Mr. POFF. The general perjury statute, which is section 1621 of title 18, United States Code, reads as follows:

"This section is applicable whether the statement or subscription is made within or without the United States."

That language was specifically added to the old statute by the Congress in 1964. The law which is proposed in this title is identical in that respect to what the law is today, and there is the same justification for it in this title as there is in the law today.

If the witness cannot suggest any potential harm, I don't see that the point is well taken.

Mr. BELLOWS. I don't see any substantial harm.

Mr. POFF. Thank you.

Mr. BELLOWS. To the point of conduct outside of the United States, I see no harm, really, in this.

Mr. POFF. One of your objections to title VII was that the bill would force the court to return to the pre-Alderman situation, in which the court would have to screen evidence on an ad-hoc basis each time a challenge to its legality was made.

Is your concern there that the work load on the court would be unmanageable? What is precisely your fear about returning to the pre-Alderman situation?

Mr. BELLOWS. I think counsel is in a better position than the court to determine whether or not it is relevant to the problem involved. And the court won't be. It ought to be up to counsel to determine whether or not the logs, for instance, of wiretapping should be turned over to him and for him to examine them to determine whether there is relevant material.

Mr. POFF. Then you feel that the Alderman decision made a meritorious procedural change in the process?

Mr. BELLOWs. I think so.

Mr. POFF. The Alderman decision, you feel, then, was based on a constitutional command and not the supervisory power of the court? Mr. BELLOWS. It may be both.

Mr. POFF. I believe, Mr. Chairman, that I have several more questions. But just because the mind can absorb no more than the seat can endure, I will abstain.

Mr. RODINO (presiding). Thank you.

Mr. Zelenko?

Mr. ZELENKO. I have only two questions.

With respect to the provisions circumscribing availability of bail on appeal of civil contempt, if the provisions of S. 30 denied bail on appeal outright, would there be any constitutional problems with such a provision?

Mr. BELLOWS. I think there might be a constitutional question.

Mr. ZELENKO. The language of the bill which denies bail, unless there is a "substantial possibility of reversal," it has been suggested has the practical effect that I have described. Thus it raises the constitutional issue.

Mr. BELLOWS. The practical effect would be to deny bail on appeal. Mr. ZELENKO. There are many questions that I would like to pose. But because the hour is late, I would like to ask a question with respect to the provisions of S. 30 which override Alderman to which you have addressed yourself.

In defense of these provisions that would overturn the constitutional rule, if you will, of Alderman, it is said that the disclosure of Government logs may be injurious to third parties or may compromise the identity of Government informants. The danger of Alderman, its critics urge, is that the Government will be precluded from prosecuting criminals who may have stumbled innocently into wiretap situations.

The case is given of an individual who may call an embassy that is under surveillance and be a party to a wiretap as a consequence. The disclosure of such information to the accused in a trial might jeopardize the security of the information of the Government. The Government would be forced not to prosecute for fear of divulging or disclosing those logs.

How do you respond to that argument?

Mr. BELLOWs. That is the horrendous case that is used.

First of all, I can't imagine Mr. Marcello being in the Russian Embassy or Mr. Accardo being a guest there. So it isn't very likely to

occur.

First of all, the Government started this by their wiretapping and their unconstitutional conduct. There ought to be-and I am sure there is a way of preventing disclosure; for instance, where it might affect citizens who have been overheard. I think some of that occurred in New Jersey, where wiretapping of a great deal of material came to light and there was disclosure.

There could be an order of the court preventing, perhaps, the right to hold for contempt one who disclosed, or making it a crime to disclose, that information.

Of course, I can understand the Government's point of view, that if counsel relates it to his client, it will pour out and go out to other agencies.

Mr. ZELENKO. I neglected to give the correct hypothetical. You suggest the Government's wiretapping is illegal. Of course, the kind of wiretapping I have described under provisions of the Federal law now would not be illegal. So probably that problem would not arise.

Mr. BELLOWS. The point is, if there was illegal wiretapping, the lawyer ought to be in a position to examine and determine whether or not there was an illegal entry, illegal wiretap.

Mr. ZELENKO. Mr. Bellows, you have talked just briefly about the title that deals with racketeering infiltration of legitimate business. There is no time interval specified in the definition of a "racketeering activity."

Could you just briefly describe the problem that the language raises in that respect?

"Racketeering activity," I think, is defined as "two convictions," but there is no time interval.

Mr. BELLOWs. That is a bad feature.

Mr. ZELENKO. Why?

Mr. BELLOWS. Because one of them could have taken place 25 years ago, with nothing intervening until just recently. Then he is called a "racketeer."

Mr. POFF. But, Mr. Bellows, you made that point earlier in direct testimony, and you are exactly right. However, you neglect to call attention to the further requirement of the bill that, having shown the two convictions, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish that the defendant would be dangerous if earlier released.

49-937-70-30

Mr. BELLOWS. How would you show that? When would you show it? To whom would you show it?

Mr. POFF. You would show it during the presentencing hearing, I would suggest.

Mr. BELLOWS. You are required to make that disclosure to the judge before the trial?

Mr. POFF. Yes, you are required to make a disclosure that the prosecution will seek a presentence hearing. If he is successful in showing dangerousness, then the court would be empowered in the case hypothecated by counsel to impose the extended sentence, but only if the court finds dangerousness.

Mr. BELLOWS. Again, according to this statute, there are no guidelines and the standards are very loose. Again, the court gets all of this information even before trial, and it makes it difficult to get a fair trial even from the best judge, when he is given a sheet with all of the things that the Government has been able to find or hear about the defendant. It makes it very difficult to try.

Mr. ZELENKO. I was directing that question, however, to the title of the bill that deals with racketeering infiltration of legitimate business, title IX, not title X. The definition there of "racketeering activity" has not time interval. And one of the two acts necessary to support that definition could have occurred long before in the past. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BELLOWS. There has been a recommendation to change that by the council.

Mr. POFF. "By the council," did you say?

Mr. BELLOWS. By the criminal law section of the American Bar Association.

Mr. POLK. Mr. Chairman, I have one last question of the witness. Yesterday I asked this same question of a witness. And because of your expertise in the criminal law, I would like to ask you the same question. It refers again to title III concerning "recalcitrant witnesses," and to the question of bail.

Take a hypothetical case where a defendant has been sentenced to 20 years, and after 5 years have passed the Supreme Court hands down a new decision, which the defendant feels may affect the legitimacy of his incarceration. He seeks relief by way of habeas corpus. The district judge denies that relief.

What is the standard for determining whether the incarcerated defendant may be entitled to bail at that point when he is appealing the denial of habeas corpus relief? Is it simply whether the appeal is frivolous or not? Or is it some much higher standard?

Mr. BELLOWS. He is already in the penitentiary?

Mr. POLK. Yes, he is.

Mr. BELLOWS. Then that makes a difference.

Mr. POLK. It does?

Mr. BELLOWs. I think it does. The courts are loath to release a man who is already in the penitentiary serving a sentence and litigation is going on to determine whether he is in there rightfully or wrongfully. Once he is in there and he has been there for some time, I don't know of any case where the courts have released a man under those conditions.

Mr. POFF. Will counsel yield?

Mr. POLK. Yes, I will.

Mr. POFF. I understand the significance of your question. In both the civil contempt situation and the habeas corpus situation there are strong reasons for holding the man until a court finds his incarceration invalid, reasons much stronger than in the general appellate situation. In both of these situations, release would generally be clearly unreasonable.

For that reason, you would expect that the same burden attached to the question of bail in the one case, where the man is imprisoned because he has been convicted and sentenced, as in the other case where the man is imprisoned because he has been in contempt of the court and the court is in the process of coercing testimony.

It seems a pretty deadly parallel to me.

Mr. POLK. I wished to clarify the record because the witness yesterday responded that the standard would be whether the appeal were frivolous, which, if so, would seem to be a tremendous loophole in the criminal law.

Mr. POFF. His comment was irrelevant-and I say that with no disrespect to the witness' testimony yesterday-because he was addressing himself to rule 46 in a situation which has nothing to do with rule 46.

Mr. RODINO. Thank you very much, Mr. Bellows. We appreciate your patience, and you have certainly been a very helpful witness.

The next witness is Mrs. Selma Samols, on behalf of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.

STATEMENT OF MRS. SELMA W. SAMOLS, ESQ., ON BEHALF OF THE WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM

Mrs. SAMOLS. I am Selma Samols, and I represent the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.

The league has already submitted a statement. I don't think I care to follow the statement word for word.

Mr. RODINO. We will be happy to include the statement in the record. (The statement referred to follows:)

STATEMENT OF SELMA W. SAMOLS, ESQ., ON BEHALF OF WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM

My name is Selma Samols, and I am of Silver Spring, Maryland. I am testifying in behalf of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, an organization founded fifty-five years ago by Jane Addams. Because we are concerned with the inimical ramifications of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1969 (S. 30), we requested permission to voice our opposition to it. We thank the Committee for the opportunity to express our views.

We know that organized crime menaces our society and our way of life; it robs both the poor and the rich; it flaunts our ethics and standards; it makes drug addicts of our young, and encourages the poor to gamble away their limited funds in the vain hope of "hitting the jackpot." It exercises control over various sports, dominates some trade unions, and by manipulating loans to business, infiltrates the business community.

There is no question that organized crime must be legally controlled. However, examination of S. 30 shows that only two of the eleven titles are directed toward organized crime. Title VIII is concerned with syndicated gambling and Title IX is directed toward the infiltration into business by organized crime. The balance of the bill in sharply repressive measures is directed against individuals who may

or may not be involved in any of the activities of organized crime. These invidious parts of the bill would be applied to individuals, and the poor, the black, and the underprivileged will suffer most from the application of the bill's repressive measures. Furthermore, S. 30 would destroy our basic protections guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States.

Title I of the Bill, which is concerned with the convening of grand juries, pro vides for extending the term of these juries, and gives them very broad investiga tive powers, including the power to issue reports against public officers or em ployees. Yet the reports provided for by Title I need not be based upon evidence sufficient to constitute a crime. The official or employee, who may lose his job and reputation, is not given the right granted every accused, to confront and cross examine his accusers and the witnesses against him. We can envision the use of such special grand jury investigation for political purposes. These grand jury proceedings are secret. They can be compared to the Star Chamber proceedings of Great Britain and to the proceedings of the former House Committee on Un-American Activities, now the House Committee on Internal Security. W€ also feel that expansion of the powers of the special grand juries would be an invasion of the province of the legislative and executive branches of government. Title II deals with the immunity of witnesses who appear before the grand juries. Under this Title, a witness who refuses to testify because his testimony may incriminate him may be compelled to waive the privilege. The accepted concept of the application of the Fifth Amendment is negated. He may leave himself open to a charge of perjury. He may be considered "recalcitrant," under Title III. if he refuses an order to testify, and could be incarcerated not only for the term of the grand jury but for any extensions thereof, and denied bail. Jail without bail is inimical to democratic principles. Such a provision can result in the incarceration of large numbers of persons whose consciences and ethics forbid them to disclose the information sought by the grand jury.

Title VII of S. 30 is a direct attack on the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, which prohibits illegal searches and seizures. It tears away at the constitutional right of a man to be immune in his own home from illegal searches and seizures. It negates a long line of important Supreme Court decisions which have helped make the people feel secure in their homes and in the belief that they are entitled to the protections guaranteed them by the Fourth Amendment. Chipping away at this vital right to be secure in one's home would have a denigrating effect upon our society. It would encourage government informers, would encourage people to inform on their friends and neighbors, would encourage crank activity, and it sets no standards for the protection of the individual. Furthermore, Title VII encourages wiretapping, because it provides that the accused be denied the right to obtain a transcript of any illegal electronic surveillance. The accused may contest only evidence which was the result of illegal police activities occurring more than five years prior to the alleged crime. For these reasons, the WILPF considers Title VII to be a threat to constitutional rights, and thus very dangerous.

Title X, "Dangerous Special Offender Sentencing," is the most vicious part of this bill. It provides that, upon a court's determination that a convicted and sentenced felon is a dangerous special offender, he may be imprisoned for an additional thirty years. The court in making such a determination would not be limited by the rules of evidence as used during the trial of an alleged crime, but may base its judgment on hearsay and illegally obtained evidence.

In addition, Title X allows the government to appeal a determination by the Court. This is in violation of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. Again, Title X allows the additional thirty year sentence to be imposed upon persons not considered "dangerous special offenders" but who have been convicted of a conspiracy involving three or more persons. This is most dangerous, because in our present climate even dissenters may spend over thirty years in prison for exercising their First Amendment rights.

It is our opinion that this bill is very dangerous, that it will take years of litigation before the constitutionality of any of it can be decided, and in those years the poor, the illiterate and the disadvantaged will suffer. The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom is urging that this bill fail in committee.

Mrs. SAMOLS. But the league is opposed to this legislation for many

reasons.