[to the circumstances of special cases, are of great political consequence. One of these is the doctrine that no State is entitled to interfere with another, either in choosing or in changing its form of government, in managing its internal affairs, and, generally, in the exercise of its undisputed rights. The other is the doctrine that every State, strictly so called, is, for all purposes of political intercourse and ceremonial consideration, to be treated as the equal of every other State.

As to the doctrine of "non-interference," a very conspicuous march in public European opinion of late years can be clearly discerned. Considering the extremely delicate adjustment of the mutual relations of European States (especially the eastern ones), and the keen and increasing concern that each has in the stability and welfare of the rest, the adoption of any absolute doctrine in favour of holding aloof from the complications existing in neighbouring States would be scarcely possible. All that could be expected or even desired would be that the principles upon which alone intervention is justified, should be definitely ascertained, and that these principles, instead of being such as merely to prop up (as did the principle of the "Balance of Power") the accidentally subsisting relations to one another of a few preponderant and ambitious States, should be conceived in the interest of the smaller and most struggling, as well as in that of the most dominant, States.

That some such principles are, at the least, in course of formation may be gathered from the language used by the contracting parties in the treaty for the pacification of Greece, concluded in London on the 6th of July, 1827, between France, Great Britain and Russia; from the language used by Lord Palmerston in defending the quadruple alliance concluded in 1834 between France, Great Britain, Spain and Portugal,

[for "establishing internal peace throughout the Peninsula ;" and from that used by President Grant in commenting, in his message to Congress on December 7th, 1874, on the attitude of the United States to the revolution in Cuba; † as well as from the persistently cautious abstinence from even prejudicial sympathy, and still more, from any expression of it,— observed by all the European governments during the late convulsive political changes in Italy, France and Spain successively.

The only grounds on which interference with the affairs of a foreign State would now be held capable of justification are―(1) the breach or attempted breach of a subsisting treaty, as where a State is restricted by treaty in the amount of its armaments, or in the quality of its military defences; or else (2) the continuance of a revolutionary state of affairs in the foreign State under circumstances in which it seems highly probable that, without such interference, either public order can never be restored at all; or can only be restored after such sufferings to humanity and such injuries to surrounding States as obviously overbalance the general evil of all interference from without. No doubt the application in particular cases of these two principles is often a matter of the utmost difficulty, and must depend, for its success, on the honesty and political foresight of the State whose interference is solicited.

[* See Wheaton's "Elements of International Law," Part II., chap. I., and Woolsey's "Introduction to the Study of International Law," § 50.]

[t"The deplorable strife in Cuba continues without any marked change in the relative advantages of the contending forces. The insurrection continues, but Spain has gained no superiority. Six years of strife give the insurrection a significance which cannot be denied. Its duration and the tenacity of its advance, together with the absence of the manifested power of repression on the part of Spain, cannot be controverted, and may make some positive steps on the part of other powers a matter of self-necessity."]

M.

H

[The most pressing and practical form in which the question of the justice or expediency of interference with the affairs of a foreign State presents itself at the present day, is when a revolution in that State is so far successful as to have resulted in the establishment of a well-organized and independent government over a considerable part of the national territory, or in the settlement of a new dynasty in the place of one more or less violently displaced, or in the seemingly final rupture of the relations between a parent State and its colonies resulting in the birth of a new State or new States.

The interference may take four different forms. A State may (1) confine itself solely to offering its friendly services to the contending parties by way of mediation or arbitration, whether in concert or not with other States. A state may (2) accord to the revolutionary party in a foreign State the rights of war which it would have were it in the position of an independent belligerent State. The concession of such rights may, at a certain epoch in the strife, be claimed both in the interests of humanity and of neutral States; there always, indeed, arrives a moment at which such a concession is made (as in the case of the late Southern insurrection in the United States) by the government from which the revolt takes place. The main difficulty is found in ascertaining the moment proper for what is called "recognition of belligerency." It must be neither so premature as to embarrass a friendly government in suppressing what may prove to be only a transient and partial display of disorder or treachery, or so dilatory as to protract the inconvenience and cruelty incident to a war conducted on a large scale apart from all the humane alleviations which the laws of war have introduced. The quality of the test for determining the moment at which interference for belligerent purposes only can be justified became a subject of earnest controversy during and after the late American

[civil war. The following passage, from a note of Mr. Dana's to his edition of Wheaton's Elements (p. 36), expresses so accurately the principles upon which the time of recognition must be fixed, that it may well be quoted in this place:

"To decide whether the recognition was uncalled for "and premature requires something more than a consi"deration of proximate facts and the overt and formal "acts of the contending parties. The foreign state is "bound and entitled to consider the preceding history "of the parties; the magnitude and completeness of the

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political and military organization and preparations on "each side; the probable extent of the conflict by sea ❝and land; the probable extent and rapidity of its development; and, above all, the probability that its own "merchant vessels, naval officers and consuls may be precipitated into sudden and difficult complications "abroad. The best that can be said is, that the foreign "state may protect itself by a seasonable decision, either upon a test case that arises, or by a general prospective "decision; while, on the other hand, if it makes the

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recognition prematurely, it is liable to the suspicion of "an unfriendly purpose to the parent state. The recog"nition of belligerent rights is not solely to the advantage of the insurgents. They gain the great advantage "of a recognized status, and the opportunity to employ "commissioned cruisers at sea, and to exert all the

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powers known to maritime warfare, with the sanction "of foreign nations. They can obtain abroad loans, "military and naval materials, and enlist men, as against everything but neutrality laws; their flag and com"missions are acknowledged, their revenue laws are respected, and they acquire a quasi-political recogni❝tion. On the other hand, the parent government is "relieved from responsibility for acts done in the insurgent territory; its blockade of its own ports is

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["respected; and it requires a right to exert, against "neutral commerce, all the powers of a party to a "maritime war."

The other forms which interference may take are— (3) active support either of a revolutionary party in a foreign State or of the government of the State in its efforts to suppress the revolution; and (4) public recognition for the purpose of general intercourse on equal terms of a newly formed, though perhaps not yet firmly established, government. The principles upon which interference of either of these kinds can alone ever be justified, and are now held to be alone justifiable, have already been adverted to. It need only be added here, that the recognition of a de facto government, no longer actually struggling with its armed enemies, requires very few special grounds of justification, while active interposition in a contest still progressing, requires very many.

The sovereignty or independence of States carries with it another principle which has important legal consequences, that is, the equality of States.

The real meaning of the doctrine of the equality of States is that, however politically feeble, or physically insignificant, a State may be, its claims in respect of sovereignty and independence-as those ideas have been already explained—are as irrefragable as those of the most influential and powerful State. Furthermore, the dignity of all States, as marked by the claims of their governments to courteous and respectful treatment at the hands of all other governments, is identical.

Nevertheless it is to be remembered that this doctrine of the equality of States is, in some measure, an artificial one, and very imperfectly corresponds with actual political facts. It demands, indeed, the utmost support it can derive from the Law of Nations to give it even a plausible show of validity, instead of being, as