Opinion of the Court. of the Revised Statutes, which was in force when the suit was commenced, declares that "no Circuit Court shall have cognizance of any suit to recover the contents of any promissory note or other chose in action in favor of an assignee, unless a suit might have been prosecuted in such court to recover the said contents if no assignment had been made, except in cases of foreign bills of exchange." The terms used, "the contents of any promissory note or other chose in action," were designed to embrace the rights the instrument conferred which were capable of enforcement by suit. They were not happily chosen to convey this meaning, but they have received a construction substantially to that purport in repeated decisions of this court. They were so construed in the recent case of Corbin v. County of Black Hawk, 105 U. S. 659, where the subject is fully considered, and the decisions cited. There a suit brought to enforce the specific performance of a contract was held to be a suit to recover the contents of a chose in action, and therefore not maintainable, under the statute in question, in the Circuit Court of the United States, by an assignee, if it could not have been prosecuted there by the assignors had no assignment been made. It is contended, however, that the complainant is not the assignee of the contract of May 31, 1871, but a mortgagee in trust of the lands mentioned therein, and can therefore maintain the suit by reason of his citizenship in New York. We cannot assent to this position. It is true the complainant is a mortagee in trust of such interest as the mortgagor had in the lands, but he brings the suit, not to foreclose the mortgage, but as one having a beneficial interest in the contract, and consequently a right to enforce it. The object of the suit is to perfect the title to the lands mortgaged by enforcing the performance of the contract. The deed of trust sets out in full the contract, and conveys all the right, title and interest which the railroad company had or might thereafter acquire in and to the lands granted by the trustees by their contract of May 31, 1871. This conveyance of all right, title and interest "in and to" the lands granted, or agreed to be granted, by the contract of sale, carried with it to the complainant an interest in the contract so far as such lands were concerned, that is, the right Opinion of the Court. to perfect the title to the lands by enforcement of the contract. It was in legal effect the assignment of the contract itself. If he cannot enforce that contract and thus secure the title to the company, the deed of trust, so far as the lands covered by the contract are concerned, is worthless as a security. If he has no interest in the contract he has no standing in court to ask its enforcement, and, if he is to be regarded as an assignee of the contract under the deed of trust, he is disabled from maintaining the suit in the Circuit Court by § 629 of the Revised Statutes. He is subject to the same disability in that respect as his assignor. Decree affirmed. APPENDIX. I. ASSIGNMENTS TO CIRCUITS. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. OCTOBER TERM, 1887. Order. THERE having been an Associate Justice of this court appointed since the commencement of this term, it is ordered that the following allotment be made of the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of said court among the circuits, agreeably to the act of Congress in such case made and provided, and that such allotment be entered of record, viz. : For the First Circuit, Horace Gray, For the Second Circuit, Samuel Blatchford, Associate Justice. Chief Justice. Associate Justice. Associate Justice. Associate Justice. Associate Justice. Associate Justice. January 23, 1888. VOL. CXXIV-47 II. APPOINTMENT OF MARSHAL SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 4, 1888. It is ordered by the court that the following letters and order be entered upon the minutes : MY DEAR SIR: SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, As the literary and historical labors upon which I am engaged as a co-worker will, during the next few years, require the whole of my time, I herewith tender you my resignation as Marshal of the Supreme Court of the United States, to take effect on the day of December next. In severing my official relations with the court I desire to convey to yourself and all its members my warm appreciation of their personal friendship and kindness during the whole of my fifteen years' service. Sincerely yours, JNO. G. NICOLAY. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, MY DEAR MR. NICOLAY: I found no convenient opportunity of communicating to the other Judges the contents of your letter of the 29th ulto., resigning the office of Marshal of the Supreme Court, until we met in conference last Saturday. Knowing as we do the great importance of the literary and historical work in which you are engaged, and its constant demands on your time, we have not felt at liberty to |