them. In this instrument she refers to that of December 17, 1895, and says that

in order to carry out the purposes of the said general assignment in regard to the said Letters Patent and applications,

she transfers to French all of her right, title, and interest in the applications. This last instrument does not request that the patents on the applications issue to the assignee and therefore would not alone warrant this Office in holding that French was the legal owner of the inventions. When, however, it is taken with the instrument of December 17, 1895, referred to therein, as it must be taken, it furnishes ample authority for French to sell the inventions and to give legal title to them as attorney.

In an instrument dated May 10, 1900, and signed by him as assignee, French assigned one of the applications to Treadwell Cleveland without requesting that the patent issue to him. In an instrument, however, dated November 8, 1900, and signed by him as assignee and also in his capacity as attorney for the inventor, French confirmed the previous assignment to Cleveland and requested that the patent issue to him. Similar assignments were made to William J. Moran of the remaining applications under consideration on June 20, 1900, and November 8, 1900.

Similar instruments were executed by Cleveland and Moran conveying all of their right, title, and interest in the inventions and applications to Jeremiah Evart Tracy and requesting that the patents be granted to him.

French having authority to sign the inventor's name and to sell and convey the inventions and Jeremiah Evarts Tracy having received the inventions through him by regular assignments requesting that the patents be issued to the assignees, it follows that Jeremiah Evarts Tracy is, according to the record, the legal owner and entitled to prosecute the cases and to be represented by an attorney of his own selection.

The alleged assignment to Joseph J. Marrin of a one-tenth interest in the inventions, dated March 15, 1895, does not identify any of the applications here under consideration and does not request that the patents issue to the assignee, and therefore if it conveys any interest in these inventions it is merely equitable and not legal. This Office cannot recognize such equitable interest in a case of this kind, but must be guided by the record as to the legal title.

In so far as the Office records go there are in these cases no conflicting assignments of the legal title; but the assignments to Jeremiah Evarts Tracy conveying the entire interest are the only ones which can be recognized as such. The revocation and power of attorney given by Jeremiah Evarts Tracy will therefore be approved and the patents will be issued to him.

The protest is dismissed.

EX PARTE HUMMEL.

Decided December 10, 1900.

(94 O. G., 583.)

GUARDIAN OF INSANE APPLICANT INTERVENING AND TAKING OUT PATENT-APPOINTMENT BY FOREIGN COURT-SECTION 4896 REVISED STATUTES.

As the guardian of an insane person appointed in a foreign jurisdiction is merely the guardian of that person and his estate within that jurisdiction and such appointment has no extraterritorial force and gives to the guardian no power over the lunatic's property in other jurisdictions, Held that a request that a guardian appointed by a foreign court be recognized as the guardian of an applicant who is alleged to be insane and be permitted to intervene and take out a patent under section 4896, Revised Statutes, should not be granted.

ON PETITION.

WATTMETER.

Application of Georg Hummel filed November 18, 1897, No. 658,959. Messrs. Briesen & Knauth for the applicant.

DUELL, Commissioner:

This is a petition by Friedrich Uppenborn stating that he is the duly-constituted guardian or curator of Georg Hummel, the applicant named in the above-entitled application, as will appear from a copy of the record of guardianship of the Royalty District Court of Munich, and requesting that as such guardian or curator he be permitted to intervene in said application on behalf of Georg Hummel and that Letters Patent be granted to him for the invention of Hummel, as set forth in the above-named application.

The guardianship of the Royalty District Court of Munich referred to, as shown by a copy on file in this Office, is to the effect thatFriedrich Uppenborn has been appointed and sworn in as guardian of the engineer Georg Hummel of unsound mind.

Section 4896 of the Revised Statutes as amended February 28, 1899, provides that

when any person having made any new invention or discovery for which a patent might have been granted becomes insane before a patent is granted, the right of applying for and obtaining the patent shall devolve on his legally-appointed guardian, conservator, or representative in trust for his estate, in as full manner and on the same terms and conditions as the same might have been claimed or enjoyed by him while sane; and when the application is made by such legal representatives, the oath or affirmation required to be made shall be so varied in forin that it can be made by them.

The guardian who asks to intervene in this case, it is seen, was appointed by the court in Munich and resided at that place. It seems to be settled that the guardian of an insane person appointed in a foreign jurisdiction is merely the guardian of his person and estate

within that jurisdiction. His appointment has no extraterritorial force and gives to him no power over the lunatic's property in other jurisdictions, and when it becomes necessary to take charge of such property in another jurisdiction a guardian must be appointed by the court in that jurisdiction. (Encyc. of Law, vol. 16, p. 577, paragraph 9, and authorities under Note 1 thereto.)

The request that the petitioner be recognized as the guardian of the applicant and be permitted to intervene and receive the patent cannot be granted. The petition is therefore denied.

OSBORN v. HOTSAPILLAR.

Decided December 31, 1900.

(94 O. G., 583.)

INTERFERENCE-AUTHORITY OF COMMISSIONER TO RESTORE JURISDICTION TO EXAMINER OF INTERFERENCES AFTER EXPIRATION OF LIMIT OF APPEAL-MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT.

Where H. contended that as O. permitted the limit of appeal from the decision of the Examiner of Interierences awarding priority to H. on the record to expire without taking any proper action, the judgment had become final, and the Commissioner had no power to set it aside, Held that the Commissioner was clothed with power, and jurisdiction was restored to the Examiner of Interferences to consider a motion to vacate the judgment.

ON MOTION.

COMPUTING-SCALE.

Application of Francis C. Osborn filed January 26, 1899, No. 703,412. Application of Jacob Hotsapillar filed April 14, 1892, No. 429,165.

Messrs. Fisk & Thomas for Osborn.

Messrs. Church & Church and Mr. Ira C. Koehne for Hotsapillar. DUELL, Commissioner:

This case comes before the Commissioner upon the motion of Osborn for an order setting aside the judgment in the above-entitled interference and an order to refix the times for taking testimony. There are several reasons set forth for this motion; but at this stage of the case it is not necessary to give them here.

No testimony was taken in this interference case, and priority was awarded to Hotsapillar by the Examiner of Interferences on the record in accordance with Rule 116. A limit of appeal from this

decision was set; but Osborn failed to take an appeal. At the oral hearing before me it was contended on behalf of Hotsapillar that as Osborn permitted the limit of appeal to expire without taking any proper action the judgment has become final, and the Commissioner has no power to set aside that judgment.

It has long been the practice for the Commissioner to consider such a motion as the one before me and to restore jurisdiction to the Examiner of Interferences to consider the question of setting aside his award of priority. In the case of Garrison v. Hübner (C. D., 1891, 59; 54 O. G., 1889) a judgment upon the record had been entered against Garrison, and no appeal was taken by him within the time limited. After the limit of appeal had expired Garrison moved that the interference be dissolved, this motion being accompanied by affidavits excusing the failure to file it within the time limited for appeal from the decision of the Examiner of Interferences rendering judgment upon the record. In that case Mr. Commissioner Mitchell said:

When, however, the limit of appeal has expired and the Examiner of Interferences has lost jurisdiction, a motion should be made before the Commissioner for permission to file a motion to dissolve the interference, which motion should be accompanied by an affidavit stating the facts relied upon, both in excuse of delay and in justification of the granting of the motion at a later date than that specified in Rule 114. If the facts relied upon are sufficient, permission is granted and the jurisdiction of the Examiner of Interferences is restored, who thereupon transmits the motion and, in case it is granted, makes the proper order vacating the judgment in the same manner as if the motion had been filed within the time originally limited for appeal.

Osborn has made a motion before the Commissioner to vacate judgment and accompanied that motion by an affidavit stating the facts relied upon as to why testimony should be taken and why the motion was not made earlier. Treating the motion to vacate judgment as a motion for permission to file his motion to take testimony, he has complied with all the requirements of the practice indicated in that decision. This practice has been well established, and I cannot agree with the contention of Hotsapillar that the Commissioner has no jurisdiction to vacate the judgment.

Following the practice as indicated in Garrison v. Hübner, supra, the jurisdiction of the Examiner of Interferences is restored, and he will consider Osborn's motion to take testimony as if it had been filed within the limit of appeal, and if in his opinion Osborn makes such a showing as would warrant the granting of the motion to take additional testimony he will vacate the judgment heretofore rendered. Unless the motion is to be granted the judgment will remain undisturbed.

18812-02-2

IN RE ALE.

Decided January 7, 1901.

(94 O. G., 584.)

CAVEAT-SO-CALLED "RENEWAL" TO BE MADE BY INVENTOR AND NOT BY ATTORNEY. As the statute does not provide for a renewal of a caveat and as a so-called "renewal" is in effect a new caveat, Held that an attorney cannot renew a caveat, but it must be done by the inventor, who is the only person who may under the statute file a caveat.

IN THE MATTER of the caveat of Theodore V. Ale, for improvement in devices for finishing glass vessels, filed October 31, 1899. Renewed November 7, 1900.

DUELL, Commissioner:

The above-entitled caveat has been referred to the Commissioner by the Primary Examiner to determine whether—

the indorsement of November 7, 1900, made by the application clerk on the face of the file as the date of complete filing should remain, or whether said date should be changed to December 3, 1900.

It appears that the original caveat was filed on October 31, 1899, and remained in force until October 31, 1900. After the expiration of that caveat, on November 7, 1900, there was received in this Office a paper signed by the attorney of record in the original caveat, accompanied by a fee of ten dollars. This paper reads as follows:

I hereby renew the caveat filed by Theodore V. Ale, November 7, 1899, describing device for finishing glass vessels and it is asked that a new certificate be issued for another year.

The caveat was given a renewal date by the application clerk as of November 7, 1900, and forwarded to the Primary Examiner for consideration. On November 17, 1900, the Primary Examiner called the caveator's attention to the decision in the case of ex parte Conklin (C. D., 1898, 85; 83 O. G., 1660) and held that the caveat had not been properly renewed or filed and that therefore it had no force and effect as a

caveat.

On December 3, 1900, a petition signed by the caveator in person was filed. The Examiner then wrote to the caveator that the date to be given to the caveat was December 3, 1900, instead of November 7, 1900. The Examiner subsequently referred the case to the Commissioner to determine which is the correct date.

Section 4902 of the Revised Statutes provides that

any citizen of the United States who makes any new invention * payment of the fees required by law, file in the Patent Office a caveat. caveat shall be *

*

*

may, on

*

*

* Such operative for the term of one year from the filing thereof.