does not necessarily govern here. It depends on the manner in which they were built. Of course, you show a good many things in these pictures that indicate that they were not intended to be permanent at the time they were built.

Mr. HATCHER. Those buildings were originally constructed in Windham, Ohio, knocked down and shipped into the township because they were surplus in Windham.

Senator SPARKMAN. Who negotiated the contract?

Mr. BARNES. PHA.

Senator SPARKMAN. They simply made the offer? It was not a question of two sides negotiating for it?

Mr. BARNES. Oh, yes, there was an appraisal.

Senator SPARKMAN. Who negotiated on behalf of the cooperative, their officials?

Mr. BARNES. I do not believe there were any negotiations. The price was set by appraisal.

Senator SPARKMAN. The price was set and the agreement was made?

Mr. BARNES. Yes.

Senator CLARK. In those cases, Mr. Chairman, my recollection is that they put it up to the cooperative at least this has been our experience on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and then if the cooperative leaves it some slum landlord goes in there, and look out.

Senator SPARKMAN. Is there anything else?

Mr. BARNES. Shall I go through and point out to you why these buildings are temporary in nature?

Senator SPARKMAN. I do not think it is necessary. We have seen the pictures, and I think that is pretty conclusive.

You have not joined in here, sir. I do not recall your name offhand.

Mr. HARRIS. My name is Reuben Harris, manager of this project. Senator SPARKMAN. You are manager of the project?

Mr. HARRIS. That is right.

Senator SPARKMAN. You agree with what has been said?

Mr. HARRIS. I totally agree.

Senator SPARKMAN. You are right there with this day in and day out?

Mr. HARRIS. That is right.

Senator SPARKMAN. And all of you gentlemen feel that it is not suitable for rehabilitation?

Mr. HATCHER. Waste of money.

Mr. BARNES. We have reports, not made by us but by engineers operating for the township, to show these are absolutely not rehabilitable, and our own engineer came to the same conclusion. Recently we had six fires out there and our insurance has been canceled.

Senator CLARK. Actually, if you had enforcement of modern building and housing codes you would be required to shut down the projects, would you not?

Mr. BARNES. That is right.

Senator SPARKMAN. Did you say your insurance had been canceled? Mr. BARNES. Yes, sir, and we have had to go to Lloyd's of London. Senator SPARKMAN. There is no insurance on it now?

Mr. BARNES. The cancellation goes in effect on June 1, and we have to go to a company which reinsures through Lloyd's of London to get insurance out there, because none of the other companies will accept it.

Senator SPARKMAN. Offhand it seems to me that a bad deal was made and that the Government ought to exercise good conscience in making it correct. We will see what the Government officials have to say when they appear here on May 26.

Thanks very much to you gentlemen, all of you.

Senator Clark is going to have to leave the committee very shortly, and in order to accommodate him we are going to call the witnesses a little out of order. I have been assured that these witnesses will be quite brief in their presentations.

First, will Lieutenant General Huebner come around?

We are glad to see you, sir. Will you proceed in your own way. Senator JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce General Huebner as one of our most distinguished citizens. General Huebner is now director of our State civil defense commission. He has had a very illustrious record as an Army officer. The commanded the 5th Corps at the end of the war, promoted to lieutenant general in 1947; was deputy commander in chief of the European Command; commanding general, U.S. Army, Europe; and acting military governor and commander in chief of the European Command from May 1949 to September 1949. He retired in 1950. We are glad to get him in New York, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPARKMAN. That ought to be a good sendoff, General. We are all familiar, of course, with your very fine record in the Army prior to your retirement, and we have known something about your work in the State of New York since that time.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. C. R. HUEBNER (U.S. ARMY, RETIRED), DIRECTOR, NEW YORK STATE CIVIL DEFENSE COMMISSION

General HUEBNER. Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee on Housing, it is both a pleasure and privilege to appear before you to discuss S. 1680, which would amend the Housing Act of 1949 for the purpose of permitting the increase of an urban renewal capital grant by an amount equal to the cost of providing civil defense facilities.

The proposed measure, insofar as it pertains to fallout shelters, is of vital significance to the people of the State of New York, and is in full accord with Gov. Nelson A. Rockefeller's repeated expressions of concern for the construction of civil defense shelter facilities in our urban areas.

Civil defense, or nonmilitary defense, is an essential component of overall national defense. Its basic purpose is to protect and assist our people who may be exposed to the effects of wartime attack. Toward this end, it provides an organized means with tested procedures for mobilizing our people and resources to perform these tasks which are essential to the preservation of our society and its economic structure in time of war, in order to meet the civilian needs and to furnish assistance to our Armed Forces.

The experience in civil defense in the past was based on actions. taken when our Nation was protected from attack by two oceans. Some of the present thinking regrettably, continues along such obsolete lines. The rapid advances in weaponry and delivery systems since World War II have completely changed the basic requirements of civil defense. Now, our Nation is exposed to attack, and the very oceans which once protected us are now avenues of danger. Unless our assumptions are radically wrong, the chances are that the United States may become a major battlefield in the next war.

Strangely, despite the apparent threat to our survival as a free nation, many of our citizens are either behind the time or defeatists. They think of civil defense either in terms of their experiences in World War II, or they have adopted a fatalistic attitude that our country would be subjected to annihilation and therefore nothing can be done to save ourselves.

There is no doubt that war would be a major disaster. However, the magnitude of disaster can be markedly limited by protective measures. Such protective measures are the responsibility of the Government-and I would like to repeat that, of the Government— at all levels.

Civil defense is civil government at war. It calls for the extension of peacetime government under wartime conditions with the necessary shift of emphasis and priority to those tasks which will enable us to survive and win the war. Civil defense directors are the coordinators of this vital governmental activity.

To discharge its wartime responsibilities, government at all levels must have a plan of action. Such plans now exist. At the national level, the National Plan for Civil Defense and Defense Mobilization was promulgated in October 1958.

In New York we have the State civil defense plan, plans for each of the 12 target-support areas, and also plans for each of our cities and counties. These plans, required by the New York State Defense Emergency Act, are integrated plans, and we are presently training within the framework of them in order that the assigned responsibilities can be carried out effectively in the event of an emergency.

For purposes of command-control, the State is divided and organized into 12 target-support areas. These areas are built around the target cities and consist of counties and cities assigned to support each such target city.

The State and local plans cover six general areas: detection-warning, information, shelter, use of warning time, rescue and relief operations, and recovery after attack. Except in the area of detection-warning, where we are dependent initially upon the North American Air Defense Command, all of the remaining areas are responsibilities of civil defense and, therefore, of government. With the exception of shelter, advances have been consistently made in all of these areas; and I am confident further programs will be made, since this is within the scope and range of our capabilities.

True, a large gap exists in the area of shelter. Yet, shelter is the key to our whole effort. It will enable us to survive and live through the emergency. There is no need to discuss here why the gap exists. While we cannot do anything about the past in this connection, we can do something about the future. This is why I am here today

before your subcommittee-to lend my voice and support to the proposal under consideration. It is a positive step forward in eliminating the gap in our civil defense effort.

In the immediate area of a nuclear detonation, nearly all life would be destroyed by blast, thermal effect, and prompt or initial nuclear radiation, and only those people who are secure in strong, blast proof shelters would have any chance of survival. In a much larger area, distant from the detonation, there would be widespread death and injury occurring over a period of days or weeks as a result of radioactive fallout. This area could extend for hundreds of miles away from the point of the weapon's burst. While it is extremely difficult to protect people against the immediate closein effects of nuclear detonation, it is entirely feasible to protect them against radioactive fallout if protection is planned and adequate shelters have been provided.

No one can predict exactly where or when the fallout will occur. This will depend on the site of each bomb burst, the height of the explosion, weather at the time, size and weight of the radioactive particles, strength and direction of the winds, and a number of other factors. Of course, this will require an adequate radiation detection and evaluation service.

What can be predicted with certainty is, in the event of a major nuclear attack on continental United States, every urban and rural community could be threatened by fallout. The most intense radiation from fallout may occur as many as 75 miles from the site of a bomb burst and radiation of fatal intensity can be expected, largely downwind but following a certain pattern, hundreds of miles away from the scene of the burst.

Without protection from this fallout, the death toll from radiation could be several times greater than the total number of deaths attributable to the blast and heat effects of the detonated weapons.

The nature of the threat posed by radioactive fallout was demonstrated forcefully in New York State in the recent nationwide civil training exercise known as Operation Alert 1960, in which the State was hypothetically subjected to 12 nuclear strikes. Based on the types and sizes of the nuclear explosions and the concentrations of population in the areas attacked, the dead from lethal radioactive fallout numbered over 5 million out of a total of 9 million killed from all causes. Nearly all of those killed by radiation could have been saved had the people been in adequate shelters.

If a large percentage of those killed directly from the effects of radioactive fallout had had the protection of family fallout shelters until radiation intensities had dropped to safe levels, these people would have lived. They might have been mildly uncomfortable for a few days, but with the recommended supply of food stocks and water in the shelters they would have survived. In most instances, with some decontamination work, normal recovery in the communities in which they lived would have been possible within a matter of a few days at the most.

Radiation from fallout presents a massive threat to target and nontarget areas alike. There is no place in our State, and for that matter in the Nation, sufficiently remote from a possible target to be free of the threat posed by fallout. Fortunately, satisfactory protection from fallout can be obtained by relatively simple means.

Three basic characteristics of fallout make protection possible: (1) Radiation diminishes with the passage of time through a natural process of decay; (2) it is reduced with distance; and (3) its penetration can be lessened by shielding. Shielding offers the most direct protection and permits taking advantage also of the decay reduction factor at the most vital and crucial time-the first few hours and days after attack.

Shelters provide not only the best form of shielding but also a most effective approach with regard to the time and distance factors. A system of shelters in places of residence designed to protect the family is the key to the problem. Most people spend the largest part of their time at or near their homes, and a great many people can get home in time to take shelter in the event of an emergency. The emphasis on home shelters is buttressed by the fact that a considerable time interval exists between the initial burst of a nuclear weapon and the arrival of fallout at locations far enough away where there are likely to be large numbers of survivors. This interval of time will vary from about 1 hour for the closer in surviving communities to 8 to 10 hours or more for the most distant locations. The time interval depends on several factors: (1) the distance from the burst, (2) size of the weapon, and (3) prevailing winds and weather conditions. Existence of this delay is very important because, even if there should be little or no warning time prior to attack, authorities agree that in planning a protection program it is reasonable to assume that those who survive the immediate blast and heat will have about 1 hour to go to their homes or other places for protection from fallout.

To meet all these conditions will require a wide range in shelter design and a flexibility in the use of materials. Size and the degree of comfort or simplicity can be varied to satisfy individual needs and desires. Where possible, fallout protection should be combined with normal day-to-day requirements and with employment of space in both new and existing buildings.

Very strong underground shelters, impervious to blast, heat, and radiation, could save some people even in the blast area, but it would be difficult to save those close to the point of detonation. This area of great devastation could extend out a number of miles with large weapons. No one, however, can tell in advance where the bursts will be or where those areas are in which people would survive the bursts.

Many assume that the bursts would be in the vicinity of military installations and within the larger cities. Taking into account the possible variations in enemy objectives, errors in aiming, defense measures, and other variables, one cannot at all be sure that urban populations will be completely obliterated by blast and heat. Many people in urban areas could survive even if they had fallout protection. This is also true in rural sections which are not in themselves target

areas.

It is essential, therefore, to provide fallout protection for urban, suburban, and rural areas alike throughout the Nation and State so that the people who survive the bursts would be protected from the ensuing fallout. This includes our largest city, New York. Unques