in providing these new services is that it generally takes 5 to 10 years from early planning to actual provision of transit service. Therefore, it is none to early to initiate the planning studies which this bill would encourage.

STATEMENT OF JOHN J. GRAHAM, BOSTON, Mass.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am John J. Graham. My address is 714 Park Square Building, 31 St. James Avenue, Boston 16, Mass.

Since October 1, 1957, I have been the trustee charged with administration and finance of the metropolitan transit authority, which operates rapid transit and bus service in the 14 cities and towns of the Greater Boston area. These views are mine. I am not speaking for the board of trustees. I have practiced in the field of transportation economics and administrative law for 14 years with experience before 18 State regulatory commissions as well as the Federal Commissions. I am a member, certified by examination, of the American Society of Traffic and Transportation.

The transportation facilities which serve the public in and around the large cities of our country are now suffering the results which were inevitable from continued and persistent lack of planning and administration, particularly since 1930. At each level of government, there has been a reluctance followed by a refusal to abide by the traditional principles that make up the public utility concept. For whatever reason, and most likely because of the desires of small and particular interest groups, public policy at the three levels of government has failed to discipline the public in its use of the modes of transportation as they have been successively made available to the public. The discipline would have come by a regulatory policy that would have preserved to each mode of transportation that portion of the transportation market which it could serve most economically and most efficiently.

The State and local levels of government followed the bad example of the Federal Government when the Congress separated the regulation of surface carriers from the regulation of air carriers. By instituting a substantially different and decidedly preferential treatment for air carriers, the Congress opened the door for condoning preferential treatment rather than a treatment based upon consistent and recognized principles of finance.

You cannot multiply your facilities and the choices of transportation modes without increasing the total costs. However these costs are assessed, they must ultimately be borne by the population to whom the services are offered. Both the Congress and State legislatures have sufficiently confused the ways in which motor vehicle and aircraft facilities are financed so that the public pays for these facilities regardless of the extent to which the public uses them, but the exact amount paid by the public is lost in the overall tax-collecting system.

For the most part, because rail and rapid transit facilities have not been included in Federal and State financing policies, the attention of the public has been not only drawn to the so-called deficit operations of these facilities, but actually the singling out of these operations by a most discriminatory government policy has overemphasized the deficits, so-called.

A public that pays for highway and airport facilities without complaining. and without comment becomes the complaining public when the unaided rail and rapid transit companies must live by attempting service curtailments and other methods of an austere survival.

In

A peculiar paradox presents itself to us. We have applied a type of thinking to metropolitan transit that we use for no other type of public service. No one would think of paying taxes for the support of public schools only to the extent that he used the schools. No one would think of paying for an airport only when he used an airline. The same is true of police, highway officers, highway construction, highway maintenance, public libraries, city hospitals, etc. other words, in a day when the overwhelming trend in government is toward offering services to all and obtaining payments for them on an ability-to-pay principle in such an era we single out metropolitan transit and say in effect this area and this area alone will be called upon to survive on a user-pay principle. And then by our actions we deprive these transit companies of as much regular traffic as possible by the formation of car pools and other illegal invasions of the passenger franchises. To a minimum of regular traffic we add all of the erratic and infrequent types of traffic and give this bundle to public transit. This heightens the difficulty of continuing privately operated facilities to the point of impossibility and, for the publicly-owned systems, it breeds per

petual dissatisfaction in the methods of apportioning operating costs in excess of fare-box revenues.

If this bill or one having similar provisions cannot be passed by the Congress, it would be necessary to repeal the highly discriminatory and unjust provisions of the present Federal highway program, and allied programs, because the latter have brought about not only unfair competition with metropolitan transit facilities but actually have challenged the financial survival of metropolitan transit facilities.

It is respectfully suggested that an amendment be inserted that would prescribe the method by which the coordination between the mass transportation facilities and services would be achieved.

While the sponsors of this measure are to be commended for showing desperately needed understanding towards the mass passenger operations, it would seem that $100 million spread over the existing needs of all the transit facilities in the country would be inadequate.

Alternately, the sum recommended in the bill could be enhanced in its effectiveness if present discriminatory grants were amended or repealed. This is a relative matter. Actually the existing law is presently acting to create greater imbalances than would or could possibly exist if all modes of transportation were left without Federal intervention.

Knowing that the Congress is continually flooded with requests for increases in appropriations, I sincerely suggest to them the alternative of creating more coordination than presently exists by quelling the discriminatory treatment of highway development at the expense of, and in duplication of, mass transit facilities.

Coordination of the most economic methods of affording transportation to the national population must involve a direction toward discipline. Multiplying the choices of modes of transportation necessarily involves the payment for the construction and maintenance of all modes without regard to the less-than-capacity use that the population can make of them.

Thank you very much for this opportunity of offering my views. I indeed appreciate the courtesy of the committee.

Senator WILLIAMS. I have some newspaper articles, one a series of three articles, which I will offer for the record. They have to do with the subject under discussion.

(The articles referred to follow :)

[From the New York Times, Mar. 2, 1959]

COMMUTER CRISIS TRACED TO UPHEAVALS OF AUTO AGE-SURVEY FINDS SUBURBAN SPRAWL REDUCES CITIES' ABILITY TO COPE WITH PROBLEM-DIVIDED AUTHORITY HINDERS CURE

This is the first of three articles on the growing commuter problem in the New York area and other cities

(By Harrison E. Salisbury)

Metropolitan New York is in the throes of a great revolution but few of the 15 million citizens have yet perceived its direction, momentum, and irresistible force.

Almost no one in the world's greatest city paints the words "commuter crisis" in hues of revolutionary scarlet. Few hear in the automobile horn the sound of a rebel tocsin.

To the Wall Streeter, commuter crisis is bumper-to-bumper traffic and the stench of exhaust fumes in the Jersey tunnels at 5 p.m.

To the Darien, Conn., housewife, commuter crisis is the 5:32-late again, too many martinis, dinner getting cold, short tempers, tears.

To Alfred E. Perlman of the New York Central, the words commuter crisis conjure up columns of red ink in the company ledgers.

To the Fifth Avenue merchant, commuter crisis means fewer customers through the big plate-glass doors, high-cost satellite stores in the suburbs.

To the huge public transport authorities, commuter crisis adds up to jingling coins in the turnstiles, the smiles of the bankers, new plans for super-superhighways and super-superbond issues.

To plain people and politicians of New York alike, commuter crisis spells a pain in the neck. Aspirin does not help. If only some morning it would vanish like a bad dream.

The reasons why commuter crisis does not, will not, and cannot simply vanish have been made apparent in an extensive survey by the New York Times. The survey has been directed not just at surface symptoms-traffic jams, arthritic railroad finances, archaic trade systems, suburban growing pains, and cancerous city blight-but also at root social changes in New York City and other large American cities.

The survey's focus has been on the mid-20th century transformation of America's way of living, which underlies the deepening crisis of population movements in, out, and through cities.

In this article, the general nature of the crisis and its causes are outlined.

A WIDESPREAD PROBLEM

It is not just a New York crisis. The same thing in one form or another afflicts every big city in the United States. A look at Los Angeles discloses the end result of irresponsible, uncontrolled urban mobility. Los Angeles has been described as a jellylike glob of humanity oozing through a sea of smog on creaking wheels. By contrast, New York, for all of its defects, is in fine shape.

Luther Gulick, urban specialist, describes what has happened in these words: "We have exploded into a new era in America, characterized by a new pattern of settlement, the vast sprawling metropolis."

Francis Bello, another student of cities, says:

"Of all the forces reshaping the American metropolis, the most powerful and insistent are those rooted in the changing modes of transportation. The changes are so big and obvious that it is easy to forget how remarkable they are." Indeed, the changes are no longer confined to North America.

London, for example, is developing every symptom of the commuter crisis that has overtaken New York City. London transit-both underground and bus-is beset by the familiar phenomenon of falling passenger traffic and declining revenues. Only Moscow still stands aloof from the weal and woe of the auotomotive revolution, probably because it has so few autos that more are stolen each year in the United States than are produced in the Soviet Union.

GIANT SOCIAL CHANGES

Compare today's habits, conventions and technology for urban living with those 25 years ago. It is immediately apparent that social change is occurring on a scale that dwarfs even Lenin's overthrow of the czars in Russia.

Faced with phenomena affecting so many lives so broadly and so deeply it is no surprise that the rickety Victorian structure of government-erected on longvanished terrestrial lines that once divided a trading village, a mill site, a region of farms and orchards-is unable to meet the challenges of the new civilization.

And if the crisscross palimpsest of government structures, conceived to meet flounders in the fumes of the gasoline revolution, it is small wonder that the steam-and-iron corporations called into being by the Vanderbilts, the Goulds, and the Fisks thrash about in desperate agony.

Faced with a genuine revolutionary challenge, old regimes-whether of technology or of government-inevitably collapse unless they are capable of internal and external regeneration and reinvigoration.

The instrument of this 20th century revolution is neither bomb nor manifesto. It is the gasoline combustion engine. There is hardly an element of the American scene more ordinary and commonplace. But the changes it is wreaking are irreversible and without limit.

THE TIME CONSIDERED

No scheme for efficient, economic and comfortable metropolitan transportation, the survey suggests, can be successful unless it is conceived and executed in the spirit of the times. And these are times of metamorphosis at a fearsome

momentum.

A patch on the tattered finances of the railroads, a tax cushion here, a new tunnel there, a rebuilt West Side highway this year, a crosstown expressway 3 years hence, all these may be badly needed. But they can hardly be described as more than placebos for the chronic illness symptomized by commuter crisis. Thirty years ago New York, like most large American cities, was an articulated whole. It consisted of an inner-core city, congested in some parts, but well served by underground and surface transit. A ring of suburbs and satel

lites, like Newark and Yonkers, was knit together by an intricate network of commuting trains, ferries and feeder services. The population pattern fitted the transportation arteries. That is how it had grown up.

The system was not perfect. The links to the Jersey side across the Hudson River (with no bridges and no vehicular tunnels) were notably deficient. Indeed, it was the malfunctioning of the Jersey connections 40 years ago that called into being the Port of New York Authority.

The first great achievement of the port authority was to draft a magnificent and detailed plan for the coordination and consolidation of the metropolitan area's transportation facilities-particularly the railroads and ferry servicesunder its aegis.

Today the authority has a notable record for efficient construction and tidy finance. But its officials fight every effort to place in their capable hands the very transport problem that the authority was created to solve the coordination of New Jersey-New York wheeled movements.

AROUND THE CENTRAL CITY

Twenty-five years ago New York City had a population of about 7 million. Half as many more people lived in the metropolitan area. All but a handful used public transportation. The key to their lives-work, business, shopping, entertainment-was the central city. It was not the convention for New Yorkers to own cars. Suburbanites had cars. Cars were not generally driven into the city-except for a comparative handful, many of which were chauffeur operated.

Today Metropolitan New York is still a dynamic, rapidly spawning urban complex. But the growth of the urban center has halted. It has begun to shrink like the core of a wind-fallen Northern Spy.

While outer areas-notably Long Lsland and Jersey-are the locales of turbulent growth, the inner city slides back. This pattern, and its attenuation in the years ahead, flows from the automobile and the new way of middle-income life in the suburbs and semisuburbs that it has brought about. Shorter working hours, the 5-day week, longer vacations accentuate the automobile's effect.

The changing pattern of New York regional population is clearly shown by this table, prepared by the New York Department of City Planning from its own figures and those of the Regional Plan Association:

The shift in relative weight of each area within the metropolitan whole is shown by these figures from the same source:

These figures indicate that 4 million people will flood into the metropolitan area in the next 15 years. But it will be a most uneven flood. New Jersey (the 10 northern counties) and New York's Rockland and Orange Counties will expand by 2,400,000. Long Island and Westchester-Fairfield County will share most of the remainder. The inner city will lose. Only the outer quasi-suburbs like Queens and Staten Island will grow.

SELF-CONTAINED POPULATION

The bulk of growth in the outer suburban ring will be self-contained population-persons who want to live near the city but who do not work in the central city, do not shop in the central city, do not amuse themselves in the central city. Whenever these persons travel, they travel by car.

Almost imperceptibly New York is being surrounded by the same kind of spongy population dough that has turned Los Angeles into "goo"-on-wheels. This is dramatically shown in the case of New Jersey.

Despite an enormous increase in Jersey's segment of the area's population, there has been an absolute decline in commuting across the Hudson and only a modest increase in overall trans-Hudson traffic to New York City.

Weekday commuting from Jersey across the Hudson has dropped from a daily average of 161,000 in 1925 to a daily average of 151,000 in 1955. Total travel across the Hudson inched upward from 233 million in 1925 to 282 million 30 years later.

To what extent the withering of New York's Jersey limb can be attributed to the inhibiting effects of complex and uncomfortable transportation (only in recent years ameliorated by modern auto facilities) cannot be estimated.

But the hard figures of Jersey give little confidence that the commuter crisis will be solved by more and newer super-highways, bridges, tunnels, and other steel-and-concrete means and nothing more. Concept as well as construction will be required.

Huge sums have been spent to build magnificent traffic centers across the Hudson. There is enormous movement of people between Jersey and Manhattan. But the movement has not grown consonant with the increase in population. There seems to be an absolute decrease in the number of persons who live in Jersey and work on the New York side.

MOVEMENT IS SLIPPING

Indeed there are indications that the overall movement of people in and out of New York City is slipping. The Regional Plan Association estimates that about 3,271,000 persons entered the city daily in 1940. The total was up to 3,682,000 by 1948. By 1956, it has been unofficially estimated at less than 3,500,000.

Of this total, the number of commuters is usually estimated at a little more than 10 percent. Most current estimates of commuters place them at 370,000 to 400,000. However, some statistical evidence indicates that here may be many more if odd-hour commuting is considered-possibly as many as 500,000 to 600,000. Regardless of the precise figure, it is apparent that life in the metropolitan area is taking on a new pattern-one sharply different from that previously known.

Greater and greater masses of people are living in a half-city, half-country environment in an area 20 to 75 miles outside the city core. They are spread unevenly over the landscape. They are gradually transfroming the whole northeastern coastal area into a supermetropolis from Boston south to Richmond and west to Philadelphia and including Washington.

Population movement within this area is free and frenetic. Most of it is on rubber tires.

These people are only dependent upon the metropolitan cores on a secondary basis. They depend on the core for banking utilities, distribution, skilled services, medicine, education, information and a multitude of other facilities, including basic transportation. But of this they have little awareness.

The underlying change in social habits of which this fatty metropolitan tissue is evidence has been accelerated by the enormous growth of leisure time in the last 25 years.

A generation ago most New Yorkers worked 6 days a week. Sunday recreation was in city theaters, city parks, city ball clubs, and city beaches.