ment, as they inspire but one sentiment. The Duke of York did not retaliate upon the French, but continued to treat his prisoners with the usual lenity of modern warfare. The French subsequently revoked their decrees, and coincided in the usual customs of war in a variety of treaties and cartels, several of which are before me, but which it is unnecessary to quote, as they offer nothing new on the subject. It may be remarked, in conclusion, that the same Conclusion. principles which have been appealed to in the preceding chapter, afford also the clue to the right treatment of Prisoners of War. The usages of former ages proceeded upon the supposition that any violence. was allowed in warfare, and that the rights of the victor upon the vanquished were unlimited; and that, having a right to deprive his antagonist of life, the captor had a right to impose any treatment more lenient than death upon his prisoner. But we have seen that, so far from the rights of a belligerent being unlimited, the Law of Nature strictly limits them to such violence as is necessary; that thus, when an antagonist no longer resists, there can no longer be any right to use violence towards him; and that, whenever the purposes of warfare are not frustrated by the granting of quarter, the belligerent cannot refuse to give quarter without a direct violation of the Law of Nature, which warrants no further harshness towards prisoners than is required by the purposes of safe custody and security. ["qu'elles contrarioient celles des gens et de la guerre, qu'elles auroient "été enlevées par une surprise faite à la Convention, que ces lois étoient "même en opposition avec les sentiments qui animent nos braves “militaires, qui savent vaincre nos ennemis et jamais assassiner les "vaincus; la Convention nationale décrète qu'elle rapporte la loi du 7 "Prairial relative aux prisonniers Anglais et Hannoveriens, et Article V. "de la loi du 24 Thermidor portant qu'il ne sera fait de prisonniers "Espagnols."-ED.] [The modern practice with respect to the treatment of Prisoners of War will be found treated with interesting detail in Halleck, chap. XVIII. and Heffter, § 129. The general custom as practised in the most recent wars is, (1) to facilitate in every possible way the exchange or release of prisoners of war, commissaries for this and kindred purposes being permitted to reside in the respective belligerent countries; (2) to release the higher classes of prisoners on parole or word of honour, to the effect either that they will not escape, or, if sent home, that they will not take up arms again during the existing war; (3) to treat the different classes of prisoners with the respect due to their several ranks and stations, and to secure that they are supplied with the means of healthy subsistence. For this last purpose, they may be compelled to engage in suitable employments if their own government fails to make (as it is bound) proper arrangements for their support (Vattel, liv. III. chap. VIII. § 154). The most harassing problem is presented when the numbers of prisoners exceed the numbers of the captors, or where (from whatever cause) the captors have not, at the moment, the leisure or capacity to secure them. Some writers have alleged that, in such a case, the captors may be justified in putting their prisoners to death. This is one of those exceptional and rare cases in which the necessities of self-defence might conceivably form a colourable plea for a mitigated judgment after the act, and when all the circumstances are ascertained and weighed; but such conduct can never be justified by a law in anticipation. To use the words of Halleck (see above), "In the present day, the conduct of any general who should deliberately put his prisoners to death would be declared infamous, and no possible excuse would remove the stain from his character."] BOOK V. OF NEUTRALITY. CHAPTER I. RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF NEUTRAL NATIONS WITH REGARD TO HOSTILITIES. NEUTRAL nations are, as the term imports, those who, Definition of in time of war, are not engaged on either side of the neutrality. contest. As a general rule, their rights may be stated as consisting in an exemption from any injury from either belligerent, and their duties as comprised in the observance of the strictest impartiality between the contending parties. Nor are the obligations of Neutrality satisfied by General duties of neutrality. the affording equal succour to both parties: they expressly demand the abstaining from any assistance to either belligerent. Thus, it is not allowed to Neutral States to export munitions of war equally to both belligerents; but it is demanded that they shall not afford such assistance to either party: it is not permitted that neutrals shall succour, on both sides, the places which are invested or blockaded by an enemy; but in this, as in the preceding case, it is highly penal to afford such aid to either belligerent. This position is emphatically insisted on by Vattel, and by other writers, and is considered at the present day as the undisputed basis of the conditions of Neutrality. (1) (1) Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. III. ch. VII. § 104. Bynk. Quæst. Jur. Pub. lib. I. ch. IX. Moser, Versuch, X. 1. 211. De Neutrality qualified by antecedent treaties. But although the obligations of Neutrality, according to the Law of Nature, demand the abstaining from all interference with either party, and though the Positive Law of Nations exacts the strictest compliance with this principle, wherever no special treaty intervenes— yet the practice of Europe, existing for many centuries, has introduced and sanctioned the rule that treaties, existing antecedently to the commencement of war, promising certain succours or exclusive privileges to one belligerent, may be fulfilled without the auxiliary so assisting becoming a party in the contest, or being considered to have quitted the condition of Neutrality. Thus troops may be lent, levies allowed, and the sale of prizes permitted, to one belligerent, by special treaty made before the commencement of war, while the other belligerent finds himself excluded from these important privileges, without Neutrality being thereby infringed, or the latter belligerent, however grievously a sufferer, having the right to demand an equality of treatment. Treaties fraudulently made, such as those contracted before the breaking out of war, but made with a special view of injuring some one power, would justify this latter power in demanding that such treaties should be cancelled, or that the parties should be treated as open enemies; and extreme cases might occur in which a nation would be called upon to declare war, unless privileges stipulated to her antagonist were repealed. If, for instance, the Porte were to grant to Russia that Russian ships of war might, during hostilities, pass and repass the Dardanelles, while the ships of no other power should be admitted to this privilege, such a monstrous assistance to one belligerent at the expense of another might justify, and indeed demand, the obtaining by force, if remonstrance were ineffectual, an equality of treatment in so essential a particular. But no breach of Neutrality would be committed by the Porte acting in conformity with such a treaty; and the antagonist of Russia would have no right, according to the Law of Nations, to complain of the Porte, as long as it merely adhered to a treaty made before the commencement of the war. But in this, as in other applications of the same principle, if the purposes of a belligerent seeking justice be frustrated, or grievously counteracted, by the acts of a neutral, he has the right to demand that such conduct be discontinued, under the penalty of war being declared if it be persisted in ; and, this right existing, the belligerent will have to consider the policy of submitting to this partial assistance to his antagonist, or of declaring war, and drawing upon himself the whole of such an auxiliary's forces, taking the chance of the recompense which may accrue from prizes or conquests. The most frequent occasions on which such aid has Auxiliary troops. been afforded by a neutral to a belligerent have been by the sending auxiliary forces, stipulated by treaty made before the commencement of war. This practice is objectionable in many respects: it is directly at variance with the true basis of Neutrality, that of affording no succour to either belligerent; but it has now been established by the habitual and concurrent practice of States, and is at the present day an undisputed principle of the European Law of Nations. Vattel. The opinion of all the leading authorities coincides Opinion of with the uniform practice of States, in establishing this principle of the Law of Nations. Vattel has some excellent remarks on this subject. He says that a defensive alliance, which engages an auxiliary to act with his whole forces, makes this contracting party the enemy of the State against which he acts. "But if a defensive alliance has not been made against me in particular, nor concluded at the time when I was openly preparing for war, or had already begun it, and if the allies have M. Q |