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Reversal of American policy on recognition

the rebels in March

1912. Victoriano Huerta overthrew Madero in February 1913 and a few days later had Madero shot. During these revolutionary outbreaks much American property was destroyed and American lives were lost. However, President Taft, about to relinquish office, declined to recognize Huerta, leaving to the incoming Wilson administration the decision of what to do about the Mexican situation. President Wilson refused to extend recognition to Huerta on the basis that Huerta had come into office as a result of murder and did not represent the wishes of the Mexican people. This was a departure from the usual American policy of recognizing existing governments regardless of how they achieved power. (30) The British recognized Huerta, as did many of the other nations. The United States, therefore, was left in an isolated position although it was recognizably a moral one.

President Wilson's watchful waiting policy prevailed through most of 1913. In November, however, he called for the resignation of Huerta and was supported in this by the British who had changed their attitude. In February 1914 the American arms embargo was relaxed to permit shipments to the anti-Huerta forces of Venustiano Carranza and Francisco Villa. This prolongation of the Mexican conflict drew criticisms at home and abroad. American investors in Mexico were losing money and brought considerable pressure on the President to recognize Huerta so hostilities would end. But Wilson stuck to his policy. Matters might have continued in this indecisive atmosphere but for an incident at Tampico on April 9, 1914. There a Mexican force arrested the crew of an American naval launch which was loading supplies at the Mexican oil port. Although the Americans were quickly released, the commander of the United States fleet, Admiral Henry T. Mayo, demanded that an apology be delivered within twenty-four hours and that a twenty-one gun salute to the American flag be fired by the Mexicans.

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Americans capture Vera Cruz

in a "necessary" act of intervention

When the Mexicans failed to accede fully to the admiral's terms, President Wilson asked Congress for permission to intervene in Mexico with armed forces. Congress consented on April 22, 1914. On the previous day, however, another incident at Vera Cruz occurred. In an effort to prevent the possible landing there of arms from a German vessel, American forces bombarded the city and landed troops who captured the town after a fight involving considerable casualties on both sides. This intervention was made with Wilson's consent and was received with great acclaim by the American people. Again Wilson had reversed his policy of non-intervention for what he considered sufficient reason. He was happy to accept the offer of the ABC powers (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile) to mediate the quarrel. A conference at Niagara Falls on the Canadian side-reached an agreement in May 1914 which gave the United States an opportunity to withdraw honorably, and which avoided war. Huerta relinquished his office in July 1914 and was succeeded by Carranza to whom the American government accorded recognition.

Almost immediately Villa revolted against Carranza. In January 1916 some of Villa's forces killed 18 Americans at Santa Ysabel, a mining

General
Pershing

pursues Villa

community. Sentiment in favor of American intervention flamed anew. Then, on March 9, 1916, Villa troops raided the town of Columbus, New Mexico, killing 17 Americans and doing considerable property damage. President Wilson sent General John J. Pershing into Mexico at the head of a punitive expedition in an effort to capture Villa. President Carranza consented to the intervention. Pershing pursued Villa far into Mexican territory and almost caught him. But the expedition was finally withdrawn in February 1917, partially because of the increasing hostility of the Carranza regime to American intervention, but more because of the approaching entry of the United States into the European war. It was evident from the cases involving Mexico that non-intervention as a policy could not always be maintained in view of the unsettled conditions

It depends on the situation

south of the Rio Grande. Nevertheless, President Wilson was true to his Mobile speech in most respects. In general he did not resort to intervention to further the interests of American investors -his interventions were mainly to protect American lives and property, and to punish Central Americans for acts of violence committed against Americans. The line is hazy, and Wilson himself found it difficult to separate moral action from economic expediency, even though he professed to be actuated by the former and sincerely endeavored to make that standard his guide.

9. The Foreign Policy Problems of

World War I

The development of American foreign policy was so complex during the period from 1914 to 1918 that only the major issues can Complex be presented in this brief examinaproblems tion. For the first time in its history increase the United States was projected American into affairs with world-wide conseresponsibilities quences with a frequency that demanded constant attention. Heretofore the problems had largely been isolated ones which could be met and solved one at a time. Now almost every problem depended in part on other concurrent ones. And almost every problem had a far wider significance than any the State Department and the President had been compelled to deal with in the past.

In the course of meeting the problems created by the First World War, the United States emerged from its position of splendid isolation to one of recognized leadership among the great nations of the globe. This emergence was gradual and at times reluctant. But it was inevitable, given the development of our foreign policy from the time of independence down to the outbreak of the war. By every facet of its growth the United States was drawn closer and closer to the point where in 1914-1918 it was the one uncommitted force which could weight the balance for or against one or the other of the great coalitions of powers that had squared off in the international

arena.

At the first signs of European war in the summer of 1914 the United States believed that the

conflict could be confined to the continent of

Neutrality in thought and deed

Europe. President Wilson almost immediately issued formal neutrality proclamations. And on August 18, 1914 he appealed to the American people to be "impartial in thought as well as in action." This was easier said than accomplished. For many reasons the American people found it hard to be neutral in thought. The Central Powers (Germany and Austria-Hungary) had large numbers of sympathizers in America among second generation families of immigrant background. But the majority of Americans felt themselves more closely involved in the cause of the Allies (Great Britain, France, Belgium, Russia, and Serbia).42(31) Ties of blood, language, culture, and other heritages linked the United States to Great Britain. Sentiment ruled opinions in favor of France and Belgium.

British
VS.
German
propaganda

Both sides especially under the leadership of Germany for the Central Powers and Great Britain for the Allies endeavored to enlist American sympathies. Britain, in general, did this adroitly; Germany, almost without exception, was clumsy in its efforts. Propaganda played a large part in the work of the two opposing groups. But allied propaganda was clever where German propaganda was slowwitted and obvious. Moreover, the British, through their control of overseas cable facilities, used the valuable tool of censorship to great effect.(32) In all, the Allies were operating from advantages not possessed by the Central Powers.

President Wilson was determined to avoid the mistakes of 1812-1815 which got the United States into war by involving our ocean commerce.43

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They stopped American merchant vessels destined for neutral ports close enough to Germany to make it possible for the goods they carried to be shipped into Germany. On November 3, 1914, Great Britain declared the North Sea a military area. They mined the waters and forced neutrals to stop at an English port for sailing directions. This enabled the British to check the cargo and to refuse guidance if the cargo was deemed contraband.

The American State Department protested these moves by the British. But the protests got almost nowhere. As time went on, pro-Allied sentiment in the State Department and the definitely pro-British stand of the American ambassador in London, Walter Hines Page, indicated to the British that they need not take the protests too seriously.

Another change in attitude in American official circles concerned loans to the warring powers. In August 1914, Secretary of State William Jennings

American loans to warring powers

Bryan advised the Morgan banking firm that loans to belligerents, while legal, were not considered by the State Department to be in keeping with American principles of neutrality. Upon this opinion the Morgan

firm decided to abandon plans for a loan to the French government. Soon, however, Allied trade in war materials profited American manufacturers to such an extent that the American industrial economy became largely dependent on a continuance of this source of business. The only method by which this could be accomplished was to establish credit for the Allies in the United States and to loan the European nations funds wherewith to buy. In October 1914 the President reversed the State Department's earlier ruling. He informed several banking houses privately that credits could be extended to the belligerents. And in August 1916 permission to loan money to the Europeans was granted. By early 1917 American banking houses had given the Allies approximately $2,300,000,000 in cash and credit, while loans and credit to Germany came to only $27,000,000.

While the United States, through its indecisive policy on British interference with American sea trade and through its financial investment in the

United States refuses to use embargo

Allied cause, was drifting into a position which endangered its neutrality, relations with Germany were relatively calm. American opinion had been shocked by the German invasion of Belgium, but when the German advance failed to reach Paris in the first weeks of the war, American fears of an early German victory lessened. When the German government protested against American sale of war materials to the Allies, the State Department replied that to invoke an embargo would be unneutral since it would favor the Central Powers. Just as truly, the absence of an embargo helped the Allies-but from the American viewpoint the Germans were in the unfortunate position of being bottled up by the superior British navy which was a practical reality of war. America's stand in this respect was actually unneutral in spirit. However, American neutrality was rapidly becoming a legalistic theory rather than a political actuality.

United States threatens to hold Germany

The strangle-hold the Allies were gaining on wartime commerce induced the Germans to take a drastic step early in 1915. On February 4 the German government announced that it was establishing a war zone around the British Isles within which it would try to destroy all enemy vessels. This meant the beaccountable for ginning of submarine warfare, a ship-sinkings vastly different type of combat than the old style of war where belligerent naval vessels gave adequate warning before sinking merchant ships and provided for the safety of passengers and crew. On February 15, 1915 the State Department protested to Germany and told the German government that it would be held to "strict accountability" if American lives or vessels were lost by German action on the seas.

American lives were lost in the sinking of the British passenger liner Falaba on March 28 and in an attack on the American tanker Gulflight on May 1, 1915. Secretary Bryan urged the President to forbid Americans to travel as passengers aboard belligerent vessels. President Wilson refused to abdicate from the position that Americans had a right to travel on vessels of their choice. The German embassy in Washington published an advertisement in the New York newspapers on

May 1, 1915, warning Americans that they sailed on belligerent ships at their own risk.

How much connection there was between this warning and the events which followed has never been clear. On May 7, 1915, a German submarine sank the British liner Lusitania off Sinking of the the Irish coast. In this tragedy 1,198 "Lusitania" lives were lost, including those of 128 American citizens. Opinion in all the neutral countries, as well as in Allied nations, was outraged by this attack. But there was no immediate overwhelming demand for war against Germany by the American people. President Wilson dispatched three notes to Germany concerning the Lusitania and other sinkings.

THE FIRST LUSITANIA NOTE, WASHINGTON, MAY 13, 1915: . . . it is clearly wise and desirable that the Government of the United States and the Imperial German Government should come to a clear and full understanding as to the grave situation which has resulted [from these sinkings]. ... Manifestly submarines can not be used against merchantmen . . . without an inevitable violation of many sacred principles of justice and humanity. . . American citizens act within their indisputable rights in taking their ships and in traveling wherever their legitimate business calls them upon the high seas. . . . The Imperial German Government will not expect the Government of the United States to omit any word or any act necessary to the performance of its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens and of safeguarding their free exercise and enjoyment.

In reply to this note, Germany argued that the Lusitania had been armed. Wilson countered with a strong note on June 9, 1915, reiterating the American stand. Secretary Bryan believed that the note was so forceful that it would lead to war. He resigned in protest and was succeeded by Robert Lansing, a man generally credited with being quite pro-British.

Germany's answer to the second Lusitania note, while not so unconciliatory, was conditional. A third note followed from Washington on July 21,

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ances that such mistakes would not occur again. The Wilson method of vigorous protest had apparently wrung from the Germans an admission of their guilt in these sinkings and a promise of future good behavior. Although Wilson was unpopular with some elements in the United States -especially among the followers of the more bellicose Theodore Roosevelt-with his succession of notes, his efforts to keep the country out of war were proving fruitful.

Germany violates her pledge

Keeping America out of war was a popular political accomplishment as the presidential elections of 1916 approached. In the main, the Germans had cooperated by avoiding the sinking of passenger liners. Their Austrian allies transgressed in the Mediterranean when they sank the Italian vessel Ancona on November 7, 1915 with several American casualties. The Austrian government responded to Secretary Lansing's protests by agreeing to pay indemnities. Then the Germans violated their pledge by attacking the French vessel Sussex on March 24, 1916, again with Americans among the casualties. Secretary Lansing favored an immediate break in diplomatic relations with Germany, but President Wilson held out for a strong warning. This admonition was embodied in a note to the German government in mid-April.

THE SUSSEX NOTE, WASHINGTON, APRIL 18, 1916: ... though the attack upon the Sussex was manifestly indefensible and caused a loss of life so tragical as to make it stand forth as one of the most terrible examples of the inhumanity of submarine warfare as the commanders of German vessels are conducting it, it unhappily does not stand alone. the Government of the United States is forced to conclude that it is only one instance of the deliberate method and spirit of indiscriminate destruction of merchant vessels. . . . The Government of the United States has been very patient. . . . It now owes it to a just regard for its own rights to say to the Imperial German Government that.... If it is still the purpose of the Imperial Government to prosecute relentless and indiscriminate warfare against vessels of commerce . . . the Government of the United States is at last forced to the conclusion that there is but one course it can pursue. Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods. . . the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether.

Germany answered this grave demand by declaring that orders had been issued that merchant ships which did not resist would not be sunk without warning or without safeguarding the lives of passengers and crews. But the Germans attached a condition to the pledge which pointed out that if the United States did not persuade the Allies to relax their blockade of the Central Powers, Germany might find herself in a position in which she would have to reserve complete liberty of decision. President Wilson was willing to accept Germany's pledge in good faith, but he would not admit the validity of Germany's attendant condition. For nine months thereafter the German submarine warfare was quiescent insofar as it involved American shipping.

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SECRETARY LANSING TO AMBASSADOR PAGE, WASHINGTON, OCTOBER 21, 1915: I desire that you present a note to Sir Edward Grey [British Foreign Minister] in the sense of the following: ... interferences with American ships and cargoes destined in good faith to neutral ports and lawfully entitled to proceed have become increasingly vexatious. . . . As the measures complained of proceed directly from orders issued by the British Government .. this Government directs the attention of His Majesty's Government to . . . [the fact that] these detentions have not been uniformly based on proofs obtained at the time of seizure, but many vessels have been detained while search was made for evidence of the contraband character of cargoes or of an intention to evade the non-intercourse measures of Great Britain. . . . The result is . . . that innocent vessels or cargoes are now seized and detained on mere suspicion while efforts are made to obtain evidence from extraneous sources to justify the detention and the commencement of prize proceedings. . . . it has been conclusively shown that the methods sought to be employed by Great Britain to obtain and use evidence of enemy destination of cargoes bound for neutral ports, and to impose a contraband character upon such cargoes, are with

out justification; that the blockade, upon which such methods are partly founded, is ineffective, illegal, and indefensible; that the judicial procedure offered as a means of reparation for an international injury is inherently defective for the purpose; and that in many cases jurisdiction is asserted in violation of the law of nations. The United States, therefore, can not submit to the curtailment of its neutral rights by these measures, which are admittedly retaliatory, and therefore illegal, in conception and in nature, and intended to punish the enemies of Great Britain for alleged illegalities on their part.

British blacklist brings on American protest

...

The British waited more than six months to reply to Lansing's note. Their answer made no concessions to the American viewpoint. Then on July 18, 1916 the British government issued a blacklist of 85 individuals or concerns in the United States with whom British subjects were forbidden to trade. Wilson promptly protested, and Congress gave the President retaliatory powers, as well as voting increased naval appropriations. Although sympathy for the British cause was still strong in the United States, arrogant measures by the British continued to lessen the advantages that country enjoyed in America.

The presidential campaign was carried on in this atmosphere of divided attitudes. Pro-German feeling, though vocal in certain sections of the Midde West, was less widespread than pro-Allied sentiment. But far stronger than either was the desire on the part of great numbers of Americans to stay out of the war. Both major political parties recognized this fact and attempted to attract voters by indefinite promises of maintaining American neutrality.

"He kept us out of war"

President Wilson, aware that a strong stand on the freedom-of-the-seas policy would inevitably involve the United States in the war, had tried unsuccessfully in 1915 and again in 1916 to bring about peace between the belligerents before "he should be caught in the trap."44 His 1916 effort was based on an idea of a league to prevent war and to enforce general disarmament. He knew that the American public was not yet ready for this approach in 1916, so he allowed the campaign to go forward on the slogan of "He kept

44 Theodore C. Smith, The United States as a Factor in World History, (New York, 1941), p. 104.

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