Three American generals, in turn, lead the NATO forces been in the military planning field. The efforts of General Eisenhower to build up a NATO force, composed of air, sea, and ground units from member nations in proportions agreed upon by their representatives at the various NATO council sessions, were more disappointing than the supporters of NATO were likely to admit. However, he did succeed in creating an attitude of support for NATO among the European members which appeared hopeful for the future. When General Eisenhower relinquished his NATO command in May 1952 to return to the United States as a candidate for the presidential nomination, he was succeeded by General Matthew B. Ridgway. A year later, General Ridgway was called home to be Chief of Staff of the Army and General Alfred Gruenther was chosen to take over his post at SHAPE. Whether this succession of three American generals creates a precedent is difficult to say. But it is probable that since the United States contributes so large a share of the military and economic assistance needed by NATO there will continue to be an American officer high in the echelon of command for NATO's military forces. It must not be lost to sight, however, that NATO is much more than a military alliance. Some day, it is conceivable, western Europe will be NATO more than a military alliance adequately armed. NATO's political aspects will then come more prominently into view. With its Council and its Secretariat NATO provides the framework for a system of political unity and cooperation which has long been the goal of many world. statesmen. In the achievement of this unity the United States must continue to play an important part. NATO is of course far from a federal union today and it is likely to continue as a coordinating defense and rearmament agency for some time to come. But the fact that the United States is an integral, and indeed a vital part of this North Atlantic community represents one of the most significant developments of our postwar foreign policy. Perhaps the NATO alliance will be recorded in history as one of the most valuable accomplish ments of the Truman administration, although the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the action in opposition to aggression in Korea are likely to bulk large in the accounting in the future. In 1953 the fact that the new president, General Eisenhower, served as first commander of the NATO military forces encouraged the supporters of NATO to believe that the needs of this novel organization would receive high priority from the incoming administration. The changing fortunes of NATO during 195354 are noted in a later section of this study.18 The inevitable problems of European rivalries, American domestic economics and politics, and worldwide communist expansionism affected NATO directly and indirectly. The result was that the early enthusiasm with which NATO was greeted by the nations of Western Europe and the two North American partners-Canada and the United States gave way to a degree of pessimism and frustration which American policy-makers were unable to dispel. But those events did not obscure the importance of NATO in the grand design for the preservation of world peace and security.19 6. American Efforts to Solve the German Problem: 1949-1951 Since the establishment of the German Federal Republic in September 1949 and the creation of the Soviet puppet government in East Germany soon after, the East-West division of Germany has prevailed. As has been indicated, this division is primarily the responsibility of the U.S.S.R.20 Failure of the Russians to agree to peace terms for a united Germany has forced the western powers to go ahead with measures to reinstate their zones of Germany into the European community. In the main, the Bonn Republic has cooperated, especially through its Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, with the western powers. On October 31, 1949 delegates West Germany from Bonn took their places for the takes part in first time on the Council of the activities of OEEC and at the Paris meeting of western the Big Three foreign ministers on European November 11, 1949 agreement was bodies reached on the progressive integra 18 See pp. 155, 159, 162-64 and 173 below. 19 The importance of the periodical meetings of the NATO Council has grown with the passage of time. They have come to serve as forums for discussion of international problems where the procedural impediments of the UN sessions are absent. 20 See pp. 137-40 above. tion of the German people into the European community. Marshall Plan aid was extended to West Germany by the ECA on December 15, 1949. As a reiteration of the Western position on Germany the American High Commissioner, John J. McCloy, issued a statement on February 28, 1950 calling for the political reuniWest Germans fication of Germany and emphasizpropose ing the willingness of the United all-German States to assist the German people elections in achieving unity. Mr. McCloy criticized the Soviet exploitation of the natural desire of the German peoples for unity while obstructing attempts to hold free elections and to develop democratic processes. The Bonn republic on March 22, announced support of the American position and proposed the election of an all-German constituent assembly, under supervision of the occupying powers or by representatives of the UN. This assembly would draft an all-German constitution to be submitted to a popular referendum in all sections of Germany. The Soviet Zone puppet government rejected this proposal, a not unexpected reaction on its part. Later in the spring, at London, Secretary Dean G. Acheson joined with Mr. Bevin and M. Robert Schuman, French Foreign Minister, in a joint declaration on policy toward Germany. Big 3 declaration on policy toward Germany JOINT DECLARATION ON GERMANY BY BIG THREE FOREIGN MINISTERS, LONDON, MAY 14, 1950: . . . The Allies are resolved to pursue their aim... that Germany shall reenter progressively the community of free peoples of Europe. . . . The Western powers desire to see the pace of progress toward this end as rapid as possible. . . . the pace will be determined by the extent to which the Allies can be satisfied that their own security is safeguarded by the development in Germany of a desire for peace. [and] by the rate at which Germany advances toward a condition in which true democracy governs and the just liberties of the individual are assured. . . . In view of the continued refusal of the Soviet Government to permit the inhabitants of their zone of occupation to rejoin their fellow countrymen in a democratic and united Germany, it has not been possible. . . to proceed to the conclusion of a treaty of peace with Germany. The Ministers accordingly agreed to set up a study group in London to undertake the necessary preparatory work to enable the occupation statute to be reviewed . . . and to make recommendations for eliminating the major practical inconveniences arising in the countries concerned from the state of war. . . . the Allies intend to give Germany the possibility of developing freely. .. and express the hope that the necessary conditions for the establishment of a government for all Germany may be achieved. . . . German troops for Western Europe? In August 1950 the Council of Europe tentatively approved the inclusion of German troops in a European army. Since the remilitarization of Eastern Germany was being speeded by the Soviet authorities, Chancellor Adenauer naturally expressed concern lest the Bonn republic be invaded by the "police" and paramilitary units of the People's Republic of the Soviet zone. The United States High Commissioner for Germany, Mr. McCloy, issued a statement in this connection. STATEMENT BY JOHN J. McCLOY, FRANKFURT, AUGUST 23, 1950: German security is enhanced rather than retarded by the present relationship between Germany and the Western powers. .. Defense of Europe must be a joint effort and strength will be achieved. This will include Germany and require of the German people and their representatives straightforward and cooperative action. . . Early in the autumn of 1950 the Big Three foreign ministers met in New York, following sessions of the NATO Council. At the close of their conferences, Messrs. Acheson, Bevin, and Schuman issued a lengthy communiqué on Western Germany. Big 3 confer on Germany, 1950 FOREIGN MINISTERS' COMMUNIQUE ON WESTERN GERMANY, NEW YORK, SEPTEMBER 19, 1950: The Foreign Ministers . . . share the desire of the German people for the unification of Germany. . . . Despite their efforts... this end will obviously not be realized so long as the Soviet Union continues to ignore proposals for democratic all-German elections, and to stage controlled elections such as the one to be held in the Soviet zone on October 15. Pending the unification of Germany, the three Governments consider the Government of the Federal Republic as the only German Government freely and legitimately constituted and therefore entitled to speak for Germany as the representative of the German people in international affairs. . . . In the spirit of the new relationship which they wish to establish with the Federal Republic, the three Governments have decided . . . to take the necessary steps . . . to terminate the state of war with Germany. the Allied Governments will increase and reinforce their forces in Germany. ... They will treat any attack against the Federal Republic or Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon themselves. The Ministers are fully agreed that the re-creation of a German national army would not serve the best interests of Germany or Europe. ... The questions raised by the problem of the participation of the German Federal Republic in the common defense of Europe are at present the subject of study and exchange of views. . . . the Foreign Ministers have agreed to permit the establishment of mobile police formations. . . . the occupying powers are prepared to amend the Occupation Statute. Relaxation of occupation terms for Germany the [German] Federal Government will be authorized to establish a ministry of Foreign Affairs and to enter into diplomatic relations with foreign countries.... the High Commission has been instructed to remove . . . all restrictions on the size, speed, and number of commercial cargo ships built for export and to allow steel to be produced outside the present limitation where this will facilitate the defense effort of the west. The three Governments .. will continue to oppose aggression... against [Berlin] . . . and [will] liberalize Allied controls in the city to the maximum extent practicable. These decisions. represent a major advance toward the progressive return of Germany to partnership in Western Europe and the consolidation of the western nations in their efforts to establish a firm basis for the future peace of Europe and the world. East German elections a fraud The elections in the Soviet zone of Germany to which the ministers referred were, of course, a prearranged endorsement of the the communist regime. The Bonn government adopted a resolution resolution denouncing the fraudulent character of the elections. This resolution was endorsed by the Allied High Commissioners. The resolution also called for free elections in all parts of Germany for a constituent assembly which would draw up a constitution for an all-German government. About 14,000,000 East Germans voted in the one-slate Soviet zone election on October 15, 1950, casting a 99.71% vote for the communist candidates and turning the East German Democratic Republic into a completely captive Soviet puppet. On October 20th, Secretary Acheson commented: "The world has just witnessed the spectacle of the election fraud staged in the Soviet Zone of Germany. Our sympathy goes out to the East German people who have been treated in such a contemptuous and humiliating fashion by their oppressors."21 21 Statement released to the press, Oct. 20, 1950. U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXIII:695, Oct. 30, 1950. Soviets attempt to block rearming of Western Germany At the time of these elections, the Soviet and Iron Curtain countries convened a meeting of their foreign ministers at Prague, Czechoslovakia. On October 21, 1950 the Prague meeting issued a communiqué charging that the chief concern of the western powers' meeting in New York in September had been the re-creation of a German army and the remilitarization of western Germany. The communist ministers added that they regarded an immediate declaration by the Potsdam signatories prohibiting rearmament of Germany as a necessity. As follow-up, the U.S.S.R., on November 3, called for a four-power conference to discuss the demilitarization provisions of the Potsdam agreements. The United States replied to this request on December 22, 1950 by saying that the Soviet suggestion was too narrow, and by proposing a meeting to discuss a wide range of international tensions. The Soviets answered on December 30, 1950, not outwardly rejecting the American proposal, but obscuring the question in a maze of double-talk. Opposition to rearmament within the Bonn Republic Meanwhile, within Western Germany itself there was considerable difference of opinion on the question of rearmament. Chancellor Adenauer made several appeals to the West Germans to agree to cooperation in the defense measures for western Europe, under certain safeguards for the Bonn republic. He was opposed largely by the Socialist party led by Kurt Schumacher. In the elections in Hesse and Wurtemburg-Baden on November 19, 1950 the voters showed disfavor with Adenauer's policy of German participation in the western defense force. Dr. Schumacher thereupon demanded a general election for all Western Germany on the issue of German re controls on German economic and political life. It was also agreed that a committee would be organized to study the question of West German contribution to European defense. On January 20, 1951 General Eisenhower visited Germany and, as commander of the North Atlantic Treaty forces, offered the German people his pledge of friendship and an opportunity to join in building the military strength of western Europe. On March 6, 1951 the Allied High Commission announced revisions in the occupation statute. These revisions included permission for the Bonn government to establish a Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Revisions of occupation statute COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONERS, BONN, MARCH 6, 1951: . . . In order to accelerate the integration of the Federal Republic in the community of free nations, the Allied High Commission has approved the immediate establishment of a Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has authorized the Federal Government to enter into direct diplomatic relations with friendly nations. . . . [they have] promulgated ... a revision of the Occupation Statute in which certain reserved powers are given up or reduced. . . . Federal and land legislation will no longer be subject to prior review by the . . . Commission. . . . In order to make an essential contribution to international cooperation, the Federal Government [will] cooperate in the equitable apportionment of materials, products and services which are in short supply or required for the common defense. . . . Chancellor Adenauer took over the newly authorized post of Foreign Minister as an additional Western Germany joins Schuman Plan and Council of Europe ... duty on March 15, 1951. In this capacity he journeyed to Paris and on April 18 signed the treaty putting into operation the Schuman Plan to pool western Europe's steel and coal production. Thus Germany became, in another instance, a vital cog in the machinery of European cooperation. On May 2, 1951 the Bonn republic was made a full member of the Council of Europe. As a further move toward reinstatement of Germany into the camp of free nations, President Truman on July 9, 1951 asked the United States Congress to end the state of war which had existed between Germany and the United States since December 11, 1941. PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S LETTER TO CONGRESS ON ENDING STATE OF WAR WITH GERMANY, WASHINGTON, JULY 9, 1951: . . . United States ends war with Germany The progress which has been made in the recovery of Europe and in the strengthening of democratic institutions there makes it appropriate at this time to end the status of Germany as an enemy country. . ... Unfortunately . . . Soviet Russia has actively prevented the growth of a representative democratic government in a unified Germany, and has thus made impossible for the time being the arrangement of a final peace settlement. we were forced to change our approach. The ultimate fulfillment of our German policy had been delayed, but we were determined to do all we could to advance that policy in the part of Germany under our control. We were joined in our efforts by the British and French governments. . . . we gave the German people under our jurisdiction the chance to create their own government. The relationship of conquerer and conquered is being replaced by the relationship of equality. . . . The termination of the state of war . . . will not affect the status of the occupation. . . . The rights of the occupying powers result from the conquest of Germany. . . . We are not surrendering these rights. . . . We do intend . . . to grant the Federal Republic increasing authority over its own affairs, and eventually to see Germany restored as a fully sovereign nation. . [Action to terminate the state of war] will give the German people a new demonstration of our desire to help bring them back to membership among the nations of the free world. The Congress adopted the resolution proposed by the President and the state of war with Germany was proclaimed at an end on October 24, 1951. Thus, the actions of the Soviet Union in occupied Germany had forced the West to take measures on its own. Most of the western nations which had been at war with GerFundamental many followed the American lead conditions and terminated the state of war by needed for various constitutional processes. stability in Two fundamental conditions were Central Europe essential if stability was to be achieved in Central Europe: free elections would have to take place in the whole of Germany before German unification could become a reality, and some kind of peace treaty with responsible German authorities would have to be achieved before Germany, either partially divided or unified, could be fully incorporated in whatever political and economic arrangements were devised for European unity. These twin ob jectives formed the basis of American policy in the German question during the next year. 7. Negotiations for the German Peace Contract and German Rearmament Big 3 agreement on a peace contract for West Germany Shortly before the formal congressional action on the resolution ending the war with Germany, an important Big Three meeting took place in Washington. Robert Schuman of France and Herbert Morrison of Great Britain journeyed to Washington to discuss European problems with Secretary Acheson. Mr. Morrison, an influential Labour Party veteran, had succeeded Ernest Bevin as British Foreign Secretary when ill health forced Bevin's retirement from office. The three foreign ministers opened their conference on September 10, 1951. They agreed to negotiate with the Bonn republic a peace contract, since the obstructionism of the U.S.S.R. prevented the possibility of an early peace treaty. And they agreed upon the employment of West German troops in a European army. At the close of the sessions, the foreign ministers issued a declaration. The sections devoted to Germany are given, in part, below. WASHING TRIPARTITE DECLARATION, TON, SEPTEMBER 14, 1951: The three Foreign Ministers declare that their Governments aim at the inclusion of a democratic Germany, on a basis of equality, in a Continental European Community, which itself will form a part of a constantly developing Atlantic Community. . . . They welcome the Schuman Plan as a means of strengthening the economy of Western Europe and look forward to its early realization. They also welcome the Paris Plan as a very important contribution to the effective Defense of Europe, including Germany. The participation of Germany in the common defense should naturally be attended by the replacement of the present Occupation Statute by a new relationship between the three Governments and the German Federal Republic. . . . The Foreign Ministers have and the security problem confronting the Federal Republic obliges the Allies to retain in the common interest, certain special rights but only in relation to the stationing of armed forces in Germany and the protection of the security of those forces, as well as to questions affecting Berlin and Germany as a whole, including the eventual peace settlement and the peaceful reunification of Germany. The UN votes to send a commission At a special session of the Peoples' Chamber of the East German republic held on September 15, Otto Grotewohl, Minister-President of the puppet government, denounced the communiqué of the Washington meeting as an attempt to deceive the German people and declared that to Germany the western powers were trying to to study subordinate Germany to their agpossibilities gressive program for imperialist exfor pansion. Following the Washington free elections meeting and the protest of the East German government, Chancellor Adenauer requested the Allied High Commission to propose the establishment by the UN of a commission to carry out investigations in all zones of Germany to ascertain the possibility of holding free elections. The three western powers presented a resolution to this effect at the sixth session of the General Assembly. The Assembly adopted the resolution on December 20, 1951 by a vote of 50 to 6. Brazil, Iceland, Pakistan, Poland, and the Netherlands were asked to designate representatives to serve on the commission. All but Poland accepted the invitation. The UN commission met in Paris on February 11, 1952 and later sent inspection teams to western Germany. The Soviet zone government declined to allow the commission to visit East Germany, with the result that no accurate study of the entire situation was possible. At a meeting in Paris on November 22, 1951, Chancellor Adenauer reached an agreement with Secretary Acheson, Anthony Eden, Conservative |