mechanism of the peace contract settlements. The West German Socialist leader, Kurt Schumacher, bitterly attacked the plans of the Big Three for the Bonn republic because, he claimed, they linked the granting of sovereignty to prior ratification of a European army program. Adenauer's own party adopted a delaying attitude and he was forced to proceed less speedily than he had hoped to do. After a long struggle he finally obtained ratification of the Schuman Plan on January 11, 1952. He won a further victory when on January 22 he was able to get an agreement from the Big Three that the question of Germany's financial contribution to western defense would be decided by the Temporary Council Committee ("The Three Wise Men") of NATO rather than by the Allied High Commission. The Bonn government believed that it would receive more considerate treatment from the NATO trio than from the HICOG, as the High Commission was called.

London meeting furthers plans for West German integration, 1952

On February 8, the Bundestag directed Chancellor Adenauer to continue negotiations with the Big Three, but set six conditions of an especially difficult sort. However, Herr Adenauer met in London with the Big Three Foreign Ministers on February 18-19, 1952. The communiqué issued at the close of the sessions expressed confidence that the difficulties facing the four powers would be ironed out successfully. FrancoGerman talks on the Saar question were to be held soon and a clemency board was set up to review the sentences of German war criminals. A joint discussion by NATO and the EDC would take place on all questions of mutual interest, thus virtually admitting the Bonn republic to NATO without formally doing so. At the same time, on February 22, 1952, the Bonn government replied to a note addressed by the East German government on February 13 to the Big Four, that free and democratic elections in all Germany must come before the conclusion of a peace treaty. The United States made its reply to the same proposition when it was advanced by the Soviet Union in a note to Great Britain, France, and the United States on March 10, 1952.

REPLY BY UNITED STATES TO SOVIET NOTE ON GERMAN PEACE TREATY, WASHINGTON, MARCH 26, 1952: . . . The conclusion

American reply to Soviet note

on German elections

of a just and lasting peace treaty which would end the division of Germany has always been and remains an essential objective of the United States Government.... the conclusion of such a treaty requires the formation of an allGerman Government. . . . set up on the basis of free elections. . . held in circumstances which safeguard the national and individual liberties of the German people. . . . The Soviet ... proposals do not indicate what the international position of an all-German Government would be before the conclusion of a peace treaty. . the Soviet Government expressed its readiness also to discuss other proposals. The United States . . . [holds the view that] . . . it will not be possible to engage in detailed discussion of a peace treaty until conditions have been created for free elections and until a free all-German Government which could participate in such discussion has been formed. . . . For example . . . no definitive German frontiers were laid down by the Potsdam decision, [as the U.S.S.R. contends] which clearly provided that the final determination of territorial questions must await the peace settlement. The United States . . . also observes that the Soviet Government now considers that the peace treaty should provide for the formation of German national land, air and sea forces, while at the same time imposing limitations on Germany's freedom to enter into association with other countries. . . . such provisions would be a step backwards and might jeopardize the emergence in Europe of a new era in which international relations would be based on cooperation and not on rivalry and distrust. . . . the proposal of the Soviet Government for the formation of German national forces is inconsistent with the achievement of . . . [plans to secure the participation of Germany in a purely defensive European community]. . . .

No peace treaty possible until after free all-German elections

In addition to the United States, this reply voiced the beliefs of the governments of France, Great Britain and the Bonn republic. In the main, the western powers put to the U.S.S.R. a challenge that Russia prove its desire for peace in Europe and for a unified Germany by allowing the commission already appointed by the UN General Assembly to supervise an all-German free election. The Soviets, on April 9, answered the March 25th note in an inconclusive fashion, but they did accept the desirability of studying conditions for all-German elections. However, they balked at the "inclusion of Germany in one or another grouping of powers directed against any peace-loving state," i.e. the group being NATO or

EDC and the "peace-loving state" being the

U.S.S.R.

The stepped-up Soviet drive for a unified Germany caused the western allies to speed their efforts to bring the Bonn republic into the West

ern European group. Beginning Peace contract April 21, 1952, representatives of signed by the three western powers and the allies Bonn government met almost daily May 26, 1952 to draft the peace contract. Meanwhile the allies replied on May 13th to the Soviet note of April 9, 1952 by saying that the West was ready to begin negotiations with the U.S.S.R. as soon as the Soviets convinced the allies of their intention to avoid the fruitless negotiations of the past. The allies particularly objected to the Soviet prohibition on Germany's freedom to join any international grouping she chose to become a member of-such as the United Nations, NATO, the EDC, etc. Before any further exchange of correspondence took place, the peace contract was signed at Bonn on May 26, 1952. The full text of the contractual agreements runs to many pages. Extracts from the statement presented by Secretary Acheson outline the main aims of the peace contract. And excerpts from an address by the Secretary indicate the provisions of the contract.

SECRETARY ACHESON'S STATEMENT ON THE GERMAN CONTRACT, BONN, PEACE MAY 26, 1952: . . . The Federal Republic is attaining the independence in foreign affairs and authority in domestic matters which befit a free state. ... When the agreements enter into effect, the occupation will come to its formal close and the Federal Government will deal with other governments on a normal basis. . . . certain powers reserved to . . . [the allies] are not retained for any reasons which have to do with the Federal Republic alone. They are related to other factors entirely-to the necessity for the presence in Germany of troops whose mission is the defense of German peace and freedom and of peace and freedom throughout the free world, and to the unhappy fact that Germany is still a divided country. . . . we have succeeded in bringing freedom to the greater part of Germany, but until freedom can be extended to the entire country, and until all Germans-East and West-are reunited in freedom, the goal will not have been reached. . . .

ADDRESS BY SECRETARY ACHESON ON THE BONN AGREEMENTS, WASHINGTON, JUNE 2, 1952. . . This is what . . . [the agreements] will

Occupation at an end in West Germany

do. The Occupation in all of Germany not occupied by the Soviet Union will end. The sole exception to this is Berlin, where the situation requires us to maintain our full rights as an Occupation

power. The three Western Powers and the German Republic reaffirm their abiding purpose to bring about a free and united Germany. . . . The Federal Republic will control its domestic and external affairs. . . . the foreign armed forces stationed in the Federal territory will cease to be Occupation forces. Joined by German contingents in the European army, they will safeguard the freedom and security of Germany and the Western World. The German Federal Republic ... will maintain the democratic rights of individuals and the Federal institutions already provided for in its constitutions. In its foreign relations, it agrees to abide by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. . . . The German Government will carry out a number of programs already well advanced, such as breaking up cartels, compensating victims of Nazi persecution, caring for displaced persons and refugees, and many other matters. . . . Germany will contribute to and participate in its own defense and in the defense of Western Europe as an equal partner in the European army. There will not be a national German army. We have given no "secret" or undisclosed commitments or guarantees.

...

The signing of the contractual agreements at Bonn was followed by the negotiation of the long planned European Defense Treaty on May 27,

EDC treaty signed May 27, 1952

1952 at Paris. By this treaty six nations-France, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the West German Federal Republic -declared their intention to create the European Defense Community (EDC). This treaty provided for a European army under a common command and wearing a uniform common to all. It also provided for a number of common political institutions in the defense field which were to lead to a European federal union. West Germany was to be a full member of this grouping. And at the same time an amendment to the North Atlantic Treaty was adopted which extended to the German Federal Republic, as a part of EDC, the assurances and protections of NATO. Therefore, in these three significant steps-the Bonn peace contracts, the EDC treaty, and the amendment to the NATO structure-Western Germany would be in a position to take her place

West Germany ready for integration with NATO and EDC

in the community of free nations of the west once these new arrangements were ratified.

The United States Senate accepted the Bonn peace contract on July 1, 1952 by a margin of 77 to 5. On the same day the amendment to the NATO protocol was approved by a U. S. Senate vote of 71 to 5. Thus, the United first to ratify States became the first nation to peace contract ratify these significant documents.22 and NATO The British government approved protocol the Bonn contract and the NATO amendment on August 1, 1952, as well as the European Defense Community treaty to which it was a party. Ten days later the six nations adhering to the agreement on the European Coal and Steel Community (the Schuman Plan), which had been ratified on June 16, 1952, met in Luxembourg to inaugurate this cooperative venture. The German Federal Republic was one of the founding members of this Community. On September 10 the program went into operation and an ancient source of European economic and political friction was formally erased. Meanwhile, on August 14, 1952, Western Germany became a member of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, thereby taking additional steps toward total integration into the world community of nations.

Inauguration of the European coal and steel community

In Western Germany, however, the course of the Bonn peace contract and the EDC treaty did not run smooth. Chancellor Adenauer faced stiff

German domestic opposition to the

peace contract and EDC

opposition in his efforts to get ratification of these two instruments of German integration into western defense. Although the death of Kurt Schumacher on August 20, 1952 removed Adenauer's most vigorous opponent, there were many in Schumacher's Social Democratic Party, as well as in Adenauer's own Christian Democratic Party, who believed that the future of a united Germany was brighter without links to either West or East. Likewise, many Germans saw

22 With these ratifications achieved, the United States on July 18, 1952, released Mr. McCloy as High Commissioner. Mr. McCloy had long wished to retire but had stayed on in Bonn to aid in the campaign for the adoption of the peace contract. He was succeeded as USHICOG by Walter J. Donnelly who had been American High Commissioner in Austria.

in the rearmament proposals a threat to the domestic stability of the German state which twice in forty years had been led into a devastating and humiliating defeat by the spirit of militarism.

At the same time, the correspondence between the western allies and the U.S.S.R. over Germany continued. Secretary Acheson replied to the Soviet note of August 23, 1952 which had attacked the Atlantic pact, EDC, and the Bonn agreements. Identical notes were sent by Britain and France to the U.S.S.R.

The U. S. continues to urge free all-German elections

AMERICAN NOTE TO THE SOVIET UNION ON GERMANY, WASHINGTON, AUGUST 23, 1952: . . . The United States. . must insist on the necessity of starting four-power discussions at the only point where they can in fact start, which is the organization of free elections. . . . the Soviet Government has evaded this clear issue. . Until an all German Government is formed which will be in a position to negotiate freely, it is impossible to discuss the terms of a German peace treaty. . . . Such a government can only proceed from free elections. . . . the East German administration is not representative of the German population of the Soviet zone. The United States Government is compelled to remind the Soviet Government that conditions have altered radically since the Potsdam Agreement of 1945. ... The Soviet conception of a peace treaty drafted by the four powers and imposed upon Germany is entirely unsuitable in 1952. . . . genuinely free elections with a view to the formation of an all-German Government must come first. . . . The contrast between the concept of free elections which obtains in West Germany and that which prevails in the Soviet zone is clear. It is for the German people to choose between these alternative ways of life. . . The United States. . . renews the proposal made in its note of July 10 for an early four-power meeting . . to discuss the composition, functions and authority of an impartial commission of investigation with a view to creating the conditions necessary for free elections. The United States . . most earnestly urges the Soviet Government to reconsider its refusal to join the other powers in a single-minded effort thus to come to grips with the problem of free elections in Germany.

This statement of American policy by Secretary Acheson remained the position held by the United States as the year 1952 ended and the new administration prepared to take over the reigns of government in Washington. On November 27, 1952 the Bundestag, lower house of Bonn parliament, voted to debate the contractual agreements and the European defense arrangements. This

was a victory for Chancellor Adenauer who had pressed for German ratification of the peace contract and the EDC treaty all through the autumn of 1952. In spite of allied hopes for an early acceptance of these instruments further delays were encountered in the Bundestag.

At the close of 1952, the German question remained far from solution. In the United States, both the outgoing and incoming administrations

A new administration has no new answers for the German problem

were materially agreed upon the necessity for German integration into the fabric of a revitalized Europe. Likewise, they were agreed in the main upon the desirability of rearming West Germany in face of the threat of Soviet aggression against Western Europe. And, with some reservations, there was practical agreement on the eventuality of a reunification of Germany. But so far there was no clear agreement on how these ends were to be achieved. And, equally important, neither the Democratic nor the Republican leadership saw means and methods which could be counted on to reach these goals while satisfying French hopes for security in Europe where the spectre of German militarism worried. French politicians every time they debated German rearmament, the EDC, and German participation in the defense of Europe against the communist menace. Europe presented many problems as the Eisenhower administration took office. And the German problem was obviously not the least of these.

8. A New Administration Faces the

Problems of Europe

When the Republican administration took up the responsibilities of conducting America's foreign policy it was fortunate to have at the head of the State Department as practiced an international diplomat as John Foster Dulles. His familiarity with the work and the personnel of the State Department, both in Washington and abroad, eased the tasks of approaching the various problems and provided a continuity of action not commonly found in the transition from control by one political party to another in Washington. (60) In respect to Europe, the Eisenhower administration had no specific commitments which it was compelled to honor as a result of the election

Eisenhower free to develop a new European policy

campaign of 1952. The Republican party had promised to take the initiative and to adopt a dynamic policy toward the Soviet Union. And, the campaigners promised a more positive approach to the political and economic situations in which the United States was involved in Europe. This was supposed to mean that America would expect greater contributions by European members of NATO and speedier demonstrations of support for the EDC, with the possibility of withdrawal of American military and financial aid if desired results were not forthcoming. The indefinite nature of the campaign promises did not require the new administration to set a date for the realization of its aims. But an element of uncertainty was injected into the the conduct of American foreign relations for the period of the campaign and the approximately two months between the election and General Eisenhower's inauguration.

Winston Churchill visits Eisenhower and Truman

Shortly before that latter event, Prime Minister Churchill traveled from London to New York where, on January 5, 1953, he visited with his old friend Bernard Baruch and his wartime associate, President-elect Eisenhower. Mr. Churchill also went to Washington to pay a pay a call upon President Truman before leaving for a winter holiday in Bermuda. The Churchill trip emphasized Brittain's interest in the new administration and the hopes of the veteran British statesman that relations with General Eisenhower could be maintained on the same friendly and person-to-person basis as had been the fashion in Churchill's dealings with Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman. From press accounts it was clear that part of Churchill's purpose in seeing Eisenhower was to reiterate his belief that Western Europe's problems and requirements deserved priority over those of the Far East, a reversal of the importance

tion by radio.23 The scope of the talk was worldwide; only those portions relating directly or indirectly to Europe are included here.

SECRETARY DULLES' SURVEY OF FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEMS, WASHINGTON, JANUARY 27, 1953: . . . President Eisenhower has

"Enlightened self-interest" to guide the United States

...

often used a phrase, "enlightened self-interest." That is going to be our guide as we go on to make our foreign policy. . . the enlightened self-interest of the United States compels that we should have friends and allies in the world. At the present time, the Soviet Communists are carrying out a policy which they call encirclement. . . Today... they control 800 million people and they're hard at work to get control of other parts of the world. In Western Europe we find that there is in existence there one of our major foreign policies, the foreign policy that is called by the word NATO. . . . The purpose there was to tie the Western European countries together with association from United States and from Canada, so as to create there a community which would be strong enough to deter any attack on Western Europe by the Red armies. . . . The present hope is that Germany and France will join in a single European defense community. . . . That's a good idea and it has had in this country bipartisan support. Unfortunately the plan now seems to be somewhat stalled. . . . We want to look the situation over at firsthand and see whether this trend to unity is on the upgrade or is on the downgrade. . . . if it appeared there were no chance of getting effective unity, and if in particular France, Germany, and England should go their separate ways, then certainly it would be necessary to give a little rethinking to America's own foreign policy in relation to Western Europe. . . . I think I can, on the basis of what I know about . . . [President Eisenhower], give you two indications as to the outline of our foreign policy. ... [1] We will not try to meet the Soviet strategy of encirclement by ourselves starting a war. . . . We shall never choose a war as the instrument of our policy.... we . . . must have a strong military establishment and we should encourage the creation of military strength among our friends; but the purpose is never to wage war but only to deter war

[2] the other purpose must be to create in other peoples such a love and respect for freedom that they can never really be absorbed by the depotism, the totalitarian dictatorship, of the Communist world. . . . Our job is to serve our own enlightened self-interest by demonstrating by our own performance, by our own examples, how good freedom is and how much better it is than despotism is. . . . The heart of a successful foreign policy is our national conduct and example. . . . our foreign

23 President Eisenhower's inaugural address on Jan. 20 had passages in it dealing with foreign policy, but the remarks rela tive to Europe were somewhat general in nature. calling mainly for Western European unity.

policies should be open so that you can know what they are, and they should be sufficiently simple so that you can understand them and judge them, and they should be sufficiently decent and moral so that they will fit into your idea of what you think is right. These principles of openness, simplicity, and righteousness... are those which are in accord with what used to be the great American traditional foreign policy. . .

Secretary Dulles and Mutual Security Administrator Stassen tour Europe

Following this radio broadcast, Mr. Dulles set out, accompanied by Mr. Harold "Openness, Stassen, newly appointed Director simplicity, and for Mutual Security, on a quick righteousness" tour of seven European countries.24 the basic aims On February 12 the Secretary reof American ported by radio to the American. foreign policy people on the observations he and Mr. Stassen had made in Europe. SECRETARY DULLES' REPORT ON HIS EUROPEAN TRIP, WASHINGTON, FEBRUARY 12, 1953: When the first program of interim aid to Europe was before the Senate in 1947, I urged... that in granting European aid "the basic idea should be, not the rebuilding of the prewar Europe, but the building of a new Europe, which, more unified, will be a better Europe." That point of view was emphatically adopted by Congress. These are the ideas that enlightened European leaders themselves put forth. They have already done much.... they have created . . . the Schuman plan ..25 Our European friends also tackled the vital problem of military unity. Last May . . . [they] signed a treaty to create a European Defense Community. . . . However . . . [nine months have now gone by] without any effective steps to ratify [the treaty]. . . . This has been somewhat disconcerting to us, because the plans for our own security are based on the assumption that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which does not include Germany, would be bolstered by the European Defense Community, which would draw on German military strength to create a solid continental European military establishment. . . . Our conclusion [from the trip] was that the project for a European Defense Community was not dead but only sleeping. we found good will and friendliness on the part of the governments and most of the people, but we also found some fear that the United States is not qualified to give the free world the kind of leadership which it needs at this critical moment. It is conceded that we have the material power, but it is questioned whether we have

24 Visits were made to Italy, France. the United Kingdom. West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. in a 10-day period.

25 Sec. Dulles and Mr. Stassen were present at the inauguration of operations of the Schuman Plan at the capital of the European coal and steel community in Luxembourg on Feb. 8. 1953.