Opinion of the Court.

The state court held that by the will of Jacob Dawson Mrs. Dawson took a title in fee simple so long as she should remain his widow, with full power to sell and convey the same in fee during widowhood; and entered judgment for the plaintiffs in accordance with the prayer of their petition. That judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Nebraska. 25 Nebraska, 313.

The defendants sued out this writ of error, and assigned for error that the state courts did not give full faith and credit to the judgments recovered by Miles against some of the plaintiffs in the Circuit Court, and disregarded the decision of this court in 104 U. S. 291.

Mr. J. M. Woolworth (with whom was Mr. D. C. Burr on the brief) for plaintiffs in error.

Mr. T. M. Marquett (with whom were Mr. N. S. Harwood and Mr. John H. Ames on the brief) for defendants in error.

MR. JUSTICE GRAY, after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court.

The real question in controversy between the parties is of the extent of the estate and power which Mrs. Dawson took under the will of her husband. In Giles v. Little, 104 U. S. 291, this court held that she took only an estate for life, determinable by her marrying again, and no power to convey a greater estate than she had herself. In the case at bar, the Supreme Court of Nebraska, declining to follow that decision, and basing its judgment largely upon the statutes of the State, held that she took an estate in fee determinable upon her marriage, with power during her widowhood at her discretion to convey in fee any part of the land, and that the devise over in case of her marrying again passed to the children only what remained unconveyed. Little v. Giles, 25 Nebraska, 313.

The question of the true construction of the will in this respect depends wholly upon general rules of law and upon the local statutes, and in no degree upon the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States; and the disregard by the

Opinion of the Court.

state court of the opinion of this court upon the question in a former suit does not give this court jurisdiction to review the judgment of the state court in this case. Leather Manufac turers' Bank v. Cooper, 120 U. S. 778; San Francisco v. Scott, 111 U. S. 768; San Francisco N. Itsell, 133 U. S. 65.

If the state court had refused to give due effect to a final judgment of any court of the United States in a case between the same parties, a federal question would have been presented, which might have been brought to this court for review. Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 21 Wall. 130; Crescent City Co. v. Butchers' Union Co., 120 U. S. 141. But this record presents no such state of things.

The case of Giles v. Little, 104 U. S. 291, was indeed between one of the present defendants and one of the present plaintiffs, and concerned the title to a lot of land now claimed by the latter; but the judgment of this court only reversed a judgment of the Circuit Court of the United States sustaining a demurrer to the petition, and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings, and (as appears by the record given in evidence at the trial of the case at bar) the petition was afterwards, and before final judgment, dismissed on the motion of the plaintiff, without prejudice to a new action; so that nothing was finally adjudged in that case, even as between the parties to it. Bucher v. Cheshire Railroad, 125 U. S. 555, 578, 579.

The ground most relied on in favor of a reversal of the judgment of the state court is its refusal to give effect to the judgments obtained in the Circuit Court of the United States against some of the present plaintiffs by Miles, a grantee of the present defendants. It is argued that the judgments in favor of Miles conclusively showed that some of these plaintiffs had no title, and that, as all these plaintiffs claimed under one title in the present suit, the judgment below in their favor must be reversed as to all of them.

As the present defendants did not claim under Miles, and were not parties to his suits, it is difficult to see how judgments in those suits could have any effect as evidence for or against them, by way of estoppel or otherwise.

Syllabus.

But it is certain that they neither had nor claimed any interest in the title acquired by Miles under those judgments.. It is well settled that, in order to give this court jurisdiction to review a judgment of a state court against a title or right set up or claimed under a statute of, or an authority exercised under, the United States, that title or right must be one of the plaintiff in error, and not of a third person only. Owings v. Norwood, 5 Cranch, 344; Montgomery v. Hernandez, 12 Wheat. 129, 132; Henderson v. Tennessee, 10 How. 311; Hale v. Gaines, 22 How. 144, 160; Long v. Converse, 91 U. S. 105. The title set up by the defendants being that of a third person, in which they have no interest, the writ of error is

Dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

KINGSBURY v. BUCKNER.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.

No. 176. Argued January 8, 9, 1890. Decided April 7, 1890,

In Illinois, a decree against a minor is subject to attack, by an original bill, for error apparent on the record, for want of jurisdiction, or for fraud. In Illinois, the rule is that a decree against an infant is absolute in the first instance, subject to the right to attack it by original bill, but until so attacked, and set aside or reversed, on error or appeal, it is binding to the same extent as any other decree or judgment. The right to so attack it may be exercised at any time before the infant attains his majority, or at any time afterwards within the period in which he may prosecute a writ of error for the reversal of such decree.

A decree is subject to attack by original bill for fraud, even after judgment in the appellate court; but a party, whether an infant or adult, against whom a decree is rendered by direction of the appellate court, cannot impeach it, by bill filed in the court of first instance, merely for errors apparent on the record, that do not involve the jurisdiction of either court.

An infant, by his prochein amy, having elected to prosecute an appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois from the decree rendered in the original suit brought by him, and having appeared by guardian ad litem to the appeal of the cross-plaintiffs in the same suit, is as much bound by the action

Statement of the Case.

of that court in respect to mere errors of law, not involving jurisdiction, as if he had been an adult when the appeal was taken.

In Illinois, a cross-bill is regarded as an adjunct or part of the original suit, the whole together constituting one case; and process against the plaintiff is not necessary upon a cross-bill, even where he is an infant. The plaintiff, by his bill, claimed to own certain real estate, by inheritance from his father, to whom the defendants had conveyed it by deed, absolute in form, and prayed for a decree confirming and establishing his title. The defendants, by cross-bill, alleged that the deed was made and accepted for the purpose of placing the title in trust for the benefit of one of the defendants, and asked a decree to that effect: Held, That the subject matter of the cross-bill was germane to that of the original bill. The statutes of Illinois, relating to suits by infants, are not to be interpreted to mean that no suit in the name of an infant, by next friend, can be entertained, unless such next friend is selected by the infant. Nor does the right to bring such a suit depend upon the execution by the next friend of a bond for costs; though he may be required to give such bond before the suit proceeds to final judgment and execution. While a guardian ad litem or prochein amy of an infant cannot, by admissions or stipulations in a suit in equity, surrender substantial rights of the infant, he may, by stipulation, assent to arrangements which will facilitate the trial and determination of the cause in which such rights are involved, and the infant will be bound thereby.

Appeals and writs of error may be taken to the Supreme Court of Illinois held in the grand division in which the case is decided, or, by consent of the parties, to any other grand division. A guardian ad litem or next friend of an infant may consent that the case, in which the infant is a party, be heard in some other grand division than the one in which it was decided, or at a term of the Supreme Court earlier than such appeal or writ of error would be ordinarily heard,' and may waive the execution of an appeal bond by the opposite party.

An appeal bond is not essential to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Illinois, any more than in this court, where the appeal is allowed and a transcript of the record is filed in due time; although the appeal may be dismissed, if such bond is not executed in accordance with the rules or the order of the court.

Case stated in which a husband is held not to be an incompetent witness, under the statutes of Illinois, in support of his wife's claim to property. Various charges of fraud and collusion upon the part of a guardian ad litem examined and held not to be sustained.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, on behalf of the court, stated the case as follows:

This suit involves the title to real estate of considerable value in the city of Chicago, of the ossession of which the

Statement of the Case.

appellant, who was the plaintiff below, claims to have been deprived by certain proceedings in the courts of Illinois, to which Simon B. Buckner, his wife and others were parties. The relief sought is a decree declaring those proceedings to have been erroneous, fraudulent, and void as to the plaintiff, and adjudging not only that such estate be restored to him, but that Buckner and wife be held as trustees ex maleficio, with liability to account for the income of the property.

The history of the plaintiff's claim to the property, as well as of the proceedings in the state courts, the integrity and legal effect of which are assailed in the present suit, must be given before examining the grounds on which he seeks a reversal of the decree.

Major Julius J. B. Kingsbury, of the United States army, died, intestate, on or about the 25th of June, 1856, seized of lots designated five and six in block thirty-five on the original map of the town of Chicago, and also of that part of the east half of the northwest quarter of section nine in township thirty-nine north, of range fourteen east of the third principal meridian, which lies east of the North Branch of the Chicago River and south of the centre of Ontario Street, in Cook County, excepting, however, a small portion of the last-named tract, previously conveyed by him to Buckner.

The intestate left surviving him his widow, Jane C. Kingsbury, and two children, Mrs. Buckner and Henry W. Kingsbury, the father of the appellant. These children were his only heirs at law.

.

By deed duly executed and acknowledged on the 15th of May, 1861, Buckner and wife, "in consideration of the sum of one dollar, and of the natural love and affection" of the grantors for the grantee, conveyed to Henry W. Kingsbury, the brother of Mrs. Buckner, and, at that time, a lieutenant in the United States army, one undivided half of the above lots five and six, and all their right, title and interest in the "Kingsbury tract," containing thirty-five acres, more or less, being the south half of what then remained of the northwest quarter of section nine, township thirty-nine, range fourteen, in Cook County, after deducting therefrom the town of Wabansia,