Strategic Defense Initiative: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Ninety-ninth Congress, First Session, October 30; November 6, 21; December 3, 5, 1985U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986 - 425 lappuses |
No grāmatas satura
1.–5. rezultāts no 70.
14. lappuse
... tried to do is very briefly dis- cuss those parts of the SDI to which I have assigned priority . These are the elements which we will try to more fully support in the face of limited resources to accomplish our overall objectives . In a ...
... tried to do is very briefly dis- cuss those parts of the SDI to which I have assigned priority . These are the elements which we will try to more fully support in the face of limited resources to accomplish our overall objectives . In a ...
15. lappuse
... trying to initiate a discussion of the offense - defense relationship and stability in the defense and space talks under way in Geneva to lay the foundation to support such future possible consultations . It is our intention and our ...
... trying to initiate a discussion of the offense - defense relationship and stability in the defense and space talks under way in Geneva to lay the foundation to support such future possible consultations . It is our intention and our ...
17. lappuse
... trying to guide this program ? Dr. IKLE . Mr. Chairman , I am glad you give us an opportunity to address this question . It is often asked . The objective here is to pro- vide an open avenue for long - term development in the future ...
... trying to guide this program ? Dr. IKLE . Mr. Chairman , I am glad you give us an opportunity to address this question . It is often asked . The objective here is to pro- vide an open avenue for long - term development in the future ...
18. lappuse
... the President is in the context of reduc- tions in offensive forces which , of course , would immensely facili- tate the job that General Abrahamson and his team is trying to grapple with . And in that context , where we 18.
... the President is in the context of reduc- tions in offensive forces which , of course , would immensely facili- tate the job that General Abrahamson and his team is trying to grapple with . And in that context , where we 18.
35. lappuse
... trying to do is cast it in the Soviet mind as to whether they can accomplish their mission or not , and try to create a deter- rent , not just be absolute in battle itself . So the deterrent factor is a big one in casting doubt in the ...
... trying to do is cast it in the Soviet mind as to whether they can accomplish their mission or not , and try to create a deter- rent , not just be absolute in battle itself . So the deterrent factor is a big one in casting doubt in the ...
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Bieži izmantoti vārdi un frāzes
ABM systems ABM Treaty ABRAHAMSON administration Agreed Statement agreement allies Ambassador Smith areas arms control Article II(1 article III attack ballistic missiles battle management believe BUCHSBAUM capability Chairman committee defense system delegation deleted deploy deployment deterrence development and testing discussion effective EXON exotic systems fense future systems hearings ICBM IKLE interceptor issue Judge SOFAER kind laser launchers LIBRARY OF CONGRESS limited ment military missile defense mobile NATO negotiating record nuclear weapons offensive Parnas PERLE physical principles President problem prohibited question radars reliable restrictive interpretation RHINELANDER SALT II SDI Program SDI research SDIO Secretary Senator COHEN Senator EXON Senator HART Senator LEVIN Senator NUNN Senator QUAYLE Senator WARNER Senator WILSON sensors Soviet Union space-based specific Strategic Defense Initiative subcommittee systems and components systems or components talking targets technical Thank THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES things threat tion understand warheads
Populāri fragmenti
416. lappuse - Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars...
62. lappuse - AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE ENTIRE RISK AS TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS WITH YOU. SHOULD THE PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING, REPAIR OR CORRECTION.
164. lappuse - Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.
137. lappuse - In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles...
230. lappuse - The ABM Treaty prohibition on development, testing and deployment of space-based ABM systems, or components for such systems, applies to directed energy technology (or any other technology used for this purpose. ) Thus, when such directed energy programs enter the field testing phase they become constrained by these ABM Treaty obligations.
162. lappuse - Each Party undertakes not to develop, test or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time...
205. lappuse - our research program has been structured and, as the President has reaffirmed, will continue to be conducted in accordance with a restrictive interpretation of the treaty's obligations".
136. lappuse - Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory...
188. lappuse - ... missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons, Proceeding from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems...
263. lappuse - The Parties understand that Article IX of the Treaty includes the obligation of the US and the USSR not to provide to other States technical descriptions or blue prints specially worked out for the construction of ABM systems and their components limited by the Treaty.