lian Co., who are manufacturers of music rolls. They listen to it and say: "That sounds good. What will you take for it?" I say: "I will surrender all rights for $500." The deal is closed on that basis.

Thereupon the Aeolian Co. have exclusive rights and the phonographic companies nor anyone else can use the composition unless. the Aeolian Co. gives its consent and fixes the terms.

Mr. PERKINS. Suppose you are a mechanical reproducer and you had invented a wonderful disk and after you had invented that wonderful disk and made a contract in connection with it, suppose Congress said, "Anyone else can manufacture it at two cents royalty for it"; what would the situation then be?

Mr. MEIXELL. I do not think that is contemplated, and it is to prevent any one company setting up that type of monopoly, which in the case I have cited, the Aeolian Co. would enjoy.

Mr. LANHAM. Mr. Meixell, you represent several companies?
Mr. MEIXELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. LANHAM. Then there must be some community of interest or of commercial dealing going on among them, as they are all of one opinion in reference to your representing them here. Does that same community of interest permeate their whole affairs?

Mr. MEIXELL. I think you can answer that as well as I can. Mr. LANHAM. If they can get together on having one man represent them here in this matter could not that community of interest widen?

Mr. MEIXELL. If I am a business man and get hold of a good thing I want to exploit it for my company; despite the fact that I sit around a common table in company with competitors. If one did not have competition, there would be no progress.

I believe we can absolutely depend upon it, that if any company can get a monopoly of a good thing that company will certainly exploit the monopoly for all it is worth.

What equities are here and what is to be done for the parties in interest, is for you gentlemen to decide. Nevertheless, while we feel that you will decide right, we nevertheless wish you to have our reactions.

The one really demanding the right to bargain is the publisher who gets hold of the copyrights, from the composers. The composers are put forward as a body of shock troops for this whole business.

As I said before, the four elements which exist each absolutely independent of each other, are the composer, the publisher, the manufacturer of mechanical music devices, and the public.

During the last few months, however, there have been some very important developments, and there are likely to be some far-reaching effects from these new developments, some of which may prove to be boomerangs for those advocating this particular measure.

To-day instead of four there are five elements in the picture. The composer, the independent publisher, the independent manufacturer of records or rolls and than a new element that might be termed the manufacturer-publisher, or one who constitutes as a unit both the publisher and the manufacturer of the rolls and records, finally the public.

Now, with these new elements, if this bill is enacted into law, the composer can pass around the rest of the elements, and go directly to the manufacturer-publisher, make the best deals there, and then

that powerful unit will have exclusive rights to the composition, and can dictate terms and prices to the rest. As it is now, this powerful unit gives his competitors accessibility which the present law provides. Take that away and you can quickly realize how a composer can surrender to that manufacturer-publisher in turn hold an absolute monopoly.

Mr. BRUNNER. Is it any worse for him to labor under that condition than for the composer to do it?

Mr. MEIXELL. I am merely citing the law. If it is advisable to remove those elements that is one thing, but for this particular manufacturer that is another thing.

Now, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, as I said when I started out, I merely want to show who in my judgment are the parties in interest to-day. First there is the composer you are deliberating in his behalf. You want to see him get a square deal. Next you are deliberating in the interest of the publisher who has been so to speak in the nature of the middleman. Third you are deliberating in the interest of the manufacturers of music rolls and phonograph records. Fourth you are deliberating in the interest of this new element which combines both publishers and manufacturers. And, fifth and finally, you are deliberating in behalf of the public, who are justly entitled to be protected.

Now, with this general statement, Mr. Chairman, I would like to call upon some of our speakers.

Mr. LANHAM. There were some statements made this morning that many of these mechanical reproducing companies are being absorbed by radio and moving-picture people. Can you give us any statement of the extent to which that now exists, or is prospective? Mr. MEIXELL. It is a recent development, and I suppose you have heard or read of the publishers involved. They are now allied with one of the largest radio and phonograph manufacturers in the world. And there have been recent rumors of another combination. Mr. Murphy spoke this of another sound-film concern getting into the publishing business.

Mr. LANHAM. As one of these producing and manufacturing concerns?

Mr. MEIXELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. LANHAM. How would a monopoly come from such a combination?

Mr. MEIXELL. Let us presuppose that the present safeguards of accessibility are removed. Then suppose I have a composition, an excellent composition, like "Dardanella," and I go to one of these big combinations and I say: "I believe this piece is good. Will you buy it?" They say: "Yes; give us the exclusive right and we will pay you $1,000." I say, "All right," and they take the composition and it makes a tremendous hit and they produce phonograph records. Then comes the competitor, either another manufacturer or a manufacturer publisher, and he says: "I want to get in on that." And they say: "You can not do that. We control this."

Mr. LANHAM. But the composer; how about him? Mr. MEIXELL. Well, he could have gone to company B, instead of to company A, but he naturally would turn to the more powerful concern. They are in position to pay a better price and speculate, because there is not one composer who knows the future prospects of

the piece. I might think it has a glorious future to-day, but tomorrow it is shown to be a failure.

Mr. PERKINS. Do you argue in favor of accessibility at 2 cents a reproduction, or accessibility on the basis of bargaining for reproduction?

Mr. MEIXELL. I am contending for the principle of accessibility. Mr. PERKINS. No one has access to another man's right unless they bargain for it, except in this one instance.

Mr. MEIXELL. The composer now has the absolute right of bargaining.

Mr. PERKINS. Once he makes a bargain with the reproducer, every other reproducer has the right to reproduce at 2 cents a record. Mr. MEIXELL. Now?

Mr. PERKINS. Is not that a limitation on his right to bargain? Mr. MEIXELL. Absolutely. There is no denying that. It is only a question of weighing in the balance all the factors which play a part.

I have been endeavoring to approach this proposition and estimate what the probable effect will be if this bill is enacted into law, as well as to call attention to the fact that in our judgment the composer now has an unqualified right to bargain. No one sets his price except the one with whom he enters into a contract.

Mr. PERKINS. Is not this analogous with being limited? If every other publisher had a right to publish at 2 cents, it would limit your right to bargain with me by reason of the fact that everyone else could take it at 2 cents.

Mr. MEIXELL. The law only applies to mechanical production, or mechanical reproduction.

Mr. PERKINS. Is not this a correct analogy?

Mr. MEIXELL. Yes, sir.

and

Mr. PERKINS. Then why not take a further step than 1909, say that any one else can publish it by paying 2 cents a publication? Mr. MEIXELL. If you enact this measure into law, and take down the present limiting factor which we have to-day, you will in effect make it possible for a concern to take away the monopoly which the composer has until he surrenders it.

Mr. LANHAM. There would be opportunity for another big company to get the output?

Mr. MEIXELL. Yes, sir. Take the competition among publishers: I have the right to go through New York, to this publisher and to that publisher. step into Mr. A, and he hears my piece and he says: "I will give you $250 for that." I say: "No; I can do better than that. I have begun to make a name for myself." So I then go out to another concern, and do not have to take the first man's offer of $250; that does not keep me from asking the next man $500 for it.

I think it is only fair to establish this premise, namely, that at this particular moment the composer under this law has had for the last 21 years, and he now has, the right of bargaining.

The next point you gentlemen raise is: Does this 2 cents per copy for mechanical reproduction so circumscribe his bargaining right as to imperil it? My personal reaction is that it does not. That is a risk which I as a composer take, and one which the publisher takes, and we know that he takes a good many risks before finding one success. The composer now possesses an absolute right to bargain.

The CHAIRMAN. I think your premise is all wrong. I do not think the composer, under the law, has any right to bargain and sell. He is absolutely prohibited from bargaining and selling his product for mechanical reproduction, except as provided by law.

My understanding is that the composer does not usually sell his copyright to his agent, the publisher. There is a contract between them. The publisher of course attempts to get some money out of its copyright by having it mechanically reproduced.

Under this law, of course, every publisher knows exactly what he can get for it; and he can not get any more. Therefore, the man who owns the copyright, the composer, is limited; he can not bargain and sell. If this law were repealed, if a publisher liked a composition he could say: "I will give you one half of the price. I would get"; and then that publisher, if they make an agreement, is the agent. He can go to one of these other companies and sell it for 8 or 10. cents a record; and that he can not do if this is enacted. Now, do you mean to say that he has that right to-day? He has his right to sell his production outright if he wishes, and he has these mechanical rights. That is all there is in this bill. What have you to say to that?

Mr. MEIXELL. We do find men bargaining away rights for sheet music and rights for mechanical reproduction.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you are absolutely wrong on that. There is probably no legal right, but trade practices come in there.

Mr. MEIXELL. I would like to see the statistics which have to do with that phase of the situation. Might I venture this opinion, that in the great bulk of the cases, the composer with a piece to sell sells it without reservation and sells it in its entirety to the publishers, and for what he can get.

Mr. PERKINS. By the shaking of heads in this room I think there is a great deal of doubt about your proposition.

Mr. LANHAM. He would get more if he had a meritorious piece and the publisher was not limited in the number of records.

Mr. MEIXELL. I am inclined to think that if this measure is enacted into law, it will not better the position of the composer.

Mr. LAMPERT. I understand that your position is that accessibility is the most considerable feature?

Mr. MEIXELL. Unless you are willing to set up monopolistic control over my composition, you must make provision for accessibility. If a publisher, A, has the right to publish, publisher B should have the same rights under the same terms and conditions.

Mr. DOXEY. What real justification do you find for this limitation?
Mr. MEIXELL. Do you mean with reference to accessibility?
Mr. DOXEY. With reference to this 2-cent limitation.

Mr. MEIXELL. As I said a moment ago, I think I had better confine myself to the principle involved, rather than enter upon the price; as the all-important consideration is the principle involved.

Mr. DOXEY. Why should there be this limitation on this one item, when there is no other limitation of any similar kind in out contractual rights?

Mr. MEIXELL. Our thought is to protect the consuming public, by whom we mean those who buy and use the records. And by absolute control over a composition and its reproduction the price can be fixed as a manufacturer can desire.

Mr. DOXEY. Do you believe in the general principle of price fixing? Unless it should be applied generally why should it be applied to the composer?

Mr. MEIXELL. For 21 years the proposition has been functioning on the line indicated here, and it has worked out through the banner years of the industry. At this particular time the industry is facing a critical situation. The proposition to-day is one of such great moment, that I think that accessibility is a matter of existence or nonexistence for some companies.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything else you desire to say?

Mr. MEIXELL. Nothing else, Mr. Chairman. I would like to introduce now Mr. George Beattys, of the Aeolian Co.

Mr. ARTHUR W. WEIL. Mr. Chairman, I have to go back to New York right away. I wonder if I might have a few minutes to make a few remarks now?

Mr. PERKINS. Are you in favor of the bill?
Mr. WEIL. No. I am opposed to this bill.

But if by any means

I could speak now, I would be very appreciative.

Mr. MEIXELL. Will my colleagues yield the floor to this gentleman? I would be very glad to let Mr. Weil speak now. The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Weil.

STATEMENT OF ARTHUR W. WEIL, REPRESENTING THE MOTION PICTURE PRODUCERS AND DISTRIBUTORS OF AMERICA (INC.)

Mr. WEIL. My name is Arthur W. Weil. I am a lawyer by profession, with office at 185 Madison Avenue, New York City. I appear here as counsel for the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America (Inc.).

Gentlemen, we appear here in opposition to this bill. I wish to say at the outset that we do not oppose the principle of the bill. Our grounds of opposition are strictly limited by one all-important consideration to us at the present time, which is the entrance of the United States into the Berne convention. That can only be done through a general revision of the copyright act.

As you gentlemen probably know, if this country does not adhere to the Berne convention during the life of the present Congress, we can not adhere to the Berne convention at all. This would mean that the only convention to which we can then adhere in the international field, aside from the Pan-American, will be the Rome convention. We are not in favor of adherence to the Rome convention. I understand that largely through the activities of Mr. Bloom, who was a former member of this committee, and who appeared as one of the United States Representatives at the Rome convention, that a period of time was left open equivalent to the life of the present Congress to enable adherence by the United States to the Berne convention.

It has been our feeling right along that there must be a general revision of the coypright law to enable the United States to adhere to the Berne convention. We have appeared before you frequently to that end.

Now, our feeling as concerns this bill, is that irrespective of the action of this committee, there is bound to be opposition to this bill