weeks. The Bureau must also be accorded administrative flexibility to establish and revise efficient forms and procedures. (State legislatures will need time to enact legislation authorizing state participation in the repository and establishing admissibility in state courts, and federal and state courts and agencies will need some time to develop procedures for processing information handled by the repository.) This new development in computerization now leads me to urge that the Committee amend this section to authorize the Attorney General to make regulations concerning forms and procedures, leave the language of the section itself in terms of a general authorization, and give the Department of Justice discretion to establish the repository at any time within a three-year period following enactment of the statute, rather than immediately.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, every one of the ten titles of this bill, which I have just described, has roots in measures jointly introduced in the Senate by Republicans as well as Democrats. Once those original bills had been introduced, the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures, which I am privileged to chair, held comprehensive and detailed hearings on the measures. We solicited and received written views and recommendations from law professors in the respective fields. The Subcommittee and its staff devoted a great deal of study to those comments. We examined two decades of proposals made by such distinguished bodies as the President's Crime Commission, the American Bar Association, the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, the American Law Institute, the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Law, and many others. Indeed, I think I can say that we have considered virtually every major organized crime proposal made in the past 20 years, and have incorporated in this measure many of those that were found to be important, valid, and constitutional.

I add, too, that the Subcommittee held a series of executive sessions to consider this material. It made numerous perfecting amendments in the bill before reporting it favorably to the full Judiciary Committee, from which it was then reported to the Senate. On the Senate floor, the bill was thoroughly debated. Several amendments were offered and considered. It is quite significant, I think, that only one Senator voted against its passage. The votes on the amendments, like the vote on final passage, were bipartisan.

Mr. Chairman, I believe it is the exhaustive study and consideration which this bill received in Committee on the Senate side that permitted it to command the bipartisan and nearly unanimous support of the Senate. We made full use of the opportunity for study, analysis, redrafting, and further redrafting, to produce in every title of the bill an appropriate accommodation between the interest of society in controlling crime and the rights of every individual to a fair procedure and just laws. Often, we found it was possible to design a provision in such a way that the particular procedure in question infringed no substantial interest of any individual simply by using careful definitions and including full procedural guarantees. Where that was possible, we did so. In other cases, we found that due enforcement of the laws necessarily placed a burden or a risk on some individual interests. Where that was the case, we assiduously drafted and redrafted the provisions to minimize the impact upon individual interests and to balance them appropriately with the interests of society, scrupulously avoiding all conflicts with constitutional guarantees, and often giving individual defendants and others more rights than the minimum required by the Constitution.

The degree of success we have achieved in developing provisions which combine effectiveness with fairness is indicated by some of the endorsements those provisions have received. Title I's authorization of special grand jury reports criticizing identified local officials, for example, has been approved by the National Association of Counties and the International Association of Chiefs of Police. Although some of their members are potential subjects of such reports, those associations are responsible, highly-regarded exponents of effective action against crime and corruption. They have recognized title I as a balanced, fair proposal, and have strongly endorsed it.

S. 30 promises to strengthen the protection of society from the ravages of organized crime, while at the same time making secure the constitutional ights and legitimate interests of the accused. Its reconciliation of the com

peting interests of society and individuals has been informed and guided by an approach to criminal justice well-expressed by Dean Roscoe Pound when he wrote:

"Civilized society presupposes peace and good order, security of social institutions, security of the general morals, and conservation and intelligent use of social resources. But it demands no less that free individual initiative which is the basis of economic progress, that freedom of criticism without which political progress is impossible, and that free mental activity which is a prerequisite of cultural progress. Above all it demands that the individual be able to live a moral and social life as a human being. These claims, which may be put broadly as a social interest in the individual life, continually trench upon the interest in the security of social institutions, and often, in appearance at least, run counter to the paramount interest in the general security. Compromise of such claims for the purpose of securing as much as we may is peculiarly difficult. [Nevertheless, ]... in criminal law, as everywhere in law, the problem is one of compromise; of balancing conflicting interests and of securing as much as may be with the least sacrifice of other interests."

We must not, however, in Pound's terms, indulge in an "excessive solicitude" for defendants, nor should we erect "technical obstacles" to a realistic and fair accommodation of society's need for protection and the rights of individuals. S. 30 is, I suggest, neither excessively solicitous of those accused, nor does it accord too much weight to the interests of society. It is, in short, what is needed by all: a fair balance. I hope and believe that upon this Committee's careful examination of S. 30, you will agree that it is an effective treatment of this difficult problem, ensuring equal protections and justice both for society and for the individual citizen.

Mr. Chairman, I urge that you give S. 30 expeditious and favorable consideration. I believe that this Nation is feeling what can only be described as "a tremor of righteous indignation." Peaceful, law-abiding citizens are becoming incensed at the prevalence of professionalized and organized lawlessness. They are demanding, as last week's Gallup Poll showed again, that the government give efforts to reduce crime priority over all other domestic programs.

Mr. Chairman, the public is demanding that we recognize that the right of society to be safe transcends the right of the criminal to be free. The public is aware that existing federal law lacks a number of necessary tools for dealing with the crime syndicate, but it believes those tools can be provided within the framework of the Constitution. Only by processing this bill to final enactment this year can the Congress meet its responsibility and truly respond to the urgent demand for wise and courageous action to rescue our society from the sickness and peril that organized crime has inflicted upon it.

Thank you.

[A Reader's Digest reprint]

WEAK LINK IN OUR WAR ON THE MAFIA

Time and again, dedicated investigative work has been all but nullified by the lenient sentences meted out to notorious syndicate criminals.

(By Sen. John L. McClellan)1

In the last decade, the nation's law-enforcement agencies have mounted an increasingly vigorous assault against the estimated 5000 Mafia members who dominate organized crime in America. Yet, despite some significant successes in prosecution, President Nixon told Congress last April that we "have not substantially impeded the growth and power of organized criminal syndicates. Not a single one of the 24 Cosa Nostra families has been destroyed. They are more firmly entrenched than ever before."

This disheartening failure is due in significant part to shocking judicial leniency in sentencing convicted mafiosi. Consider these instances:

1 As Chairman of both the Government Operations Committee and the Criminal Laws and Procedures Subcommittee, Senator John L. McClellan (D., Arkansas) has won bipartisan respect for his penetrating investigations into labor racketeering and organized crime. He presided over the televised 1963 hearing at which Mafia defector Valachi first publicly revealed the inner workings of what he called "this second government," known to its members as La Cosa Nostra.

In Chicago, Internal Revenue Service agents for two years dogged gambling kingpin Rocco Potenzo, right-hand man of local Mafia boss Sam "Momo" Giancana. They suspected him of secretly operating several honky-tonks under false licensing arrangements. Through persistent investigation, they were eventually able to prove that Potenzo feloniously operated without federal liquor licenses, under the names of "front" men. One of the small fry whose name Potenzo fraudulently used got a three-year sentence. Potenzo himself, convicted before another judge on five counts and facing up to 15 years and a $10,000 fine, got only a $1000 fine-and no jail term. As Potenzo's lawyer rose to enter the usual appeal, Potenzo grabbed his arm. "Sit down, you -!" he snapped, and

marched grinning to the clerk to peel off his fine from a crisp bankroll.

In Pennsylvania, Mafia corrupter Walter Joseph Plopi plunked $300 on the desk of a state senator to persuade him to influence a newly elected Allegheny County prosecutor to ignore gambling. As a starter, Plopi promised $2000 a month to the prosecutor to allow his McKeesport numbers racket to continue, and $200,000 a year, a 50-50 share of all future profits, and money for any political compaigns "if you really want to play ball on a county-wide basis." State police, hidden by prearrangement with a tape recorder running, stepped forward and seized Plopi's $300 as evidence. For this flagrant attempt at corruption, Plopi could have received a year in jail. Yet the judge ordered a mere $250 fine, and Plopi, handed back the $300 seized as evidence, walked out of court $50 richer than when he entered.

In California, Jimmy "The Weasel" Fratianna, released after a five-year prison term for extortion, turned up with a Mafia-financed fleet of trucks hauling dirt on a federal interstate-highway project. Could the "West Coast executioner for the Mafia" (so labeled in a California legislative report), officially credited by police intelligence with at least 16 gangland killings, suddenly “go legit"? Investigators soon found out: Fratianno, over a period of months, had swindled his drivers of $24,374 by paying them substandard wages while collecting federal highway funds for the prevailing union scale. On July 28, 1968, the U.S. Attorney won a conviction on 16 counts of conspiracy and filing false statements. But Fratianno, instead of a possible 80 years in prison, got a mere $10,000 fine and three years' probation.

GALLING EXPERIENCE

Since 1960, the Justice Department has convicted 129 identified Cosa Nostra members under statutes giving judges discretion in sentencing. A study by our Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures shows that most of the offenders got only about half the maximum sentence. Fifteen received no jail term whatsoever, only fines or probation, and 85 got less than the maximum jail terms for the crimes for which they were convicted. Such lenient sentencing has so crippled the war on organized crime that the National Crime Commission in 1967 concluded: "There must be some kind of supervision over those trial judges who, because of corruption, political considerations or lack of knowledge, tend to mete out light sentences in cases involving organized-crime management personnel.' I know from galling experience what it is to assault entrenched criminal syndicates only to see years of dedicated investigation nullified. One of the worst gangsters we uncovered in my years as chairman of the Senate labor-rackets investigations was Anthony Corallo. A captain in one of New York's five Mafia "families," Corallo won his nickname of "Tony Ducks" because he always managed to duck the law. (Exception: a 1941 narcotics conviction that got him six months.) Our hearing record showed how Corallo helped Jimmy Hoffa gain control of New York City's 140.000 Teamsters by bringing in 40 hoodlums-with records of 178 arrests and 77 convictions for crimes ranging from extortion to murder-to intimidate the rank-and-file membership.

By 1962, Corallo was convicted under a federal anti-racketeering statute: he had conspired to pay a $35,000 bribe to a New York judge and a U.S. Attorney to "fix" a friend's sentence for a $100,000 bankruptcy fraud. Yet when Corallo's sentence was handed down, he drew-despite his public record as a vicious racke teer-only two years, instead of the maximum five-year prison term. (Of the two years, he actually served 18 months.) In 1968, federal investigators publicly stated, Corallo and his gangster associates were once again controlling at least seven of the 56 Teamster locals in the New York area, forcing millions of consumers to pay hidden tribute.

In June 1968, Corallo stood before the same judge, again convicted under the same federal anti-racketerring statute. This time, by loansharking a financially

pressed New York City water commissioner, he had been able to arrange and share a $40,000 kickback on a city contract. Nevertheless, although he specifically recalled the 1962 sentence he had given Corallo, the judge gave Corallo only three years, instead of the maximum five-year sentence. Is there any doubt that Corallo's gangland flunkies will keep his criminal empire running while he takes his short leave of absence and returns soon to the very same stand?

THE WORST CONDONED

Tragically, this is far from an isolated case:

Louis Taglianetti, a "soldier" in the Patriarca crime family which dominates New England, was convicted of income-tax evasion, for which he could have got five years. Since Taglianetti's Mafia record was exposed at our 1963 Senate hearings, the judge could hardly have been unaware that he was dealing with a significant organized-crime figure. FBI electronic-surveillance logs, later placed on the public record, confirmed that the organization to which Taglianetti belonged dealt constantly in murder, extortion, kidnaping, bribing state police and judges, fraud, perjury, loansharking, gambling and labor racketeering. Yet the judge gave Taglianetti seven months. Ironically, for the ordinary citizen Convicted that same year of tax evasion, the average sentence was ten months in jail.

John Lombardozzi, brother of a captain in New York's Gambino Mafia family, pleaded guilty to bankruptcy fraud and conspiracy to smuggle funds into a federal jail. The bankruptcy scheme defrauded creditors of a Brooklyn jewelry store of some $20,000. For that, Lombardozzi got a two-year suspended sentence and five years probation-not one day in jail. For the smuggling conviction, a possible ten-year rap, he got probation, too. Convicted with three other mafiosi of assaulting an FBI agent whose skull they fractured, Lombardozzi went to jail for 16 months. In the theft of more than a million dollars' worth of securities from a Wall Street broker, he got four years' imprisonment. Altogether, on his four separate felony convictions, which could have got him 28 years, Lombardozzi drew just over five.

Jerry Angiulo, underboss in the Patriarca family and controller of Boston's criminal syndicate, was publicly charted in our 1963 hearings as New England's No. 2 thug, involved in gambling, shylocking, burglary, robbery and larceny. In 1966, he was convicted for assaulting a federal officer. FBI agents, electronically monitoring boss Patriarca's headquarters, recorded how Angiulo discussed his pending prosecution in detail, plotting to defeat it by procuring a blind man to perjure himself and establish an alibi, then getting a second "standup" witness to lie that he, too, saw the phantom encounter. Yet, instead of the possible three years, Angiulo got only 30 days in jail.

In 1966, after four years of effort, the FBI unraveled a complicated transaction and made an airtight case against Joey Glimco, one of the worst labor pirates ever uncovered by our Senate labor-rackets investigations. Glimco rules Chicago's Teamster Local 777, embracing 5000 taxi drivers and miscellaneous maintenance workers. Crony of Chicago's top mobsters, Glimco had a record of 36 arrests on charges including robbery and murder.

As payoffs for a bogus contract that protected a businessman from the organizing efforts of legitimate unions, Glimco had taken gifts ranging from a home sprinkler system to a sporty Jaguar. The investigation and prosecution Cost the government well over $200,000, and resulted in a four-count indictment that could have got Glimco a year in jail on each count. Yet, in February 1969, he was allowed to plead guilty, pay a $40,000 fine and return to his union piracy. "It was the finest piece of investigative work I have ever seen," the young prosecutor, Assistant U.S. Attorney David Shippers, said. "When Glimco got a kiss and went free, it was devastating to us all."

HEARTENING EXCEPTIONS

Today the occasional defector like Joe Valachi, plus the FBI electronic-surveillance logs, has ripped the veil of secrecy from the Mafia's innermost workings. There can be little excuse any longer for ignorance about its nature. Hearteningly, some judges are dealing toughly with the Mafia criminals:

Judge Walter R. Mansfield, last December in New York, gave key Mafia monarch Anthony DiLorenzo the ten-year maximum on a conviction in a conpiracy to transport interstate more than a million dollars' worth of stolen

IBM stock. Judge Julius J. Hoffman, in Chicago, sent Sam "Teetz" Battaglia anointed heir to the Chicago syndicate throne, and his top lieutenant, "Joe Shine" Amabile, to prison with 15-year sentences on an extortion conviction in 1967. Citing testimony that witnesses had been threatened with being "beat into jelly with baseball bats" and had to be kept in jail during the trial for their own safety, Judge Hoffman denied the usual appeal bond as soon as the jury's guilty verdict was in, and locked the defendants up without further ado.

Such judicial toughness, if continued, could in time begin to hurt the crime confederation. But even the toughest judges can hardly do the full job needed under present statutory sentencing limits. Despite long records of criminal activity, two thirds of the 328 mafiosi indicted by the federal government since 1960 have faced maximums of five years or less-hardly sufficient even to seriously inconvenience their continuing criminal organizations.

The National Crime Commission proposes two major reforms in sentencing organized-crime offenders:

1. Congress and the state legislatures should provide for special sentences for hardened professionals and criminal repeaters. Our present criminal-justice system, fundamentally created to cope with random felons, has been outmoded by the rise of modern criminal cartels. The Mafia's top hoods have plotted their criminal syndicate to insulate the principals against prosecution for crimes that involve severe sentences. Today, however, the public welfare demands that our judges in fixing sentence must be allowed to consider not merely the isolated felony perpetrated but the surrounding fact of a permanent criminal organization.

The National Crime Commission would like to see special-length sentences where a pre-sentence hearing shows that a felony was "committed as part of a continuing illegal business in which the convinced offender occupied a supervisory or other management position." Similarly, the Model Sentencing Act. drawn up by a distinguished National Council on Crime and Delinquency advisory panel of 52 federal and state judges, recommends a 30-year term for professional criminals convicted of a felony "committed as part of a continuing criminal activity." Says the chairman, Chief Judge Alfred P. Murrah of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit: "Prolonged incarceration is necessary for certain individuals whose behavior patterns and personality make them highly dangerous to society."

2. Prosecutors should be allowed to appeal sentences that they deem too lenient or too short to protect the public from dangerous and habitual offenders. In some cases, undoubtedly, ignorance about the nature and scope of organized crime accounts for light sentences. But we cannot escape the fact that the Mafia has demonstrated that it can corrupt judges, too. A New York judge went to jail on a two-year sentence in 1962 along with "Tony Ducks" Corallo in his sentencefixing conviction. And New Jersey's Supreme Court was forced last December to suspend a trial judge who was charged with offering a prosecutor a $10,000 bribe to quash a case against two Mafia gambling figures.

With Senators Sam J. Ervin (D., N.C.), James B. Allen (D., Ala.) and Roman L. Hruska (R., Neb.), I am co-sponsoring the pending Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (S.30), which provides for both prosecutor appeals and special sentences for habitual offenders and members of organized criminal conspiracies. Under its provisions, the trial judge would, after a conviction, hold a presentence hearing at which the offender would have the right to call witnesses, crossexamine the government's witnesses and be informed of the substance of any information the judge might rely on. Upon finding that the offender has two prior felony convictions, or had committed a felony as part of a conspiracy with three or more others to engage in a pattern of criminal conduct, the judge could order a sentence up to 30 years.

RECORD OF TERROR

The record of four decades of Mafia murder, torture and terror is plain: We cannot really rehabilitate the hard-core members of organized criminal syndicates. Leniency has no place in dealing with them. An FBI study of 386 mafiosi shows that, at an average 47 years of age, they have had criminal careers involv ing an average eight arrests stretching over 20 years, studded by repeated convic tions and short prison terms. Society's only hope for real protection is prolonged imprisonment for such criminals.

This is, in fact, the cornerstone of the federal government's mounting campaign against organized crime. "Through large-scale target investigations," says Presi