ices and in other agencies, in formulation and execution of their portions of the SDI to accomplish those above program objectives. The first of these is that we must fully examine the multilayer architecture design and the major factors affecting the technology decisions, such as the survivability, lethality, countermeasures studies, affordability, and military strategy that go with those. It is essential to have the best possible understanding of these issues so that we can clearly chart the course for the program. Even though the resources devoted to this particular work are relatively modest, the importance of the results cannot be overstated. Nearly every element of the SDI is touched.

Second, we must explore to the greatest extent possible technologies that could support the ability to engage hostile ballistic missiles in the boost and postboost phases. This includes kinetic and directed energy weapons, early warning, acquisition, tracking, and pointing sensors; and certainly battle management, communications, command, control and our intelligence capabilities. The leverage afforded by the potential of defense in these stages of a hostile ballistic missile's flight is decisive. Conceivably, the highest payoff and the greatest return on defensive dollar investment would occur in these phases, before deployment of a missile's warheads and the associated penetration aids.

Next, data handling, along with command and control technologies for layered defenses must be investigated comprehensively and exhaustively. We currently are actively defining requirements in this area, as results emerge from our ongoing architecture studies. We must expand our ability to produce high performance, fault tolerant computing systems and supporting operating systems. Our ability to develop large and complex software systems to carry out the battle management mission functions must be enhanced. All this is done through analysis of communications network requirements, definition of the network architectures, and identification and development of the technology requirements. This will be followed by the development of a candidate system test bed, that is, on-the-ground test bed, and evaluation through simulation of these communications systems. Clearly this work is central to the concept of a layered defense against ballistic missiles. No matter what evolves from our research in other areas of the program, reliable, resiliant, and responsive data handling and command and control capabilities are requisite.

Beyond the boost and postboost realm, thorough examination of potential capabilities in other layers, and here I mean all the other layers, is needed. They are fundamental. Inquiry into the technologies that could support defensive approaches in the midcourse and in the terminal phases is critical. This includes kinetic and directed energy alternatives along with the tracking and discrimination sensor research that is required. You are all aware of the power offered by a layered defense and the advantage afforded the defender by the multilayered concept. To fully exploit this advantage, we must make available for our future leaders the widest range of defensive options along the entire spectrum of a ballistic missile's flight.

Now, success in nearly every element of the SDI is dependent on major advances in supporting technologies for spacepower, power

conditioning, low-cost components, space transportation, and logistics. We must achieve rapid progress in these supporting technologies and innovative new concepts if viable alternatives developed throughout the program will indeed be feasible. Unprecedented magnitudes of power in space may be required for some of the possible defensive systems. It is essential to carefully consider affordability and specifically the mass to orbit weights across our entire program. Reliability, availability and maintainability obviously take on a new meaning in the environment of space. Indeed, all facets of logistics and supporting technologies demand careful attention from the outset. And I have directed all concerned to fully include these considerations in every quarter of their work.

Additionally, we must accelerate examination of potential applications to the shorter range missile threat. This is obviously of primary concern to our allies. Our security is inextricably linked to that of our allies. We will not confine ourselves solely to an exploitation of technologies with promise against intercontinental ballistic missiles or sea-launched ballistic missiles. We will also carefully examine the technologies with potential against shorter range ballistic missiles as well.

This does not represent an exhaustive list of activities in the strategic defense initiative. As I know you appreciate, there are a myriad of elements that have not been mentioned. This is not meant to denigrate in any way their meaning or their importance to the program. Instead, what I have tried to do is very briefly discuss those parts of the SDI to which I have assigned priority. These are the elements which we will try to more fully support in the face of limited resources to accomplish our overall objectives.

In a related vein, I would like to mention at least briefly the potential for spinoff and civilian application of the SDI research. We think this promise is great throughout all parts of the program. I am personally concerned that we not miss the splendid opportunity to capitalize on the results of the research of the SDI and apply it across all facets of our economy and society. For this reason, I have created within the SDIO the Office of Educational and Civil Applications. Among other things, its director will be responsible for developing and encouraging the widest possible use of SDI-related technologies, consistent with security considerations, for civil use, and helping to identify potential and existing technology applications and techniques that have economic benefits for the Nation. I would like to just skip slightly to the key points that the Secretary has made in the past because I think this does offer a final perspective.

The aim of the SDI is not to seek superiority, but to maintain the strategic balance and thereby assure stable deterrence.

Research will last for some years. We intend to adhere strictly to the ABM Treaty limitations and will insist that the Soviets do so as well.

We have no preconceived notions yet about the defensive options that research may generate. We will not proceed to development and deployment unless the research indicates that the defenses meet strict criteria.

Within the SDI research program, we will judge defenses to be desirable if they are survivable and cost effective at the margin.

It is too early to speculate on the kinds of defensive systems, whether ground based or space based, and the best merits of each, although we are beginning to define them, and we have some initial ideas.

The purpose of the defensive options we seek is clear, to find a means to destroy attacking ballistic missiles before they reach any of their targets.

U.S. and allied security remains indivisible. The SDI Program is designed to enhance allied security as well as U.S. security. We will continue to work closely with our allies to ensure that, as our research progresses, allied views are carefully considered.

If and when our research criteria are met, and following close consultations with our allies, we intend to consult and negotiate, as appropriate, with the Soviets pursuant to the terms of the ABM Treaty, which provide for such consultations, on how deterrence could be enhanced through greater reliance by both sides on new defensive systems. This commitment should in no way be interpreted as according the Soviets a veto over possible future defensive deployments. And, in fact, we have already been trying to initiate a discussion of the offense-defense relationship and stability in the defense and space talks under way in Geneva to lay the foundation to support such future possible consultations.

It is our intention and our hope that, if new defensive technologies prove feasible, we-in close and continuing consultation with our allies-and the Soviets will jointly manage a transition to a more defense-reliant balance.

SDI represents no change in our commitment to deterring war and enhancing stability. We would deter a potential aggressor by making it clear that we could deny him the gains he might otherwise hope to achieve rather than merely threatening him with costs large enough to outweigh those gains.

For the foreseeable future, offensive nuclear forces and the prospect of nuclear retaliation will remain the key element of deterrence. Therefore, we must maintain modern, flexible, and credible strategic nuclear forces.

Our ultimate goal is to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely. By necessity, this is a very long-term goal, which requires, as we pursue our SDI research, equally energetic efforts to diminish the threat posed by conventional arms imbalances, both through conventional force improvements, and the negotiation of arms reductions and confidence building measures.

Again, I thank you for the opportunity to appear today and welcome your questions.

Senator THURMOND. General Abrahamson, would you allow an interruption?

Mr. Chairman, I have to go to another committee in just a minute to preside.

Would you permit me to ask one question right now?
Senator WARNER. Yes; of course.

Senator THURMOND. General Abrahamson, I just want to ask you this question. You have illustrated the funding profiles of SDI and the Manhattan project and the Apollo Program. Now you may have left out an important point that I thought might be worth bringing out. What would have happened to the Manhattan project

and what would have happened to the Apollo Program if Congress had imposed the same spending constraints on them that Congress has imposed on the SDI?

Would you prefer to answer that for the record? It would be all right if you do, but I would like to have that question answered. General ABRAHAMSON. Let me answer one thing that has to do with the process, sir.

Stability in planned programs is a key issue, stability meaning that we need to be able to plan a program and then to be able to conduct it with a longer timeframe than just a year.

Now, sometimes the technology and the progress warrant changes, and then we need the resources to be able to quickly exploit those so that we do not put resources into avenues that are not the ones that will pay off in the highest possible way. But when you have to replan the program on a continual basis, there are dramatic adverse effects. No. 1, the progress is slowed in these projects as you replan them and replan them. Second, you begin to lose the best people because these people want to make progress, they are dedicated to the program objective, and if they are frustrated in their ability to do that, then you not only have the program slowed, you lose some of the very best people. I can only speculate that if that happened in the Manhattan project and in the Apollo Program we would not have perhaps had the atomic bomb ready by the time that we needed it in World War II; and second, the amazing achievement of being able to go to the Moon in a decade would probably have been substantially delayed.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you very much.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Thurmond.

Now, gentlemen, is there further direct testimony you wish to provide at this time? I know that you have a brief presentation on the architectural studies.

General ABRAHAMSON. Senator, it may be best in terms of the committee members to let you ask a round of questions.

Senator WARNER. The Chair proposes, in view of the fact that we have nearly 100 percent attendance of the subcommittee and we have several distinguished other members of our full committee, that we limit the first round of questions to 5 minutes and then proceed to a second round thereafter.

Would that be agreeable, Mr. Hart?

Senator HART. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WARNER. Thank you. I will lead off.

Dr. Ikle, one of the purposes of this series of hearings that Mr. Hart and I have structured is to really try and remove some of the points from the overall record of SDI that we in the Congress frankly feel to be somewhat incredible. This program has suffered, if I may say respectfully, from a credibility gap. The thing that has bothered me from the very earliest has been the representation that through this program we could, and I quote your testimony again today, eliminate, eventually eliminate the awful threat posed by ballistic missiles.

Now, I have had perhaps just a brief sojourn in this field since 1969 when I went to the Department of the Navy, that is, the field of atomic and nuclear weapons and so forth. I personally cannot

subscribe that any level of technological success would meet the dictionary definition of eliminate. That means zero.

Now, I wonder if you would focus on that. Is that still a goal to which the administration is trying to guide this program?

Dr. IKLE. Mr. Chairman, I am glad you give us an opportunity to address this question. It is often asked. The objective here is to provide an open avenue for long-term development in the future where we can, through the defensive program, and when it becomes effective, reduce substantially the effectiveness, the military effectiveness and the mass destruction threat inherent in ballistic missiles.

To be specific beyond that, how you would, as you say, in a total sense eliminate the threat of ballistic missile is premature. One preferred course that we would like to follow, which has been enunciated by the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense, is to get into a cooperative program with the Soviet Union, a cooperative transition to reduce the threat. And it follows almost tautologically, if you have a phased transition of reducing offensive ballistic missiles, then phasing in defenses, that eventually these defenses can become totally effective.

If, however, say sometime in the next century, the Soviet Union would continue to oppose such a cooperative outcome-and I think there is reason to believe that a cooperative outcome is more likely than some people postulate-but if they continue to oppose, then it is possible that ballistic missiles could still penetrate some defenses, some missiles could still get through.

We cannot foresee the future with full certainty.

Senator WARNER. I also share some skepticism on any future cooperation with the Soviet Union that would approach those goals, but that is a separate subject.

I would like to ask the General, from a technological standpoint, and that is your charter in this program, do you think it is an achievable goal that we can eventually eliminate the awful threat posed by ballistic missiles?

General ABRAHAMSON. I think the importance of that goal is very similar to when President Kennedy set the goal to go to the Moon. He did not say let's go nine-tenths of the way or halfway to the Moon. He said let's go to the Moon.

What it means to us in the program, sir, is that it is our responsibility to search for architectures and for technologies that would provide a very robust kind of defense, one that we hope would be so effective someday, if these were exploited and developed, that it would indeed cause a Soviet targeteer, somebody on the other side, to not have sufficient confidence in his ability to get the numbers of ballistic missiles through so that he could achieve a military objective.

Now, I have said several times that nothing that we can do in life is perfect. On the other hand, we can look for the kinds of technologies and configurations that would be good enough to achieve a defensive level of deterrence, and that again is why the layered architecture is so important.

Senator WARNER. Well, General, that seems to me to be a very reasonable explanation, but it does not embrace in my judgment the phrase "eventually eliminate."