[Questions submitted for the hearing record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

TECHNICAL PROBLEMS FACING THE SDI PROGRAM

Senator WARNER. Dr. Buchsbaum, with your background and expertise, do you see any technical problems facing the SDI program that are insurmountable?

Dr. BUCHSBAUM. I don't see any technical problems that would preclude an effective strategic defensive system from being built. There are still very many problems which the SDI program faces to which there are not yet solutions. That's why vigorous research is necessary. But, I would not call any of these problems "insurmountable".

EASTPORT GROUP CONCLUSIONS ABOUT SDI

Senator WARNER. Dr. Cohen: Has the Eastport Group reached any preliminary conclusions about SDI computer and battle management issues, and if so, could you please summarize these for us?

Mr. COHEN. The Eastport panel has reached several conclusions. I will summarize them by quoting from the upcoming report of the panel:

"The panel concludes that computing resources and battle management software for a strategic defense system are within the capabilities of the hardware and software technologies that could be developed within the next several years. However, the anticipated complexity of the battle management software and our ability to test, simulate, modify, and evolve the system make battle management and command, control, and communication the paramount strategic defense problem.

"Software technology is developing against inflexible limits in the complexity and reliability that can be achieved. The tradeoffs necessary to make the software task tractable are in the system architecture. As indicated in the Fletcher Report, the 'applique approach' of designing the system first and then writing the software to control it is the wrong approach for SDI.

"One promising class of system architectures for a strategic defense system are those that are less dependent on tight coordination than is implied by the Fletcher Report. The advantages of this type of architecture include robustness, simplicity, and the ability to infer the performance of full-scale deployment by evaluating the performance of small parts of the system. Otherwise, the United States could not test a full-scale deployment short of actual use. The panel prefers an unconventional architecture that simplifies the software development and testing tasks over reliance on radical software development approaches and the risk that reliable software could not be developed by the ‘applique approach' at any cost."

In addition to the above conclusions, the panel made several other recommendations to SDIO regarding various issues such as hardware, software, simulation/testing, and communication. The most important recommendation is probably that the software for the strategic defense system will follow the communication paradigm, as decribed earlier both by Mr. Buchsbaum and myself.

Senator WARNER. I thank each of you. This has been one of the more valuable sessions in our series of hearings.

Thank you.

Mr. COHEN. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 5:15 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1985

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC AND

THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC.

ALLIED PARTICIPATION

The subcommittee met, in open session pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John W. Warner (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Warner, Thurmond, Quayle, Nunn, Exon, and Levin.

Staff present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director for the minority; Alan L. Chvotkin, counsel; Robert G. Bell, Robert F. Bott, Douglas R. Graham, Drew A. Harker, and William E. Hoehn, Jr., professional staff members; Judith H. Freedman and Russell C. Miller, research assistants; Karen A. Love, staff assistant.

Also present: Romie L. Bownlee, assistant to Senator Warner; James M. Bodner, assistant to Senator Cohen; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; John B. Keeley, assistant to Senator Levin; and Gregory B. Craig, assistant to Senator Kennedy.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN W. WARNER,

CHAIRMAN

Senator WARNER. The subcommittee convenes in open session this afternoon to continue with our series of hearings on the President's Strategic Defense Initiative.

In previous hearings we have focused on some of the technical and policy objectives of the SDI Program. Today we will focus on the important issue of allied participation in SDI research activities.

Our witnesses this afternoon are Mr. Richard Perle, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, and Lt. Gen. James Abrahamson, the Director of the SDI Örganization. On behalf of the subcommittee, I would like to welcome both of you this afternoon.

In my view, it is very important that we consult with our allies as closely as possible while we pursue the SDI Program, and that they be encouraged to participate actively in the program. This is not simply because U.S. national security and that of our allies is

inextricably linked, but also because our allies possess strong technical capabilities in a number of areas that will assist us in meeting the objectives of the SDI Program.

In this regard, I would like to commend our witnesses who have spent much of their time in recent months traveling among allied capitals. I attach a great deal of importance to these consultations. I would also like to commend my colleague, Senator Quayle, for his interest in this subject. At his request, the subcommittee may conduct a hearing during the week of December 16 in which we will focus on the requirement for an antitactical ballistic missile system in greater detail.

Mr. Secretary, we will lead off with you.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD PERLE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Mr. PERLE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to take this opportunity to review the administration's policy regarding allied involvement in SDI research and a description of where we stand today in our discussions with our allies.

I should also like to touch on the issues associated with allied participation in which the committee may be especially interested. I will be happy, of course, to answer any questions.

As you will recall, Secretary Weinberger on behalf of the President extended an invitation last March at a meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group to our NATO allies and some others to join with the United States in the SDI Research Program to determine whether there are any defense technologies that could enhance deterrence and increase stability.

Our NATO allies together with Japan, Australia, Israel, and Korea, were invited to participate in the program. The invitation was prompted by our conviction that U.S. security is inextricably linked with that of our allies and hence our allies ought to have an opportunity to join with us in participating in the Research Program intended to enhance their security as well as our own.

Moreover, in informal discussions with our allies, a number of them expressed the hope that the SDI Program might be open to their participation. To provide interested allies with a thorough technical understanding of the SDI Program and to assist General Abrahamson's organization, a number of government institutions, industries, and universities have been exposed to technical briefings in Washington and have made tours of various U.S. SDI research facilities and laboratories.

General Abrahamson has traveled to many countries for this purpose and many allied experts have visited the United States. We have indicated to our allies that we were prepared to respond to any form of interest that they might choose and in that regard made it clear we welcome both direct government participation in the program as well as the involvement of private firms, institutions, universities, and the like.

If a government chooses not to participate directly in the SDI Program, we respect that decision. Several allied governments have

indicated they will not participate directly, but that their private industries and institutions are free to do so.

The Canadians, French, Danes, Dutch, and Norwegians have taken this position. That is, the governments will not participate directly, but their firms are permitted and in some cases encouraged to do so.

The Australian and Greek Governments have indicated they would rather not participate, but have made no statement regarding the private participation of industries in their countries.

For our part we have often stated that a direct government role other than that required by necessary security arrangements is not necessary for allied firms that may seek to participate in SDI research contracts.

As a practical matter, however, new government-to-government agreements would facilitate broader allied participation than would otherwise be possible. It is not a requirement that there be government-to-government agreement, but we think of those cases where there are, the prospects of participation are significantly increased. The Defense Department has been engaged in bilateral negotiations with the Ministry of Defense of the United Kingdom concerning British participation in the program. Secretary Weinberger and Defense Minister Michael Heseltine recently reached an essential agreement on a memorandum of understanding that will enter into force when it has been approved by Her Majesty's government. The Secretary is in London at the moment.

While the basic understanding has been arrived at, the British Government may wish further to consider when and how they will proceed. So, while we think it likely there will be a government-togovernment overarching agreement between the governments, I cannot tell you when that will be concluded.

With respect to participation by the Federal Republic of Germany, we expect the government in Bonn to make a decision in the fairly near future on whether and how they wish to participate in the program.

We expect a similar decision in the not too distant future from the Italian Government.

Perhaps I should say a word or two about the sorts of policy issues that have been associated with the question of allied involvement.

The first deals with the ABM Treaty constraints and how they bear on allied cooperative research. The United States, as you know, is conducting the SDI Program in full compliance with the 1972 treaty.

Let me assure the subcommittee that cooperative SDI research efforts undertaken with allied governments, institutions, industries, and universities will be subjected to continuing review to assure compliance with U.S. international obligations, including the ABM Treaty.

We have developed a set of guidelines and procedures to assure that all exchange of data with allied cooperative research efforts are in compliance with our obligations under the treaty.

With regard to the longstanding U.S. concern about technology transfer to the Soviet Union, I want to emphasize that the illegal and improper flow of technology remains a major concern of this

administration, not only with respect potentially to SDI research, but also for other types of cooperation in the defense area, indeed, in areas of high technology and that have both defense and nonde

fense purposes.

The provisions of SDI research contracts in any bilateral arrangement regarding allied cooperative research will reflect the commitment of the administration to prevent unauthorized dissemination of sensitive SDI information bearing on our security.

In terms of security arrangements to protect classified SDI research, there are a number of requirements which must be satisfied in order for a foreign contractor to perform or receive information necessary to bid on SDI contracts with subcontractors.

Under the terms of the U.S. national disclosure policy and/or bilateral information and industrial security agreements, the potential foreign contractor must be cleared by its own government. Classified information involved in the contract must be approved for release by the United States to the receiving government, and that information must be transferred through government-to-government channels utilizing the security systems and procedures that they have and that are subject, in the case of NATO, to a NATO-wide standard.

We intend to adhere to the strictest safeguards in order to protect sensitive SDI Program information and technology.

Mr. Chairman, that summarizes our approach to allied cooperation. I would only add that I have had an opportunity to meet with many officials from allied governments who have come to this country and those who have had an opportunity in connection with their own deliberations to visit our facilities, to go out to the laboratories to meet with General Abrahamson's program people. They have come away from those discussions and those visits with the kind of enthusiasm that the people involved in the program communicate because they feel it themselves so deeply.

I think as time has gone on, some of the initial skepticism that we experienced has dissipated, not entirely, but to a significant degree. I think that is a tribute to the sense of optimism and progress that the people involved in the program have conveyed to those officials who have had a chance to see them at work. Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

We will now hear from General Abrahamson and then have questions.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JAMES A. ABRAHAMSON, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE ORGANIZATION

General ABRAHAMSON. Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to be back. I think this is a critical and timely subject, given the extensive discussions we have had with many of our allies and where we are in that particular process.

Rather than read my entire statement, I would like to start in the middle of page 7. I would like to point out for the subcommittee that the initial several pages deal with the rationale and the importance of our deterrent, whether it be offensive or defensive, to our allies protection, and the very close relationship of our security to theirs. Therefore, I recommend that portion of the statement.