was proposed as a guide in political action. Accordingly, while such rapid advances were made in many branches of literature, no progress can be recorded in the science of International Law.

Suarez, who lived from 1538 to 1617, is the first Suarez. author whose works on this subject have obtained any notoriety, although not the first writer that gave some attention to such inquiries. Sir James Mackintosh, in his History of the Progress of Ethical Philosophy, speaks of him as the writer who "first saw that international law was composed, not only of the simple principles of justice applied to the intercourse between states, but of those usages long observed in that intercourse by the European race, which have since been more exactly distinguished as the consuetudinary law acknowledged by the Christian nations of Europe and America." But Suarez himself speaks of this distinction as already recognised by previous writers: "Neque ab hâc sententiâ dissentiunt Juristæ, qui jus gentium distinguunt in primarium et secundarium, et prius dicunt in jure naturali, posterius vero esse positivum humanum." (1) And this position he supports by references to writers by whom this distinction had been made. Previous authors had therefore existed, whose writings are now unknown; while Suarez, in the luck of fame, bears usually the reputation of being the originator of the correct method of studying international law. His work is entitled De Legibus ac Deo Legislatore, and it treats of the formation of laws and the nature of moral obligation. But notwithstanding the astonishing learning which his pages evince, Suarez is not now worth consulting, unless from curiosity; and curious his Treatise certainly is, from the vast reading which it displays in its author; reading so profound that we

(1) Suarez, De Legibus ac Deo Legislatore, lib. II. c. xix. s. 4.

cannot help respecting it, although its results are now useless; the questions discussed by Suarez having since been much more satisfactorily debated under the improved philosophy of later times. But this must not produce an ungrateful forgetfulness of how valuable, for his age, the labours of Suarez really were. His works were published at Venice, in twenty-three volumes folio, between 1741 and 1745, and his reputation at the present day seems influenced by the bulkiness of his productions, which prevents his being usually read, and prevents his being totally forgotten.

Next to Suarez comes Albericus Gentilis, who lived during the last half of the sixteenth century. (1) His father was an Italian physician, who embraced Protestantism, and sent Albericus to England, where he became professor of civil law at Oxford, about 1582. He was patronised by the celebrated Earl of Essex, to whom his Treatise De Jure Belli is dedicated. In this treatise Gentilis considers the right of making war, and the conduct to be observed during war regarding prisoners, hostages, and other similar questions. His work, although now completely superseded, must have been interesting to men of the age in which it was published; especially as, according to the declaration of Gentilis, his was the first treatise of the sort in existence. Besides the treatise De Jure Belli, Albericus Gentilis wrote a work, entitled Hispanica Advocationis libri duo, a posthumous publication, edited by his brother; who informs us, that this was the only essay, among several manuscripts on jurisprudence, which Albericus would allow to be published. On the occasion of James I. remaining neutral during the war

(1) According to Ompteda from 1551 to 1611, Litteratur, I. 168.*

[* See the valuable lecture on Gentilis by Professor Holland, delivered at All Souls College, Nov. 7, 1874 (Macmillan).-ED.]

between the king of Spain and the Low Countries, a great number of cases, in which Spanish interests were concerned, came before the courts of this country, and Albericus Gentilis was appointed, by the Spanish ambassador, official advocate in such causes in behalf of the Spaniards; and hence the title of his work, which was, I believe, first printed in 1613. His discussions on different topics of prize-law are valuable to the student, even at the present day. The study of the Roman law sharpened his judgment for all questions where rights were involved; and, although not dependent on any systematic knowledge of international law, the decisions of Gentilis usually correspond with those of more recent times. His opinions on contraband of war, on captures in a neutral territory, on prizes made after the conclusion of peace, and on the goods of enemies laden in the ships of neutrals, have obtained the sanction of our courts of admiralty in almost every particular. And this is saying a great deal for Albericus Gentilis, for it is no slight merit for the first writer on a new subject to have judgment and penetration sufficient to carry him at once to correct conclusions.

Any of my readers who may have traced the history Grotius. of any science, or of any discovery, must have remarked how difficult it is to allow to any person the full merit of originality. Vague germs of the ideas which we find perfected and adapted to action are discernible in the writings of preceding authors, and these again have still further predecessors in the same train, so that the earliest notions discoverable strike us as probably not original in themselves, but only as the earliest that occur to our research. It is so with the celebrated treatise of Grotius. But such undefined surmises after truth hardly impair the originality of a great writer; and although we may be able to trace the influence of remote associations, yet enough of the creative power of

His adaptation to his times.

genius still remains for our admiration; and the assistance which such vague suggestions can afford is so slight, that though they affect the fact, they leave untouched the merit, of originality. Such merit belongs, I think, to Grotius, who, if I may be allowed the illustration, gained no more from the writings of preceding authors than our own greatest dramatist did from the old tales which formed the basis of his plots. The works of Gentilis, by which Grotius allowed that he profited, may have afforded him a few examples, but could never have suggested his system, and are remote from the scope of his purpose. Other writers are mentioned by Grotius as having written on the rights of war, as Victoria, Henry of Gorcum, Matthæus, Johannes Lupus, Franciscus Arias, Johannes de Lignano, Martinus Laudensis, and Balthazar Ayala. Of whom Grotius reports, that "hi omnes de uberrimo argumento paucissima dixerunt," observing no system, and blending divine, civil, and canon law, in indiscriminate confusion.

To Grotius then is due, I think, the merit which is usually accorded to him, of having been the originator of that which, unaided, he permanently established as a science in Europe. He had the happiness of being exactly adapted to the times in which he lived, for had he lived much earlier he would have found Europe unfitted for the reception of his doctrines; and his times required a mind like that of Grotius, the new relations of the European powers needing reference to settled principles for their guidance. What I mean will be obvious to those who are acquainted with the discussions on international questions in the reigns of Elizabeth and James I., where they will find positions laid down that are sometimes correct, sometimes erroneous; but where it is obvious that in all cases a customary law was nearly all that was thought of by the states

course.

men of those times, no settled principles existing whereby to test those customs, or to serve for guidance where precedent failed.* The wars, too, consequent upon the Reformation, which were fully as much political as religious, developed those new relations of the Christian powers, of which some rude traces are observable in the rivalries of Charles V. and his contemporary monarchs, and in the jealousy of her neighbours shewn by Elizabeth; but which now began to assume their present aspect of a system of which the various European powers are components, demanding an ascertained precision in those national rights and duties made of more frequent controversy by this nearer interThat this estimate of Grotius is not exaggerated may be shewn from the value which was placed upon his works by his contemporaries. It was regarded by princes and ministers as of first-rate importance, especially by Gustavus Adolphus and by Oxenstiern; and it attracted the attention of the most eminent men of letters in all countries. So great was the notice. taken of the work, that within fifty years from the death of its author an edition was published with variorum notes, in the manner of the ancient classics, an attention never before shewn to any modern production. Ompteda gives an account of forty-five different editions of the work published before 1759, (1) and of these twenty-three appeared in the half century after the first publication of the work in 1625. And the Elector Palatine, moved by the consideration of this treatise, deemed the study so important that he caused public lectures to be delivered on the subject at Heidelberg,

(1) Litteratur des Völker-Rechts, II. 392.

[* See chap. xvii. of Mr. Ward's Enquiry into the Foundation and History of the Law of Nations in Europe, on the history of the Law from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century; also the Debate on Naturalization in the House of Commons in the 4th year of James I.'s reign. (Parliamentary History of England, vol. i.)-ED.]