Seward's ambitious designs The administration, for domestic reasons, did not go through with the design to buy Cuba at this time. But the idea of manifest destiny was clear in the conclusions of the three American ministers who joined in the Ostend and Aix la Chapelle meetings to discuss the proposal. William H. Seward, Lincoln's Secretary of State, was another advocate of manifest destiny. As early as 1846 he had declared: "Our population is destined to roll its resistless waves to the icy barriers of the north." And in 1860 he was peering further afield when he said, "I can look southwest and see, amid all the convulsions that are breaking the Spanish-American republics, and in their rapid decay and dissolution, the preparatory stage for their reorganization in free, equal, and self-governing members of the United States of America."4 As the history of territorial acquisition is reviewed in the pages immediately following, it must be borne in mind that the doctrine of manifest destiny was flexible, that it could be used to justify annexation for the noblest of motives or the most expedient of political manipulations. Also, not all territorial annexation can be classified under the heading of manifest destiny. Some additions to the territory of the United States were achieved by other means, as has been and will be demonstrated. And some territorial objectives of manifest destiny never did become a part of the United States, specifically Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Canada, and Mexico. In the late years of the 19th century the term manifest destiny went out of fashion. It was succeeded by such terms as Yankee imperialism and dollar diplomacy, which, while not entirely synonymous, were held in equal disesteem. The events behind this change will be treated in a later section of this publication.5 Spain renounced her claims to the Oregon region and withdrew to the 42° parallel (now the northern boundary of California, Nevada, and Utah) after the Adams-Onis Treaty of 1819. Russia, as a result of treaties with the The Oregon question United States VS. United States in 1824 and with Great Britain in 1825, vacated her holdings on the Pacific coast south of the 54°40′ line. The vast Oregon territory then became a prize for which only the United States and Britain were left to contest. This area of approximately 500,000 square miles included about half of present-day British Columbia, all of Washington, Oregon, and Idaho, and such portions of Montana and Wyoming as lie west of the crest of the Rockies. Both Britain and America had numerous claims to various sections of the region by virtue of exploration, settlement, trading posts, and by principles of continuity and contiguity of territory. By 1821 a British trading organization, the Hudson's Bay Company, was politically and commercially dominant in much of the northwest, but American enterprises were becoming interested in Oregon. In a treaty with Great Britain in 1818 the United States had made a ten-year agreement giving each nation free access to the whole territory. This convention also defined the boundary between the United States and British North America as the 49° parallel west from the Lake of the Woods to "the Stony [Rocky] Mountains." CONVENTION OF 1818 BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES, LONDON, OCTOBER 20, 1818: . . . It is agreed, that any Country that may be claimed by either Party on the North West Coast of America, Westward of the Stony Mountains, Shall, together with its Harbours, Bays, and Creeks, and the Navigation of all Rivers within the same, be free and open, for the term of ten Years to the Vessels, Citizens, and Subjects of the Two Powers... The 1818 convention on joint access was renewed for an indefinite period in 1827. For the next ten years American interest in Oregon remained relatively quiet. Starting in 1841 the tide of American immigrants following the Oregon trail to the rich Willamette valley swelled rapidly. By 1845 there were 5,000 Americans in Oregon south of the Columbia River, while the region north of the river had only about 700 Britishers. Britain had several times offered to compromise on the line of the Columbia, while the United States had three times proposed a compromise on the 49th parallel. The American rush to Oregon However, compromise was not popular. The Democratic party platform of 1844 made this clear. DEMOCRATIC PARTY PLATFORM, BALTIMORE, MAY 29, 1844: . . . Resolved: . . That our title to the Whole of the Territory of Oregon is clear and unquestionable; that no portion of the same ought to be ceded to England or any other power, and that the re-occupation of Oregon and the re-annexation of Texas at the earliest practicable period are great American measures, which this Convention recommends. . . . This extravagant resolution caught the public imagination and the slogan of "fiftyfour forty or fight" became a votecatching battle cry along with "All of Oregon or none," and "The reannexation of Texas and the re-occupation of Oregon." In the spirit of manifest destiny John C. Calhoun, Secretary of State, wrote to Richard Pakenham, British Minister in Washington: "54° 40' or fight!" CALHOUN TO PAKENHAM, WASHINGTON, SEPTEMBER 3, 1844: Our claims to the portion of the territory drained by the Columbia River may be divided into those we have in our own proper right and those we have derived from France and Spain. We ground the former, as against Great Britain, on priority of discovery and priority of exploration and settlement. . . . To these we have added the claims of France and Spain. The former, we obtained by the treaty of Louisiana, ratified in 1803; and the latter by the treaty of Florida, ratified in 1819. . . . Now, our population may be safely estimated at not less than nineteen millions, of which at least eight millions inhabit the States and territories in the valley of the Mississippi. . . . To this great increase of population may be added the increased facility of reaching the Oregon territory. . . . These joint causes have had the effect of turning the current of our population towards the territory. . . . There can, then, be no doubt now that the operation of the same causes which impelled our population westward from the shores of the Atlantic. to the valley of the Mississippi, will impel them onward. . . into the valley of the Columbia, and that the whole region drained by it is destined to be peopled by us. The election of 1844 was close, but the Democrats won with Polk. The victory of the expansionists alarmed the British and they proposed arbitration of the Oregon question. Secretary Calhoun declined the British offer, January 21, 1845. His successor, James Buchanan, proposed to Pakenham, on July 12, 1845, that the two countries divide the territory on the 49th parallel. This time the British minister flatly rejected the proposal without so much as referring it to London. President Polk, who had gone back on his campaign slogan of 54°40′, withdrew the offer completely. In his annual message to Congress the President reviewed the history of the Oregon dispute. MESSAGE OF PRESIDENT POLK TO CONGRESS, WASHINGTON, DECEMBER 2, 1845: All attempts at compromise having failed, it becomes the duty of Congress to consider what measures it may be proper to adopt for the security and protection of our citizens now inhabiting or who may thereafter inhabit Oregon, and for the mainte nance of our just title to that Territory. In adopting measures for this purpose care should be taken that nothing be done to violate the stipulations of the convention of 1827, which is still in force. . Under that convention a year's notice is required to be given by either party to the other before the joint occupancy shall terminate and before either can rightfully assert or exercise exclusive jurisdiction over any portion of the territory. . . . At the end of the year's notice, should Congress think it proper to make provision for giving that notice, we shall have reached a period when the national rights in Oregon must either be abandoned or firmly maintained. That they can not now be abandoned without a sacrifice of both national honor and interest is too clear to admit of doubt. . . . After a tedious debate, Congress passed a resolution empowering the President to terminate the joint occupancy of Oregon, and Polk signed the paper April 27, 1846. Numerous other events, as well as the action of the Congress, moved Britain to offer a compromise based on the 49° line. Polk referred the question to the Senate "for previous advice-a most unusual procedure. [Thus] . . . the opprobrium for accepting or rejecting the compromise would fall squarely upon that body, and not upon the Administration." The Senate advised acceptance and the treaty was signed. OREGON TREATY WITH GREAT BRITAIN, WASHINGTON, JUNE 15, 1846: From the where the termi point on the forty-ninth parallel boundary laid down in existing treaties nates, the line of boundary . . . shall be continued westward along the said forty-ninth parallel . . . to the middle of the channel which separates the continent from Vancouver's Island; and thence southerly through the middle of the said channel, and of Fuca's Straits to the Pacific Ocean; provided, however, that the navigation of the whole of the said channel and Straits south of the forty-ninth parallel . . . remain free and open to both parties. Bailey, op. cit., p. 243. Bailey's italics. Annexation by joint resolution of Congress As Secretary of State in 1819, when the western boundary of Louisiana was estabEarly attempts lished, John Quincy Adams had to acquire been reluctant to relinquish AmeriTexas can claims to Texas. He continued to desire the acquisition of Texas and was able, as President of the United States in 1827, to initiate negotiations for its purchase.(9) This attempt to acquire all or part of Texas failed, and a later attempt made by President Jackson met with a similar fate. After Texas had won its independence from Mexico as the result of a successful revolution, it was eager to join the American Union. Spurred to action by the reports of British activities in Texas, the American government concluded a treaty of annexation with Texas on April 12, 1844. The treaty was rejected by the Senate of the United States, and the whole Texan question became an issue in the political campaign of 1844. Annexation was finally achieved through a joint resolution of Congress. (10) JOINT RESOLUTION ANNEXING TEXAS, WASHINGTON, FEBRUARY 27, 1845: . . . Congress doth consent that the territory properly included within... the republic of Texas, may be erected into a new State . . with a republican form of government .. in order that the same may be admitted as one of the States of this Union. . . . New States, of convenient size, not exceeding four in number, in addition to said State of Texas, and having sufficient population, may hereafter, by the consent of said State, be formed out of the territory thereof, which shall be entitled to admission under the provisions of the federal constitution. . . . In the instance of Texas, this joint resolution accomplished all the annexationists could desire and it measurably extended the Congressional participation in foreign relations. What could not be accomplished by a treaty needing the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate, was consummated by a joint resolution of a Congress sensitive to the mandate of the people as expressed in the elections of 1844. A joint resolution required only a simple majority in each house. The constitutionality of acquiring territory by joint resolution was doubted by many members of the Whig and Free Soil parties, but President Tyler signed the resolution on March 1, 1845, three days before relinquishing his office to James K. Polk. While the legalists debated, the way for Texas to come into the Union was opened by the use of a device the framers of the Constitution had not foreseen. The flexibility of that document may have been stretched by the action of the Congress in appropriating to itself extraordinary powers in the field of foreign policy, but the resiliency of the fundamental law of the land allowed for such exhibitions of electoral sensitivity to the wishes of the people. The annexation of Texas materially increased the difficulties that had arisen between the United States and Mexico. Mexico regarded Texas as a part of her national domain, and The Mexican had already warned the United War of 1846-48 States, November 3, 1843, that the annexation of that area would be followed by a declaration of war. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were broken in mid-1845. Mexican military actions across the Rio Grande in April 1846 brought an announcement from President Polk, on May 11, 1846, that war existed "by the act of Mexico itself." Two days later Congress formally declared war on Mexico. In order that the war might be terminated at the earliest possible moment, President Polk sent Nicholas P. Trist as a special commissioner to reside at the headquarters of the American Army in Mexico, with full powers to negotiate for peace whenever the opportunity should arise. Trist remained in Mexico, and eventually signed the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848), by which Mexico yielded the territory all the way to the Pacific. Therefore, while Texas was partially the cause of the Mexican War, it was not a prize of that conflict. Its annexation by the United States had provoked Mexican hostilities, but it was already within the Union before the war commenced. The real fruits of victory lay further west, as the next section will show. The urge to acquire California When the rash of Latin American wars of independence which freed the southern half of the Western hemisphere from Spain between 1790 and 1822 subsided, Mexico was left in possession of the vast territories conquered by Spain in the American southwest. Mexican rule over these areas stretching to the Pacific was desultory and spotty. Elements in the United States early cast covetous glances toward California in particular as another potential Texas. In 1835 President Jackson proposed that the United States offer $500,000 to Mexico for San Francisco Bay and the region north to the British claims. Nothing came of this proposal. Seven years later President Tyler had a plan for resolving the Oregon dispute on the line of the Columbia River if, in turn, Great Britain would induce Mexico to sell northern California to the United States. This project likewise was unsuccessful. With numbers of Americans settling in California to carry on trade, agriculture, cattle-raising, and other pursuits it was inevitable that the same sort of separatist movement would occur there as in Texas. Likewise, fears of British penetration from the north caused the State Department to watch developments in California. With this in view, James Buchanan indicated the government's desires. SECRETARY BUCHANAN, TO THOMAS O. LARKIN, AMERICAN CONSUL AT MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA, WASHINGTON, OCTOBER 17, 1845: I feel much indebted to you for the information which you have communicated to the Department from time to time in relation to California. The future destiny of that country is a subject of anxious solicitude for the Government and people of the United States. The interests of our commerce and our whale fisheries on the Pacific ocean demand that you should exert the greatest vigilance in discovering and defeating any attempts which may be made by foreign governments to acquire a control over that country. In the contest between Mexico and California we can take no part, unless the former should commence hostilities against the United States; but should California assert and maintain her independence, we shall render her all the kind offices in our power, as a sister Republic. This Government has no ambitious aspirations to gratify and no desire to extend our federal system over more territory than we already possess, unless by the free and spontaneous wish of the independent people of adjoining territories... In addition, President Polk's message of 1845, relating primarily to Oregon, bore unmistakable reference to what he suspected were British designs on California. ... PRESIDENT POLK'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, WASHINGTON, DECEMBER 2, 1845: Jealousy among the different sovereigns of Europe, lest any one of them might become too powerful for the rest . . . cannot be permitted to have any application on the North American continent, and especially to the United States. We must ever maintain the principle that the people of this continent alone have the right to decide their own destiny. Should any portion of them, constituting an independent state, propose to unite themselves with our Confederacy, this will be a question for them and us to determine without any foreign interposition. We can never consent that European powers shall interfere to prevent such a union because it might disturb the "balance of power" which they desire to maintain upon this continent. ... it is due alike to our safety and our interests that the efficient protection of our laws should be extended over our whole territorial limits, and that it should be distinctly announced to the world as our settled policy that no future European colony or dominion shall with our consent be planted or established on any part of the North American continent. . . . Late in 1845 President Polk sent John Slidell to Mexico as a special envoy with instructions, among others, to offer $25,000,000 for California and the intervening area. Slidell met Expansion with no success. When the United by conquest States went to war with Mexico, the and purchase Whig opposition to Polk charged that the President had deliberately provoked the war to conquer California, having failed in every other method to acquire that territory. Nicholas Trist, as has been mentioned, negotiated the treaty which closed the war. This treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, February 2, 1848, ceded New Mexico (as defined by the AdamsOnis treaty of 1819) and California to the United States, and confirmed the American title to Texas as far as the Rio Grande. The United States agreed to pay $15,000,000 to Mexico and to assume claims of American citizens amounting to $3,250,000 in return for what was approximately half of the Republic of Mexico. During the war an American military expedition had reached California and inflicted several defeats on the impotent Mexican garrisons there. American settlers had declared California independent on July 4, 1846, and a naval detachment from the Pacific squadron captured Monterey on July 6. The commander, John D. Sloat, thereupon proclaimed California annexed to the United States. By conquest and by cession the extensive territories which later became the states of California, Arizona, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah, and parts of Colorado and Oklahoma were added to the possessions of the United States. The Treaty of Gualdalupe Hidalgo did not end the question of the boundary between the United States and Mexico. Following the discovery of gold in California in 1848 and the The Gadsden rush of immigrants to the Pacific Purchase coast, the desirability of a railroad route which would avoid many of the problems of elevation, tunnelling, and weather present in the higher Rockies caused the administration of Franklin Pierce, an expansionist, to look with favor on a plan to build a line south of the Gila River. Jefferson Davis, The end of Pierce's Secretary of War, recomexpansion into mended James Gadsden, a promiadjoining lands nent Southern railroad promoter, as the man to accomplish the administration's designs. Gadsden was sent as minister to Mexico in May 1853 with instructions to buy a right of way across Mexican territory south of the Gila. On December 30, 1853, Gadsden signed a treaty giving the United States an area west from El Paso to a point beyond Yuma, including the town of Tucson. In return for this cession, which filled in the present southern boundaries of New Mexico and Arizona, the United States agreed to pay Mexico $10,000,000. Gadsden had tried to get an outlet to the Gulf of California in addition to the territory he did secure, but the Mexican government refused to include that concession. By the Gadsden purchase the southern boundaries of the continental United States were finally set, subject to minor alterations by surveyors. Thus in 1853 the nation climaxed its expansion into territory contiguous to its existing holdings.(11) The Alaska question Early Russian Relations between Russia and the United States were generally friendly from the time of the American revolution through the close of the Civil War. Only in 1821 when the Russian government issued a ukase, or official proclamation, on September 4, prohibiting foreign vessels from approaching within 100 miles of or landing on the northwest coast of America from the Bering Straits south to the 51° parallel, were there serious strains in the dealings between the two powers. In response to this ukase, the Secretary of State protested to the Russian minister in Washington at this unwarranted presumption on the part of the Czar's government. Great Britain made an independent protest to Russia at the same time. Secretary Adams then communicated the substance of his conversations to Henry Middleton, the American minister at St. Petersburg. American relations SECRETARY ADAMS TO H. MIDDLETON, The United WASHINGTON, JULY 22, 1823: . States can admit no part of these claims. Their right of navigation and of fishing is perfect, and has been in constant exercise from the earliest times, after the peace of 1783 . . . subject only to the ordinary exceptions and exclusions of the territorial jurisdictions, which, so far as Russian rights are concerned, are confined to certain islands north of the fifty-fifth degree of latitude, and have no existence on the continent of America. . . . The right of the United States from the forty-second to the forty-ninth parallel... on the Pacific Ocean we consider as unquestionable. . . . This territory is to the United States of an importance which no possession in North America can be of to any European nation. . . . It is not conceivable that any possession upon the continent of North America should be of use or importance to Russia for any other purpose than that of traffic with the natives. In 1824, Secretary Adams negotiated a treaty whereby Russia agreed to relinquish claims to territory between the 51° and 54°40′ lines. This confined the Russian holdings on the Pacific coast, which at one time had included trading posts and forts as far south as Fort Ross, some 100 miles north of San Francisco Bay, to an area north of what is now the southernmost point of Alaska.(12) In 1863 Russia, facing the possibility of becoming involved in a war against France and Great Britain, sent the major portion of her navy to New |