington, D.C. DEAR DR. JOHNSON: It is clear that should an atmospheric or varying degree of a comprehensive nuclear test ban take place in the near future, the capabilities of the surveillance network will be the primary source of our technical basis for the assurance that declarations or agreements are being adhered to. In this connection it would be very helpful to the Joint Committee to have an up-to-date assessment of— (1) The present capabilities of the Atomic Energy detection system (AEDS), for detection and identification of nuclear weapons tests by yield; (2) The future programed capabilities of the AEDS and the dates when these improvements will be available and checked out; (3) Plans or studies for further improving the AEDS and the kind, degree, and time of availability of improvements envisaged. It would be of further help if this assessment were to cover the four environments-atmosphere, underwater, underground, and high altitude, including outer space. In connection with underground I would hope that a breakdown could be made by reference to the three types of media-hard rock, soft rock, or porous rock saturated with water (example, Nevada tuff), and dry porous rock or loose rock (example, dry alluvium). As for high altitude some breakdown as follows should be made: less than 100 km, between 100 and 1,000 km, between 1,000 and 1 million km, and greater than 1 million km. The high-altitude situation should relate to unshielded events and, if possible, clear state ments should be made with regard to estimates on how these assessments may be degraded through the use of various shielding techniques. Recognizing that present surveillance capabilities depend upon the area of the world one is concerned about, it would be most appropriate that for the case of atmospheric, underground, and high altitude the following areas be assessed separately-U.S.S.R., Mongolia, China, and north Africa; for the case of atmospheric, underwater, and high altitude the areas of Arctic Ocean, North Pacific, South Pacific, North Atlantic, South Atlantic, and Indian Ocean be assessed separately. If underwater is an appropriate environment within the confines of the U.S.S.R. differing from underground there, this too should be commented upon. Breakdowns of geographical areas and environments other than those mentioned above or in addition thereto may be appropriate. If so, please do not hesitate to comment on or furnish the proper assessments for them in the context indicated above. I realize that the above request may appear to be unduly burdensome but I understand there was a study made several years ago which was very similar and perhaps only updating would be required. The information requested will be most helpful to the Joint Committee in carrying out its responsibilities for being fully and currently informed in this area. Sincerely yours, JOHN T. CONWAY, Executive Director. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS FROM DR. JOHN FOSTER RELATING TO SAFEGUARDS In my prepared statement I directed attention to the need for agreement on the words "capability," "intensive," and "readiness." These three words refer to the first three safeguards indicated by the Joint Chiefs. My lack of assurance of a common understanding led to their inclusion in my statement. The first safeguard of the Joint Chiefs, "The conduct of comprehensive, aggressive, and continuing underground test programs From my meeting with President Kennedy on July 31, 1963, I received assurance that the laboratories were to continue underground tests, and that we would be able to conduct experiments involving high yields. Up until the time of my testimony, it was not pos sible to obtain agreement on the meaning of such words as "comprehensive" and "aggressive." Formal assurance would require a letter from the USAEC authorizing the laboratories to proceed on a specific underground program. The Stennis Subcommittee on Preparedness requested definition of such a program on August 9, 1963. The second safeguard indicated by the Joint Chiefs, "maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities and programs ***." We have had discussions with the Division of Military Application of the AEC concerning our proposals for replacing substandard and temporary World War II barracks with permanent buildings. Discussions on possible construction in fiscal years 1964 and 1965 are still in progress. Chairman Seaborg stressed the importance of the construction of permanent facilities, in the July 31 meeting with President Kennedy. The third safeguard, "the maintenance of facilities and resources necessary to institute promptly, nuclear tests in the atmosphere ***" involves the meaning of the word "readiness" discussed in my prepared statement. It is important to point out that the safeguards outlined by the Joint Chiefs, to which Senator Jackson refers, were developed only recently. It takes a few weeks to prepare proposals responsive to the procedures indicated, and, in turn, time is required to develop and transmit authorizations which represent the best assurance one can have. This general subject has been discussed since 1958. I am aware that approximately $55 million are now committed for improvements to Johnston Island. In addition, $15 million have been committed to instrument diagnostic aircraft. To date, however, the laboratory has not received assurance of funds or authorization to proceed with the purchase of hardware to achieve a readiness capability. With regard to the fourth safeguard of the Joint Chiefs, "*** the improvement of our capability, within feasible and practical limits, to monitor the terms of the treaty ***," I do not consider this to be within the direct responsibility of the laboratory, and, therefore, have no additional comments. STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY LEO SZILARD TO THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE U.S. SENATE The test ban agreement which the administration has submitted to the Senate for ratification would advance the cause of peace, if, subsequent to its ratification, the Government were to propose to the Soviet Union an agreement providing for an adequate political settlement, which would serve the interests of the Soviet Union and the other nations involved, as well as our own interests, and which the Soviet Union might rightly be expected to accept. If this were not done, however, and if the Government proceeded with an extensive program of underground bomb testing, then, rather than furthering the cause of peace, the test ban agreement would be likely to do just the opposite. By engaging in this type of testing on a large scale, the United States would force the Soviet Union to conduct numerous bomb tests also. The underground testing of bombs is very expensive, however, and since the Soviet Union is economically much weaker than the United States, it would in the long run be forced to abrogate the agreement. Such a turn of events would prove my old friend and distinguished colleague, Dr. Edward Teller, to have been right-for the wrong reasons. The problem of establishing peaceful coexistence between the United States and the Soviet Union involves the rest of the world as much as it involves Europe. It is difficult to visualize a political settlement in which Russia would agree to coexist with parliamentary democracies located in its proximity which look to us for support, while at the same time the United States would continue to maintain its present position that it cannot coexist with a Communist country, located in this hemisphere, which looks for support to the Soviet Union. Any attempt on the part of the Government to arrive at a political settlement with the Soviet Union on such a basis would be an attempt "to eat one's cake and have it too," and few people, if any, have ever accomplished this feat. If I were a Member of the Senate, I think I would want to know at this point how the Government proposes to follow up the conclusion of the test ban agreement, before casting my vote for the ratification of the agreement. I am not speaking here as a scientist who can claim to have special knowledge of the atomic bomb, but rather as a citizen whose political judgment is not obscured by being in possession of “inside information." Senator JAMES WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, Washington, D.C. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ALAMOS SCIENTIFIC LABORATORY, DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I have followed with great interest your hearings on the test ban treaty. You know, of course, that I am strongly in favor of this treaty, and agree wholeheartedly with the testimony given by Dr. Bradbury, Secretary McNamara, and Dr. Harold Brown. Dr. Teller in his opposing testimony has emphasized the possible impact of the treaty on the development of antimissile defense. I should like to point out that to my knowledge Dr. Teller is not an expert in this subject. While he has worked for nearly 25 years, and very successfully, on atomic weapons, his interest in AICBM is of very recent date, and I do not believe that he has worked on this subject very much himself. On the other hand, I have worked on AICBM for about 5 years. Many members of the President's Science Advisory Committee, while not doing direct work on the subject, have followed the AICBM development in great detail through frequent panel meetings, at least since 1957. These include Dr. Wiesner himself; Dr. Panofsky, the present Chairman of the AICBM Panel of PSAC; Dr. Garwin; and myself, a former member of PSAC and present member of its AICBM Panel. Dr. Fisk is also thoroughly familiar with the subject, as are Dr. Harold Brown and Dr. Herbert York. Your committee has heard from Drs. Brown and York, and has received a recent PSAC statement endorsing the test ban which was signed by Drs. Panofsky, Garwin, Fisk, and others. Of course, I agree with the PSAC statement. I strongly believe that any one of the persons mentioned has greater familiarity with the AICBM problem than Dr. Teller. One of the statements made by Dr. Teller; namely, that AICBM could be effective against an attack by a weak enemy like Communist China, was made by the PSAC Panel on AICBM many years ago, perhaps as early as 1958. Therefore, this statement which Dr. Teller considers as one of the "surprises," is no surprise to those scientists who have followed AICBM development for the past several years. It is true that the technical possibilities of AICBM have improved in the last years. But the fact that Dr. Teller is surprised when he finally gets around to looking at a certain development is not germane to the subject of the test ban. In spite of the fact that PSAC has long known that AICBM could be effective against a weak enemy or partially effective against an ICBM attack by Russia, the PSAC Panel has always concurred with the DOD that AICBM in its present form should not be deployed because it is not sufficiently effective. Some of your witnesses have stated clearly that AICBM depends primarily on problems of radar and missile development. I would say that these two features mean about 90 percent of the AICBM problem and only 10 percent of the prob lem lies in the nuclear warhead. By far the major part of the nucelar warhead problems are well in hand from previous tests. Further improvement of the warhead, if necessary, can well be accomplished by underground tests. The remaining very small part of the AICBM effort depends on understanding certain effects of atomic weapons. I have worked on these effects for several years, and I am working on them now, together with many other scientists. I believe that the remaining understanding of these effects can be achieved by theoretical evaluation of the tests which were carried out in 1958 and 1962. The scientists who have looked at the entire AICBM problem seem unanimously of the opposite opinion to Dr. Teller, who has only worked on a small phase of this problem-the nuclear weapon. I should be happy if you would make this letter available to the members of your committee. Yours sincerely, H. A. BETHE. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE UNITED NATIONS, INC., Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT, Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee, MY DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: The officers, chapters, and members of the American Association for the United Nations are united in support of the limited test ban agreement which the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union signed in Moscow on August 5. You have received favorable testimony and letters from people in many walks of life and from representatives of many kinds of organizations. The educational program of our association is directed to the support of the United Nations and the position of leadership of our country in the United Nations. The test ban agreement has a distinct bearing on the strengthening of the United Nations and the role of our country in it. President John F. Kennedy in his address to the Nation on the test ban treaty pointed out that "for the first time, an agreement has been reached on bringing the forces of nuclear destruction under international control-a goal first sought in 1946 when Bernard Baruch submitted our comprehensive plan to the members of the United Nations." Former President Dwight D. Eisenhower in his "Atoms for Peace" address before the United Nations General Assembly on December 8, 1953, said, "Finally, if there is to be advanced any proposal designed to ease even by the smallest measure the tensions of today's world, what more appropriate audience could there be than the members of the General Assembly of the United Nations." And President Kennedy in his "Decade of Development" address to the 16th General Assembly of the United Nations on September 25, 1961, called for a treaty ending nuclear tests as the beginning of disarmament negotiations. As this is written, approximately 75 members of the United Nations have signed the treaty. It is expected that the response will have been overwhelming by the time the General Assembly convenes on September 17. Why this overwhelming adherence? The members of the United Nations entertain the hope that this treaty will be the first effort to reverse the trend of the cold war. Frequently representatives of the so-called smaller states speaking in United Nations bodies and frequently these bodies themselves have called upon the major powers to reach some basic agreements so all of the nations could move forward from the threat of war to permanent peace. Furthermore, the treaty can be the first of a series of steps leading to the final goal of total disarmament in a world of law and a strengthened United Nations. The goal of total disarmament was first proclaimed by a resolution adopted unanimously by the 14th General Assembly. It is a generally held conviction that an agreement to stop nuclear testing must be the very beginning of disarmament. For one thing, it reduces the chances that a number of other countries might have nuclear weapons. Finally, the members of the United Nations welcome the agreement because it will virtually stop the poisoning of the atmosphere to the detriment of future generations. We Americans may not realize the sensitive position of our country in this regard because we are the only country that has used atomic bombs. Over 100 nations of the world feel they have had to stand by helplessly while the atmosphere was poisoned and outer space dangerously disturbed by the atomic tests of the two nuclear giants. It is difficult for citizens of a very powerful country to realize the feeling of hopelessness in a great part of mankind who fear that a fate of nuclear destruction may await them and they can do nothing about it. To them, the nuclear giants have taken the first step toward a reduction of nuclear fallout, toward a reduction of tensions, and toward the goal of disarmament. As one of the most important members of the United Nations and one of the two nuclear giants, the United States has a dual responsibility. It must take a lead in contributing to the organization of peace-few steps can be taken in that direction without the cooperation or leadership of the United States. At the same time, it must be in a position to contribute to the military defense of the world until the final goal of a disarmed world under law is attained. A review of the statements of the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and many others shows that this treaty contributes to the two above objectives. It is an important step in the consolidation of peace. Its risks to American defense are minimal-in fact, testimony has been given before your committee that the treaty may actually enhance our security. In conclusion, let us say that in the light of the arguments that have been given by American leaders for the ratification of the treaty, in the face of the overwhelming appreciation of mankind for the treaty and the adherence of an overwhelming majority of the governments, we feel certain that the Senate will consent to ratification by a large majority. Sincerely yours, HERMAN W. STEINKRAUS. President. CLARK M. EICHELBERGER, Executive Director. OSCAR A. DE LIMA, Chairman, Executive Committee. JOSEPHINE W. POMERANCE, Chairman, Disarmament Information Committee. STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY ADM. ARTHUR W. RADFORD, U.S. NAVY (RETIRED), ON PROPOSED TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE, IN OUTER SPACE AND UNDER WATER Mr. Chairman, I regret that I was unable to appear before your committee in person but I do appreciate the opportunity to submit for the record the statement which follows: Ten years after signing the armistice agreement at the end of the Korean war, we the United States-have reached another important signing. Shall we, or shall we not, agree to the atomic test ban treaty now before the Senate for ratification? Important witnesses before your Senate committee have argued that we should. Equally important witnesses have argued that we should not. Others have recommended approval with reservations. |