to redress a trespass, yet they will interfere under peculiar circumstances, and have often done so where the trespass was a continuing one, and a multiplicity of suits at law was involved in the legal remedy. The doctrine was recognized and the authorities cited in the Murdock Case, 73 N. Y. 579, and the rule deemed perfectly settled. That case, and those referred to, it is true, were cases of intrusion, where no consent had been given for the entry of the intruder; but whether the trespass was such from the beginning, or became one after a revocation of the license, can make no difference as it respects the adequacy of the legal remedy. That is the same in either event. Two cases of the former character were cited in the Uline Case. Bowyer v. Cook, 4 M. G. & S. 236; Holmes v. Wilson, 10 A. & E. 503. In one, stumps and stakes had been left on plaintiff's land and in the other buttresses to support a road; in each an action of trespass had been brought and damages recovered and paid; and in each case, after a new notice to remove the obstruction, a further action of trespass was brought and sustained. So that, as I have said, the legal remedy is identical, however the trespass originated. It is a general rule that a court of equity will act in such cases only after the plaintiff's right has been established at law, but that rule has its exceptions. T. & B. R. R. Co. v. B. & H. T. R. R. Co., 86 N. Y. 128. Where the facts are in doubt, and the right not clear, such undoubtedly would be a just basis of decision, though the modern system of trying equity cases makes the rule less important. Where, as in an intrusion by railroad companies whose occupation threatens to be continuous, the injury partakes of that character, an action at law to establish the right has not been required. Indeed, I am inclined to deem it more a rule of discretion than of jurisdiction. In Avery v. New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company, 106 N. Y. 142, to which we have been referred since the argument, we were disposed to sustain a mandatory injunction requiring defendant to remove so much of a fence as obstructed plaintiff's right of way, although the obstruction was not a nuisance but an invasion of a private right. In that case the equitable remedy was not challenged by either counsel or the court, and evidently stood upon the grounds here invoked; those of a continuing trespass the remedy for which at law would be inadequate, and involve repeated actions by the injured party for damages daily occurring. These views of the case enable us to support the judgment rendered. It should be affirmed, with costs. All concur, except RUGER, Ch. J., not voting. Judgment affirmed.1 1 See comment in McSorley v. Gomprecht, 30 Abb. N. C. 412, 415 (1892). Cf. Council Bluffs v. Stewart, 51 Ia. 385 (1879). In Rosser v. Randolph, 7 Port. 238 (1838), an injunction was denied has some. feet so schat. mochday that has THE INADEQUACY OF OTHER REMEDIES able to be caused the coursed by it and are SUPREME COURT, GEORGIA, 1877. ste and that Trelfel should be grouted tance they has been moclocked by [59 Georgia Reports, 790.] [CHAP. II cause o told him thBLECKLEY, . The nuisance complained of may be easily and wching only expeditiously abated by the municipal government of Cuthbert. the there a shop Code, § 4095. "A little water clears us of this deed." It will ime Thivis a angerous nuisance put out all the fire in the establishment, and, that done, the nd should be abatet nuisance will cease. Or, if the fire should be rekindled, and operaLance tions renewed, the order of abatement may be still more effectually executed by dismembering, or, if necessary, demolishing the property. What is local city government for, if not to deal with such a case as this? A dangerous fire is maintained in the heart of a city, day after day, and instead of calling on the municipal authorities to stop it, a bill is filed, and the chancellor importuned for an injunction. What is the obstacle to resorting to the mayor and council for protection, and obtaining it at once? The chancellor could see none, nor can a majority of this court. To anticipate the inefficiency of a statutory remedy exactly adapted to the case, and apparently adequate and complete, is warranted neither by precedent nor any general principle. Should the remedy be tried, and obstacles to its speedy success actually arise, it may then be in order to invoke the interposition of chancery by injunction. WARNER, C. J., concurred. against the construction of a dam overflowing the plaintiff's spring, because he could prevent the injury by digging a ditch 250 ft. long, 4 ft. deep, costing $20. Ormond, J., said, citing Kent, C., 3 Johns, Ch. 287: "To call into exercise the extraordinary power of the court, there must be a strong and mischievous case of pressing necessity.' This does not seem to be one of those cases but is one in which a court of law can afford full and adequate relief." Accord, Kingsbury v. Flowers, 65 Ala. 479, 486 (1880), draining; English v. Progress, 95 Ala. 259, 267 (1891), altering house to lessen vibrations from electric light plant; Boyden v. Bragaw, 53 N. J. Eq. 26 (1894), removing monument; Porter v. Armstrong, 132 N. C. 66 (1903), deepening brook. Contra, Clowes v. Staffordshire, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 125 (1872), building filter to stop pollution; Richmond v. Atlantic, 10 R. I. 106 (1871), same; Sylvester v. Jerome, 19 Colo. 137 (1893), making cellar water tight; Burlington v. Scwarzman, 52 Conn. 181 (1884), removing slight highway obstruction; Martin v. Marks, 154 Ind. (1899), widening gate to avoid obstruction; Boston Ferrule Co. v. Hills, 159 Mass. 147 (1893), renting rooms elsewhere; Paddock v. Somes, 102 Mo. 226 (1890); Masonic Temple v. Banks, 94 Va. 695 (1897), pumping flooded cellar and using disinfectants. See Pomeroy's view, §§ 1947, 1967. In Gregory v. Nelson, 41 Cal. 278, 289 (1871), the defendant sought to avoid an injunction against washing away the plaintiff's ditch, by substituting a flume or pipe. JACKSON, J., dissenting. The facts of this case, as developed by the bill, answer and affidavits, show, I think, imminent danger from fire to the property of the complainant and of other business houses in the heart of the city of Cuthbert, as well as constant annoyance from cinders, soot, smoke, etc., etc., from a steam grist-mill improperly worked by a defective engine and boiler. The houses were set on fire several times, and the defect of the engine and smoke-stack does not appear to have been remedied so as to avoid constant danger, night and day. If there be no adequate and complete remedy at law, and if the complainant has not by laches in neglecting to interfere until the erection of the nuisance, lost his right to complain, the case seems imperatively to demand the interference of the chancellor by injunction. Is the right forfeited by laches? It is proven beyond question or cavil, that the complainant demanded of the defendant, while he was erecting the machinery, whether or not he intended to work the steam engine there, and the reply was that he did not, but after trial he meant to move the establishment out of the city to a place where no danger could ensue from its operations. So that there is no reasonable ground to impute laches to the complainant his conduct having been superinduced by the fact that defendant put him off his guard by stating that he intended to do what he did not do. Is the remedy at law as adequate and complete as in equity by injunction? The Code, § 4095, it is true, does give to the mayor and council the power to abate the nuisance; but from their judgment there could be an appeal, by certiorari or otherwise, to the superior court, and the delay would be necessarily long, and complainant's property might be burnt up before the nuisance could be abated. If it be said that the defendant would be required to give security for damages in the event that he appealed, the answer is that he could, and probably would, certiorari or appeal in forma pauperis, for the allegation is that he is insolvent. Besides, fire in a city, in the very heart of its business portion and densest population, is always attended with danger to human life, which is irreparable in damages. It may be said that equity would then interpose by injunction, but not until delays showed the remedy at law inadequate. The reply is that then it might be too late. From the facts shown here, there is reasonable certainty of danger every moment, and equity should not one moment hesitate to do what in the end it is probable she will be forced to do, lest her hesitation should cause damage to life and property wholly irreparable without her aid. It may be argued that the Code § 3002, only empowers equity to interfere before the nuisance is completed; but this is a nuisance which is never completed its gravamen consists in the illegal use of proper machinery and that use is continuous and daily, and the danger from it continuous and momentary. Besides, if the facts sworn to be true, it was the false statement of the defendant which prevented the complainant from interposing while the machinery was being erected and before its completion. For these reasons, while averse to interference with the chancellor's discretion in ordinary cases of application for injunctions, and reluctant to do so in any case, my judgment upon the facts here makes this danger from this nuisance so imminent that I would reverse the decision below if I could, and order the injunction to be granted until the hearing. 7864 1 Accord, Swaim v. Morris, 93 Ark. 362 (1910). Contra, Knox v. Mayor, 55 Barb. 404 (1868); Underhill v. Murphy, 117 Ky. 640 (1904). Effect of public right to abate by civil action, Johnson v. Reduction Co., 175 Cal. 63 (1917); of private right to abate in action at law, Cadigan v. Brown, 120 Mass. 493 (1876). See L. R. A., 1917E, 1009n. Equitable jurisdiction as affected by right to mandamus, Bourke v. Olcott, 84 Vt. 121 (1910); Moundsville v. Ohio R. R. Co., 37 W. Va. 92 (1892); N. P. v. Van Dusen, 245 Fed. 454 (C. C. A., 8th, 1917); by right to resort to Public Service Commission, Middlesex v. Penn. R. R., 82 N. J. Eq. 550 (Ch., 1913); by remedy in quasi-contract, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 864. Jurisdiction over fraud as affected by action for deceit, Ewing v. Dutrow, 128 Va. 416 (1920); 7 Va. L. Rev. 673. The creation by statute of an adequate legal remedy does not prevent equitable relief if previously given. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 478 (1898); Third Nat. v. Mylin, 76 Fed. 385 (Pa., 1896) Pokegama v. Klamath, 96 Fed. 34, 55 (Cal., 1899); Woodward v. Woodward, 148 Mo. 241 (1899). See Johnson v. Reduction Co., 175 Cal. 63 (1917); Herring v. Wilton, 106 Va. 171 (1906); "Equity jurisdiction after the creation of an adequate legal remedy," 23 Colum. L. Rev. 59 (1923). Many of the cases cited in the foot-notes at the end of each section in Chapter I deal with inadequacy of the remedy at law. The following cases will also be found interesting: Lifford v. Quin, I. R. 7 Eq. 347, 352 (1873). Sylvester v. Jerome, 19 Colo. 128 (1893). Indianapolis Nat. Gas Co. v. Kibbey, 135 Ind. 357 (1893). Tift v. Southern, 123 Fed. 789 (Ga., 1903). Western v. Stillman, 68 Misc. 456 (1910). Sullivan v. Goldsticker, 73 Misc. 291 (1911). Glenwood Light v. Mutual Light, 239 U. S. 121 (1915). Rogers v. Nevada, 60 Colo. 59 (1915). Thompson v. Whitemore, 88 N. J .Eq. 535 Ch. (1917). Woodstock v. Quinn, 201 Ala. 681 (1918). Hunt v. Hunt, 215 S. W. 228 (Tex. Civ. App., 1919). Grant v. Giuffrida, 267 Fed. 330 (App. D. C., 1920). Denison v. Brotherhood, 191 Ia. 698 (1921); 7 Ia. L. B. 120. CHAPTER III RELIEF IN EQUITABLE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST TORTS SECTION I SPECIFIC RELIEF: TYPES AND SCOPE OF INJUNCTIONS NOTE ON EARLY JUDICIAL ATTITUDE TOWARD INJUNCTIONS COTTENHAM, C., BROWN v. NEWALL, 2 Myl. & C. 558, 570 (1837): "I am most unwilling to lay down any rule which should limit the power and discretion of the court as to the particular cases in which a special injunction should or should not be granted; but I have always felt and since I have been upon the bench I have seen no reason to alter my opinion that extreme danger attends the exercise of this part of the jurisdiction of the court, and that it is a jurisdiction which is to be exercised with extreme caution. It is absolutely necessary that the power should exist, because there are cases in which it is indispensable; but I believe that, practically, it does as much injustice as it promotes justice; and it is, therefore, to be exercised with extreme caution." BALDWIN, J., BONAPARTE v. CAMDEN etc. R. R., Baldwin (U. S.) 205, 217 (1830): "There is no power the exercise of which is more delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation, and sound discretion or more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuing an injunction; it is the strong arm of equity, that never ought to be extended unless to cases of great injury, where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages. The right must be clear, the injury impending or threatened, so as to be averted only by the protecting preventive process of injunction; but that will not be awarded in doubtful cases, or new ones, not coming within well established principles; for if it issues erroneously, an irreparable injury is inflicted, for which there can be no redress, it being the act of a court, not of the party who prays for it. It will be refused until the court are satisfied that the case before them is of a right about to be destroyed, irreparably injured, or great and lasting injury about to be done by an illegal act; in such a case the court owes it to its suitors and its own principles, to administer the only remedy which the law allows to prevent the commission of such act." CRONIN v. BLOEMECKE AND OTHER [58 New Jersey Equity Reports, 313.] ON application for preliminary injunction. Heare affidavits and answer and affidavits. Patal EMERY, V. C. The bill is filed to enjoin a nuisance alleged to result from the playing of a game of base ball in the grounds known |