§ 463. The plea of nolo contendere.-In certain of the distriet courts in criminal prosecutions under the act a plea of nolo contendere has been tendered by the defendants and accepted by the court, and fines imposed as a punishment. This plea is recognized in some jurisdictions in misdemeanor cases (12 Cyc. 354) and when accepted by the court is an implied confession of the crime charged, and is therefore equivalent to a plea of guilty except that it gives the accused an advantage of not being estopped to deny his guilt in a civil action based upon the same facts, as he would be on a plea of guilty. See 2 Hawkins P. C. c. 31, Sec. 3. In other words, it is an admission of guilt, btu not of facts, alleged as a basis of the charge of guilt. SECTION 3. 464. Section 3 of the act. 465. Territories and district of Columbia included. 8 464 (329). Section 3 of the act.-SEC. 3. Every contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce in any Territory of the United States or of the District of Columbia, or in restraint of trade or commerce between any such Territory and another, or between any such Territory or Territories and any State or States or the District of Columbia, or with foreign nations, or between the District of Columbia and any State or States and foreign nations, is hereby declared illegal. Every person who shall make any such contract or engage in any such combination or conspiracy shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments in the discretion of the court. § 465 (330). Territories and district of Columbia included. This section, it will be seen, differs from section 1 only in the fact that it includes in the contracts in restraint of trade declared illegal and criminal not only those made in commerce among the several states and with foreign nations, but also those made in any territory of the United States or of the district of Columbia, or between any such territory and an other, or between any such territory or territories and any state or states, and also between the district of Columbia and any state or foreign states. This inclusion of contracts in a territory or in the district of Columbia is not under the authority of the commerce clause of the constitution, but under the general governmental power vested in congress over the territories of the United States and over the district of Columbia. Congress in the exercise of its power to organize and govern its territories combine the federal and state authority, Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U. S. 1. Congress is also vested by the constitution with the exclusive legislative authority over the district of Columbia. Constitution of U. S., art. IV, sec. 3, par. 2; art I, sec. 8. 466. Section 4 of the act. SECTION 4 467. Procedure in equity under the act. 468. Right of statutory injunction limited to the government. 469. The act under the general equity jurisdiction of the court. 470. A state cannot enjoin under the act. 471. Suits by the government for dissolution of unlawful combinations, procedure. 472. A decree in the Standard Oil case. 473. A decree in the American Tobacco Co. case. § 466 (331). Courts may prevent and restrain violations.Sec. 4. The several circuit courts of the United States are hereby invested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of this act; and it shall be the duty of the several district attorneys of the United States, in their respective districts, under the direction of the Attorney-General, to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such violations. Such proceedings may be by way of petition setting forth the case and praying that such violation shall be enjoined or otherwise prohibited. When the parties complained of shall have been duly notified of such petition the court shall proceed, as soon as may be, to the hearing and determination of the case; and pending such petition and before final decree the court may at any time make such temporary restraining order or prohibition as shall be deemed just in the premises. § 467 (332). Procedure in equity under the act. The right of the United States to proceed by injunction against illegal combinations under this act has been uniformly sustained. Thus in the Trans-Missouri Freight Association case the court said that the government had the power to bring the suit to enjoin the association from proceeding, although the association had been dissolved pending the suit before the decree was entered. This ruling was followed in the other cases cited, the Joint Traffic Association case and the Northern Securities case. In the latter case the court enjoined the corporation organized under state laws from exercising the powers acquired by virtue of the acquisition of the stock of the subsidiary companies. In such a suit filed by the United States a restraining order may be issued with notice, and where the unlawful combination acts as an unincorporated association, it is sufficient that the as sociation with a number of its officers and members are made parties; it is not necessary that all of its numerous membership should be made parties. United States v. Coal Dealers Assoc. of Cal., 85 Fed. 252 (N. Dist. of Cal., 1898). § 468 (333). Right to statutory injunction limited to the government.-Under this act a court of equity is not authorized to entertain a bill by a private party to enforce its provisions, the remedy being limited to the government of the United States. See Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe R. Co. v. Miami Steamship Co., 30 C. C. A. 142, 86 Fed. 4o7 (1898); Southern Indiana Express Co. v. United States Express Co. et al., 35 C. C. A. 172, 92 Fed. 1022 (1899); Pidcock v. Harrington, 64 Fed. 821 (1894); Block v. Standard Dist. Co., 95 Fed. 978 (1899). The court said in the first cited case however that it did not doubt the general jurisdiction of the circuit court as a court of equity to afford preventive relief in a proper case against threatened injury about to result to an individual from any unlawful agreemen^, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade. The distir ction is between the statutory remedy conferred by the act and the general jurisdiction of the court of equity to grant equitable relief, where irreparable injury or other conditions for the exercise of equity jurisdiction exists. In this latter lass of cases, where the general jurisdiction of a court of equity is invoked, and no rights under the constitution and laws of the United States are in question, the jurisdiction of the federal conrt must be based upon the diverse citizenship of of the parties. See Hagan v. Blindell, 6 C. C. A. 86, 56 Fed. 696, affirming 54 Fed. 40. Where however the equity jurisdiction of a circuit court of the United States is invoked on the ground of a property right under tb, constitution or laws of the United States, for protection against any illegal combination threatening such property right, the court would have jurisdiction irrespective of diverse citizenship. See section 8, Interstate Commerce Act. 8 469. The act under the general equity jurisdiction of the cour. The equity jurisdiction of the circuit court, therefore, has been invoked by private parties where there is diverse citizens hip, and on grounds for the exercise of the equity powers of the court. The equitable relief, however, must be a protection against irreparable injury to the complainant, and can not extend to the dissolution of the combination on the ground of injury to the public, as that procedure would be open to the government only. See National Fire Proof Co. v. Mason Bldg. Assn., C. C. A. second circuit, 169 Fed. 259 (1909), affirming 145 Fed. 260. The jurisdiction of equity has also been sustained where a stockholder of a corporation has alleged the refusal of the corporation to maintain an action at law for damages and he is compelled to resort to equity on account of such refusal of the corporation to act. See concluding remarks of opinion in Ames v. American Telephone & Telegraph Company, circuit court Mass., 166 Fed. 820 (1909). See also Bigelow v. Calumet & Heckla Mining Co., 167 Fed. 721 western district of Michigan, where a stockholder was held entitled to sue to restrain another corporation which had obtained the control of a majority of its stock from voting the same and eliminating competition between the two companies to the irreparable injury of complainant. (This case was ultimately decided on the merits in favor of the defendant.) In Shawnee Compress Co. v. Anderson, 209 U. S. 423, 52 L. Ed. 865 (1908), the supreme court affirmed the judgment of the supreme court of the territory of Oklahoma, 16 Okla. 231, in reversing the decree of the district court of the territory in favor of the defendants in a suit by minority stockholders to caneel a lease of the corporate property with directions to enter judgment for plaintiff, relief being granted on the ground, wherein the supreme court concurred, that the lease was part of a scheme to permit a monopoly of the business in the territory. § 470 (334). A state cannot enjoin under the act.-Neither can a state proceed under the act by injunction. Thus in the State of Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 194 U. S. 48, 48 L. Ed. 870, the supreme court held that the state of Minnesota could not maintain a suit in its political character to enforce the Anti-Trust Act of congress, as the statute confines the action to suits by the several district attorneys of the United States in their several districts under the direction of the Attorney-General. The court said that the purpose was to secure the uniformity of the enforcement of the act so far as direct procedure in equity was concerned, according to the uniform |