forces, whether strategic or conventional, and all of us, I think, have much to learn about what the administration plans.

I think it is unfortunate that SDI polarized so much of the Congress and the country along political lines. It is unfortunate and unnecessary, and I hope that those of us who are neither pro-SDI nor opposed to SDI can continue to be heard. We await the technological evolution of this program as we have for many years, and we support the research that goes into it.

I think at this point those of us in that more or less neutral ground see no particular reason to polarize this question further. There are some serious questions arising because of the upcoming summit; our commitment, apparently continuing commitment to the basic elements of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and some confusion, I must say, on the part of those of us who are agnostic on this question about what the administration's policy is, where it feels the treaty drops the line between what is permissible and what is not, and any clarification on that question, Dr. Ikle, or others I think would be extremely helpful to many of us who I say are neither opponents nor proponents but continue to support ongoing research in this vast array of technologies.

And so I once again am pleased that the Senator from Virginia, Chairman Warner, has seen fit to continue to not only try to educate the committee, but also the American people on what could well be one of the most important, most dramatic areas of research and development that the military has undertaken in this century. And I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WARNER. I thank the Senator from Colorado.
Mr. Cohen.

Senator COHEN. Mr. Chairman, I just have a couple of comments to offer.

I tend to associate myself with the comments made by Senator Hart in terms of the members of this committee being at least somewhat neutral on the issue of how far we should go with the SDI Program. I think a different element has been introduced in the last few weeks, and that is the connection between the SDI Program and the restrictions of the ABM Treaty, and I think it is fair to say based upon my experience on this committee that the administration has at least been lukewarm, if not indeed opposed, to the ABM Treaty in the past.

Secretary Weinberger, for example, has come before the committee on a number of occasions indicating that the ABM Treaty has failed in its objective because it was predicated upon the belief that we would restrain the offensive buildup in nuclear systems when in fact we have seen a dramatic buildup on the Soviet side and indeed somewhat of a buildup on our own.

But recently, in the last couple of weeks, we have seen a new interpretation being given to the ABM Treaty, and it seems to me that that poses a number of problems for us. If we do not like the treaty or we find it incompatible with our interests, then we ought to go back and either amend the treaty or repeal the treaty. But what seems to have occurred is that we have come up with a new tactic, and that is a sort of revisionist theory of history. We do not like it, so we therefore go back and reinterpret it in order to accommodate whatever plans we have.

Now, I have looked at the Congressional Record on this, and I find it somewhat interesting that if the administration's new interpretation of the ABM Treaty is in fact true, then we have something tantamount to a revocation of the New Testament, as such, or the King James version of the New Testament. We have got a situation in which every Member who voted for the ABM Treaty apparently did so for the wrong reasons. Those who voted for it believed that it did indeed prohibit research or, rather, testing and development in the field of space systems. Those who voted against it, interestingly enough-Senator Buckley was one of the two, as I recall, Members of the Senate who voted against the ABM Treaty-did so for the following reasons. He said, "Thus the agreement goes so far as to prohibit the development, testing, or deployment of sea, air, or space-based ballistic missile defense systems.' So even Senator Buckley, who voted against it, voted against it because he believed it prohibited space based systems.

So we have got a wonderful situation in which those who voted for it did so for the wrong reason and those who voted against it did so for the wrong reason, and that to me is not a plausible interpretation of what has taken place.

And so I think that we have to not only look at what is possible; I agree with Chairman Goldwater, we can do about anything with our scientific capability. The question is should we, and under what circumstances should we engage in revisionist history.

Senator WARNER. A very interesting statement, Mr. Cohen.

Mr. Bingaman.

Excuse me, Mr. Nunn. I did not see you.

Senator NUNN. No, go right ahead.

Senator WARNER. Senator Bingaman.

Senator BINGAMAN. I have no initial statement. I am glad to hear the testimony, Mr. Chairman, and appreciate the chance to sit in on the subcommittee.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Wilson.

Senator WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will not delay the proceedings long.

My good friend from Maine, though, has triggered an interesting discussion. Probably we should have it later and not at the expense of the witnesses. But having just returned from what is admittedly my first trip to Geneva, and having engaged one of the Soviet negotiators there in a discussion of the interpretation of the ABM Treaty, I was particularly interested when the deputy of our section, our defense and space section, later confirmed the judgment of Judge Sofaer that the record shows very clearly that the Soviet negotiators time and again were pressed by the American negotiators on the ABM Treaty to agree to the kind of restrictions that has become the common understanding of what the treaty held, and time and again they rejected that.

In a statement, the record shows that they did reject it. So I think this is not revisionism, I think there is a very clear case that can be made, and I think it has been made, not only by Judge Sofaer but by others who were very much privy to the negotiations. And it is Ambassador Hank Cooper to whom I refer.

But I think that the hearings that the chairman has called are vitally necessary. I think this discussion indicates the need for the

hearings I think that what we want to be very clear about is that the United States is engaged in an effort to secure the kind of peace that is meaningful and that it does not engage in any kind of wishful thinking, either about what it can achieve technologically or about what it can achieve through the kind of impatience for agreement for which I think Americans are all too well known.

I think the fact that we have negotiated very little in the past year despite the pressure of SDI on the Soviets to come to some accommodation indicates how difficult that process is. I think the clearest lesson that we have had so far is the need for American patience, and American staying power. If we are to keep the incentive what it is at the present time until we have secured the kind of agreement that we are assured is verifiable, one that is worth a bargain, one that we can exact a cost for noncompliance from, we simply have to continue with the kind of program that is both permitted by law and permitted by resources. But I think the incumbent role of Congress is to see that we do not short those with the technological ability of the resources they require to do the job.

So with that, Mr. Chairman, I commend you for holding these hearings.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.

Mr. Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, just very briefly, I am delighted that you are holding these hearings. They are critically necessary at this time in our history. There has been a lot of confusion and division in the administration about the SDI Program, about the relationship of SDI to the ABM Treaty. Early after the announcement of the SDI system we were told by one party in the administration that SDI deployment, if it proved feasible, would be negotiable. Another party in the administration told us it would not be negotiable. We were then told recently that a new system such as SDI is not even covered by the ABM Treaty, a very stark departure from the prior representations of the SDI Office and this administration that they would comply with the ABM Treaty, and there was no suggestion in those earlier statements that new systems such as the SDI were not covered by the ABM Treaty.

So we have really had a flip-flop-flip on the question of the new systems being covered by the ABM Treaty. We do not even have agreement inside of the administration on the question of whether or not we are willing to negotiate clarifications in the gray areas in the ABM Treaty, some of the definitions that are not explicitly defined in the ABM Treaty. Part of the administration suggests there are gray areas that need to be negotiated. Other parts of the administration suggest that we will not negotiate any clarifications of the ABM Treaty.

So I think it is important to the public, to our negotiating position and to our allies that we get some clarifications as to where this administration is on the present status and future of SDI, both as it is unfolding technologically, but also as it relates to the ABM Treaty.

These hearings could not be more timely, and I commend the chairman for his willingness to hold them.

Senator WARNER. I thank the Senator from Michigan, and indeed, you were among those that petitioned for these hearings.

At the present time Mr. Hart and I plan five sessions, this being the first. We will have on November 6 a closed session with the same witnesses present today. Therefore, we will be quite understanding if the witnesses wish to defer their responses to any inquiries from the Members of the Senate until such time as the closed session if in their judgment the responses would be classified.

On November 12 we will cover the issue of Soviet strategic defenses. On the 19th and the 21st we have tentatively, following the summit, two sessions primarily for the purpose of hearing from persons who have views somewhat at variance with yours, and also to assess the impact of the summit on the future of the program. Senator NUNN. May I just make one brief comment, Mr. Chairman?

Senator WARNER. Yes.

Senator NUNN. I think these hearings are going to be very worthwhile and going to be very enlightening, and I congratulate you on the time schedule. I hope we can coordinate that with the hearings we are now setting on the reorganization matters. We have got 22 weeks of those, and I know there are many members of this subcommittee, and I am one of them, and you are and Senator Hart and others, that want to be present for as much of those hearings as we can. So perhaps we can coordinate that.

Senator WARNER. Yes; the schedule has been coordinated with the chief counsel, and the minority counsel, as far as I know. Senator NUNN. We will check on that.

Senator WARNER. Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend you for holding these hearings, and if there is no objection, I ask that my statement be placed in the record, and I have a few questions here. I will not be able to stay for the entire hearing.

I just want to commend you gentlemen for the great work you are doing with SDI. I think it is probably the most outstanding technology that has come before this country in my generation. If we can really develop SDI as now envisioned by you gentlemen and by the scientific world, there is no doubt it would be the turning point, I think, to bring peace in the entire world.

I remember when we went to the Soviet Union, there were eight Senators. The big point that Mr. Gorbachev dwelled on was SDI, demilitarizing space, he says. He emphasized that over and over again. He is afraid of SDI. If we develop SDI, then he sees that we can knock down his missiles, and he may feel helpless that he cannot carry out his domination of the world. And so I just want to say to you I hope you will keep developing SDI, as I think it is essential to preserving peace in the world. And I commend you for the great effort you are making.

[The prepared statement of Senator Thurmond follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND

Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening today's hearing concerning the Strategic Defense Initiative and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. I would like to add my welcome to Dr. Ikle and General Abrahamson. You gentlemen are no strangers here, and it is a pleasure to receive your testimony today.

The hearing notice indicates that the purpose of today's hearing is to receive testimony on the policy and technology objectives of the Strategic Defense Initiative. I

certainly hope that the objectives of the program are as the President has already stated, and that is to render nuclear weapons obsolete.

The recent decision, however, to restrict our research and development programs to the narrowest interpretation of the ABM Treaty, while the Soviets are under no such constraints, casts serious doubt about our ability to reach our objectives in a manner consistent with our national security interests.

My interest in ballistic missile defense goes back nearly 30 years. In 1957, following early intelligence reports of Soviet ABM developments, I called for U.S. development of such a system, and in 1963, I requested the first secret session of the Senate since World War II so that my colleagues could be briefed on a Soviet prototype ABM system.

The ABM Treaty was seen as an historic breakthrough in the arms race in that it would make future arms reductions possible. That idea has proven miserably incorrect. So, it seems to me that it would be in our best interest to proceed with SDI at as rapid a pace as is technologically feasible.

Unfortunately, we have chosen not to do so by our announced intention to follow a restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty. I hope that Dr. Ikle and General Abrahamson will fully address the ramifications of this decision on the pace of our efforts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Thurmond.
Dr. Ikle.

STATEMENT OF DR. FRED C. IKLE, UNDER SECRETARY OF

DEFENSE FOR POLICY

Dr. IKLE. Mr. Chairman, we appreciate very much your inviting us to this hearing, giving General Abrahamson and myself the opportunity to bring your committee up to date on the strategic defense initiative.

As I have stressed here before, Mr. Chairman, the strategic defense initiative is not an optional program at the margin of our defense effort. It is a key element in our long-term policy of enhancing United States and allied security and of reducing the risk of nuclear war.

During the 21⁄2 years since the President announced this program, much of the controversy about it has been sorted out. Many of the questions I believe have been successfully answered. Of course, as in the case of any large, long-term-research program, a great many questions cannot be resolved for some time, and some disagreements will surely continue to enliven our debate.

At this time, the research program under the strategic defense initiative has already brought us encouraging results and developed clear priorities. General Abrahamson will discuss these with you. Likewise, our extensive consultations with the allies have generally gone well. And in Geneva, we have made a sustained effort to explain to the Soviet negotiators the scope and purposes of this initiative and to invite the Soviet Union to join us in a cooperative transition to a safer strategic order, a strategic relationship that would rely mainly on defensive instead of offensive nuclear arms. But we must also keep in mind that the decision to introduce ballistic missile defenses and its timing is not up to us alone. Judging from past trends, it is not implausible that the Soviet Union will move ahead of us and of our alliance in some of these decisions.

The Soviet Union has always considered defense to be an important and natural part of its own national security. As you know, it has maintained and perfected its extensive air defense network, a great many underground shelters for its own leadership, a large