reversing 53 Fed. 476, sustained the authority of the circuit court under this section of the Interstate Commerce Act to enforce the giving of testimony and the production of books and papers. It was strongly urged that the provision was in conflict with the constitution in that it imposed on judicial tribunals duties that were not judicial in their character. But the court ruled that the proceeding under the twelfth section of the act was not merely ancillary and advisory, nor was its object merely to obtain an opinion of the circuit court, which would be without operation upon the rights of the parties. Any judgment would be a final and indisputable basis of action as between the commission and the defendant, and furnish a precedent for similar cases. The judgment was none the less one of a judicial tribunal, dealing with questions judicial in their nature, and presented in the customary forms of judicial proceedings, because its effect may be to aid an administrative or executive body in the performance of duties legally imposed upon it by congress in the case of a power granted by the constitution. The issue made in such a case was not one for the determination of a jury, nor could any question of contempt arise until the issue of law in the circuit court was determined adversly to the defendants and he had refused to obey, not the order of the commission, but the final order of the court. Such a power to adjudge for contempt could not, under our system of government and consistently with due process of law be vested in a subordinate and administrative or executive tribunal for final determination. There was a dissenting opinion by Justice Brewer, in which Chief Justice Fuller and Justice Jackson concurred. 155 U. S. 1, 39 L. Ed. 49.

§ 352 (268). Relevancy of testimony before the commission. In a later decision, Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25 (1904) 48 L. Ed. 860 the supreme court sustained an application of the commission, reversing the circuit court, for the production of papers and the giving of testimony in an investigation pending before the commission concerning an alleged pooling agreement in the transportation of coal. The complaint filed before the commission alleged that the railroad companies were natural competitors and had made an agreement or combination in coal rates which were unreasonable and

unjust. The witness refused to produce contracts for purchasing coal by the railroads from operators in Pennsylvania and to answer certain questions as to the sale and price of coal, and it was claimed that the enforced production of these papers and the compelling of this testimony would be violative of the fourth and fifth amendments to the constitution. The supreme court said that while the contracts might not establish the pooling arrangement, they would have a legitimate bearing upon the inquiry, and that the testimony should not be so limited as to unreasonably hamper the commission by narrowing its field of inquiry beyond the reasonable requirements of the rights of citizens, as such a course would seriously impair its usefulness and prevent a realization of the salutary purposes of congress. The court held also that as under the act of 1903 the witnesses were given immunity, there was no invalid objections under the fourth and fifth amendments to the constitution. It was also ruled in this case that the contracts, under which the railroad companies engaged in interstate carriage of anthracite coal had acquired certain collieries, whose proprietors were about to build competing lines and guaranteed the stock and bonds issued in payment thereof by a corporation whose charter they had purchased for that purpose, could properly be produced, although they had been made with third persons not parties of the proceeding.

§ 353. Limitation of the power of the commission to enforce testimony. In Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 211 U. S. p. 407, 53 L. Ed. 253, December, 1908, the court reversed the circuit court of the United States, southern district of New York, in one case where the court directed appellant to answer certain questions in an investigation by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and affirmed its judgment in another case where it refused to compel an answer. See 157 Fed. 432. This was an investigation by the commission on its own order (see 12 I. C. C. R. 277), as to certain consolidations and combinations in interstate commerce. Appellant Harriman was interrogated about the ownership of certain stock of the Chicago & Alton Railway Company, deposited with his bankers, and certain stock of other railroads so purchased and deposited. He was asked whether he or any other director bought stocks of

the Union & Southern Pacific in anticipation of dividends; and appellant Kahn, member of the firm of Kuhn, Loeb & Co., was asked concerning the same matters. The court held that the witnesses could not be required to answer before the Interstate Commerce Commission except in connection with complaints for violation of the Interstate Commerce Act or with the investigation by the commission of subjects that might have been made the object of complaint, these being the only matters contemplated by the provision of section 12 of that act which gave the commission power to require testimony for the purposes of the act, which power could not be exercised by the commission performing its duty under that section to keep itself informed as to the manner and method in which the business of common carriers was conducted, nor in connection with the enforcement of the requirement of section 20 concerning reports by carriers nor to aid the commission in recommending, pursuant to section 21, additional legislation by congress. Justices Day, Harlan, and McKenna dissented. The court said the act clearly showed that the power to compel the attendance of witnesses was to be exercised only in connection with the quasi-judicial duties of the commission. This decision was rendered after the amendments of 1906, but prior to the amendment of 1910. See section 15, infra.

8354. Investigating power of a grand jury in United States courts. It was, also ruled in the Wilson Case, supra, that a grand jury could make investigation, summon and examine witnesses, and compel the production of books and papers, although there was no case or specific charge pending before it, and that a subpoena duces tecum is not invalid because it contains no ad testificandum clause but simply directs a corporation which. could not give oral testimony, to produce books.

It is not necessary that a subpoena duces tecum directed to a corporation should conform to the provisions of the U. S. R. S. 877, concerning the summoning of witnesses; nor is an accused accorded the right to be apprised of the names of witnesses who appeared before the grand jury.

355, General powers of the commission.-The powers of the commission have been so enlarged by the amendments of

1906 and 1910 which are set forth in succeeding sections that the general provisions of this section, giving the commission authority to inquire into the management of the business of common carriers to obtain full and complete information, and to execute and enforce the provisions of the act, have been superseded by the comprehensive range of powers set forth in sections 15, 16, and 20, as enacted in the amendments referred to.

The comprehensive and inquisitorial power of the commission is illustrated by investigations from time to time as to freight rates in different sections of the country and in other inquiries made, either on its own motion or under specific direction of congress. Very large administrative duties are also required in connection with the Safety Appliance Laws. See infra. See report on the eastern bituminous coal situation, January 25, 1907, and the report on block signal systems, February 23, 1907.

The services of the commission have also been invoked in adjusting controversies between shippers and carriers, as in the investigation of the differentials recognized by the carriers in their rates to the different cities of the eastern seaboard. See report for 1904, p. 23.

The commission in taking testimony before itself, whether in original investigations or in the hearing of complaints, is empowered to summon witnesses or to produce documentary evidence from any place in the United States to any designated place of hearing. The power of the commission in this respect is greater than the power of the courts of the United States, as witnesses living out of the district are not required to attend court at a greater distance than a hundred miles, nor to attend the taking of depositions under a commission at any place out of the county, nor more than forty miles from the place of their residence. Section 870 R. S. U. S. This power however has been rarely used, as the commission has arranged its hearings as authorized by the act (section 19) in different parts of the county convenient for the witnesses.

SECTION 13.

356. Complaints to commission-How and by whom made-How

served upon carriers.

357. The amendment of 1910.

358. Procedure before commission-Parties.

259. Pleadings and proofs.

360. Demand for reparation must be specifically stated.

361. Burden of proof.

362. Production of books and papers.

363. The rulings of the commission as precedents.

§ 356 (270). Complaints to commission-How and by whom made-How served upon carriers.-SEC. 13. (As amended June 18, 1910.) That any person, firm, corporation, company, or association, or any mercantile, agricultural, or manufacturing society or other organization, or any body politic or municipal organization, or any common carrier, complaining of anything done or omitted to be done by any common carrier subject to the provisions of this Act, in contravention of the provisions thereof, may apply to said Commission by petition, which shall briefly state the facts; whereupon a statement of the complaint thus made shall be forwarded by the Commission to such common carrier, who shall be called upon to satisfy the complaint, or to answer the same in writing, within a reasonable time, to be specified by the Commission. If such common carrier within

[Reparation by carriers before investigation.]

the time specified shall make reparation for the injury alleged to have been done, the common carrier shall be relieved of liability to the complainant only for the particular violation of

[Investigations of complaints by the Commission.]

law thus complained of. If such carrier or carriers shall not satisfy the complaint within the time specified, or there shall appear to be any reasonable ground for investigating said complaint, it shall be the duty of the Commission to investigate the matters complained of in such manner and by such means as it shall deem proper.

Said Commission hall, in like manner and with the same authority and powers, investigate any complaint forwarded by the railroad commissioner or railroad commission of any State or Territory at the request of such commissioner or commission, and the Interstate Commerce Commission shall have full author[Commission may issue orders in investigations begun

on its own motion.]

ity and power at any time to institute an inquiry, on its own motion, in any case and as to any matter or thing concerning