is poor Federal management on tens of thousands of projects. Electronic research and development as supported by the Department of Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration is so vast and complex no one really knows who is now doing what, where, and how, in experiments.

The report says:

Some of the work may already have been successfully performed elsewhere, but may not have been described yet in reports or published in technical journals. Still other experiments may have yielded negative results elsewhere but may not have been written up and may thus "disappear" only to be finally duplicated

later on.

The results of the situation

the chairman stated

are

1. Programs crucial to the Nation's security do not attain their highest and promptest yield.

2. Extra financial burdens are levied on the Nation's taxpayers, and 3. Byproducts from federally sponsored research and development do not become available as promptly as they might become available for our civilian economy.

The subcommittee singled out information, electronics in view of the crucial importance of this "dynamics" research and development to national security and to rising standards of living.

Electronics represents about one-fourth of all defense support of research and development.

This is the kind of report issued by the Senate committee just a year and a half ago. This report was the reason for stimulating my curiosity as to what are we doing in the field of retrieval, retrieving this vast amount of research information that is going on, as the gentleman from Ohio says every minute of the day.

How can we possibly keep track of this unless we have a substantially large staff apparently doing nothing but this?

People who are not necessarily working with industry, just on their problems, but just retrieving this information and then getting it back to those people who do work for NASA in the various centers and who have some responsibility on specific programs to the Defense Department, to the other Government agencies, and laboratories, and to all of industry so that each researcher can take advantage of what somebody else has done. This would probably advance the state of the art much more rapidly than if we build 40 laboratories, but don't do a proper job on retrieval and dissemination.

This is my very honest and sincere concern, Doctor, and I would like to have you address yourself to this problem.

Dr. KELLEY. Yes, sir, I will.

I have read the report. I have it right in front of me and I am familiar with the problem it addressed itself to at that time which was the number of or proliferation of reports an agency such as ASTIAArmed Services Technical Information Agency-was one Agency set up to coordinate these and make sure they get to the proper hands on

time.

Now since, and I believe it was in progress at the time this report was issued but certainly since that time, NASA has instituted an information retrieval service or rapid access to its reports, contract reports, and I'm sure this is coordinated with the DOD system.

I think the NACA system for the reports they had written, I was not a member of the NACA, but a user of their reports, has been one of the best documentation systems in this country.

96-504 0-63-pt. 3b- -6

However, in addition to information retrieval which is essentially how to catalog, classify, and disseminate the vast number of reports that are written, I believe you have to have a group that can digest the reports and evaluate their contents and, in fact, by coordination. association, and reputation, work with the people from other agencies, universities, contractors, and more readily and more quickly exploit the ideas.

In other words, this addresses itself

Mr. KARTH. I am in agreement with you up to that point, Doctor. I'm telling you that you have a real friend.

I have been complaining about it for years, ever since I have been in Congress.

Dr. KELLEY. We feel in addition to a documentation classification service, we need in-house competence to be able to evaluate the results of ourselves and others, and the best way to do this--I heard some discussion in the committee last week on it we feel the best way to do this is with people who are getting their fingers dirty, if you will, who understand the real live problems.

If I may return for 1 second to the laser situation, I would hope any electronics company worth its salt which hoped to stay in the forefront of the military space electronics business, was thinking and working on lasers.

One of our problems on lasers, that is part of electronics-one of our problems, is to evaluate the good ones from the bad ones. Mr. KARTH. Are we making those evaluations now, Doctor?

Dr. KELLEY. We have to develop our own in-house competence to evaluate the results of others and also make known our requirements to the engineering companies in terms that they can understand.

Mr. KARTH. Doctor, you find a real sympathetic ear here on what you said up to this point but I hope I can find a sympathetic ear, too, when I say that I think we should take first steps first.

I think we have got to first determine what is being done in this country and I think you probably agree with me we really don't know what's being done in all of these areas you so eloquently discussed and showed us beautiful slides on. We really don't know everything that's being done in these other areas, and I'm not talking about up-to-the-minute-type knowledge.

Dr. KELLEY. Whatever knowledge-I don't know what you mean. I don't understand the question.

Mr. KARTH. I say, we really don't know what's going on in this country in all of the areas that you showed us slides on, in the field of electronics.

We really don't know what's going on in all of these areas, all over this United States of America in Government laboratories as well as privately owned laboratories and private industry.

We just don't know what's going on, and I said I wasn't going to say "up to the last minute" either. We are way behind in retrieving all of the information on all of the research effort that's being made in this Nation, are we not?

Dr. KELLEY. I would hope that is not the case.

Mr. KARTH. What is your opinion, Doctor?

Dr. KELLEY. My personal opinion, with the large, lively, and capable electronics industry in the United States; whatever they are doing, if they hope to find a market for it, they make it known to the

customer.

In this case it happens to be the Government.
That is part of the 40 contacts a day I was discussing.

We don't know up to date, every minute, what is going on in every backroom in every company, but everything they think is applicable to our missions I am sure they call it to our attention.

Mr. KARTH. Do you really, honestly, think, Doctor, that you are familiar with all of the electronics research that goes on in this country in all these specific areas you mentioned today and many more we should be interested in?

Do you honestly and truly believe that?

Dr. KELLEY. I don't believe I, myself, am, specifically, no.

I couldn't catalog the business.

Mr. KARTH. Do you think NASA is?

Dr. KELLEY. To what is pertinent to our business, I think we are pretty much on top of the state of the art; however, I think we see many more problems in the future that we have to solve.

But I think we are pretty much on top of the state of the art and this is very largely due to the activities themselves.

Mr. KARTH. Are you the Dr. Albert Kelley who headed up the Ranger program study?

Dr. KELLEY. I am.

Mr. KARTH. Now, for some reason or other, this document is still classified secret and I shall not invade that secrecy, but I wonder if you could tell us, at least in those areas that are not secret, what you found and as a result of it what your major recommendations were in the Ranger program?

What were our major problem areas?

What were your major recommendations for getting this program going and making it a success?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KARTH. Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. In order to get the question-and we want you to be very brief, Dr. Kelley, I don't want to put you in an embarrassing position now, to any information that is secret, confidential, or classified and you feel that you would have to divulge that in answering the question.

We don't want to embarrass you.

Is that correct, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. KARTH. I'm sure he understands that.

Mr. MORRIS. If you want the question put in a different manner we'll put the question in a different manner, or if you don't think you can answer the question without divulging things you should not, I think the committee would understand.

Mr. RANDALL. I join the gentleman from New Mexico on that. In another committee we had the same instance in which the witness had problems.

Mr. KARTH. I'm sure you understand that. We don't want to go into anything that is confidential.

Dr. ŘELLEY. To go into detail would require a classification discussion.

We looked at the Ranger program as a whole, and there are secret and valid secret classification items woven throughout the whole program. However, I can make a generalized observation right here, if I may, which would not invade the security domain and if we wanted to

discuss any security measures, maybe I could at the pleasure of the chairman in an executive session.

Mr. KARTH. Fine.

Dr. KELLEY. But you must look at the whole Ranger program in terms of what we were trying to do when we were trying to do it. We were shooting for the Moon and we were trying to accomplish something that hadn't been done before.

Ranger is one of the most difficult missions that we set out to accomplish; with an Atlas launch; Agena first burn followed by a coast down the South Atlantic almost to the tip of South Africa; second burn; escape; release of the capsule; orientation of the capsule to the Sun; orientation to the Earth; midcourse maneuver and then coming up to the Moon; a reverse maneuver to orient the spacecraft to land; separation of a capsule; crashing of the capsule into the Moon while it's taking TV pictures and then the capsule itself bouncing around and surviving-we hope.

Very, very, frankly, we pushed the state of the art in that case and it was the electronic state of the art.

As you know, all the failures in the Ranger problem were of an electronic nature, in one way or another

Mr. KARTH. I think when you say "in one way or another," I guess you could attribute almost any difficulty we have in this country to electricity or something that's connected with a switch.

Most of our fires are caused by faulty circuits, let's eliminate electricity, then we won't have any more houses burning down.

This we can honestly and fairly say, Doctor, because this is true. You can do almost anything with statistics and can almost make it say anything you want to tell.

Because of this we want just one more big inhouse laboratory. This is really what you are saying, aren't you?

Dr. KELLEY. No, I wasn't relating it to the lab.

I was stating the facts in the Ranger report which I understand is in the hands of the committee.

Mr. KARTH. I really want to get into this in executive hearing. I don't want to take a chance of violating this secrecy but nothing in here would demonstrate to me you had any electronics-the "big problem in our continuous failure to make a satisfactory Ranger shot was an electronic shot.

Mr. MOSHER. I don't think you really stated the purpose of your line of questioning here.

Do I understand it is all directed to a skepticism on your part concerning the validity of the proposal for a new electronics laboratory in the Boston area?

Mr. KARTH. I don't think there is any question but that's what Dr. Kelley is here for. This is the budget request and this is part of the reason for his appearance today.

Mr. MOSHER. This is the significance of all his questioning in the last half hour as it relates to this?

Mr. KARTH. I would say a portion of it is.

Mr. MOSHER. Yes.

Mr. KARTH. I had in mind the doctor was doing a real good job here and I want to congratulate you, Dr. Kelley, attempting to convince this subcommittee you are in need of the budget request that is before this committee for consideration.

I think you are doing a very good job, and I class you along with some of those other able Government people who have appeared before this committee.

Let me ask you this question, Doctor. Has this electronic research center ever been proposed to the Bureau of the Budget? Dr. KELLEY. You mean in past years?

Mr. KARTH. Prior to 1964.

Dr. KELLEY. No, it was not.

In fact, there was no electronics organization, as such, in NASA until November of 1961 when our office was formed and we realized that we had to do something about the future of the agency in electronics. While we are in the electronics business throughout our projects, as you saw in the slides, in fact to a large extent, there was no organizational implementation and when the agency reorganized, November 1, 1961, as you are aware, included along with the major reorganization for the Office of Manned Spaceflight was a reorganization of the Office of Advanced Research and Technology including recognition of the importance of electronics by establishment of our Office.

Mr. KARTH. You are not saying you just became aware of this problem last year, are you?

Dr. KELLEY. No; not at all. The agency was aware of the problem, as I understand, even when it was being formed. This was something that was lacking.

Mr. KARTH. I see.

Dr. KELLEY. We were directed shortly after we were formed; that is, our office, to come up with a plan to implement NASA's long-range requirements in the area of space electronics and guidance.

In other words there was recognition, and this was well over a year ago, there was recognition, formally, of the fact we were going to have to grow in electronics and in guidance-research capability.

We had to investigate and study the implementation of this growth. Mr. KARTH. We have been growing in this area, haven't we, Doctor?

Dr. KELLEY. I hope we continue to grow more.

Mr. KARTH. But the question is, We have been, haven't we?
Dr. KELLEY. We have been growing, gradually, yes, sir.

Mr. KARTH. I'm sorry for having interrupted you before you completed your testimony.

Have you completed it?

Dr. KELLEY. No, sir. I have about 5 more minutes.

Mr. KARTH. All right, maybe we could complete your testimony today and then get the questions tomorrow.

Dr. KELLEY. We were on the subject of lasers.

Could I have the next slide, please (fig. 116, p. 1954)?

Mr. KARTH. I think that's what started the question. Go ahead, Doctor. I'm sorry.

Dr. KELLEY. One of the first experiments now in space, using lasers will be the S-66 satellite which we will launch later this year which will have many corner reflectors on it.

A corner reflector is a device which, when illuminated with a beam, reflects the beam right back to you regardless what angle you are looking at the reflector. We are doing reflection and tracking experiments. One of the facets of this, since it is a tracking instrument, is that we don't have to use any equipment on the satellite.