tremely relevant to the Congress and to the relevant committees on appropriations and authorizations.

Mr. PERLE. I was here when that ratification debate took place. I must say it did not explore in any detail these issues bearing on other physical principles because they seemed so distant at the time.

Other things were said in the course of that ratification debate about the circumstances under which we would withdraw from that treaty, and we have not done so. So, if the Senate had anything in mind when it ratified that treaty, it was that we would. not continue to be bound by that treaty if the Soviets achieved a capability to attack and destroy our land-based forces during the period in which that treaty and its associated interim agreement was in effect.

So, the assumptions of 1972 have long passed, but it does seem to me it is incumbent upon us to examine the treaty and make some judgments about what we intended in the treaty, what the words of the treaty say, and what a reasonable interpretation of those words in the treaty would be.

We have now done that. I am sorry to say successive administrations did not do it very carefully. But having done it and having come to the conclusion that the treaty does permit testing and development of systems based on other physical principles, a decision to be bound permanently to the more restrictive interpretation when the Soviets are not bound to that interpretation would constitute a unilateral inhibition on our program, an inhibition that in the long run I think will make it impossible for us to make an intelligent decision about whether to proceed to deployment.

That is the only point I want to make. You are voting very large sums of money for this program. I think it is reasonable to satisfy yourselves that this money is going into a program that can be brought to fruition.

Senator NUNN. We are assuming that General Abrahamson will tell us if he runs into any problems with the narrow interpretation. His testimony, I understand, is that he has no problem with the narrow interpretation.

General ABRAHAMSON. At this point in time.

Senator NUNN. At this point in time or in the near term?
General ABRAHAMSON. Or in the near term.

Let me add something, sir, about what you just said that I think is going to be very important. If the Congress is going to ask that question repeatedly as part of the appropriations process, then I believe what I am going to have to do is what I have done up to this point and that is to examine very carefully and to say, what is the shortest, most direct route.

Senator WARNER. I might say less expensive because you are reaching that juncture where to go for a broader interpretation is less expensive.

Is that not correct?

General ABRAHAMSON. There will be that time. As I indicated, I have not done all of that kind of planning. It is an appropriate question, I do not disagree with you, but what it does say is that I will have to then undertake a continual reexamination of the pro

gram to see where the savings might be achieved if we do go in a more direct route. I have not done that to date.

Senator WARNER. I think you should. That would be a savings in time as well as in dollars.

General ABRAHAMSON. Yes.

Mr. PERLE. If the purpose of the program is to arrive at a point where a decision should be made whether to deploy a strategic defense, there is no doubt it would be vastly cheaper and much faster to do so under the broad interpretation of the treaty than under the narrow interpretation.

Senator WARNER. The word "vastly" is used calculatedly?

Mr. PERLE. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. You could add that it would be much cheaper and faster if you had no treaty at all.

Mr. PERLE. I think the restriction on deployment is not as significant an inhibition as the decision to deploy.

Senator NUNN. Are you saying that the treaty under the broad interpretation in no way impedes the SDI research and development with respect to those systems based on other physical principles? I thought General Abrahamson said that we would have to have an amendment to the treaty.

General ABRAHAMSON. To go into the deployment phase, sir.

Senator NUNN. With a broad interpretation, you would never need an amendment until such time-

General ABRAHAMSON. For those items. I am not a lawyer, sir. I am repeating now what is a legal interpretation, as I understand it, from the legal counsel and groups of people who have examined this, both in the State Department and in the Department of Defense.

Under those conditions if we can proceed into the development phase for other physical principles, then, yes, sir, it is correct that we, for the portion of the system someday that might be restricted only to other physical principles, could go directly.

However, to go beyond development and testing to a deployment is not included in that broader interpretation of the treaty.

Senator WARNER. One last observation.

General ABRAHAMSON. Am I being clear or being accurate? Are you following what I am saying, sir?

Senator NUNN. I believe I followed it.

General ABRAHAMSON. I am not trying to be fuzzy.

Senator NUNN. I recognize that. I am not sure that you and Mr. Perle have said the same thing, but that is all right, too.

Senator WARNER. If I can summarize because you and I discussed it a number of times privately and I think on one occasion in a public hearing. By pursuing a less restrictive interpretation of the ABM we will have:

One, a less costly program.

Two, you will get there faster.

Three, my recollection is that we probably would get a better, a more fully developed and more effective SDI.

General ABRAHAMSON. I believe that is the case. When one must proceed into that, of course, is an open question at this point in time.

Senator NUNN. One final question on this point. You say you have not examined that yet, but you also said, you know, the question of cost and time lag. You also said you see no impediment with the narrow interpretation in the short term.

General ABRAHAMSON. Yes.

Senator NUNN. I guess the thing that is fuzzy, in my view, is are you sure there is no impediment with the narrow interpretation in the short term or is it because you have not looked at that?

General ABRAHAMSON. Remember, the program was structured on the narrow interpretation. So, the indepth kind of thinking that we have done, the indepth kind of planning, is based on the narrow interpretation.

What I indicated was that it is very proper now to begin to go into some very careful and detailed, indepth planning on a broader basis to see if that is in fact a careful—right now it is a judgment. It is not a carefully examined situation.

Senator NUNN. You say we could be spending more money and taking more time right now at the moment than we would otherwise take if the President had made the decision to go to a broader interpretation.

General ABRAHAMSON. I think that is a possibility. However, that possibility will grow as time goes forward and as we get into more integrated experiments. That was the basis of my earlier answer that I think we are several years away from a significant impact. Senator WARNER. Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. I am going to change the subject a little bit because we have dwelled on this a long, long time. This spring several Senators were in Paris and we had a very interesting discussion with then Defense Minister Hernu. He was telling us about the French Eureka Program.

I am wondering what has happened to the Eureka Program since then. At that time he did not seem to think there was much compatability between our SDI and their Eureka Program. The French intend to proceed with Eureka and gave some indication that Bonn might join them in that.

What has happened to the Eureka Program? How does it differ from SDI and is there a chance of melding the two programs together?

General ABRAHAMSON. First of all, I believe that the Eureka Program is an evolving program, obviously. It is evolving in terms of agreement between government on funding and the technical concept behind it.

It is a program whose principle objective is to carry out research in certain particular areas. Some of those areas, but not all, many of those areas have some applicability to SDI in the sense if their work on computers and software programs were mature, that might help us.

By the same token if our work on computers and software and applications for our defensive systems were mature, that would probably help them. So, I have indicated publicly that I did not feel that there was significant competition between the two programs. In fact, I thought there may be some similarity between the two programs.

There is a possibility, however, that at some point in time there may be a particular research team or a particular effort that we would prefer that they give the priority to a defensive SDI application as to one of those. But I do not know of any of those now.

In general, I think those are reinforcing kinds of technical efforts and not in competition, as has been expressed all too often and I believe erroneously, in the press. I have talked directly with the Director of the Eureka Program.

Senator EXON. Is there general cooperation between you and your French counterpart?

General ABRAHAMSON. No, sir. If you explain cooperation as have we extended our planning to the level at this point that we are coordinating investment, we have not achieved that point yet. I do not believe that the Eureka Program itself is mature enough yet that that is a good strong possibility.

Senator EXON. In the last 6 months has there been a softening of what at one time seemed to be the French and the German positions that they were not going to have too much to do with SDI and they were going their own way? Has there been a softening of that position?

Has there been a mellowing of that position toward melding our efforts?

General ABRAHAMSON. In the case of the Federal Republic of Germany, they have been interested enough to send the largest of the teams that has spent the most time trying to understand the conditions under which we would go forward, but even as important, to understand the technology.

Senator ExON. How about the French?

General ABRAHAMSON. In terms of the French, the French Government has said if companies prefer to come individually, they see no objection and they would assist, at least with the minimum level of government-to-government agreement, and the one level we must have is security.

In fact, that process is happening. So, I think that in general there is a melding. But at the French Government level there has not been an embracing of SDI in an overarching agreement on something of that kind at this point.

Senator EXON. Is there a possibility that some of the SDI money that we are trying to get appropriated here might end up in French companies' hands for research and development?

General ABRAHAMSON. There is a possibility, sir, if it is cost effective and if they have competitive ideas that would assist us. Senator EXON. Thank you, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WARNER. Senator Levin has a question or two and then we plan to go into executive session.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, when we started this program it was your position that we determine SDI's feasibility under the then interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

General ABRAHAMSON. Yes.

Senator LEVIN. Is that still your position?

General ABRAHAMSON. I tried to explain-

Senator LEVIN. Is it still your position we can determine feasibility under the narrow interpretation?

General ABRAHAMSON. Yes, sir.

Senator LEVIN. It will cost us more and take longer?

General ABRAHAMson. It will take more of your individual time to understand the implications of the technology.

Senator LEVIN. I understand all that. Nonetheless, it is still your view that we can still determine its feasibility under the narrow interpretation?

General ABRAHAMSON. Probably at a lower confidence level.
Senator LEVIN. Let me try to get a straight answer.

General ABRAHAMSON. I am giving a straight answer, sir. I am saying the answer is yes.

Senator LEVIN. You can attach all the conditions you want?

General ABRAHAMSON. The condition is that there probably will be a lower confidence level.

Senator LEVIN. I understand that. It will take us longer, it will cost us more, it will be a lower confidence level. It was justified. When you started out, in your view, you never would have started out even though we were operating under the narrow interpretation; is that correct?

General ABRAHAMSON. Yes.

Senator LEVIN. Is it still justified under the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty with the conditions you set forth?

General ABRAHAMSON. I believe it is justified.

Senator LEVIN. If you knew right now we were going to be continuing to operate under the narrow definition of the ABM Treaty, you would still recommend we proceed?

General ABRAHAMSON. Yes, sir, because I believe in the program. Senator LEVIN. How much cheaper will it be if we decide that the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty is the one we want to follow?

General ABRAHAMSON. Sir, I am sorry, but I cannot give you a responsible answer. I have not calculated that or tried to deal with it. That will be a very difficult subject. As I indicated, it takes planning, it takes an understanding. It will probably be like the rest of the SDI Program, an evolving number.

Senator LEVIN. You are unable to tell us right now?
General ABRAHAMSON. I am unable to tell you now.

Senator LEVIN. Can you tell us how much faster we will know the feasibility?

General ABRAHAMSON. No.

Senator LEVIN. You are the head of the program. You cannot tell us how much faster, how much we will save under the broader interpretation?

Secretary Perle used the word "vastly."

STATEMENT OF FRANK GAFFNEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Mr. GAFFNEY. May I add a point on that.

Senator LEVIN. He is not here to defend himself.

Mr. GAFFNEY. At your request, I am substituting for him.