have put in place to pursue this project vigorously and leave the policy questions to us. You present the very best effort you can put together and it has been a very impressive one and you had answered questions candidly. I really admire the work that you and your team have done. I think many of those who are concerned about SDI share the sentiments I have just expressed. So, keep up the good work. I have a couple of brief questions, Mr. Chairman. The first is about cost. Now, these kinetic-kill vehicle platforms, how large are they? One shuttle load? General ABRAHAMSON. The kinetic-kill vehicle, also one that would be put in space would hopefully be very, very small. Senator GORE. The platform? General ABRAHAMSON. It depends on what we finally designed. If you put a hundred of these smaller missiles in one platform, then, yes, it might add up to a shuttle load. If, on the other hand, it becomes more survivable by putting only 10, you might be able to put 10 in a shuttle. Senator GORE. The baseline now, as I take it, is 20 to 30 projectiles on each platform. Now, the platform that is capable of being survivable and accurately launching 20 to 30 of these little projectiles is a pretty big platform up there; is that correct? Does it have computer capability in space? General ABRAHAMSON. Yes, it has to be able to be basically aimed in a rough way. Senator GORE. Is it a fair consumption that a platform of this complexity, of this size, of this sophistication, capable of having that computer capacity and aiming, deploying and launching vehicles and knocking down ICBM's, it is fair to assume that a platform of that kind would cost at least as much as one of our [deleted] satellites today [deleted]. General ABRAHAMSON. No, sir, I do not think that it is. Senator GORE. It would be cheaper than a [deleted] satellite that cannot do any of those things? General ABRAHAMSON. Yes, sir. Senator GORE. Tell me why that is the case. General ABRAHAMSON. Some of the present very complex satellites that we use have a tremendous computer requirement. They also have [deleted] requirements that are very, very complex. What we are talking about essentially is a rocket fired in the sky and some syabilization for it and enough computer and communications capability that you can cause it to effectively be aimed and aimed quickly. Let me use one example and I am sorry, I could not bring a model of some of these things right now, we can now, and will be much better in a few years, take a laser communicator, which is about that big, and put it on the satellite and be able to transmit millions of bits of information in a very, very short time in a way that the Soviets cannot interfere with it. I do not know the cost of that. Senator GORE. I understand. Let me make sure that the Chairman is on track with the point that I am making with this question. We have a new platform going up in space that has sophisticated computer capability and capability to launch 20 to 30 projectiles, the capability to evade and/or survive attack, and the cost projections are that it will cost one-tenth of 1 percent as much as the present generation of [deleted] satellites. General ABRAHAMSON. I do not know where you got that. General ABRAHAMSON. No. That was for the kinetic-kill vehicle itself. Senator GORE. That is for the projectile? General ABRAHAMSON. For the projectile. Senator GORE. What is your estimate for the platform? General ABRAHAMSON. At this point we have not made a good firm estimate. Senator GORE. Is $1 billion a fair estimate? General ABRAHAMSON. That is much too expensive. In fact, the whole thrust of this program is that we must find ways to bring down the cost of these systems. In fact, one of the major efforts that is causing a great deal of difficulty in the space community and for myself is that what I am talking about is that we will not build satellites the way we build satellites today. They are built individually. They are built with a great number of people doing a lot of different kinds of tests. We will have to be able to build these like they were a product line. Senator GORE. If one of these platforms costs as much as the present generation of satellites, then the cost of this component alone would be on the order of $11⁄2 trillion. General ABRAHAMSON. The answer is if it even approaches the cost of something like that, we will have failed and I would never go for a recommendation that that kind of system should be included. Senator GORE. I have a lot of faith in you, General, and I hope you keep up the good work, but my faith has limits in this particular area. If anybody can do it, you can. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry to take so long. Senator WARNER. We are glad to have members of the Senate avail themselves of the opportunity to come visit with our distinguished witnesses. [Questions for the hearing record with answers supplied follow:] QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER ABM TREATY AND "EXOTIC" TECHNOLOGIES Senator WARNER. Do Soviet strategic defense programs provide any insights into the way they have interpreted the ABM Treaty's limitations on exotic technologies, such as lasers? Mr. PERLE. Soviet programs for anti-ballistic missile and space defense, which include advanced technologies and spacebased weapons, were in place prior to the signing of the 1972 ABM Treaty. In fact, Soviet emphasis on the necessity of research into defense against ballistic missiles was demonstrated by then-Minister of Defense Grechko shortly after the signing of the ABM Treaty, when he told the Soviet Presidium that the treaty, "places no limitations whatsoever on the conduct ing of research and experimental work directed toward solving the problem of defending the country from nuclear missile strikes." Therefore, the Soviets never had the slightest intention, notwithstanding the existence of the ABM Treaty, of abandoning the search for strategic defense of both the sort that were available at the time and what was then considered exotic systems, systems based on other physical principles. SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROGRAMS. Senator WARNER. The administration's recent publication on Soviet Strategic Defense Programs makes it clear that the Soviets have been aggressively pursuing their own strategic defense programs for many years-well before the President's 1983 speech. What is the military significance of these activities for the United States? Mr. PERLE. The Soviet Union has an extensive operational strategic defensive network which dwarfs that of the United States as well as an active research and development program in both traditional and advanced defenses against ballistic missiles. Soviet offensive and defensive force developments pose a serious challenge to the West. If left unchecked, they would seriously undermine our ability to retaliate effectively in case of Soviet attack. The situation would be even more severe if the Soviet Union were to have a monopoly on advanced defenses against ballistic missiles in addition to its sizable offensive and conventional defensive forces. The SDI program is a prudent and necessary response to the ongoing extensive Soviet antiballistic missile effort, including the existing Soviet deployments under the ABM Treaty. The SDI provides a necessary and powerful deterrent to any near-term Soviet decision to expand rapidly its ABM capability beyond that permitted by the ABM Treaty. INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY Senator WARNER. In its recent decision regarding the interpretation of the ABM Treaty as it relates to exotic technologies, has the administration created a "double standard" whereby the Soviet Union is free to pursue their own strategic defense programs in a more aggressive manner than we are permitting for ourselves? Mr. PERLE. No. Both the United States and the Soviet Union, as signatories to the ABM Treaty, have the legal right to test and develop ABM systems and components "based on other physical principles." As a matter of U.S. policy, however, the President has decided that we will continue to conduct the SDI research program on the basis of the more restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty. X-RAY LASER PROGRAM Senator WARNER. Would you comment on the recent press reports about the problems that are being experienced in the x-ray laser program? General ABRAHAMSON. Recent newspaper articles imply that significant differences of opinion exist among the Department of Energy (DOE) laboratory scientists regarding x-ray laser experiment designs and attendant experiment measuring instrumentation. We believe that diverse scientific opinion, technical peer review and acknowledgment of honest technical disagreement among scientists is healthy and is encouraged. We have received testimony that the SDI research activities in the Department of Energy (DOE) laboratories comprise a state-of-the-art program which requires new inventions in most experiments. These experiments are highly complex, are carefully planned and carefully executed. Historically, for the research, development and testing (RD&T) of any new nuclear system, many underground tests are required to incorporate the learning derived from previous experiments. One experiment out of many on a test does not provide all the answers to a problem and may, in fact, raise more questions. LLNL and LANL staff provide a continuing peer review for each other on all nuclear weapons RD&T, based on scientific and technical criteria. In addition, the University of California scientific and academic advisory committee regularly reviews both laboratories RD&T programs as a part of a routine management oversight function. The track records of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) on the development of nuclear weapons and associated state-of-the-art technologies is unparalled in history, vital to our national security and, with Congress' support, we expect that trend to continue. There is also Department of Defense Review both through the program office and organizations such as the JASON's. There are countless articles in the media on strategic defense and many have reported erroneous or misleading information. We do not think it would be useful to allow columnists through their newspapers to advise the Congress or Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) scientists on the resolution of any high technology problems. We do not view any scientific differences of opinion on SDI technology issues in the DOE laboratories to be a political issue and enthusiastically support the present research program. Senator WARNER. Gentlemen, thank you for your presence. The hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, At 1:08 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.] STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1985 U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC AND THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. ABM TREATY LIMITATIONS The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John W. Warner (chairman) presiding. Present: Senators Warner, Cohen, Quayle, Wilson, Nunn, Hart, Levin, and Bingaman. Staff present: Robert F. Bott, professional staff member; Arnold L. Punaro, staff director for the minority; and Jeffrey H. Smith, minority counsel; Robert G. Bell, Douglas R. Graham, William E. Hoehn, Jr., and George K. Johnson, Jr., professional staff members; Colleen M. Getz and Russell C. Miller, research assistants; and Karen A. Love, staff assistant. Also present: Robert P. Savitt, assistant to Senator Cohen; James M. Bodner, assistant to Senator Cohen: Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle: Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Allan W. Cameron, assistant to Senator Denton; Janne E. Nolan, assistant to Senator Hart; John B. Keeley, assistant to Senator Levin; and Edward McGaffigan, Jr., assistant to Senator Bingaman. OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN W. WARNER, CHAIRMAN Senator WARNER. The subcommittee meets in open session this afternoon to receive testimony from administration and public witnesses on the implications of the ABM Treaty for the President's Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI] Program. This is the fourth in a series of hearings that the subcommittee is conducting on the SDI Program, and several more hearings are being scheduled for after the Thanksgiving recess. We purposely planned it that way in order to receive information on the summit, thus enabling us to understand how the SDI Program has impacted on our arms reduction efforts. The ABM Treaty limitations on exotic technologies have received heightened attention of late. This attention has resulted from the administration's review of the ABM Treaty text and the accompa |