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colonies in Africa are of minor importance, and full treatment would have to analyze the reasons Portugal's holdings are only slightly more sig- for the decline of American prestige in Latin nificant at the present time. Wherever the in- America since World War II. Many of the reasons terests of the United States may become involved have, of course, been purely local and beyond the in the near future in any of these colonial regions, control of State Department policymakers. But, the belief is that friendly relations between the there is some evidence to suggest that recent United States and the parent country will help to American diplomatic representation in a number ease the path toward settlements of difficulties and of the leading Latin American countries has not will enable the United States to count upon been as effective as necessary. Several countries whatever utilization of Belgian, Portuguese, and

have been favored with our best diplomatic Spanish colonial areas and resources seem talent, but in others appointments have gone to quired for mutual security.

political supporters of the administration. Tariffs, (76) The United States is not directly

economic policies, and unilateral decisions have involved in the troubles in Kenya. That area is

also undermined American influence with certain still a colony of Great Britain and as such comes

Latin American nations. Apology is also made under the control of the Colonial Office in Lon

here for not discussing more fully American don. Very few Americans have settled in Kenya

relations with Mexico, Cuba, Brazil, Argentina, and any questions involving Kenya that may arise

Panama, and other nations of the area. in connection with American policies are dealt (80) Late in 1954 and early in 1955 some inwith between Washington and London. So far dications that Canadian foreign policy was not these questions have been very infrequent. How- exactly in harmony with American policy, espeever, since Great Britain, our NATO ally, is cially in respect to the Far East, occurred. Canabuilding its African and Middle Eastern defense dian sentiment was strong in favor of settling the system with Kenya as one of the keystones the explosive Red China-Nationalist China issues by possibility of future American involvement in arranging for the neutralization of the Formosa problems arising out of the Kenya colonial straits and the recognition of the existence of troubles is a likelihood. The British are not apt "two" Chinas. Such differences tended to be to give up Kenya, but the tragic events of the magnified by both Canadians and Americans, but past few years make it evident that some liber

they did not alter the basic facts of the interalization of Britain's colonial policies will be dependence of the two countries. Other areas of necessary if Kenya is not to become an unprofit

disagreement lay in the economic field where able battleground in the struggle between the

American tariffs and import restrictions operated white settlers and the aroused natives.

against Canadian products and where American (77) This request by the United States caused

mass production threatened to upset the smaller considerable surprise among the European mari- and less advantageously situated Canadian home time nations. They were sympathetic to the Ameri

industries. Likewise, Canadian economic ties with can desire to prevent war materiel from reaching

the British Commonwealth affected markets and Guatemala, but they could not agree to the sur

prices in Canada when American goods sought render of their sovereign rights by allowing U.S.

to enter the competition. naval patrols to stop their vessels on the high seas. Several of the European countries expressed their

(81) Examples are so numerous that merely willingness to supervise shipments to Central

to mention them would require much space. In America, but they pointed out that the American the postwar era, for instance, questions relating proposal was contrary both to international prac- to the Austrian peace treaty, incidents involving tices and to oft-declared American principles of the satellite areas of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, freedom of the seas. After the declinations by the and Poland, and the long series of frustrating European nations, the American proposal was negotiations with the Soviet Union might be cited dropped by the State Department.

as topics to which not enough attention has been (78) One of the interesting developments of given. On this latter subject it might be well to the Guatemalan incident was the establishment note that to detail the efforts of the United by the OAS of a system of aerial patrols of the States to treat amicably with the Russians would border areas. American aircraft were used in emphasize the underlying theme of postwar Amerthis patrol to observe and report evidences of ican policy—unceasing effort to communicate to hostile behavior on the part of both Guatemalan the rulers of the Soviet Union the determination factions as well as in neighboring Central Ameri- of the free world to resist aggression while seeking can border regions.

through every honorable means to reach solutions (79) In this brief review of U.S. policy in of the tensions created in large part by Soviet regard to Latin America, only a few of the out- unwillingness to respect the decencies of internastanding developments have been discussed. A tional relations.


(82) There is in a democracy no place for the belief that “Theirs not to question why; theirs but to do and die." Eternal vigilance upon the part of the public toward the actions and utterances of their leaders is one of the fundamentals of a free society. To criticize and oppose are not disloyal—but these devices must be founded on facts. And only when the policymakers adequately inform the people can they expect the kind of support for our foreign policies that will afford those policies the kind of backing required for success. Deceit, planned or unconscious, on the part of leaders is not only foolhardy, it is dangerous. Whenever it is practiced-either by withholding legitimate information or by "doubletalk”—the policy invites failure. Likewise, when the public by impassioned or unreasoning pressure forces its leaders into untenable policies, the results are almost inevitably disappointing, and often disastrous.

(83) Recall, if you please, such expressions as “No entangling alliances," "Freedom of the seas,' "Fifty-four, forty, or fight!" "Remember the Alamo!" "The reannexation of Texas," "Remember the Maine!” “Perdicaris alive, or Raisuli dead!” "Too proud to fight," "Make the world safe for democracy,” “The Fourteen Points,” “Quarantine the aggressors," "The Four Freedoms," "Unconditional surrender,” “Let the dust settle," "Containment,” “Situations of strength,” “Roll back

the Iron Curtain,”. “Unleashing Chiang Kaishek," "Instant and massive retaliation," and scores of others. One notable phrase which deserves much more attention than it receives as a guiding precept for the carrying out of American foreign policy is Theodore Roosevelts favorite, "Speak softly, but carry a big stick.” It is ironic that the most famous user of this phrase did not accept its wise counsel as often as judgment might have dictated.

(84) Perhaps the single most significant fact of present-day American foreign policy is the reliance by the United States upon "allies.” This dependence represents the greatest reversal, or advance, in our nation's history. After a century and a half in which we avoided formal alliances the United States has come full circle and built a series of binding alliances linking our country with nations as diverse as Pakistan and Peru, Thailand and Turkey, Denmark and the Dominican Republic. NATO, OAS, ANZUS, SEATO, and the pacts with Japan, Nationalist China, the Republic of Korea, the Philippine Republic are as revolutionary in their meaning for American foreign policy as anything that has occurred since we became a nation. Not even our membership in the UN indicates so basic a change in how the Americans view the place of our country in the community of nations.

Air Force-McGregor & Werner, Inc., Atlanta, Georgia, 3,000, 4-13-56



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