cago, on November 29th, declared that a blockade was not the way to get the men back. Other means would have to be tried first. On December first the Secretary repeated this stand. And at a press conference on the following day, President Eisenhower took the occasion to counsel patience, while giving his views on the dangers of blockade.

President Eisenhower advises patience

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S REMARKS ON "THE COURAGE TO BE PATIENT," WASHINGTON, DECEMBER 2, 1954: . . . on our side we must make certain that our efforts to promote peace are not interpreted as appeasement or any purchase of immediate favor at the cost of principle. We must, on the other hand, be steady and refuse to be goaded into actions that would be unwise. . . . If this is a deliberate attempt . . . [by Communist China] to goad us into some impulsive action in the hope of dividing us from our allies . . . then it certainly makes a mockery of the softer tone that has been used in Russia toward Western Europe at times lately. . . . in many ways the easy course for a President . . . is to adopt a truculent, publicly bold, almost insulting attitude. . . . That would be the easy way for this reason: those actions lead toward war. . . . if we are going ever to take such a fateful decision as leads us one step toward war, let us by no means do it in response to our human emotions of anger and resentment.... Let us recognize that we owe it to ourselves and to the world to explore every possible peaceable means of settling differences before we even think of such a thing as war. And the hard way is to have the courage to be patient. . Now, I just want to say one word about the idea of blockade. It is possible that a blockade is conceivable without war. I have never read of it historically. . . . So far as I am concerned, if ever we come to a place that I feel that a step of war is necessary, it is going to be brought about not by any impulsive individualistic act of my own, but I am going before the Congress in the constitutional method set up in this country and lay the problem before them, with my recommendation as to whatever it may be. . . . At least 11 of these soldiers. were in uniform. there in conformity with obligations incurred under the United Nations. .. How the United Nations can possibly disabuse itself of a feeling of responsibility in this matter, and retain its self-respect, I wouldn't know, and so I think the United States does not stand alone. . . . So far as the honor of the United States is concerned, I merely hope that I shall not live long enough to find myself accused of being insensible to the honor of the United States and the safety of her men and soldiers, no matter where we send them.

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of Red China's actions

One possible avenue of approach to freeing the prisoners was suggested by the President's remarks and on the 4th the United States took a step in that direction. Ambassador Lodge United States formally requested the UN to put requests UN on its agenda a motion to condemn condemnation Communist China for imprisoning the American airmen.124 On the 7th the nations who had fought for the UN in Korea combined to urge the General Assembly to vote condemnation of the Red conduct.125 The next day the Assembly put the American complaint on the agenda by a ballot of 48 to 5, with only four abstentions. It likewise approved, by 44 to 5, a vote to open debate on the question immediately. In the discussion which followed, Anthony Nutting, chief British delegate, made a vigorous defense of the American claim. He pointed out that the men were entitled to the rights of military prisoners of war, that it was ridiculous to expect anyone to believe they were spies since they were in uniform and were not practiced linguists able to speak Chinese, and that their fate was the responsibility of the UN whose cause they were serving in Korea. On December 10th the Assembly proceeded to vote. By a count of 47 to 5, with 7 abstentions, the resolution condemning Red China was adopted. The Assembly thereupon directed the UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjoeld to seek the early release of the imprisoned airmen.

Resolution of condemnation adopted by General Assembly

no immediate release of the imprisoned men. Except for those who were more hopeful than experienced, it was hardly believable that the Chinese Reds would hand over the men without obtaining concessions valuable to them, if they would agree to the release of the prisoners on any terms. In fact, Chou En Lai in his acceptance of a visit from Mr. Hammarskjoeld indicated that he would refuse to discuss the prisoner issue at all. We know now that he did talk of the possibility of freeing the men. But to date we do not know what price he set for his government's "leniency" in this

cle I. The Parties undertake . . . to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means. . . . II . . . the Parties . . . will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and communist subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability. . . . V. Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the territories of either... would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. . . . VI. For the purposes of Articles II and V, the terms "territorial" and "territories" shall mean in respect of the Republic of China, Taiwan 126 and the Pescadores; and in respect of the United States ... the island territories in the West Pacific under its jurisdiction. The provisions of Articles II and V will be applicable to such other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement. . . . VII. The Government of the Republic of China grants... the

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The position on the offshore islands is unaffected by this treaty. Their status is neither promoted nor is it demoted. the injunction to our armed forces is to defend Formosa and the Pescadores. Now, whether or not in any particular case the defense of these offshore islands by reason of the nature of those islands or the nature of an attack against them is such that it is deemed part of the defense of Formosa, that would be a matter which on the first instance at least the military people would advise, and the President would probably make the final decision. 127

The Secretary also observed that an attack by the communists on the island of Formosa would have the "probable result" of a retaliatory attack by United States forces on Red China, but that this would not necessarily result in a general war. It would be, the Secretary continued, "a retaliation of sufficient severity to make it clear that the aggressor cannot gain by his attack more than he loses."128

Red attack on Formosa would invite retaliation

127 U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXXI 896, Dec. 13, 1954. The islands referred to were principally Quemoy, Matsu, the Tachens, and other smaller groups scattered in the Formosa Straits.

128 U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXXI:898, Dec. 13, 1954.

government of China, approved of the spirit and letter of the Formosa pact. 129

On this encouraging note the year 1954 ended and the prospects of peace in the Far East were no brighter than when it had begun. America's position in the Orient had been further defined, but it

129 The treaty was ratified by the Senate Feb. 8, 1955, by a vote of 64 to 6.

had also been further weakened by the events of 1954. SEATO and Formosa were achievements on paper-what the practical effect of these alliances would be it was too soon to tell. But Geneva and the French defeats in Indochina scarcely encouraged observers to mark 1954 as a year of achievement in the Far East.

1. America's Introduction to

Middle East Problems

Before World War II, American involvement in the Middle East was almost limited to problems affecting missionaries and a a few businessmen

American interest in the Middle East very recent

interested in the exploitation of petroleum resources. Occasionally, during the 19th and early 20th centuries, the State Department was called upon to handle a question relating to the Middle East. But, in general, the area was one of the least noticed by the United States of all the world's regions. Even with our recent preoccupation over matters relating to Palestine, Iran, Egypt, and adjacent areas, we are not yet very familiar with this quarter of the globe. For the purposes of this study the Middle East area will be considered to be composed of those nations and dependencies grouped around the eastern end of the Mediterranean, the Arabian peninsula, and the Persian Gulf.1 Other classifications might be acceptable,, but for convenience this is the one chosen here.

One reason for American neglect of the Middle East has been that the area was customarily regarded by the United States as coming within the

spheres of influence of several EuEuropean ropean powers and there was no nations inclination on the part of the had prior United States to interfere in such interests matters. Great Britain, France, Turin area key, and Russia were individually, and at times collectively, interested in this region and since their interests were

1 Specifically: Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Yemen, Oman, the British protectorate of Kuwait, and the British colony of Aden. Afghanistan and Pakistan might be considered borderline areas in this classification. Turkey, although geographically adjoining the Middle East, is generally regarded as a European power.

regarded as paramount, the United States remained aloof from the problems which rose in the Middle East, particularly up to the close of World War I. We had some connection with the Zionist movement which sought to establish a homeland for the Jewish people, and we were involved in the Armenian troubles of the Turks during and after the First World War.2 But in the main, our first exposure to the myriad problems of the Middle East came in the course of World War II, and most directly in the kingdom of Iran.

Iran (or Persia, as it was formerly known) has long been a pawn in the contest between Russia and Great Britain in the Middle East. In 1941,

Wartime occupation of Iran by U. K. and U.S. S. R.

to guard against Axis seizure of Iran, Russian and British troops occupied sections of the Kingdom. The Russians took over protection of the northern area, especially the

province of Azerbaijan, and the British established a zone in the south. A central zone was left unoccupied but not devoid of control. On January 29, 1942 the occupying powers agreed with the government of Iran to respect its territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence. And they pledged to withdraw their troops six months after the end of the war against the Axis.

The United States entered the Iranian picture in late 1942 when American troops were sent to the Persian Gulf area to build and guard a supply route overland to the Soviet Union. Some 30,000 Americans, mostly railroad and motor maintenance and transport battalions, served in the Persian Gulf Command

American troops in Iran, 1942-45

The United States was semi-officially connected with a mission to Persia (as Iran was then called) in 1922-27 to straighten out that country's financial structure.

during the war in various sections of Iran. Their work in moving supplies created a favorable attitude on the part of the Iranians toward America. The troops were removed from Iran before the end of 1945, leaving behind them a general feeling of goodwill for America.

3-power declaration at the Teheran Conference, 1943

The Roosevelt - Churchill - Stalin meeting at the Iranian capital of Teheran in the autumn of 1943 emphasized the importance of that country in the fight on the Axis. At this conference the three powers issued a declaration regarding Iran. THREE-POWER DECLARATION ON IRAN, TEHERAN, DECEMBER 1, 1943: . . With respect to the post-war period, the [three] Governare in accord with the Government of Iran that any economic problems confronting Iran at the close of hostilities should receive full consideration. . . . The [three] Governments . . . are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. . . .

ments

...

The Soviet Union, however, continued to use the wartime occupation of northern Iran to spread communist influence in Iran. Soviet agents sup

Foreign influences in Iran during World War II

ported the Tudeh Party, a group of intellectuals and liberals controlled by native communists. Meanwhile, British and American petroleum interests, private in nature, began to negotiate for postwar concessions in areas beyond the territories already assigned to the powerful Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. A Soviet request for oil concessions in northern Iran was turned down by the Iranian government in October 1944-a move which led the Moscow press and radio to increase its attacks upon the "reactionary" government of Iran. At the same time, communist agents in Azerbaijan fomented a radical movement demanding autonomy for northern Iran. A revolt broke out in that region in November 1945, supported by Red agents.

At the Potsdam Conference in 1945, the Big Three "agreed that Allied troops should be withdrawn immediately from Teheran, and that further stages of the withdrawal of troops from Iran should be considered at the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to be

Iran asks withdrawal of foreign troops

held in London in September, 1945." On September 13, 1945, the Foreign Minister of Iran sent notes to each of the Big Three powers requesting the withdrawal of Allied troops. A month later Ernest Bevin, British Foreign Secretary, announced that the evacuation of British troops was almost completed and that, on September 20th, Foreign Minister Molotov had assured him that Russian troops would be out of Iran by the agreed date-March 2, 1946-six months after the war's end. However, when the revolt in Azerbaijan broke out November 18, 1945, Russian forces prevented Iranian troops from moving into the northern province to quell the uprising. Great Britain immediately drew the attention of the Russians to their promises under the 1942 treaty, and, on November 26 the United States proposed to both the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. that all allied forces be removed from Iran by January 1, 1946. The Soviets rejected. this proposal on December 3, 1945.

Soviet forces block suppression of revolt in northern Iran

Moscow meeting fails to reach agreement on Iranian question

The Government of Iran, on December 13, then formally requested the Big Three powers to take up the question of troop withdrawal at the forthcoming Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. The Moscow conference did discuss the Iranian problem, but no agreement was reached. At the close of the sessions, Secretary Byrnes reported: "At one time it looked as if we might agree on a tripartite commission to consider Iranian problems. . . . Unfortunately, we could not agree.' ."4 Failing to achieve a settlement in this fashion, the Iranians decided to place their case before the United Nations. While the British sought to persuade the Iranians to try the usual diplomatic channels once more, the Iranians insisted on placing the matter in the hands of the Security Council.

The Council took up the question at its first session on January 19, 1946. As a countermove the Soviet bloc brought formal charges against Great

3 Article XIV. Protocol of the Proceedings of the Potsdam Conference, Aug. 1, 1945. U.S. Dept. of State Press Release No. 238, Mar. 24, 1947. No decision was reached at the London meetings.

Report by Sec. Byrnes on Moscow meeting, Dec. 30, 1945. U. S. Dept. of State Publication No. 2448, Conference Series No. 79.