§ 49.

Results of attempt to

set up a law of interfer

internal

affairs of states.

The attempts to introduce into the European law of nations a right of interference in the internal affairs of other stat have come to the following results: (1.) ence in the England has constantly protested against such a principle, and has been scrupulous in placing her interventions on other grounds. When, in 1826, the government of that country, in accordance with ancient treaties and on application, sent troops to Portugal to sustain the regency there against the pretensions of Don Miguel, it was declared that nothing would be done to enforce the establishment of the constitution, but that others would be resisted in their attempts to overturn it. At that time it was said by Mr. Canning, in the House of Commons, that France had given to Great Britain cause of war by her violation, in 1823, of the independence of Spain. (2.) The principle has been applied only in the case of weaker nations; while the two French revolutions of 1830 and 1848, were allowed to take their course, and the revolutionary governments were soon acknowledged. (3.) France cannot, without gross inconsistency, accede to this principle. (4.) The principle, carried out, must bring Christian states into conflict; for the right of interfering in favor of liberty can be urged even on the ground of self-preservation, as well as that of interfering to put down popular movements, since free and despotical institutions must be dangerous to one another's existence. If the powers of Europe had been equally divided between constitutionalism and despotism, such a principle would not have been avowed, for it might work both ways. Its avowal, therefore, can be ascribed only to the consciousness of superior might. (5.) The interference, as it cannot prevent the moral and intellectual causes of revolution, by delay only embitters and fanaticizes its spirit. It leaves the payment of a debt at compound interest to posterity.

§ 50.

4. Interfer

ence in the

Belgic revo

lution of

1830.

The interference of the five great powers in the affairs of the Netherlands has some peculiar characteristics of its own. First, the kingdom had been constituted at the Congress of Vienna, out of Holland, Belgium, and certain neighboring duchies, as a kind of barrier between France and Germany. Fifteen years afterwards, on the outbreak of the July revolution in France, Belgium separated violently from the rest of the Netherlands, and it became evident that two such heterogeneous parts could not be welded together. The king of the Netherlands invoked the mediation of the five powers, who first procured an armistice between the parties, then in the character of unauthorized arbitrators laid down the terms of separation, and finally forced a compliance. The views that governed in the long negotiations, which finally lent the sanction of Europe to this divorce, are given at length by Dr. Wheaton in his "History of the Law of Nations," and are a most instructive chapter. Belgium acquired its independence with the rights and obligations of perpetual neutrality; a French prince was prevented from occupying its throne; the Scheldt, with other streams and canals common to Belgium and Holland, was to remain free; Antwerp, as by the terms of the peace of Paris in 1814, was to be a port without fortifications, and the territory of the new kingdom was confined within narrow bounds, because it was born in a revolution. Thus there was "a compromise in this case between the two principles which had so long menaced, by their apprehended collision, the established order and the general peace of Europe." Doubtless, if France itself had not just before asserted the right of revolution, the interference here would have been directed to the point of healing the schism in the Netherlands by main force.

§ 51.

Interference on the score of humanity or of religion can be justified only by the extreme circumstances of the case.

In

5. Interference on the score of re

humanity.

the age which succeeded the Reformation, both self-preservation and religious sympathies induced the Protestant states to aid one another against the superior ligion and of might of the Catholic, and to aid the votaries of their faith within Catholic countries, in order to secure for them freedom of worship. Elizabeth of England sent aid to the revolted Hollanders on religious grounds, and Cromwell's threats slackened the persecution of the Waldenses by the Duke of Savoy. In modern times, the interference of Great Britain, France, and Russia, on behalf of the Greeks, in 1827, was avowedly dictated by motives of humanity. The Greeks, after a bloody contest, had so far achieved their independence, that the Sultan could not reduce them. Accordingly his vassal, Mehemed Ali, of Egypt, was allured to send an army of subjugation into the Morea, and the atrocious scenes of fanatical war were renewed. The Greeks applied to France and England for help or mediation. At length, in consequence of the battle of Navarino, October 20, 1827, and the French occupation of the Morea, the Peninsula was evacuated by Mohammedan troops, and finally the independence of Greece was acknowledged. Dr. Wheaton says of these events that the Christian powers were eminently justified in their interference "to rescue a whole nation not merely from religious persecution, but from the cruel alternative of being transported from their native land into Egyptian bondage, or exterminated by their merciless oppressors. The rights of human nature—wantonly outraged by this cruel warfare — were but tardily and imperfectly vindicated by this measure, but its principle was fully justified by the great paramount law of self-preservation. Whatever a nation may lawfully defend for itself, it may defend for another if called on to interpose.' The interference of the Christian powers to put an end to this bloody contest, might therefore have been safely rested on this ground alone, without appealing to the interests of commerce and of the repose of Europe, which, as well as the interests of humanity, are alluded to in the treaty (for 1 Elements, Part II., chapter i., § 10.

the pacification of Greece, July 6, 1827), as the determining motives of the high contracting parties."

EQUALITY OF SOVEREIGN STATES.

§ 52.

Equality of

We have already explained equality to denote equality of rights. All sovereign states stand on the same level in this respect, the old and the new, large and states. small, monarchies and republics, — for the conception of a state to be applied to all is the same, and their sovereignty is the same. This, however, is not incompatible with special privileges of a commercial nature granted to one nation before another, or to superior rank in the ceremonial of courts.

tions.

Formerly the most punctilious rules of etiquette were observed at most of the courts of Europe. Gustavus Rank of naAdolphus, who said that all crowned heads were. equal, was one of the first, to despise pretensions of superiority. Rules are necessary to prevent ambassadors and their wives from contending for precedence, or feeling that an insult has been offered to them or their country. But with all the nicety of court etiquette, such quarrels have frequently taken place. Among the most noted of these disputes, was one of long continuance between the ambassadors of France and Spain.1 The place of France, until the sixteenth century, according to the ceremonial of the Romish See, had been next to that of the German emperor, but, as Charles V. was both emperor and king of Spain, his successor on the Spanish throne claimed precedence of other kings, and thus brought on a collision. At the Council of Trent the dispute rose to such a point that the French declared that they would renounce obedience to the Pope, if deprived of their place, and it was only settled by allowing the Frenchman to continue in his seat next to the Legate who presided, and the Spaniard to occupy a seat of eminence opposite to him. The most serious outbreak, how

1 See Ward's Hist., ii, 272 seq. (Dublin Ed.)

ever, of this rivalry occurred at London, in 1661, when, according to the usage of the time, the ambassadors went in procession to meet a newly arrived ambassador from Sweden. The ministers of both nations appeared with an armed retinue. As the Frenchman attempted to put his carriage next to that of the English king, the Spaniards raised a shout, scared the horses, and occupied the place. The French then fired upon them, and received back their fire, so that eight were killed and forty wounded in the encounter; but the Spaniards, having during the melée cut the ham-strings of the French horses, were able to secure the coveted precedence. Louis XIV. threatened war for this outrage, and thus forced the Spaniards into a declaration that their ambassador should never be present at ceremonies where a contest for rank could arise between them and the French.

According to the old rules of Europe, the Pope (whom Protestant nations and Russia regarded as only an Italian sovereign) ranked highest in dignity, the German emperor next, monarchies before republics, sovereigns before half-sovereigns, and princes of inferior name closed the list. The following order of rank emanated from the Roman court in 1504: the Roman emperor, king of Rome, king of France, of Spain, Arragon, Portugal, England, Sicily, Scotland, Hungary, Navarre, Cyprus, Bohemia, Poland, Denmark (with which Sweden and Norway were then united), the Venetian republic, the duke of Brittany, of Burgundy, Electors of Bavaria, Saxony, Brandenburg, archduke of Austria, duke of Savoy, grand duke of Florence, dukes of Milan, Bavaria, Lorraine, etc.1

The rules of late acted upon in regard to the rank of different states and of their sovereigns are, according to Heffter, the following:

Existing

rules of rank.

1. States to which, for themselves or for their sovereigns, royal honors pertain, have had an external rank before those to which these honors do not belong. Such honors are the right of sending ambassadors of the first class, the use of the royal title, crown and corresponding arms, and certain 1 Heffter, § 28, p. 49. Comp. Suppl. to Dumont, v., 202.