Opinion of the Court.

arise in this except one which is thus stated in the specification of error found in the brief of counsel for Hoadley :

"It was error for the court to decide that that part of the act of March 11, 1858, was valid which ratified the order of the board of supervisors of October 16, 1856, adopting the plan or map of the city 'in respect to the reservation of squares for public purposes,' and thereby deciding that plaintiff has no title, thus impairing the obligation of the contract of grant, in ordinance 822, in violation of Article 1, § 10, of the Constitution of the United States.

"It was error, because, under said decision, that part of the act of 1858 took plaintiff's property without due process of law, and without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States."

This makes it necessary to inquire whether ordinance 822 contains any contract with Hoadley, the obligation of which was impaired by the act of March 11, 1858, or whether it vested in him any property which would be taken away without due process of law if the statute is adjudged to be valid. In the consideration of federal questions of the character presented by this specification of error our first duty is to determine whether there is such a contract, or such right of property as is alleged. The existence of the contract or of the right is part of the federal question itself. The Bridge Proprietors v. The Hoboken Company, 1 Wall. 116, 145.

As to this branch of the case the record shows that the Supreme Court of California said in its opinion:

"Whatever rights the plaintiff acquired under the Van Ness ordinance he took subject to the act of 1858, which approved the survey and map above mentioned. This is true under any proper application of the doctrine of relation invoked on behalf of plaintiff. The act of approval ratified the ordinance 822 allowing title to be made under it by a possession designated in it, and ratified also ordinance 845 and the order of the justices approving the survey and map above mentioned; and when the act of 1858 was passed, the doctrine of relation could vest in the plaintiff no greater rights than he took under the act of 1858. Any rights which plaintiff derived under

Opinion of the Court.

the act of 1858 would be subject to all its provisions. At the same time that ordinance 822 was ratified the order approving the map and survey above mentioned was also ratified, and whatever rights plaintiff took under the act were subject to the provisions of the ordinance and order so ratified. We find in the case no trace of a contract between the plaintiff and any one which ever vested in-plaintiff any rights different from those accorded to him herein." 70 California, 325.

To this we agree. When the ordinance was passed the title of the city to the property covered by the claim then pending before the District Court on appeal was imperfect. It never did acquire title by entry as contemplated in the first section, and that further action was required both by the legislature of California and by Congress before occupants could secure title under the grants contemplated in § 2, is clearly shown by § 10, which specially provides for application to the legislature to confirm and ratify the ordinance, and to Congress to relinquish the title of the United States. The ordinance granted only such title as the city was permitted by Congress and the State to convey. In its legal effect the act of Congress conveyed the lands to the city for the uses and purposes specified in the ordinances and the order of the city ratified by the act of the legislature. In this way the two squares, as designated in the report of the commissioners, approved by the order of October, 1856, were dedicated to public use as squares. Lands so dedicated could not lawfully be conveyed by the city to private parties, and therefore the conveyance by Congress did not inure in this particular to the benefit of Hoadley. In short, the State refused to confirm the ordinance, so far as it had reference to the grant by the city of any part of these squares, and Congress in its conveyance followed in this particular what had been done by the State.

The judgment is

Affirmed.

The court, on motion, amends the judgment and decree in this case heretofore announced, and reported 123 U. S. 335.

THIS case is reported 123 U. S. 335. After judgment was announced, Mr. Robert B. Lines, of counsel for appellees, on their behalf, presented to the court the following motion, entitled in the cause:

Come now the appellees, by Robert B. Lines, of counsel, and move the court that the decree heretofore rendered in the above entitled cause be set aside, and the said cause remanded to the District Court for the Northern District of Florida, with instructions to enter its decree confirming the title of appellees to the lands in controversy, describing the same according to United States surveys, and specifying the amounts of land and scrip certificates respectively, to which said appellees may be entitled, under the acts of Congress of June 22d, 1860, and March 2d, 1867.

And for ground of their said motion, the said appellees respectfully show:

That they are informed, that parts of said lands have been sold or granted by the United States; that in such case, it is provided by §§ 11 and 6 of said act of 1860, 12 Stat. 85, that the confirmees shall have the right to enter upon any of the public lands of the United States, a quantity of land equal in extent to that sold by the Government; that it has been the practice heretofore in such cases, for the decree of the lower court, to state whether any and what lands have been so sold within the limits of private land claims, (see Mandates and Records in United States v. Cushing, October term, 1873; United States v. Marquis of Casa Yrujo, October term, 1878, &c.); and that, unless the decree of the court below in this

Syllabus.

cause be reformed to include such a statement, the appellees will meet with difficulty at the Land Office, in securing either scrip for the lands sold or patents for the portion, if any, remaining unsold.

ROBERT B. LINES, of Counsel for Appellees.

MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court.

It is ordered that the judgment in this case be amended by adding thereto instructions to the District Court from whose decree the appeal was taken to amend its decree by describing, according to United States surveys, the lands applied for by the appellees and confirmed to them by the decree, and by declaring that if any parts of said lands have been sold or granted by the United States, the appellees shall have the right to enter upon any of the public lands of the United States, a quantity of land equal in extent to that so sold or granted; and by directing a reference to be made to a master to ascertain whether any such sales, and if so what, and to what extent, have been made; and by declaring the appellees entitled to scrip certificates to the extent and amount of such sales and grants.

And the said District Court is further instructed to take such further proceedings as may be necessary to carry out the instructions of this decree.

So ordered.

CRAWFORD v. HALSEY.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA.

Submitted February 2, 1888.- Decided February 20, 1888.

A member of a bankrupt partnership, purchasing of the assignee in bankruptcy a debt due the firm, takes only such rights as the assignee has, under the bankrupt laws, to contest the validity of a transfer of the debt as in violation of those laws.

Statement of the Case.

THIS suit was brought on the 29th of July, 1876, by Henry Barnewell and William C. Gaynor, assignees in bankruptcy of Crawford, Walsh, Butt & Co., a mercantile firm doing business at Mobile, Alabama, composed of James Crawford, Charles Walsh, Cary W. Butt, Robert C. Crawford, and Charles Walsh, jr., against William F. Halsey, to recover $4118.55 and interest at the rate of eight per cent per annum from February 28, 1874, claimed to be due for moneys had and received for and on account of the bankrupts. The defence was that the firm had assigned the claim on the 3d of December, 1873, and that, to avoid litigation, it was, on the 12th of May, 1875, submitted by all parties, including the firm and the person to whom the claim had been transferred, to the arbitrament of certain persons, "with the powers of amicable compounders," who, on the 10th of June following, determined that there was nothing due from Halsey.

On the 27th of May, 1879, the assignees in bankruptcy sold the claim to Robert C. Crawford, one of the firm, and authorized him to prosecute the suit which had been begun. This assignment was filed in the cause April 20, 1880. The parties then went to trial, a jury having been waived, and on the 1st of May, 1880, a judgment was announced by the court in the following form: "The court, considering that an assignment was made by Crawford, Walsh, Butt & Co. to Parker & Son; that the matter was submitted to amicable compounders, who rendered their judgment for defendant, and the present plaintiff in interest (Robert Crawford, a member of the late firm of Crawford, Walsh, Butt & Co., bankrupts) cannot be heard to set up the invalidity of the transfer by said firm, it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that this suit be dismissed with costs."

This judgment was duly entered on the minutes of the court, which were signed by the judge on the 5th of June, 1880, at the end of the term, but the judgment was not engrossed in the judgment book nor signed by the judge, as required by § 546 of the Code of Practice of Louisiana.

On the 1st of February, 1883, Crawford again appeared in court and entered a motion for a new trial on the following grounds: "That said judgment is contrary to the law and the