and the progress we are making, or a combination of the two, then this President or a future President may decide to be guided by the correct legal interpretation.

Senator LEVIN. Why would the President, of course, be guided by the correct legal interpretation?

Dr. IKLE. And permit an expansion of the program into these areas which we previously, based upon an incorrect interpretation, felt were prohibited?

Senator LEVIN. Why would the President not obviously follow what he sees as the correct interpretation?

Dr. IKLE. Do you mean right away?

Senator LEVIN. At any time.

Dr. IKLE. Well, obviously he wants to follow the correct interpretation, but we do not have to do everything that is permitted. The treaty does not force us to do it.

Senator LEVIN. Do you not want to do everything that is correct? Dr. IKLE. The treaty is permissive here. Obviously we are not forced to do this kind of testing by that treaty.

Senator LEVIN. So even though the treaty allows you, you claim this negotiating record which has never been made available to the Congress allows for an amendment of the actual language of article V which prohibits the testing, development, and deployment, flat out prohibits it, you say that is modified by something in that negotiating record, even though the negotiator denies it. You are saying that, well, even though that negotiating record that is somewhere out there allows this, that you may not do it anyway, even though it is the correct thing to do. I find a real confusion here, frankly, in the administration's position. It is either the correct interpretation and you are going to let the program develop according to it, or it is not the correct interpretation and you are going to constrain the program.

And I think you are basically hedging still, and frankly, I am glad because I think your new interpretation is off the wall. And so I am delighted you are hedging. I mean, I do not want to kid you as to where I am on that.

Dr. IKLE. I have to disappoint you, Senator. We are not hedging. We are convinced it is the correct interpretation.

Senator LEVIN. But you are not going to put it into effect yet. Dr. IKLE. It is not contrary to any article of the treaty. The treaty is somewhat ambiguous on it, and that is why I have to go to the negotiating record.

Senator LEVIN. Does it not prohibit the testing, development, and deployment?

Dr. IKLE. Not of the parts that are based on new physical principles.

Senator LEVIN. The new physical principles is not in the treaty itself, is that not correct?

Dr. IKLE. This would take a long time . . . But the treaty itself lists what were seen then as the components of ABM systems, interceptor missiles, launchers, and radars.

Senator LEVIN. In fairness to the treaty and to the agreed statement, does it not say that the purpose of that agreed statement (d) is in order to ensure fulfillment of the obligations, not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in article

III? I mean, that is the way the agreed statement (d) starts. You folks just want to ignore that.

Dr. IKLE. There is very good and detailed testimony, which I would not want to improve upon or repeat, by the expert lawyers. Judge Sofaer testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. We can submit here the full testimony which goes through this step by step, traces how these articles are interconnected, how the meaning of the treaty applies to the traditional components and not those of new principles.

Senator LEVIN. You have not answered my question.

Why do you not give General Abrahamson and his folks the new interpretation and tell them to design his program accordingly since it is the correct one? Why do you not just do it, if you are not hedging? Why do you not do it?

Dr. IKLE. Well, we are not hedging on legal interpretation. The President and we have not seen a need now to exploit, to take advantage of, everything that is permitted. There are many areas under the treaty which may be permitted. We do not have a single ABM site either. But it is quite clear the treaty does permit the single ABM site, and the Soviets do have one.

Senator LEVIN. General Abrahamson, is your program affected at some point by the decision whether to adopt the narrow or the broad interpretation?

General ABRAHAMSON. Sir, at some point the program is affected by either interpretation, and there will be a time that in fact we will have had to achieve, hopefully, a cooperative transition with the Soviet Union.

Senator LEVIN. But is your program affected by the narrow interpretation earlier than by the broad interpretation?

That is a very straightforward question.

Dr. IKLE. I would say yes, frankly.

Senator LEVIN. Even Dr. Ikle would say yes.

Dr. IKLE. It really goes over into a political question, but—and the General has very well explained it in much greater detail than I could-because of the kind of degree of certainty you may want to have about certain stages of development, testing will help you get the additional certainty.

Senator LEVIN. Would you agree, General, that your program would be constrained earlier by the narrow interpretation than by the broad interpretation?

General ABRAHAMSON. At some point it would.

Senator LEVIN. I said would it be constrained earlier?

General ABRAHAMSON. Yes, sir, at some point it would be constrained earlier, at an earlier point than another.

Senator LEVIN. Is that point earlier?

General ABRAHAMSON. Senator, I still want to say that we can conduct a program to provide evidence so that a compelling and useful decision can be made. That is the way we started out, and we can do that.

Senator LEVIN. I understand that, but my question is

General ABRAHAMSON. It would be a much more complex and difficult decision for you to understand.

Senator LEVIN. Now, my question is, will your program be constrained at an earlier point by the narrow interpretation than by the broad interpretation?

General ABRAHAMSON. The answer is yes, particularly depending upon how, what kind of criteria and information you need in order to make an effective decision on going into the next phase.

Senator WARNER. Let me try and just clarify for the record, and this is rather pedantic. In reference to the ABM Treaty, we have got the original, we have got the old, we have got the new, and we have got the McFarlane versions. For someone trying to read through this, what is the original or the old interpretation? Is that the one in this report to Congress?

Dr. IKLE. I think by and large in our discussion of it the last few minutes, we have referred to the old interpretation as the one that is more restrictive, that would prohibit testing and development of systems based upon new physical principles, and the one that is reflected in the report that Senator Levin read from. Then there is a new or less restrictive interpretation, the one on which the State Department legal counsel testified and the one that the President determined is the correct interpretation.

Senator WARNER. All right, now, where is McFarlane in that? Dr. IKLE. He did indicate this less restrictive interpretation was the correct one.

Senator WARNER. The less restrictive-▬

Dr. IKLE. I mean, we all agreed in the administration that the correct interpretation is that interpretation which permits testing and development of systems based on new physical principles.

Senator WARNER. And that present interpretation which is guiding General Abrahamson is different than the one that you just worked on here in the report to Congress?

Dr. IKLE. Yes.

Senator WARNER. And you are going to tell us exactly how it differs?

Dr. IKLE. We will submit for the record how this would affect the language in the report.

[See p. 41 for insert.]

Senator WARNER. Now, General Abrahamson, you said—and I copied it down as best I could-sometime you are going to come up against this problem, and you are hopeful that cooperation or transition with the Soviet Union would resolve it.

Now, what did you mean by that?

General ABRAHAMSON. I think the policy under which the administration is operating, and obviously the reason that we are discussing it with the Soviet Union now is that we would hope that we can get past this propaganda stage, and that they will understand that it is in their interest as well as our own to move to a more defensive type of deterrent. Once that is achieved, hopefully we will then be in a position to, in a negotiated way, modify the treaty so that both we and they could move into a defensive regime.

At the same time, people have indicated that while that is a hope, we would not accept the idea that they would hold a veto over our ability to proceed.

Senator WARNER. Now, just for the record, I indicated that the Levin letter was not before the Congress. I understand that it was

inserted in the record in connection with the confirmation of Mr. Hicks. So for those who want to find it, it is found there. But we can also include it in this record, can we not, Mr. Levin?

Senator LEVIN. Sure.

[The information referred to follows:]

SDIO TERMINOLOGY

Senator LEVIN. Congress and the NSC have mandated that all SDI research be conducted in full compliance with the 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of ABM systems or components that are space-based, sea-based, air-based or mobile land-based. The SDIO has agreed that field tests of space- or other mobile-based devices cannot involve ABM components, prototypes or breadboard models thereof.

In order to exercise effective oversight of SDI's compliance with the ABM Treaty, the SDIO has to have detailed definitions of a number of key terms in the way they are applied to all SDI experiments involving non-fixed, land-based devices.

I would like to know in an unclassified form how the Department of Defense and the SDIO define the following terms as they relate to the 1972 ABM Treaty: (a) Component

(1) A detailed definition and explanation of the distinctions between "component" and "subcomponent" "prototype' and "subcomponent," "breadboard model" and "subcomponent", "adjunct" and "Component," and the distinction between "field test" and "laboratory research."

(2) Whether a prototype must perform the complete function of an ABM component.

(3) Whether a device that significantly contributes to the performance of an ABM component as defined in article II of the Treaty is an ABM component.

(4) Whether a device that can perform an ABM mission is an ABM component. (5) Whether an ABM component, subcomponent, prototype, or adjunct must be verifiable by national technical means.

(6) Why the following experiments in SDI are not field tests of prototypes of nonfixed land based ABM systems or components:

1. Boost Surveillance and Tracking System Experiment

2. Space Surveillance and Tracking System Experiment

3. Airborne Optical Adjunct Experiment

4. Space-Based Kinetic Kill Vehicle Experiment

5. Space-Based Railgun Experiment

(7) Whether any of the experiments in SDI are considered to be "based on other physical principles" under the ABM Treaty. If so, what is the U.S. position as to the coverage of these experiments under the treaty?

Dr. HICKS. 1. "ABM components" are ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, and ABM radars and are described in article II of the treaty. Devices capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars also are treated as ABM components under the treaty.

Neither "laboratory research" nor "field testing" are terms used in the ABM Treaty.

For a "prototype" to be limited by the ABM Treaty it must be a prototype of an ABM system or component. Regardless of whether a device is labeled "prototype," "breadboard," "test bed," or "preproduction model," or any other term of art, the determination of what treaty restrictions apply is based on whether it constitutes an ABM component under the treaty, or is capable of substituting for an ABM component. Finally, the word "adjunct" is not used in the ABM Treaty. In the ABM Treaty negotiating record, the term "adjunct" is referred to as a device that could be used in conjunction with an ABM component, but that could not perform all the functions of, or substitute for, the component.

Neither the treaty nor the relevant negotiating record refer to the term subcomponent or breadboard mode.

2. For any device, whether labled "prototype" or some other term of art, to be limited by the ABM Treaty, it must constitute an ABM system or component (an ABM interceptor missile, ABM launcher, ABM radar), or a device capable of substituting for such an ABM component.

3. No. Only devices which are capable of substituting for ABM components are covered in this context.

4. Again, the criterion for application of the treaty is whether a device constitutes an ABM component or is capable of substituting for a component.

5. No. The ABM Treaty contains no such requirement.

6. As described more fully in the report to Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative (1985), there are three basic types of research and development activity that are permitted by the ABM Treaty: (1) conceptual design or laboratory testing; (2) "field testing" of devices that are not ABM components or prototypes of ABM components; and (3) “field testing" or fixed land-based ABM components. The Boost-Surveillance and Tracking System Experiment, Space Surveillance and Tracking System Experiment, Airborne Optical Adjunct Experiment, Space-Based Kinetic Kill Vehicle Experiment, and the Space-Based Railgun Experiment all fall within the second category of ABM Treaty-permitted activity.

7. Some of the experiments in the SDI program will involve devices considered to be "based on other physical principles." Any such experiment will be consistent with the ABM Treaty.

In a more general vein, the Department of Defense has exercised effective oversight of the SDI research program as it is affected by the ABM Treaty and has judged the compatibility of our SDI experiments with that treaty on a case-by-case basis by making use of several reasonable working principles. These principles are discussed in the Report to Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative (1985).

Senator WARNER. Now, I think we have about concluded, and Dr. Ikle, I say most respectfully on this question of the elimination, as you call it, that we will eventually eliminate the threat posed by ballistic missiles that you might consider recasting that as eliminating the possibility of a disarming first strike. I think that is the goal that we are seeking as opposed to preventing the penetration of a single weapon. I think a number of the Members of Congress today, of the Senate, have shared with you their grave concerns about this concept of sharing our technology with the Soviet Union, and I join them. Senator Hart has spoken to it and others have spoken to it.

Perhaps this hearing can be of some benefit to indicate that here there are some deep-seated feelings on those two aspects of the policy which I think, quite candidly, undermine the administration's credibility, and we need to restore the maximum amount of credibility in order to get the funding that General Abrahamson needs.

I think there will be a direct relationship between that credibility and the action by the Congress on the SDI budget that will be submitted in late January or early February.

Gentlemen, I thank you.

Yes, General Abrahamson.

General ABRAHAMSON. Sir, while you are speaking of credibility and since I believe that there is no real credibility to the claims by some of the people who seem to be able to jump into instant celebrity status merely by saying some part of the SDI is impossible. Senator WARNER. Yes.

Forgive me. We will resume the hearing and receive direct testimony on that issue after the vote.

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, will there be additional opportunities for questions, and if not, will you leave the record open? Senator WARNER. We will leave the record open.