focusing of the effort that we contract to industry would be able to yield us results within a year or two and begin to pay off. I would predict that the center, in terms of its salary and overhead and facilities, even if you write off the longer range research contribution, will pay for itself in terms of the reliability factor that it can add to the overall programs. Colonel GOULD. Can you put your finger on any on-going programs with NASA that will be delayed if this project were deferred for 1 year! Dr. KELLEY. Will be delayed? We have not tied this into any particular project. If you want to look at schedules and launches, probably none. If you want to look at effectiveness per launch or reliability per launch, quite a bit. Mr. KARTH. You think that one more laboratory is going to answer all of our electronic problems! Is that what you are saying? Dr. KELLEY. It is going to allow us to focus our efforts and industry's efforts on the problems which are quite substantial. We have to really get working in this particular area. Mr. KARTH. So what you are saying is that all of the research that is going on in this area, in private industry, in Government laboratories, and in the universities, is completely inadequate and the answers will be given to the problem areas we now find ourselves facing by building a NASA laboratory? Do you really mean that? Dr. KELLEY. This, is by far the most efficient way of doing it. I don't really know how else you are going to do it if we don't increase our efforts in electronic research Mr. KARTH. I think I can tell you several ways I think it would be much more efficient, but I am not sure you would listen. One thing I think we should do, Dr. Kelley, is to find out first, all of the research that is going on in the electronics industry in this country, which I am sure we don't have. I am sure of that, and I think you being an honest man, will admit it. So by saying that just one more laboratory is going to solve 95 percent of the problems that we have in the space field, I think is just about as ridiculous a statement as I ever heard before this committee. Really, I say this in wanting to be completely and totally objective. With all of the research that is going on in Government laboratories, if we don't have a half dozen laboratories doing research in electronics, I'd be surprised. We have got quite a number of outstanding Government laboratories doing a great deal of work in this area. We have a number of outstanding universities and colleges doing a great deal of research in this area. We have a vast number of very highly touted and well-respected companies doing great research in this area, and to say that just one more Government laboratory will answer our problems, I think is, quite frankly, tantamount to striking this thing from the budget. I really think so. Dr. KELLEY. Could I make a comment ? Mr. SMITH. Yes, sir; go right ahead. Dr. KELLEY. We know there is an extensive industry and university effort, and we believe that the laboratory will serve to focus this effort on the particular space problems. It is not going to provide all of the answers, itself. It is going to be able to focus the problem for the people who are going to do the work in industry and universities with some work being done in the laboratory, itself, and then focus the answers back into the space projects. Mr. KARTH. Doctor, there are those who say this kind of work should be done at the various centers, where the research can be applicable to the projects that that Center is working on, and they make a very, very strong case. So these are some of the people who disagree with you and others who say we need a separate, a distinctly different type of research facility than we now have, because we now have 50 electronic research centers going on within NASA. We have one at every one of our research centers. I am not complaining, I am just saying this has been called to my attention. They say "Good grief, if we need more electronic research in the satellite field, or in the manned spacecraft field, or whatever field it is, then this kind of research should be going on at the center where the people concern themselves with the problems confronting them in that particular area." I don't know if this makes a reasonably good argument. I don't suppose it makes a good argument to those who favor the separate center, you know, but, on the other hand, your argument doesn't make much sense to them, either. The only point I do make, Doctor, and this is what I really object to, someone assuming that we are so naive and so completely unqualified to make decent and accurate and well-founded judgments, that we should be told that unless we have just one more Government laboratory our problems in electronics are going to continue to harass us forever, and that if we do have that laboratory our problems are going to vanish. If it is that necessary, why, good grief, someone should be fired for not having proposed this thing 5 years ago. This should have been the first thing NASA ever requested. If this thing is so absolutely imperative today, it would have been better to cut off the funds to any one of our other research centers, or maybe all of them, and put all of our emphasis on this thing in earlier years. I think with the emphasis now being put on it, someplace along the line someone that was responsible for making this determination a long time ago should be fired because he obviously didn't make it. More important than that, he may have made a determination, but made the wrong one, and decided not to build it until this year. Someplace along the line we have a great need for improvement in management. Colonel GOULD. One final question. You have included in the project estimate, $2 million for design and engineering. I assume this is all design in this case. What is the leadtime for design on the first increment that will be accomplished for this $2 million? Dr. KELLEY. This is for master planning and to plan our 1965 facilities. Colonel GOULD. What is the leadtime? Dr. KELLEY. You mean leadtime from when to when? Colonel GOULD. How long is it going to take to complete the master plan? Dr. KELLEY. To do this work? Colonel GOULD. Yes. Dr. KELLEY. About 3 to 5 months. You see, we are working with the corps right now in getting together technical criteria for the particular buildings. And then they will be working in terms of this master planning and the corps itself may do the master planning on this particular activity. At such times as these funds are available, or would be available, then we would go into a site selection and begin to narrow down on a particular site and design for a particular site. Colonel GOULD. Are you saying that a complete master plan for an installation of this nature can be laid out to include schedule of existing and required facilities, preliminary costs, utility layouts and costs estimates made in 3 to 5 months? Dr. KELLEY. This is the initial master plan from which then we would you are more familiar with this than I am-from which point we would depart into details for our 1965 increment. You are doing master planning all of the time as you go along. Colonel GOULD. The master plan is the first thing that should be accomplished in any installation. I think this is one of your basic problems with many of the NASA installations. Master plans are made up on a year-to-year basis to cover projects being programed. But you say 3 to 5 months you would have your initial increments of the master plan? Dr. KELLEY. I would expect that. Let me say enough so we could then begin to zero it on a 1965 facilities plan. Mr. KARTH. Anything, Doctor, that you would like to add to this thing before we conclude? Dr. KELLEY. No, sir. Mr. KARTH. Mr. Myers, anything you would like to add? Mr. MYERS. No, sir; I have nothing to add. Mr. KARTH. If not, the meeting is adjourned. 1964 NASA AUTHORIZATION WEDNESDAY, MAY 8, 1963 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ADVANCED RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY, The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., Hon. Joseph E. Karth (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding, in room 214-B, Longworth House Office Building. Mr. KARTH. The meeting will be in order. Mr. Gough, are you ready to proceed, sir? Mr. GOUGH. Yes, sir. Mr. KARTH. Would you and Mr. Goodrich care to take the witness chairs. Briefly, the reason the subcommittee found it necessary to ask FAA to testify today is that about a week or two ago we heard from representatives of NASA in the Office of Advanced Research and Technology on the NASA request for some $9 million for research in direct support of the supersonic aircraft. We noted that FAA, for example, in their fiscal 1964 budget proposal, did not ask for any funds for the supersonic transport, and our curiosity was aroused. NASA explained that the reason they were requesting funds this year was because the organic act gave them the right to engage in all basic research. This subcommittee, I believe, agrees, that as a result of this provision in the organic act it was NASA's responsibility to proceed in this fashion. Since that time, however, the subcommittee became aware of the fact that some 2 years ago the FAA, as they appeared before the Appropriations Committee, requested a 2-year appropriation for a feasibility study on the supersonic transport. This feasibility study was to answer questions on the feasibility of the Government support for the development of a supersonic transport, especially in the basic research area. Until such a study is completed, and the President makes a national policy decision, this committee questions the wisdom of granting the funds requested by NASA for direct support of the supersonic transport. For that reason we felt it necessary to call FAA officials before the subcommittee to give us the benefit of their viewpoint. If you have a prepared statement, sir, and you would like to proceed please do so in any manner you wish. STATEMENT OF MELVIN N. GOUGH, DIRECTOR, AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT SERVICE, FEDERAL AVIATION AGENCY; ACCOMPANIED BY NATHANIEL H. GOODRICH, GENERAL COUNSEL Mr. GOUGH. Thank you, sir. I do have a prepared statement, and I hope you have a copy there. It has four attachments. In keeping with your request, as I understood it, when I received it verbally, I have prepared this statement to clarify the points that I think you have just made. Shall I read it, sir? Mr. KARTH. If you like; however, if you would like to sum marize Mr. GOUGH. I think it would be helpful to read it. I consider it very short. Mr. KARTH. All right, sir. Please proceed. Mr. GOUGH. Thank you. In the initial consideration of the supersonic transport question in the executive branch of the Government in this administration it became readily apparent that three agencies within the executive branch had statutory responsibilities, technical competence and background experience directly applicable to the determination of the Government's role and responsibilities in supersonic transport development. These agencies are: The Department of Defense, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Federal Aviation Agency. In the interest of efficient and expeditious action it was decided that the three agencies would jointly proceed in a cooperative effort in the public interest to make a recommendation to the President with regard to supersonic transport development in the United States. Accordingly, the Secretary of Defense; the Administrator, NASA; and the Administrator, FAA; published a commercial supersonic transport aircraft report in June of 1961, which analyzed the problem and set forth the basic concepts and principles for the joint effort, including a definition of the roles and broad responsibilities of the three agencies in this joint undertaking. That is exhibit 1, and I think you gentlemen have one of those. This was in June of 1961. (Exhibit 1, "Commercial Supersonic Transport Aircraft Report," issued jointly by DOD, NASA, and FAA in June 1961 is in the committee files. The conclusions of the report are as follows:) EXHIBIT 1 The development of a commercial supersonic transport aircraft is now technically feasible. The B-58 and B-70 programs and broad earlier research and experience of supersonic flight from which they evolved provide the United States with a unique capability for developing a supersonic transport. Considerable research and development effort is required to attain the levels of safety, reliability, and economical performance required for a satisfactory commercial transport aircraft. The magnitude of the development task and the current financial situation of the U.S. aviation industry preclude its accomplishment on a timely basis solely by private enterprise. The development and production of a commercial supersonic transport aircraft appears essential to continued U.S. leadership in commercial aviation and is |