for ourselves and the other free nations, a maximum deterrent at a bearable cost. . . . there is no local defense which alone will contain the mighty land power of the Communist world. Local defenses must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power. . . . The way to deter aggression is for the free community to be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing. . . . Now the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff can shape our military establishment to fit what is our policy, instead of having to try to be ready to meet the enemy's many choices. . . . it is now possible to get, and share, more basic security at less cost. . . .63 If we turn to Europe, we see readjustments in the NATO collective security effort.... after the aggression in Korea, its members made an emergency build-up of military strength . . . . But the pace originally set could not be maintained indefinitely. . . . We found . . . last December, that there was general acceptance of the "long haul" concept [introduced by the United States at the April 1953 meeting of the NATO Council] and recognition that it better served the probable needs than an effort to create full defensive land strength at a ruinous price. . . . Western Europe cannot be successfully defended without a defense of West Germany. West Germany cannot be defended without help from the Germans. . . . The West German Republic needs to be freed from the armistice; and new political arrangements should be made to assure that rearmed Germans will serve the common cause and never serve German militarism. The French produced a plan to take care of this matter. It was to create a European Defense Community. . . . when the Eisenhower administration took office last January. the project was nigh unto death. . . . Until the goals of EDC are achieved, NATO, and indeed future peace, are in jeopardy. . . . New collective security concepts reduce nonproductive military expenses of our allies to a point where it is desirable and practicable also to reduce economic aid. . . . foreign budgetary aid is being limited to situations where it clearly contributes to military strength. ... We have persisted, with our allies, in seeking the unification of Germany and the liberation of Austria. . . I hope... [the Soviet leaders] will come [to Berlin] with a sincerity which will equal our own. With these hopes and the determination to face the Soviets boldly across the conference table, Secretary Dulles prepared to depart for Berlin.

Choosing an acceptable site for the Berlin meetings

...

The Western allies were cheered by news that the upper house of the Netherlands parliament had ratified the EDC treaty, by a vote of 36 to 4, on January 20, 1954. But there was little to cheer about

* A section on Korea and Indochina is omitted here.

in the bulletins from Berlin where the four-nation occupying authorities wrangled almost daily over where the delegates to the scheduled conference would mtet. Finally, on January 16th, a compromise was reached whereby the site of the meetings would be alternated for the first three weeks between the Allied Control Authority Building in the American zone of Berlin and the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin.

The Berlin conference, January 1954

On January 25, 1954 the conferences began. The meeting was the seventh gathering of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Big Four. Obviously Mr. Molotov's strategy was to divide the West by inserting the issue of Red Chinese representation at big power meetings, by courting the French in the hope of further dividing the allies, and by a delaying action which might wring concessions from the Western nations. The allied aim appeared to be to present a united front and to try to keep the discussions to the questions involving Europe. During the second week of the talks the Russians showed clearly their opposition to free elections in Germany by suggesting the formation of a provisional all-German government by the parliaments of the East and West German republics. This proposal was refused by the allied foreign ministers, in spite of a concurrent offer of bait to businessmen from Britain by the Moscow government in the form of one billion dollars (gold) in exchange for British industrial products.

Then Mr. Molotov tried another avenue in his effort to split the Western allies. On February 10 he proposed a 50-year nonaggression treaty for

gestion. Mr. Dulles commented: "I suppose that Mr. Molotov intended his proposal as a poor sort of practical joke."

After twenty-five days of conversations, the Berlin conference ended on February 18th. The upshot of all this talking was that the Big Four

Only agreement reached at Berlin provides for a conference on Far Eastern problems

agreed that they had failed to agree on solutions to the problems of Germany, Austria, and European security. They did reach agreement on the need for a later conference to settle the Korean peace and to discuss the problem of restoring peace in Indochina. This conference was scheduled to take place at Geneva, beginning April 26, 1954. On the Korean issues, the parties would be the Big Four, Red China, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of North Korea, and such other countries whose armed forces participated in the Korean war as chose to send delegates. The meetings on Indochina were to be confined to the Big Four, Red China, and certain other invited states. Thus the Berlin meetings disbanded with very little tangible gain for either side, but with the promise that the Geneva talks would take up where Berlin left off in an attempt to ease the tension between East and West.

Secretary Dulles reviews

On his return from Berlin, Secretary Dulles made a radio and television report to the American people on his impressions of the conference. SECRETARY DULLES' REPORT ON THE BERLIN CONFERENCE, WASHINGTON, FEBRUARY 24, 1954: . . . as far as Europe was concerned, we brought Mr. Molotov to show Russia's hand. It was seen as a hand that held fast to everything it had, including East Germany and East Austria, and also it sought to grab some more. . . . Five years had elapsed since the western ministers had met with the Soviet Foreign Minister. During these 5 years much had occurred. . . . What did all this add up to, in terms of world politics? . . . There was only one way to find out-that was to meet with the Russians and deal with them in terms of some practical tests. We went to Berlin in the hope that Soviet policies would now permit the unification of Germany in freedom, or at least the liberation of Austria. These two matters would, in relation to Europe, test the Soviet temper. We hoped to achieve those two results and we were determined to let no minor ob

the Berlin conference

5 New York Times, Feb. 14, 1954, Sec. 4, p. 1.

.

stacles deter us. The obstacles we incurred were, however, not minor but fundamental. The Soviet position was not at first openly revealed. . . . But . . . as Mr. Molotov was compelled to respond to our probing of his words, the Soviet purpose became apparent. For the first time in 5 years the people of West Europe, America, and indeed all who could and would observe, sized up today's Soviet policy out of Mr. Molotov's own mouth instead of by guess or by theory. It amounted to this: To hold on to East Germany; to permit its unification with West Germany only under conditions such that the Communists would control the election machinery through all Germany; to maintain Soviet troops indefinitely in Austria; to offer Western Europe, as the price of Soviet "good will," a Soviet-controlled Europe which would exclude the United

What is

the real policy States except in the nominal role of an

of the Soviet Union for Europe?

"observer" along with Communist China. This last Soviet project for what Mr. Molotov called "European security" was so preposterous that when he read it laughter rippled around the Western sides of the table to the dismay of the Communist delegation. Laughter is a denial of fear and the destroyer of mystery-two weapons upon which the Soviet Union has relied far too long. Both of these weapons were swept aside in one moment of Western laughter.... Mr. Molotov . . . told Germany that the price of unification was total Sovietization. He told Austria she was to be occupied until Germany paid the Soviet price. He told France that the western frontier of communism was to be the Rhine and not the Elbe. He told all Western Europe . . . that the price of momentary respite was for the Americans to go home. . . . When he called for the abandonment of a European Defense Community, the dismantling of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the scrapping of United States bases, he spoke with no soft words. . . . The Soviet position admitted of no real negotiation. . . . There was another aspect which carried too, its drama. That was the effort of Mr. Molotov to divide the three Western Powers. . . . In that respect, he failed totally. The Conference ended with a greater degree of unity between the three Western Powers than had existed when the Conference began. . . . The governments of France and Britain rejected . . . the Soviet proffer of European "peace" at a price which would have meant Western European disunity. . . . The Soviet has offered its alternatives to western planning, and they are so repellent that there seems no choice but to proceed as planned. Certainly that is the United States conviction. . . .

Soviets fail to divide the Western allies

Between the Berlin conferences of January 25February 18, 1954 and the Geneva meetings which

began in April, events in the Far East and in

Latin America assumed great imWest Germany port for America's future and Euvotes for rope seemed to be neglected.66 rearmament There was, actually, no intent to ignore Europe, but first things warranted major attention. A few events in Europe during these six or eight weeks merit mention here. On February 26, the West German Bundestag voted 334 to 144 to amend the Bonn constitution to permit the raising of an army under the EDC commitments, thus opening the way for German military forces to be contributed to the European army when it was established. On March 9, 1954 Chancellor Adenauer flew to Paris to talk with Foreign Minister Bidault on the question of the Saar. Reports coming from Paris said that the German and French foreign policy leaders had agreed upon a "Europeanization" of the Saar industrial region whereby all nations would benefit from the economic strength of this rich valley.

The Soviet Union, on March 26, 1954, announced that it was granting full sovereignty to the East German People's Republic. However, the same statement revealed that Soviet troops would stay in East Germany. The American State Department indicated its belief that the change meant nothing in the East Germany way of added freedom for the East

Soviets grant "full sovereignty"

to

was

Germans. The Soviet move analyzed by Western policymakers as an attempt to attract the Bonn Germans away from an "unattainable" EDC and toward unification with East Germany on Russian terms. So long as France delayed ratification of the EDC treaty, the U.S.S.R. apparently believed that any wedge driven between free Germany and the West was worth hitting hard and often. A minor incident of this period indicated how far from agreement the

66 This was the period, also, when national attention was diverted by the much publicized hearings before a subcommittee of the U.S. Senate inquiring into charges and countercharges made by the Department of the Army and Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (Republican, of Wisconsin). These hearings had only incidental impact upon American foreign policy in that they caused our allies to wonder at the spectacle of a great nation engaged in so acrimonious a procedure while world questions of peace or war were in the balance.

Marshal

Juin denounces EDC

ment.

French were on the question of European unity and German rearmaMarshal Alphonse Pierre Juin, commander of NATO's western front forces, and vice-chairman of France's Superior Council of War, on March 27, publicly denounced the EDC treaty and advocated that the treaty be replaced by an agreement which gave France greater control over her own forces. Premier Laniel, on March 31st, summoned Marshal Juin to Paris to explain his stand. The Marshal ignored the orders of the Premier and Mr. Laniel thereupon removed Juin from the Council of War.67 A brighter side of the EDC picture was seen on March 30th, however, when the Bonn Republic formally signed the EDC treaty and the contractual agreements with the three Western allies.68

In view of the uncertainty prevailing during the spring of 1954 over the future of EDC it is perhaps interesting to read a message sent at this time by President Eisenhower to the leaders of the nations which signed the treaty. 69

President Eisenhower pledges retention of U. S. forces in europe

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTERS OF SIGNATORY COUNTRIES OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY TREATY, WASHINGTON, APRIL 15, 1954: The essential elements of [the American] . . . position . . . may be simply stated. The United States is firmly committed to the North Atlantic Treaty. The obligations which the United States has assumed under the Treaty will be honored. . . . when . . [the EDC treaty] comes into force the United States . . . will conform its actions to the following policies and undertakings: (1) The United States will continue to maintain in Europe, including Germany, such units of its armed forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute its fair share of the forces needed for the joint defense of the North Atlantic area. (2) The United States will consult with its fellow

...

67 This dismissal did not immediately affect Marshal Juin's post with NATO. On April 6 the NATO Council censured Juin for his remarks on EDC. He was retained as western front commander of NATO.

68 Luxembourg ratified the EDC treaty on Apr. 7, 1954. The Italian Chamber of Deputies began debate on the treaty during the first week of April 1954, but the treaty was sent to a committee for study and lingered there for several months.

69 Sec. Dulles made a quick trip to London and Paris, Apr. 11-14, 1954, on matters principally relating to the Indochina crisis. While abroad it is probable that he participated in the discussions which resulted in the Franco-British treaty of April 13 which provided for continued British military support on the European continent of EDC forces, thereby assuring France of aid against a possible resurgence of German militarism.

signatories to the North Atlantic Treaty and with the European Defense Community on questions of mutual concern. (3) The United States will encourage the closest possible integration between the European Defense Community forces . . . and United States and other North Atlantic Treaty forces. . . . (4) The United States will continue. to seek means of extending to the Atlantic Community increased security by sharing in greater measure information with respect to the military utilization of new weapons and techniques for the improvement of the collective defense. (5) ... the United States will regard any action from whatever quarter which threatens ... [the] integrity or unity [of the EDC] as a threat to the security of the United States. (6) .. The United States calls to attention the fact that for it to cease to be a party to the North Atlantic Treaty would appear quite contrary to our security interests when there is established on the Continent of Europe the solid core of unity which the European Defense Community will provide. This pledge of American support for EDC, coupled with the British assurances announced by Sir Winston Churchill on April 14th, were evidence of the effort being made by the AngloAmerican alliance to keep alive the idea of a common defense for Western Europe. But the efforts were not showing much sign of success in the face of French unwillingness to ratify the EDC agreement on terms acceptable to other members of the community.70

This briefly was the situation when the Geneva Conference of April 26 opened. Since that con

The Geneva Conference, April 1954

ference was designed to deal most directly with matters affecting Korea and Indochina, an account of its deliberations is contained in a later section of this review of American foreign policy since World War II." While the Geneva talks were in progress very little forward motion toward the completion of EDC was discernible. For almost two months the primary attention of the great powers was upon Far Eastern problems.

Even when it became known in mid-June that Sir Winston Churchill and Sir Anthony Eden were flying to Washington to confer with Presi

10 The NATO Council met in Paris on Apr. 23, 1954. The communiqué issued after the meeting was mostly a formal expression of satisfaction with the past and hopes for the future. See U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXX:670, May 3, 1954. 11 See pp. 223-29 below.

Churchill and Eden make hurried visit to Washington

dent Eisenhower the general belief was that the conversations would deal with Pacific area questions, since differences of opinion between the British and American govern

ments over the handling of the Far Eastern situation were threatening

to strain the friendly basis of Anglo-American relations. However, when the leaders of the two allied nations met in the White House from June 25th to 29th the program for European security received some notice. If Britain and America could not agree on ways to solve the Pacific dilemma, they were in accord on the subject of Europe. As an indication of this common purpose, a section of the statement issued at the close of the conference is quoted here.

72

ANGLO-AMERICAN STATEMENT ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, WASHINGTON, JUNE 28, 1954: . . We are agreed that the German. Federal Republic should take its place as an equal partner in the community of western nations, where it can make its proper contribution to the defense of the free world. We are determined to achieve this goal, convinced that the Bonn and Paris Treaties provide the best way. We welcome the recent statement by the French Prime Minister that an end must be put to the present uncertainties. . . . It is our conviction that further delay in the entry into force of the EDC and Bonn Treaties would damage the solidarity of the Atlantic nations. We wish to reaffirm that the program for European unity inspired by France, of which the EDC is only one element, so promising to peace and prosperity in Europe continues to have our firm support. The reluctance of France to ratify the EDC treaty without entangling amendments led the United States and Britain to explore ways of extending sovereignty to West Germany without waiting for French EDC arrangeapproval of the ments.73 Senator Knowland, on July 12th, attempted to amend the foreign aid bill then being considered by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to cut off aid to France and Italy unless those two countries ratified the EDC treaty by December 31, 1954. The committee voted 8 to 5 to reject the Know

Senator Knowland attempts to force French and Italian action on EDC

..

72 The statement also contained sections on Southeast Asia and Atomic Matters which are omitted here. For full text see U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXXI:49, July 12, 1954.

13 See ibid., XXXI:148-49 July 26, 1954, for Sec. Dulles' statement on this question.

land rider, thus killing this direct threat to the two relucant NATO members. On the 14th Prime Minister Churchill told Parliament that the United States and Britain, at the Washington conferences, had agreed to grant limited sovereignty to West Germany even if France failed to act favorably on the EDC pacts. Secretary Dulles confirmed the announcement by the British leader. Two days later Mr. Dulles revealed that President Eisenhower might call the Senate back into session after its adjournment to act on the AngloAmerican proposal. It was clear that all these moves were efforts to indicate to the French the impatience felt by Britain and the United States and to speed, if possible, French action on the European security program.

Soviets propose an all-European conference

Shortly after the close of the Geneva sessions, the Soviet Union proposed on July 24th, an allEuropean parley, with Communist China included as an observer, in an obvious attempt to delay and to prevent the ratification of the Bonn and EDC treaties.74 In the light of this suggestion by the Russians and the Dulles announcement of the 16th, it is significant to note that the American Senate voted 88 to 0, July 30, 1954, its approval in advance of whatever steps President Eisenhower believed necessary to institute measures to provide for West German sovereignty. At last the French seemed willing to move, and on August 5th Premier Mendès-France called for a meeting of the five EDC nations to be held at Brussels on the 19th.

On August 14th M. Mendès-France revealed his proposals for changing the EDC arrangements so they would be acceptable to France and would give that nation what it felt would be necessary and sufficient guarantees against a strong Germany. The State Department in Washington on the 16th made known its opposition to the French suggestions. When the EDC powers met in the Belgian capital on the 19th Mendès-France encountered united opposition to his amendments.

French promise early action on EDC, but suggest alterations

14 See U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXXI:398-401, Sept. 20, 1954, for the text of the Soviet proposal. The U.S.S.R. renewed the suggestion in another note to the various powers. Aug. 4, 1954. See ibid., XXXI:402. Sept. 20. 1954. At about this same time a delegation of leaders of the British Labour Party on its way to Peiping was lavishly entertained in Moscow by high Soviet officials.

The conference broke up on the 22nd after rejecting the French proposals and failing to agree on any acceptable alternatives. Mendès-France flew to London to confer with Sir Winston Churchill. Secretary Dulles still voiced the hope that France would ratify the EDC treaty as it stood.75 Finally, on the 24th, the French Premier, in a radio address to his people, announced that his cabinet had agreed to put the EDC treaty to a vote in the Assembly without making it a question of confidence in the government so that the resulting ballot would not have the effect of determining the continuance or fall of the Mendès-France administration.

In the debate that followed it was plain that France had no enthusiasm for EDC, despite the fact that it had originally been the French who

French Assembly votes to postpone EDC ratification

suggested such an arrangement for the defense of Western Europe. When the decisive vote was taken on August 30th, the Assembly in effect killed EDC by approving the indefinite postponement of ratifying action by a margin of 319 to 264. President Eisenhower, who was at the Iowa State Fair in Des Moines when the news reached him, admitted that the decision of the French Assembly was a "major set back" to the cause of European security.76 And Secretary Dulles, the following day, called for an emergency session of the NATO Council to reappraise the situation with a view to repairing the damage. He reiterated, however, that the United States had no intention of acting unilaterally in this crisisthat whatever was done would be achieved through consultation and mutual cooperation." Still the defeat of EDC was a serious discouragement to a man who had worked so hard to bring about such an arrangement and who had proclaimed so strongly that EDC represented the best hope of European security and unity.

11. Rebuilding the European

Security System