Regulating Toxic Substances: A Philosophy of Science and the LawOxford University Press, 1993. gada 18. febr. - 272 lappuses The proliferation of chemical substances in commerce poses scientific and philosophical problems. The scientific challenge is to develop data, methodologies, and techniques for identifying and assessing toxic substances before they cause harm to human beings and the environment. The philosophical problem is how much scientific information we should demand for this task consistent with other social goals we might have. In this book, Cranor utilizes material from ethics, philosophy of law, epidemiology, tort law, regulatory law, and risk assessment, to argue that the scientific evidential standards used in tort law and administrative law to control toxics ought to be evaluated with the purposes of the law in mind. Demanding too much for this purpose will slow the evaluation and lead to an excess of toxic substances left unidentified and unassessed, thus leaving the public at risk. Demanding too little may impose other costs. An appropriate balance between these social concerns must be found. Justice requires we use evidentiary standards more appropriate to the legal institutions in question and resist the temptation to demand the most intensive scientific evaluation of each substance subject to legal action. |
No grāmatas satura
1.–5. rezultāts no 88.
vii. lappuse
... problems pressing upon government institutions are being driven by technological advances . Legislative and regulatory assumptions made years ago are being con- stantly challenged as technological advances allow more sensitive ...
... problems pressing upon government institutions are being driven by technological advances . Legislative and regulatory assumptions made years ago are being con- stantly challenged as technological advances allow more sensitive ...
viii. lappuse
... problem . The basic challenge to the current process raised in this book deserves some attention and debate : whether we ought to require the same scientific rigor in the legal process which we would apply in the laboratory . We need to ...
... problem . The basic challenge to the current process raised in this book deserves some attention and debate : whether we ought to require the same scientific rigor in the legal process which we would apply in the laboratory . We need to ...
xii. lappuse
... problems . Alternative procedures seemed to be needed . Continued support from the National Science Foundation permitted me to address some of the legal and institutional issues . A 1989 appointment to California's Proposition 65 ...
... problems . Alternative procedures seemed to be needed . Continued support from the National Science Foundation permitted me to address some of the legal and institutional issues . A 1989 appointment to California's Proposition 65 ...
xv. lappuse
... Problems with the Science of Carcinogen Risk Assessment , " PSA 1988 , Vol . 2 , pp . 467-88 . Sections of Chapter 2 draw from " Scientific and Legal Standards of Statistical Evidence in Toxic Tort and Discrimi- nation Suits , " Law and ...
... Problems with the Science of Carcinogen Risk Assessment , " PSA 1988 , Vol . 2 , pp . 467-88 . Sections of Chapter 2 draw from " Scientific and Legal Standards of Statistical Evidence in Toxic Tort and Discrimi- nation Suits , " Law and ...
xvii. lappuse
... Problems in the Statistics of Human Epidemiological Studies and Animal Bioassays , 29 Discovering Risks , 29 Practical Evidence - Gathering Problems , 30 Theoretical Difficulties , 31 Traditional Practices in Interpreting ...
... Problems in the Statistics of Human Epidemiological Studies and Animal Bioassays , 29 Discovering Risks , 29 Practical Evidence - Gathering Problems , 30 Theoretical Difficulties , 31 Traditional Practices in Interpreting ...
Saturs
3 | |
1 The Scientific Background | 12 |
2 Scientific Evidence in the Tort Law | 49 |
3 Joint Causation Torts and Administrative Law in Environmental Health Protections | 83 |
4 Scientific Procedures in Regulatory Agencies | 103 |
5 Epistemic and Moral Justification | 152 |
Notes | 179 |
Uncertainties in Carcinogen Risk Assessments | 221 |
Cancer Potency Estimates of CDHS and EPA | 222 |
Relative Risk as a Function of Alpha and Beta Values | 225 |
Statutes Authorizing Regulation of Carcinogens | 229 |
Derivation of TDsub50 Potency Values | 230 |
Bibliography | 231 |
Index | 243 |
Citi izdevumi - Skatīt visu
Regulating Toxic Substances: A Philosophy of Science and the Law Carl F. Cranor Ierobežota priekšskatīšana - 1993 |
Regulating Toxic Substances: A Philosophy of Science and the Law Carl F. Cranor Ierobežota priekšskatīšana - 1993 |
Bieži izmantoti vārdi un frāzes
AFL-CIO animal bioassays appropriate argue argument Benzene bioassays Black burden of production burden of proof California cancer Carcinogen Risk Assessment carcinogens cause Chapter chemical choice concern considerations court Cranor decision discussion disease environmental health epidemiological studies estimates evaluation expedited expert exposed exposure to toxic false negatives false positives Federal Ferebee harm Hazard health protections Ibid identified industry inference injuries institutions issues joint causation Journal jury Law Review leukemia mistakes models normative null hypothesis Occupational Safety opportunity OSHA OSHA's overregulation plaintiff potency present principle problems reasons regulatory false regulatory law relative risk require research science risk assessment risk assessment procedures risk management risks to human rule Safety and Health scientific evidence scientists standards of evidence statistical statutes substantial suggests theory Theory of Justice tion tort law tort suits toxic substances toxic tort typically U.S. Congress uncertainty underregulation utilitarian workplace health
Populāri fragmenti
67. lappuse - If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise...
205. lappuse - Unreasonable adverse effects on the environment The term "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment" means any unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into account the economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide.
59. lappuse - Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while Courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which...
109. lappuse - ... to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period of his working life.
149. lappuse - Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on the basis of the judges' personal policy preferences. In contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform its judgments.
197. lappuse - if scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise...
214. lappuse - ... unsupported by substantial evidence in any case subject to the requirements of sections 7 and 8 or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or (6), unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court. In making the foregoing determinations the court shall review the whole record or such portions thereof as may be cited by any party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.
16. lappuse - In the absence of adequate data on humans, it is reasonable, for practical purposes, to regard chemicals for which there is sufficient evidence of carcinogenicity in animals as if they presented a carcinogenic risk to humans.
Atsauces uz šo grāmatu
Reclaiming the Environmental Debate: The Politics of Health in a Toxic Culture Richard Hofrichter Ierobežota priekšskatīšana - 2000 |